Mapping Globalization (Long)
Kenneth Rochel de Camargo Jr.
says...
> I present this information without comment one way or the other on
> this issue.
>
Thanks. It'll take a while to digest, but looks interesting, at least.
Ken
John Wester
(Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE)) always has some interesting
things. With some of the threads here talking about this issue,
I thought it might provide some interesting references.
I present this information without comment one way or the other on
this issue.
Cheers!
John
<quote>
[The publisher's Web site isn't very helpful, but you can order
single copies of this journal issue by phone.]
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Date: Sat, 4 Aug 2001 10:55:23 -0400 (EDT) From: Eszter Hargittai
<esz...@phoenix.Princeton.EDU>
American Behavioral Scientist Special Issue on Mapping
Globalization
Edited by Eszter Hargittai and Miguel Angel Centeno Princeton
University
This special issue is part of a larger project supported in part
by the International Networks Archive, Princeton University. (
http://www.princeton.edu/~ina ) AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST,
Vol. 44 No. 10, June 2001 1545-1560 (c) 2001 Sage Publications,
Inc.
Single copies are available from the publisher for $20 by phone
(800-818-7243 or 805-499-9774), fax (800-583-2665), or e-mail
(or...@sagepub.com).
The Sage Web site is <http://www.sagepub.com/>.
CONTENTS
The Authors
Introduction Defining a Global Geography ESZTER HARGITTAI and
MIGUEL ANGEL CENTENO
ECONOMIC NETWORKS
World-System Structure and Change: An Analysis of Global Networks
and Economic Growth Across Two Time Periods EDWARD L. KICK and
BYRON L. DAVIS
Global Institutions and Networks: Contingent Change in the
Structure of World Trade Advantage, 1965-1980 MICHAEL ALAN SACKS,
MARC J. VENTRESCA, and BRIAN UZZI
The Global 500: Mapping the World Economy at Century's End ALBERT
J. BERGESEN and JOHN SONNETT
Shifting Governance Structures in Global Commodity Chains, With
Special Reference to the Internet GARY GEREFFI
COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
A Longitudinal Analysis of the International Telecommunication
Network, 1978-1996 GEORGE A. BARNETT
World City Networks and Hierarchies, 1977-1997: An Empirical
Analysis of Global Air Travel Links DAVID A. SMITH and MICHAEL F.
TIMBERLAKE
THE INTERNET
Old Hierarchies or New Networks of Centrality? The Global
Geography of the Internet Content Market MATTHEW A. ZOOK
Network Cities and the Global Structure of the Internet ANTHONY M.
TOWNSEND
Mapping the "Worlds" of the World Wide Web: (Re)Structuring Global
Commerce Through Hyperlinks STANLEY D. BRUNN and MARTIN DODGE
KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS
Global Webs of Knowledge: Education, Science, and Technology
THOMAS SCHOTT
Netting Scholars: Online and Offline EMMANUEL KOKU, NANCY NAZER,
and BARRY WELLMAN
---
Introduction Defining a Global Geography
Eszter Hargittai and Miguel Angel Centeno Princeton University
The articles in this special issue provide a map for understanding
the networks of transfers and relationships that make up the
international web of globalization. Globalization involves a
variety of links expanding and tightening a web of political,
economic, and cultural interconnections. A variety of data
indicate that we are undergoing a process of compression of
international time and space and an intensification of
international relations. Both popular accounts and more rigorous
analyses tell us that international connections are increasing; an
expanding variety of goods and services are being exchanged across
boundaries; more and more people live their professional, family,
and intellectual lives in more than one country; and cultural
autarky is no longer possible (1). Yet, individual data sources
tell us little more than that. How fast are we integrating? What
does the global web look like? Who is in the center and who is on
the margins? How have these positions shifted over the past two
decades? The following dozen studies explore these questions
through systematic and historical data, delving into the
underlying structure of the apparent integration.
GLOBALIZATION IN CONTEXT
WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION?
Defining globalization has become something of a cottage industry.
Mauro Guillen (2001) has counted literally hundreds of citations
using the term globalization, each often offering a new version of
a definition. Common elements include the intensification of
global compression, interdependence, and integration.
Essentially, global inhabitants have much more to do with one
another and interact more often than they once did.
Definitional uncertainty aside, there is considerable debate
regarding the significance of this phenomenon. Castells (1996, p.
92) contends that we are living through a dramatic transformation
into a global economy distinct from the "world" economy born in
the 16th century. Yet, other scholars offer evidence indicating
that the current process of global interconnection is much less
dramatic than what occurred in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries (Hirst & Thompson, 1996). For some theorists,
globalization has altered the economic chances of significant
populations (Reich, 1991; Rodrik, 1997), but others argue that its
effect has been exaggerated (Berger, 1996; Fligstein, 1998;
Krugman, 1994).
Does globalization matter? We believe that much of the argument
stems from collapsing two quite different elements of the issue at
hand. The first is the process of globalization, the mechanics of
international integration; the second is the product or
consequences thereof. The latter has received more attention, and
we turn to that first.
SIGNIFICANCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBALIZATION
Given the themes of this special issue, we obviously believe that
globalization matters (or more accurately, might matter). The
real question is how it will matter and for whom. We may begin by
analyzing the limits of the effects of globalization to define the
outer boundaries of the phenomenon. The naysayers do have a point
in reminding us that the talk of globalization is often precisely
that. The triumphalism (or panic) that often characterizes
discussions of the topic neglects the many aspects of daily life
that for all intents and purposes, remain relatively unaffected by
international flows and transfers.
Perhaps the most obvious limit on these is the continued salience
of territorial frontiers (2). With very few exceptions, for
example, one must be both a citizen and a resident to vote in a
political election. Some countries obviously have an
international element in their domestic politics, and ease of
travel has complicated some electioneering strategies (3). The
opinions of major international players are courted and watched.
Nevertheless, each arbitrarily drawn nation-state still formally
determines the most significant aspects of its policies.
Similarly, on which side of a border one is born often makes a
very important economic difference. A child in Nuevo Laredo,
Mexico, might have a harder time accessing the potential of the
U.S. economy than one born across the border in Laredo, Texas;
citizens of Greece and Hong Kong enjoy access to wider markets
than those of Turkey and the People's Republic of China.
The significance of borders illustrates the different ways that
globalization affects social groups. For example, borders are
more significant for labor than for capital. The European Union
may be a transnational labor market, but it is not officially open
to all comers. Latin American immigrants working on the bottom
rungs of the U.S. labor market have little protection. In much
the same way that exclusive neighborhoods increasingly separate
themselves from the poverty that surrounds them, rich countries
may build higher barriers as a response to their being
increasingly "near" to poorer societies. One of the more
interesting future developments in globalization will be the
extent to which it either allows freer transborder labor flows or
increasingly relies on the power of the nation-state to restrict
it.
Frontiers place limits on other aspects of life. Although capital
may face fewer restrictions than labor, states do sometimes try to
control the price of their currencies, limit their flows, and
prohibit certain transactions or interchanges. Despite the
possible congruence in the definition of human rights (Keck &
Sikkink, 1998; Meyer, Frank, Hironaka, Schofer, & Tuma, 1997), the
opportunities available and support expected differ radically from
one citizenry to another, even keeping all other factors constant.
Certainly, political violence and the direction thereof is most
often defined and constrained by international boundaries.
Overall, as long as nation-states retain a monopoly over the means
of destruction, globalization will operate under significant
limitations.
Nor has globalization affected everyone. Perhaps the most obvious
gulf is between societies internationally. No matter what
indicator one may use (trade, communication, etc.), significant
parts of the world are essentially outside the new global society.
In some cases, whole countries are excluded for a variety of
reasons; for example, North Korea is isolated ideologically,
Sierra Leone economically. This is to say not that the global
economy or political divisions do not affect what goes on in these
countries but that the vast majority of citizens and institutions
do not regularly interact with the rest of the world. Generally,
we may speak of a core group of countries largely defined by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), with
some hangers-on where international exchanges are a regular part
of life for large parts of the society. On the bottom, there is a
group (much of Africa, for example) largely isolated from these
trends (4). In between are the most interesting countries, where
significant groups of people and large parts of the economy have
been transformed by international contacts but isolated regions
and groups also exist in significant numbers.
What accounts for the different rates of participation? The
obvious explanation is money. Richer countries have more to buy
and sell in the global market-place and more access to the means
with which to do so (5). Domestically, the same differences
apply. The upper class and those living in major urban centers
are, as a rule, much more likely to participate in the globalized
world (6).
What does it mean to be included or excluded? Much of the
academic debate has dealt with the consequences for countries and
their populations of finding themselves within the global web.
The effect of globalization on income distribution, state
authority, and culture has been amply studied and debated, but
definitive conclusions elude us (Geertz, 1998; Meyer et al., 1997;
Panitch, 1996; Sklair, 1991; Strange, 1996; see Guillen, 2001, for
a fuller list).
Given that there is still little agreement about the possible
consequences of being globalized, we know even less about what
effects remaining marginalized from globalization might have.
From the point of view of globalization boosters such as Thomas
Friedman (1999), avoiding globalization is both practically
impossible and potentially disastrous. Those not connected to the
global economy will miss out on the next economic and social
revolution and will be permanently relegated to the global trash
bin, they believe. Although we may not share Friedman's vision of
no alternatives to globalization or his enthusiasm for the changes
it brings, he may be right in contending that efforts to avoid
participation or the inability to participate will have dire
consequences.
Even those who minimize the impact of globalization recognize that
the increasing amount of international contact has, at the very
least, transformed the context in which countries operate. It is
impossible, for example, to analyze a modern economy without
reference to trade or foreign investment. Labor may not flow
freely, but the globalization of production has had significant
effects on employment and wages in selected economic sectors. A
society's cultural preferences cannot be studied in isolation; the
international flow of images and ideas (or the protection against
these) must be considered. But the manner in which globalization
affects different aspects of social and economic life remains
unclear. What are the channels through which international
pressures make themselves felt? Does this happen in the same way
that a uniform gas exerts identical pressure everywhere, or are
there special zones where influence is greatest? What are the
windows through which societies observe globalization and through
which it penetrates their homes?
Arguably the most important (and most debated) consequence of
globalization is the increasing concentration of power and wealth.
For example, in practically every industry, a few transnational
firms now claim huge market shares. How is globalization
responsible? Globalization has been accompanied and supported by
an intense process of international isomorphism on practically
every level and in almost all aspects of life. We are seeing the
universalization of a single set of criteria for judging the worth
of projects, firms, and, yes, individuals. Where previously each
region, country, or even city prized different things (or in the
case of protection, forced many competitors out of markets), now
we have a global standard for performance and, increasingly, a
global standard for aesthetic preferences. Combined with the
hegemony of the market, this produces a set of efficiency
mechanisms that prize specific criteria, encourage the adoption of
certain policies, and select a particular set of actors for
survival. Although these mechanisms may not be operating at a
definition of efficiency that we like, what matters is that what
the global market says is good becomes good everywhere: There is
no escape. This leads to concentration for several reasons.
First, the criteria for success are not socially or geographically
neutral but reflect the standards and preferences of leading
powers. These criteria tend to favor certain players (e.g.,
Hollywood films, Web sites in English, Microsoft products).
Because competition on a global market allows for massive
economies of scale, these increasingly large corporations can
compete with anyone on price and force local competitors out.
Their dominant positions create huge barriers to entry. In the
end, the ubiquity of these products becomes part of their appeal.
Homogeneity and monopoly reinforce each other.
We are particularly interested in how globalization will shape
global inequality as measured between nations and societies (7).
There is no denying the interdependence that globalization brings
about, but the asymmetries of that dependence, the consequences of
the hierarchical flows, and the relative position within a set of
relationships will help shape the nature of global power over the
next decades. Research done on telephone communications indicates
that international contact has increased, but so has the
centrality of the United States in a global system (Louch,
Hargittai, & Centeno, 1999). To what extent can this new-found
power be explained by the exogenous effects of globalization
itself, as opposed to the internal characteristics of the
countries involved?
A DIFFERENT ROAD MAP
To answer this question, we must shift to the second half of a
discussion on globalization: the process rather than the outcome.
Analysts have been understandably concerned with the substantive
areas linked to globalization: wages, trade balances, cultural
diffusion, and so on. We have paid much less attention to the
infrastructure network that actually makes up globalization.
The transformation of the technical and organizational
infrastructure of international integration is obvious and needs
to be considered in any analysis of globalization. The road - not
only what is on it - has changed dramatically over the past
several decades. Hirst and Thompson (1996) are correct, for
example, in noting that other periods have also seen dramatic
expansions in international commerce and that international flows
have been freer or played a more significant role in social and
economic dynamics. This is certainly true if we compare the
relative importance of international trade within the total global
economic product or if we emphasize facility of movement across
frontiers. What is new is the vast range of connections, the
speed at which they occur, and the complexity of their
interactions. International transfers now include a much wider
array of products and services across forms of technology
unimagined a decade, much less a century, ago. More important,
these transfers are much more tightly intertwined, producing what
we call a truly global web. Figure 1 illustrates the dramatic
decline in the cost of international transport and communication,
which not only has facilitated (and been encouraged by)
globalization but may be its most important legacy. (Figure 1:
Cheaper Tolls on the Global Highway)
Recent progress in international communications is a good example
of how today's information exchange happens in a truly global
intertwined network. There is a tendency to exaggerate the novel
aspect of the Internet and its capacity to cut across vast
distances in no time. That facet is not what makes the Internet
novel; the telegraph had already achieved that more than a century
ago (Standage, 1998). Rather, the truly unique feature of the
network is that it allows communication in a type of distributed
web that spans the globe in an intertwined manner. It allows a
user to send a message from one location to 50 others while also
storing that message for subsequent access by yet others from yet
different locations. This is how space, time, and contact nodes
genuinely converge, thanks to the Internet. Moreover, one need not
even send a message to a specific person for it to be read. A
passive posting on a Web site will generate its own readership.
If international communications used to represent thousands or
even millions of dyads, the current situation involves billions or
possibly trillions of overlapping and open-ended multiperson
groups (8).
Under the previous system of international contact, different
parts of the world might be connected to relatively few others.
Now, the number of paths between different people and locations
has exploded. This implies that changes in the form and frequency
of flows between two points may have reverberations in unexpected
paths far removed from them. Whereas previously we might have
spoken of a world on which a variety of lines were drawn, we now
need to think of the globe as enmeshed in a web (9). The new
global geography has made relative position within the web
simultaneously more difficult to define and much more important.
The old references to continents or even to core/periphery refer
to a two-dimensional perspective on the world, which has become
increasingly useless and deceptive in an N-dimensional reality
(where N is the number of forms of international interactions).
Globalization, if it is a significant social phenomenon in its own
right, involves much more than the intensification of a single
form of exchange or even the cumulative effect of a series of
transformations. It is the possibility of interaction between a
variety of interchanges across the globe, the complexity of these
interactions, and the density of the ties between previously
distant societies that may be truly consequential. The potential
significance of globalization can be appreciated only when
analyzed as a whole. We believe the first step toward a better
understanding of the phenomenon in question is to define a new
global geography that takes into account not merely the physical
environment in which societies operate but their relational
environment - those with whom they work, speak, exchange, and
fight. Where countries fit in an overlapping set of global
relations will help determine the extent to which globalization
will have an effect on them and the nature of that influence.
If we are to ascertain the specific effect of globalization, we
need to define a standard measure not automatically correlated to
one of the substantive issues being addressed. That is, we need
an indicator that both serves as a representation of a society's
position within a global web and is relatively independent of the
phenomenon globalization is supposed to affect. Categorizations
by income, regime types, or political blocks may miss the critical
dynamics of global cliques. Coordinates within a new geography of
globalization represent a much more promising alternative. These
indicators would describe a country's position vis-a-vis other
countries in a combination of various transactions. Centrality
and reciprocity would be obvious indicators of where a society
stood. Perhaps more useful would be comparisons of its position
within the various subnets defined by specific transactions. The
combination of these measures would then help explain (a) what
forms of globalization affect a particular society and (b) the
direction of the change (10).
MEASURING GLOBALIZATION
NETWORKS AS MAPS
Except for the seminal but crude measures of world systems
analysis, we know of little work that has taken the different
countries' relational position in the process of integration
itself as the key differentiation between them (11). Only this
form of formally structural approach allows us to begin to
understand both the processes of global integration and different
societies' and countries' position therein. The absence of
structural analyses is especially surprising, given that the study
of globalization seems tailor-made for that buzzword of
contemporary social science: networks. We now live, or so we are
told, in a "network society" (Castells, 1996; Wellman, 1988).
Some have suggested that networks represent a third major category
of human interaction (after markets and hierarchies) and that
increasingly, it is this form of connection that will determine
our lives (Powell, 1990). Yet, network analysis has only begun to
map the manner in which relational structures shape social action.
Network theory and methods offer an excellent means with which to
understand globalization; they are ideally suited to defining the
underlying pattern of the literally millions of sets of ties
across the globe (12). To begin with, networks represent the best
metaphor for the new international society. Borrowing from Powell
(1990), we can argue that global relationships cannot be
understood entirely as either markets or hierarchies; rather, they
involve a set of political, social, cultural, and economic links
reinforcing, producing, and contradicting each other. Societies
are connected through language, transportation, trade, families,
tourism, and educational exchanges. The resulting relationships
are not a product of any single one of these connections but of
the manner in which these reinforce or contradict each other.
Network analysis offers the best means with which to begin mapping
these relationships in a coherent manner because it provides
precise and concrete means with which to measure and compare them.
Network analysis privileges relationships rather than individual
attributes. Who you are may be irrelevant; it is whom you know
(or do not know) that counts (Granovetter, 1974/1995). A
society's relative wealth or even military power may be relevant
only in terms of the network of political and economic
relationships in which it is embedded. To understand A and B's
relationship, their mutual links to C may be more important than
the specific attributes they share or the nature of their conflict
or cooperation. With this emphasis on social structure, network
analysis is, thus, best positioned to provide an accurate portrait
of the new global relationships without the encumbrance of a
priori categorizations. It provides an alternative to
overdeterministic explanations, whether materialist or
culturalist.
Networks are particularly useful for the analysis of how
globalization channels its influence. For example, the discussion
of cultural convergence and organizational isomorphism (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983; Meyer et al., 1997) has never specified how cultural
and organizational standards are actually transported across firm
and national boundaries. Network analysis would provide the road
map through which one could trace policy preferences or
legitimization strategies. Based on a nation's position within
the global web, we might then be able to predict the likelihood
that it would adopt certain practices or engage in particular
forms of learned behavior. In short, network methods would give
the analysis of globalization predictive power and the capacity to
test its hypotheses.
NETWORKS OF WHAT AND BETWEEN WHOM?
If networks represent the best lenses with which to understand
globalization, what kind of data should we analyze with them? The
possibilities are endless, but we first need to be aware of areas
left unexplored. That is, before discussing networks of visible
interactions, we need to be cognizant of the invisible set of
relationships helping to shape the external surface of our global
map. One area of concern is transactions that are not adequately
measured yet may play a significant role in the construction of
international networks. Another issue is the unit of analysis
that should be used or the level at which we theorize
international transactions taking place.
With regard to the first, perhaps the most obvious missing data
concern illegal transfers (13). One estimate of the globalized
black market suggests that it may represent $500 billion of
transactions a year (Castells, 1998, Vol. 3, p. 169). In general,
smuggling (writ large) may be the oldest form of globalization.
It may also be the purest expression of the phenomenon, if we
think of globalization as a global search for economic or social
efficiency that explicitly seeks to evade formal state authority.
What are some of these data-less transfers? Although it is
possible to make some calculations based on international
financial balances, we obviously do not have a comprehensive idea
of the undeclared or illegal flows of money to and from different
countries.
Money laundering may total the equivalent of 2% to 5% of global
Gross Domestic Product (United Nations Development Program [UNDP],
1999, p. 5). Drugs may be one of the most important international
commodities, with important consequences for capital flows,
transport networks, and political complications. One estimate
places this trade
at $400 billion annually or 8% of world trade (UNDP, 1999, p. 5).
Small arms may also represent an important international commodity
whose flows are not well documented. Prostitution alone is said
to be a $20 billion industry with an important international
dimension ("Giving the Customer," 1998) (14).
Given that the movement of illegal migrants affects the most
underprivileged groups of societies, lacking information in this
domain prohibits us from gaining a clear understanding of how
globalization and social stratification interact. Consider, for
example, the likely importance of illegal transfers to the
transnational communities that have received so much recent
attention in the social sciences (Portes, 1997). Entry into such
a community may begin with an illegal migration. Wage labor may
be illegal or occur in marginalized or even prohibited industries;
remittances may be unreported to both host and native countries.
The ties that bind these communities across borders may thus elude
us when defining our new geography yet represent one of its most
important components.
We also possess few data on computer links, transfers, and
relationships. This is particularly important, given that so much
of globalization appears to be fueled by Internet connections and
information transacted across fiber-optic cables. Unfortunately,
several aspects of the technology make it inherently impossible to
collect the type of relational data that would allow an analysis
of the communication networks underlying this traffic (15).
Despite these difficulties, some have attempted to quantify
Internet traffic (OECD, 1998) by relying on the few clues we have
of where data may be residing, but the accuracies of such data are
highly questionable.
Although it may be difficult to classify consumption as a network,
we might also consider the level of globalization that occurs by
that means. It is quite clear that McDonald's and the Gap are all
over the globe and that the British Spice Girls and the Puerto
Rican singer Ricky Martin have touched teenage music fans' hearts
everywhere (16). However, it is less transparent how the
consumption of such products infiltrates into the rest of people's
lives. Although there is an ongoing debate on how the diffusion
of such cultural icons affects local cultures (Ritzer, 1996;
Watson, 1997), we have no information on how many people are
actually affected and what areas of their lives are influenced,
both directly and indirectly, through the exposure to consumer
items from other countries and cultures.
If much of the above is currently uncountable or untraceable,
there is, nonetheless, enough information out there to define the
basic shape of the global network. Thanks to the institutional
fascination with data that have accompanied and supported
globalization, practically every legal transaction across borders
is counted and reported. Telephone calls, plane arrivals,
shipments of goods, and receipts for services can all be used to
trace the shape and dynamics of the new international order (or to
determine the extent to which it is new). These measures are
often imperfect and certainly not exhaustive, but they do provide
an adequate first brush with the new global geography.
There are equally difficult challenges with units of analysis.
International networks consist of millions and perhaps billions of
individuals making decisions and establishing contacts. These
operate within millions of organizations of an infinite variety.
These, in turn, tend to be concentrated in particular cities and
regions. Yet, much of the information available and certainly the
majority of the analysis emphasizes relationships between national
societies. This is partly a reflection of a nation-centric bias in
much of social science. More important, it is a product of the
very data-gathering techniques and protocols on which
international analysis depends. This is particularly paradoxical
given that a significant part of the globalization literature
predicts the withering away of the relevance of the nation-state.
The new geography of globalization should begin to gather data at
levels of aggregation smaller than the nation-state. Saskia
Sassen (1991) has demonstrated the critical importance of global
cities in maintaining the new international system. On a larger
scale, specific regions within countries (e.g., Emilia-Romagna in
Italy, Catalonia in Spain, the American coasts) are much more
integrated into the global economy. Cross-border zones are very
much a part of globalization and may account for a
disproportionate share of relational links. The new geography
should make every attempt to privilege these subunits, which are
increasingly more relevant than our nation-centric analytical
atlas.
IN THIS ISSUE
Having established a set of ambitious goals, we need to admit that
this special issue is but a start. Given the constraints of
global network data availability highlighted above, this special
issue focuses on analyses of informational and commercial flows
while leaving other areas for future exploration. The articles do
not resolve all the issues discussed above. Some do not use
formal network methods. Others continue to rely on national-level
data. We believe, however, that the articles represent a beginning
or an indication of the kind of work that will produce a more
useful and insightful analysis of globalization. One clear bias
deserves to be acknowledged. We have largely ignored the
microfoundations on which these relationships are based. We speak
of states, societies, and organizations being linked, with only
cursory attention paid to the individuals who actually make up the
web (Koku, Nazer, & Wellman, 2001 [this issue] being a prominent
exception). We can only hope that a parallel project will analyze
the human relationships that underlie the global structures we
have documented.
We begin with a section devoted to economic interactions, arguably
the foundation for all other connections. Kick and Davis explore
world-system structure across two periods, 1960 to 1965 and 1970
to 1975. The two authors assess the interplay between global and
national domains of analyses. They also examine the
national-level consequences of strong, weak, and intermediate ties
for the non-core countries of the world. When taken together, the
dynamics studied permit an examination of the central themes of
world-system theory and network approaches in general and identify
future agendas for sociological theorizing and research.
Sacks, Ventresca, and Uzzi continue assessing the effects of
country position in the global social structure of international
trade on economic performance. Their first finding is the
relative insignificance of much-touted domestic factors such as
savings rates or education. They demonstrate that relative
position within a global trade network is a significant factor in
determining economic success. The relationship is not simplistic,
however. Actors within the world-trade network are differentially
able to reap benefits based on their position, and unique social
structural conditions provide different types of benefits to
distinct kinds of actors.
Bergesen and Sonnett use Fortune magazine's Global 500 to analyze
the structure of the world economy and to speculate about the rise
and fall of hegemonic states. They show that about half the
global firms are involved in basic production and the rest split
between finance and service industries; these are about equally
divided among Asia, Europe, and the United States. In terms of
the number of firms and industries in which countries produce, the
relative position of the United States shows a clear decline, that
of Japan has improved, and Europe's has remained relatively
stable.
Gary Gereffi's article examines how the commodity-chains framework
facilitates our understanding of the structure and dynamics of
global industries, as well as the development prospects for
nations and firms within them. First, he introduces the seminal
distinction between producer-driven and buyer-driven commodity
chains. Second, he identifies the main types of lead firms in the
automobile and apparel commodity chains. Third, he illustrates
how this approach can be used to study multiple dimensions of
development.
The second section of the special issue analyzes international
communications infrastructures. George Barnett examines the
international telecommunications network and how it has changed
since the late 1970s. The network may be described as one large
interconnected group of nations arrayed along a
center-to-periphery dimension. Barnett then discusses the future
of the international communication structure and the implications
for the development of a universal culture.
David Smith and Michael Timberlake provide a parallel analysis of
shifts in the global infrastructure through their study of airline
traffic. They highlight the shift in the global hierarchy of
cities reflecting many of the changes discussed in accompanying
chapters.
The next three articles focus on the geography of the Internet.
Matthew Zook uses a combination of domain names and user counts to
provide an assessment of the global distribution of Internet
content creation at the national and urban level and the structure
of the supply and demand for this content at the national level.
This article relies on the theories of export-based development to
assess the strengths and weaknesses of countries' Internet
presence and the ramifications of this for future development.
Anthony Townsend's article challenges assumptions regarding global
city dominance of telecommunications networks. To illustrate
global cities' role in the deployment of Internet networks, the
author presents a comprehensive map of New York City's
international linkages. By showing that the city is dependent on
a broad group of other metropolitan areas for international
backbone connections - the underlying infrastructure of the
Internet - the author argues that the network is both driving and
reflecting broader trends toward far more complex webs of
interurban economic and communications flows than was experienced
previously.
In their article, Stanley Brunn and Martin Dodge analyze the
connections between nations, using data on the number of Web pages
and hyperlinks gathered from a commercial search engine in 1998.
They analyze and describe the geography of the hyperlinks between
nearly 200 nations, revealing the most and least connected regions
and nations, with a particular focus on African and Central Asian
countries.
The final two pieces focus on exchanges between scholars. Thomas
Schott's article is a review describing findings in previous
studies of the global networks promoting and constraining the
global circulation of knowledge. The cultivation of knowledge is
institutionalized around the world in the three social
institutions called education, science, and technology. The
article summarizes what is known about these global webs,
specifies what is unknown, and proposes an agenda for mapping and
analyzing these global webs.
Koku et al. (2001) consider how distance affects interpersonal
communication within scholarly communities. The article serves as
a possible challenge to those who might see in globalization all
things made new again and reminds us of the importance of
face-to-face communication. In a special issue devoted to
globalization, this article serves to highlight both the promise
and the limitations of this new geography.
CONCLUSION
So what does this bright new world look like? The articles in
this special issue suggest that the new global geography will have
two critical characteristics.
First, almost all the authors make note of the nonlinear
complexity of the new global structure and how this helps
determine economic, political, and social outcomes. Post-1980
globalization is not simply a form of the 19th-century world
economy at faster speed and greater volume; it represents a
substantive shift in the manner in which individuals,
organizations, and societies are interconnected.
Second, it is clear that globalization does not involve a
flattening of a global hierarchy. Some countries are richer, have
better communications, and play a more central role. Moreover,
there are clear benefits to be derived from this centrality. As
globalization intensifies, these benefits might even increase,
producing practically insurmountable (if invisible) walls around
the new empires. More specifically, practically all the studies
point to the dominant position of the United States in practically
every international network. In many ways, globalization may be
better understood as the Americanization of the world.
The combination of global scale and complexity of relationships
may imply that models of international governance and domination
borrowed from earlier eras may no longer be relevant. If this is
true, then students of globalization will have to begin laying
down the most essential foundation blocks of a new social
scientific project.
NOTES
1. World exports are now $7 trillion a year or 21% of the global
product; various forms of foreign investment total $2.5 trillion;
foreign exchange activity is estimated at $1.5 trillion daily;
workers' remittances now total $58 billion and represent an
important part of the Latin American and Middle Eastern economies;
and nearly 600 million international tourists travel each year
(United Nations Development Program [UNDP], 1999, p. 25).
2. See Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton (1999) for a summary
of positions of the continuing relevance of states.
3. The election flights to Israel are but one example. Candidates
for national office in Santo Domingo campaign in New York. As
elections become cleaner in Mexico and as citizenship rights are
redefined, the U.S.-based vote may become decisive.
4. Even here, however, globalization (broadly understood) plays a
role. While Sierra Leone may be a perfect example of the global
underclass removed from the transnational arena, the existence of
an international diamond market has fueled that country's civil
war.
5. For example, Germany exports 20 times more than Brazil per
capita and 85 times more than Kenya while importing 15 times more
than Brazil and 55 times more than Kenya (again, per capita).
Germany also has 6 times more telephones per capita than Brazil
and 42 times more than Kenya (No Limits Ventures Ltd., 1999).
6. But there may be significant and important exceptions. For
labor- exporting countries, the working class may be as
international as the elite.
7. As we will explain later, due to limitations in the way data
are collected, most current analyses are restricted to
investigations at the national level.
8. The unequal international distribution of access to the
Internet also serves as an excellent indication of how the shape
of the infrastructure of globalization may determine the outcomes
it produces (Hargittai, 1998, 1999; International
Telecommunication Union, 1997). The United States, for example,
has more computers than the rest of the world's countries
combined; it accounts for a large percentage of the creation and
distribution of Web content (Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, 1997); 80%of World Wide Web
content is in English. The typical Internet user is a member of a
very elite minority (UNDP, 1999, Press Kit, pp. 1-2).
9. An illustrative tale follows: The typical international
transaction of 1900 was essentially linear. The port of Buenos
Aires might include a ship loaded with wheat and meat destined for
London, another holding locomotive parts from Liverpool, and a
third immigrants from Naples. The lines between origins and final
destinations were straight, and the contents only interacted in
the sense that one helped pay for the other. Today, a plane
landing from London at Ezeiza Airport might include executives
planning an investment in Argentina for export to Brazil, a
shipment of computer boards that a local IBM subsidiary will
transform prior to re-export to Peru, a German student hoping that
her improved Spanish will help her find work in international
banking, a Boston couple on their round-the-world honeymoon, and a
Bolivian doctor hoping to immigrate. Moreover and most important,
equivalent transactions and movements will be occurring over a
wider variety of media (other airlines, cars, ships, phones, the
Internet, etc.)
10. This would allow, for example, a much more precise
articulation of a country's position within a global system. Core
countries might be characterized both by their centrality and by
the consistency of their relational position within a variety of
transactional subwebs. Peripheral societies would share this
consistency but remain on the margins of the system.
Semiperipheries would be characterized by relatively high
centrality on some measures (e.g., commercial trade) but low
centrality on others (e.g., cultural exports).
11. The theoretical model closest to this enterprise is the work
of Breiger (1981) on international interdependence.
12. It is important to clarify that we are using the term networks
in the "soft" sense of the word. Networks are not necessarily
self- aware or even cohesive and exclusive. We cannot speak of
networks for themselves or even in themselves. Networks are, in
many ways, artificial groupings placed in a myriad of
relationships by an external observer. The real point is not to
discover hidden agents in the formation of a new global order but
to accurately reflect social relations and patterns of power and
influence.
13. Some legal transfers may also not be properly analyzed.
Intracompany transactions may represent a hidden world of
globalization. Similarly, we need to be aware of what we might
call intranetwork transfers involving informal markets in bonds,
currency, and futures. Data on capital/ communication flows may
err on the conservative side, given that such transfers often
happen through internal networks that often do not show up in
official national aggregate statistics.
14. Although there are popular accounts of the most common
supplier nations, it is less clear where these people end up; in
general, no precise data exist on such flows because some of the
people are transported officially through various visas whereas
others are smuggled across borders.
15. Internet data can get from Point A to Point B through various
channels. This is precisely what made it so attractive for
military needs when it was being developed in the 1960s (Hafner &
Lyon, 1996). Unfortunately, information about the physical
location of Points A and B is often difficult to learn from
electronic identification data. An e-mail address such as
na...@server.com often implies no information about the physical
location of the user.
16. The first result of a Web search for Ricky Martin's picture on
a popular American search engine yields a link to a Hungarian
teenager's Web site (Lycos 1999 Web search,
http://www.lycos.com/picturethis/).
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end
</quote>
Michael Warner
<john.wester@remove_this.netshepherd.com> wrote:
>I present this information without comment one way or the other on
>this issue.
It'll have to wait for a little offline attention :-)