Coercion (was: [TCS] Re: [BoI] Schools think criticism doesn't work..)

[Jason]

On Thu, May 2, 2013 at 7:14 PM, Elliot Temple <cu...@curi.us> wrote:
>
> I do not call dirty looks "force" and I don't believe anyone else here does either.
> They may be coercive but are not force or violence. (Unless they are used to
> communicate e.g. threat of violence, which is a common way they are used.)

This is a good example of why the terminology used around here is problematic.

You appear to be saying that you don't call dirty looks "force"...

...except when you think they are force...

...which you think that they commonly are (at least in parents?) WTF?

>> The
>> word more clearly defined and applied is "coercion". When used around
>> here "coercion" has a very specific (and in my opinion both unusual
>> and unhelpful) definition.
>
> You have not solved the problem of better terminology. If you can't think of a single
> better approach, why complain about the use of the best known terminology?

Fair enough - I never did propose in detail what I think is better
than TCS/ARR "coercion".

Here's what I think is a better approach:

Force is an act of physical violence or physical restraint against
someone else's person or property.

Threat of force is an act which either directly states that an act of
force is imminent or signals it such that a reasonable person in the
situation would conclude that force is imminent.

Fraud is an overt lie or a statement or act designed to mislead another.

Force, threat of force, and fraud are not always immoral. They are
immoral when they are used in contravention of an individual's rights.
The way to explicitly denote an act of force, threat, or fraud in
contravention of rights is to add "initiation" to it, i.e. "initiation
of force", "initiated threat". "Initiated fraud" is technically
correct but rarely used.

The word "aggression" refers collectively to initiated acts of force,
threat of force, and fraud - meaning, those acts of force, threat of
force, and fraud which are in contravention of someone else's rights.
"Coercion" is a synonym for "aggression" in common usage, but due to
the history of that word's usage on these lists I propose avoiding it
altogether. Just use "aggression" when you mean initiated force,
threat of force, fraud, or some combination thereof.

Any interaction that isn't force or threat of force or fraud is a form
of persuasion. That doesn't mean they're all good/rational. Words to
describe forms of persuasion should not be comingled with words to
describe force, threat of force, and fraud. Examples on the rational
side include creativity and criticism, logical argument, and
presentation of evidence. Examples on the irrational side include
manipulation, social pressure, and some exercises of economic power.

---

This approach is better than "coercion" as used by TCS/ARR for the
following reasons.

One reason: This approach is not entwined with the flawed assertion
that enacting one theory while another active theory conflicts with it
is always suffering / bad.

Another reason: This approach doesn't require us to metaphorically
reach into someone's head and divine what their theories are, whether
or not those theories "conflict", and whether or not they are "active"
in order to make, and criticize, moral judgments.

Another reason: This approach much more readily exposes concepts like
"self-coercion" and coercion in absence of force, threat of force, or
fraud, to criticism. One cannot commit aggression against oneself,
because one can't violate one's own rights. You can, for example, lie
to yourself but that doesn't violate anyone's rights. A nagging spouse
may violate one's preference not to be nagged, but that's clearly
different from them violating a *right* not to be nagged.

Another reason: This approach does not lend itself to confusing a
discussion about things like nagging with a discussion about things
like punching. Yelling, dirty looks, withholding privileges, and
nagging don't count as threat of force unless a reasonable person in
the situation would conclude that they are a prelude to force. When
they are (and I agree that sometimes they are) it needs to be stated
explicitly rather than assumed.
"Coercion" as used by TCS/ARR glosses over this very important and
necessary distinction as irrelevant, because whether force is imminent
or not, the yelling etc. is designed to cause enacting one theory
while a conflicting theory is active. So TCS/ARR "coercion"
effectively says, "who cares whether or not force is imminent"? That's
a really big problem!

Another reason: This approach allows discussion of different forms of
persuasion to take place on their own merits and using their own
terminology, without resort to distracting and vague allusions to
force, threat, and fraud. All forms of persuasion may not be created
equal, some may be better (more rational, more error correcting) than
others, but they should never be lumped in with force or threat or
fraud. Acts which are force, threat, or fraud as defined above are
qualitatively different from acts which are not.

Another reason: This approach makes discussion of rights more explicit
and easier to criticize. Take confining a child to the house
("grounding"). Grounding is clearly force under my definition and
coercion under TCS/ARR. But whether grounding is aggression or not
(the *morality* of the situation) requires a discussion of whether or
not the child has a right to leave the house. That's a very important
discussion to have! That is, really, the *CORE* of the issue. TCS/ARR
"coercion" says that such a discussion doesn't matter because the only
thing that matters is the child's theories and which ones are "active"
and whether or not the active ones "conflict".

In summary, this approach makes distinctions explicit that TCS/ARR
"coercion" serves to obscure, particularly the important distinctions
between violence and non-violence, as well as between rights and
preferences. TCS/ARR "coercion" obscures morality behind definition
and assertions about people's mental states, in what appears to me to
be an attempt to broadly classify a wide variety of behaviors as
immoral that are commonly regarded as moral. That is a very
problematic over-reach / short cut which my proposal avoids.

--Jason