questions??
S. Rosenhart
Hi I'am looking for questions subject philosophy (or a point of view), please send me
some, I will be must greatfull.. Some questions for you..
-Can something exist for you. if you have never heard of it. never seen it and never had
any fysical contact with it?
- Never ask the question , if you can't handle the answer..
- You can feel lonely, while your not alone (marriage)..
- Can someone have an original idea?
- True wisdom starts when you realise how little you now....
- At what moment in time starts a person to die? (at birth..)
I appologise for the bad english , please send me some ????
e-mail rook...@pi.net
Gary McGath
Rosenhart" <rook...@pi.net> wrote:
>-Can something exist for you. if you have never heard of it. never seen
it and never had
>any fysical contact with it?
>I appologise for the bad english , please send me some ????
Look for the assumptions implied in a question. The expression "exist for
you" implies that the world doesn't exist in itself, but is centered on
your consciousness and has no reality apart from it. If this were the
case, then how could you even ask anyone the question? The response itself
would just be part of what "exists for you."
A true solipsist can't engage in a debate.
--
Gary McGath gmc...@mv.mv.com
http://www.mv.com/users/gmcgath
"Keep your FCC-ing hands off my computer."
Michael A. Peil
: Hi I'am looking for questions subject philosophy (or a point of view), please send me
: some, I will be must greatfull.. Some questions for you..
: -Can something exist for you. if you have never heard of it. never seen it and never had
: any fysical contact with it?
For me? Or "for one?" The distinction is important. See, e.g.,
M.A. Peil and F. AEngstorm, "Objective Conciousness and the Peil-o-centric
Universe," in the 1985 issue of the _National Journal of Jarf Studies._
Basically, the authors posited that something _can_ exist for me if I've
never heard of it, never seen it, and never had any physical contact with
it, based on months of empirical research.
Unfortunately, Herr Dkr. AEngstorm was "unwilling, on professional and
ethical grounds" to extend the hypothesis to humanity at large. We were
going to follow the article up by running a series of tests on the Good
Doctor himself, as well as several summer interns, but AEngstorm was
called away to Copenhagen for "family business."
: - Never ask the question , if you can't handle the answer..
Although this is probably very good practical advice, it's not much
on which to base a metaphysics. See, for example, J.F. McBrayer, "Blinders-
On Philosophy," (Spring 1993) in which Mr. McBrayer compares the
_Weltanschauungen_ of major characters from 1970s sitcoms.
: - You can feel lonely, while your not alone (marriage)..
The NCJS is anxiously awaiting a monograph on this topic from Profs.
McBrayer and Donath, due out sometime in the fall.
: - Can someone have an original idea?
Again, depends on the "someone," and it also depends on your paradigm.
According to the Jarf Paradigm, for example, as soon as one enters into
the Jarfian Discourse, _every_ idea one comes up with is an "original"
idea. (The NCJS has signed onto the Prague Declaration on Intellectual
Property.)
Admittedly, this creates serious disincentives to publish. On the
other hand, it means the Jarf Paradigm, unlike many other intellectual
communities, does not suffer from significant attrition of ideas.
(Prof. Dimmick recently published a reprint of Darwin's _On The Origin
Of Species_ under his name, capitalizing all the common nouns. This
was received by critics as "perhaps too derivative, but of significant
value to the community at large.")
: - True wisdom starts when you realise how little you now....
Again, me? Or people in general? Certainly, true wisdom starts when
one realizes how little _I_ know. In fact, when the NCJS is hiring
new staffers, they are required to sit down with me, in my role as
Executive Director of the Center, for a half-hour interview. If,
by the end of the interview, they still have even a mote of respect
for my intellectual or academic prowess, they are not called back.
If the statement to be assessed is "True wisdom starts when the
individual realizes how little (s)he, personally, knows," I would
have to disagree as a matter of Center policy. This seems to imply
that wisdom requires a modicum of self-awareness. Under the current
State of the Paradigm, wisdom is not at all dependant upon self-awareness.
(Wisdom is, according to latest research, a function of four variables:
education, net worth, height-weight ratio, and amount of cayenne
consumed in an average 24-hour period, adjusted for weight.)
: - At what moment in time starts a person to die? (at birth..)
April 17, 1978. Although this creates some difficulties for persons
born _after_ that date, we haven't heard any complaints. This
date was arrived at by the Second International Conference on
Existence, held in the Hague. Coincidentally, the Conference ran
April 15-19, 1978.
: I appologise for the bad english , please send me some ????
Bad English? I'll get on it.
michael peil
Executive Director
National Center for Jarf Studies
Ithaca, NY
Robert Zook
>
> A true solipsist can't engage in a debate.
Sure they can. However, for a solipsist such a debate would be
in effect "mental masterbation", entertaining perhaps but not to
be considered of much worth.
Bridget Ellen Engman
>S. Rosenhart (rook...@pi.net) wrote:
>: Hi I'am looking for questions subject philosophy (or a point of view), please send me
>: some, I will be must greatfull.. Some questions for you..
>: -Can something exist for you. if you have never heard of it. never seen it and never had
>: any fysical contact with it?
>For me? Or "for one?" The distinction is important. See, e.g.,
>M.A. Peil and F. AEngstorm, "Objective Conciousness and the Peil-o-centric
>Universe," in the 1985 issue of the _National Journal of Jarf Studies._
P
One should note that believing one lives in a universe centered on Mr.
Peil may seriously affect one's horoscope. It is extremely important
to consider the conjunctions of Mr. Peil and other important objects,
such as Venus, Mars, and squirrels.
But onyl if the squirrels are prepared in a light wine sauce under the
full moon.
For a full description of Peil-o-centric Astrology, particularly as it
relates to the Culinary Sciences Division, please see B. E. Engman and
F. AEngstorm, "Peil is from Mars, Squirrels are from Venus," in the 1992
issue of the _National Journal of Jarf Studies._
>Basically, the authors posited that something _can_ exist for me if I've
>never heard of it, never seen it, and never had any physical contact with
>it, based on months of empirical research.
>Unfortunately, Herr Dkr. AEngstorm was "unwilling, on professional and
>ethical grounds" to extend the hypothesis to humanity at large. We were
>going to follow the article up by running a series of tests on the Good
>Doctor himself, as well as several summer interns, but AEngstorm was
>called away to Copenhagen for "family business."
P
Given this suspicious behavior, one wonders about the nature of the tests
performed on you in the "months of empirical research," that they would
frighten even the brave and adventurous Herr Dkr. AEngstorm. Would you
please enlighten us? (And next time, can I help?)
>: - Never ask the question , if you can't handle the answer..
>Although this is probably very good practical advice, it's not much
>on which to base a metaphysics. See, for example, J.F. McBrayer, "Blinders-
>On Philosophy," (Spring 1993) in which Mr. McBrayer compares the
>_Weltanschauungen_ of major characters from 1970s sitcoms.
>: - You can feel lonely, while your not alone (marriage)..
>The NCJS is anxiously awaiting a monograph on this topic from Profs.
>McBrayer and Donath, due out sometime in the fall.
P
However, given that Prof. McBrayer is undoubtedly still recovering from
the study of 1970s sitcoms mentioned above, I doubt this will be released
on schedule. There is also a slight possibility that the content mey
be altered somewhat -- perhaps considering the question of whether one can
feel lonely when one is a young man living with two young girls and
pretending to be homosexual, or the impact of marriage to an alien on
one's loneliness quotient. Given this possibility, I strongly recommend
that you pay close attention to the first few paragraphs in order to
avoid being presented a few pages later with an answer one can't handle.
>: - Can someone have an original idea?
>Again, depends on the "someone," and it also depends on your paradigm.
>According to the Jarf Paradigm, for example, as soon as one enters into
>the Jarfian Discourse, _every_ idea one comes up with is an "original"
>idea. (The NCJS has signed onto the Prague Declaration on Intellectual
>Property.)
>Admittedly, this creates serious disincentives to publish. On the
>other hand, it means the Jarf Paradigm, unlike many other intellectual
>communities, does not suffer from significant attrition of ideas.
>(Prof. Dimmick recently published a reprint of Darwin's _On The Origin
>Of Species_ under his name, capitalizing all the common nouns. This
>was received by critics as "perhaps too derivative, but of significant
>value to the community at large.")
P
P
(pardon my editing...) However, a recent study by K.E. Engman entitled
"Squirrel Vindaloo and the Russian group Consciousness" was rejected
as a crass plagiarism of the first chapter of the book of Job. One can
never be too vigilant...
B
C
C
However, a recent study by
>: - True wisdom starts when you realise how little you now....
>Again, me? Or people in general? Certainly, true wisdom starts when
>one realizes how little _I_ know. In fact, when the NCJS is hiring
>new staffers, they are required to sit down with me, in my role as
>Executive Director of the Center, for a half-hour interview. If,
>by the end of the interview, they still have even a mote of respect
>for my intellectual or academic prowess, they are not called back.
>If the statement to be assessed is "True wisdom starts when the
>individual realizes how little (s)he, personally, knows," I would
>have to disagree as a matter of Center policy. This seems to imply
>that wisdom requires a modicum of self-awareness. Under the current
>State of the Paradigm, wisdom is not at all dependant upon self-awareness.
>(Wisdom is, according to latest research, a function of four variables:
>education, net worth, height-weight ratio, and amount of cayenne
>consumed in an average 24-hour period, adjusted for weight.)
P
With all due respect, Mr. Peil, you have neglected to mention the effect
of the consumption of squirrel on one's wisdom factor. This is made
especially complex by the effect a dish of squirrel consumed immediately
before one is tested for bcc (blood cayenne content) can have on the
results.
>: - At what moment in time starts a person to die? (at birth..)
P
Of course, this neglects the idea of whether babies are alive before birth.
If a person starts to die at birth, what happens to those babies who are
born dead, or those aborted? Truly the mind boggles.
>April 17, 1978. Although this creates some difficulties for persons
>born _after_ that date, we haven't heard any complaints. This
>date was arrived at by the Second International Conference on
>Existence, held in the Hague. Coincidentally, the Conference ran
>April 15-19, 1978.
>: I appologise for the bad english , please send me some ????
>Bad English? I'll get on it.
>michael peil
>Executive Director
>National Center for Jarf Studies
>Ithaca, NY
--
BENGMAN * "Cabin Fever has ravaged all aboard,
Bridget Engman * This once-proud vessel has become a floating psycho ward.
b-engma@students * We were sailing, sailing, heading who knows where,
.uiuc.edu * And now, though we're all here, we're not all there!" --MTI
JanHolland
If debate is communication, the solipsist can not because communication is
a two-way street. The sol. is broascaster with the receiver off.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jan Holland t...@pop.pi.net
Individual/society/state/environment never existed separately, they developed together.
They needed each other to survive, so ...
Mutual assistance helps to survive=adapt=develop.
Karen Mercedes
existence, only that no human being on earth is capable of perceiving the
world objectively, and thus for human beings, the world can have only a
*subjective* existence. It would take a truly enlightened person indeed
to be able to view the world totally without reference to himself.
Indeed, that kind of detached omniscience is what I thought distinguished
God from man.
Karen Mercedes
merc...@access.digex.net
=====
On Wed, 27 Mar 1996, Gary McGath wrote:
> In article <NEWTNews.25248.8...@rookster.pi.net>, "S.
> Rosenhart" <rook...@pi.net> wrote:
>
>
> >-Can something exist for you. if you have never heard of it. never seen
> it and never had
> >any fysical contact with it?
>
> >I appologise for the bad english , please send me some ????
>
> Look for the assumptions implied in a question. The expression "exist for
> you" implies that the world doesn't exist in itself, but is centered on
> your consciousness and has no reality apart from it. If this were the
> case, then how could you even ask anyone the question? The response itself
> would just be part of what "exists for you."
>
> A true solipsist can't engage in a debate.
>
Aaron Boyden
> It doesn't necessarily imply that the world does not have an objective
> existence, only that no human being on earth is capable of perceiving the
> world objectively, and thus for human beings, the world can have only a
> *subjective* existence. It would take a truly enlightened person indeed
> to be able to view the world totally without reference to himself.
> Indeed, that kind of detached omniscience is what I thought distinguished
> God from man.
Perhaps God can do the logically impossible, but it is my impression that
viewing the world totally without reference to one's self is beyond the
logically possible, however enlightened one might be.
---
Aaron Boyden
650...@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu
"If there were gods, how could I endure it, not to be a god? Hence, there are
no gods." -Nietzsche
Stephen Grossman
: It doesn't necessarily imply that the world does not have an objective
: existence, only that no human being on earth is capable of perceiving the
: world objectively, and thus for human beings, the world can have only a
: *subjective* existence. It would take a truly enlightened person indeed
: to be able to view the world totally without reference to himself.
: Indeed, that kind of detached omniscience is what I thought distinguished
: God from man.
Karen Mercedes
: merc...@access.digex.net
Since you are discussing this in an Objectivist group, you might learn some
Objectivist basics. Eg, Rand's objectivity is not conventional objectivity.
You have refuted conventional objectivity. Within Objectivism, objectivity
is connecting mind, via volition and logic, to reality. And this is humanly
possible, tho many evade it and construct insanely elaborate
rationalizations. Eg, Kant.
Aaron Boyden
> Since you are discussing this in an Objectivist group, you might learn some
> Objectivist basics. Eg, Rand's objectivity is not conventional objectivity.
> You have refuted conventional objectivity. Within Objectivism, objectivity
> is connecting mind, via volition and logic, to reality. And this is humanly
> possible, tho many evade it and construct insanely elaborate
> rationalizations. Eg, Kant.
You give Kant too little credit. You say that objectivity is some kind of
relation between mind and reality. I take it that you mean that
objectivity is present when our beliefs match up with the world in a
certain way. Now, how could we check and see if our beliefs match up with
the world? It seems that in order to do this, we'd have to take our
beliefs, on the one hand, and the world, on the other hand, and compare
the two. But when exactly do we have access to the world, separate from
our beliefs, so that we can compare it to our beliefs? That is the
problem Kant tried so hard to solve, and complex and flawed as his
attempted solution was, I find it considerably more insightful than
Randian hand-waving.
Gary VDH
>On Sun, 31 Mar 1996, Karen Mercedes wrote:
>> It doesn't necessarily imply that the world does not have an objective
>> existence, only that no human being on earth is capable of perceiving the
>> world objectively, and thus for human beings, the world can have only a
>> *subjective* existence.
Why do we keep talking as if "objective" and "subjective" are
*absolutely exclusive* domains? It is too late in my evening to go
into why they are not and cannot be. But will do so if challenged.
>> It would take a truly enlightened person indeed
>> to be able to view the world totally without reference to himself.
>> Indeed, that kind of detached omniscience is what I thought distinguished
>> God from man.
>Perhaps God can do the logically impossible, but it is my impression that
>viewing the world totally without reference to one's self is beyond the
>logically possible, however enlightened one might be.
>---
>Aaron Boyden
>650...@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu
>"If there were gods, how could I endure it, not to be a god? Hence, there are
>no gods." -Nietzsche
--
Gary
Neither Here Nor There
/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
"The same regulating forces, that have created nature in all its forms are
responsible for the structure of our psyche and also for our capacity to think."
-- Werner Heisenberg, physicist
\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
Peter J. King
> On Sun, 31 Mar 1996, Karen Mercedes wrote:
>
> > It doesn't necessarily imply that the world does not have an objective
> > existence, only that no human being on earth is capable of perceiving the
> > world objectively, and thus for human beings, the world can have only a
> > *subjective* existence. It would take a truly enlightened person indeed
> > to be able to view the world totally without reference to himself.
> > Indeed, that kind of detached omniscience is what I thought distinguished
> > God from man.
> Perhaps God can do the logically impossible, but it is my impression that
> viewing the world totally without reference to one's self is beyond the
> logically possible, however enlightened one might be.
It wouldn't be logically impossible for Spinoza's god, presumably
(though I'm not sure that what counts is being or not being omniscient -
nor of "enlightenment").
With reference to Karen Mercedes' original posting, though, it's
surely important to distinguish between the objective existence of the
world and the possibility of objective knowledge of the world. Her
argument is for the latter, not the former.
Peter J. King
| http://sable.ox.ac.uk/~shil0124 |
| http://www.geocities.com/Athens/2648/ |
| Philosophy resources, plus |
| lots more - both serious and recreational |
Stephen Grossman
: On 1 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
: > Since you are discussing this in an Objectivist group, you might learn some
: > Objectivist basics. Eg, Rand's objectivity is not conventional objectivity.
: > You have refuted conventional objectivity. Within Objectivism, objectivity
: > is connecting mind, via volition and logic, to reality. And this is humanly
: > possible, tho many evade it and construct insanely elaborate
: > rationalizations. Eg, Kant.
: You give Kant too little credit. You say that objectivity is some kind of
: relation between mind and reality. I take it that you mean that
: objectivity is present when our beliefs match up with the world in a
: certain way.
Youve merely restated conventional objectivity in a vague and ambigious way.
Whenyou choose to logically connect mind to reality, you're objective. Focus
mind on reality and identify it. Kant, of course, created such a bizarrely
elaborate fantasy that most later intellectuals spin lesser fantasies
fromhis. It has no intellectual respectablility.
Now, how could we check and see if our beliefs match up with
: the world? It seems that in order to do this, we'd have to take our
: beliefs, on the one hand, and the world, on the other hand, and compare
: the two. But when exactly do we have access to the world, separate from
: our beliefs, so that we can compare it to our beliefs? That is the
: problem Kant tried so hard to solve, and complex and flawed as his
Ś: attempted solution was, I find it considerably more insightful than
: Randian hand-waving.
You must spend much time with people who follow you down the subjectivist
rabbit hole. Existence exists. You are conscious of it automatically with
perception and volitionally/logically w/reason. Under no circumsrtances will
I make internal criticism of your rationalization of your evasion of reason.
Rand, like some Presocratics (at least), Aristotle and Aquinas, recognizes
the primacy of existence. Most other philosophers posited the primacy of
consciousness and created elaborate pseudo-philosophies to prove that
existence corresponded to their consiousness. We call these people mental
patients. Eg, feeling a desire to sacrifice his happiness, Kant claimed that
THE BEYOND was calling him and telling him to sacrifice himself. This is
intellectual junk, worthy of nothing except a drunken laugh and a lot of
agony for grad students. You are lost in subjectivity, shifting madly
between beliefs, worlds, comparison, seeming, access, etc. I imagine that,
by now, your subjectivism has developed from an intellectual view to a
powerfully ingrained habit of manipulating your consciousness so that the
evasion of reason is automatic. This is, literally, psychosis. Kant, of
course, provides a comprehensive justification of this. You need a rational
philosophy to survive but I assume that survival is no longer your basic
concern. See Plato for dying well.
: ---
Peter J. King
[snip the unargued sneers at a poorly understand Kant, and the usual
Randian dismissal of other views]
> Existence exists.
Meaningless. Existence is at best a second-order property (put another
way, quantification). There is nothing in the world describable as
`existence' - there are things, which we can describe as existing.
> You are conscious of it automatically with
> perception and volitionally/logically w/reason. Under no circumsrtances will
> I make internal criticism of your rationalization of your evasion of reason.
Apart from the sneering tone, it's difficult to make out what on
earth this means.
> Rand, like some Presocratics (at least), Aristotle and Aquinas, recognizes
> the primacy of existence.
I think that you ought to read and think about these philosophers
- then go back to Rand. That is, if you don't mind losing your faith.
Philosophy is about thinking - not about swallowing the derivative and
muddled pronouncements of a second-rate writer.
[snip more insults and sneering]
Why is it that the only people worse than fundamentalist
Christians at substituting sneers and insults for rigorous thought are
Randians? No, no, don't tell me - it was a rhetorical question.
Stephen Grossman
: On 3 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
: > Existence exists.
: Meaningless.
Begging the question. Ie, meaningless within your philoosphy or Objectivism?
Philosophy is more powerful than conventionally known. Each philosophy has a
view, explicit or not, on everything. Within your philosophy, existence is
meaningless. Within Objectivism, its objectively meaningful. So, we return
to basics. Which philosophy shall be accepted? What is your metaphysics?
Important, this is not relativism, which is just one more philosophy w/no
metaphysical superiority. Ie, objectivity exists and is systemized by
Objectivism. I only claim that Objectivism is objectively true. I do not
claim that Objectivism is true by the standards of any other philosophy. You
could have a philosophy of green, with a green metaphysics, epistemology,
etc. You could say that green refutes Objectivism and all other non-green
phiosophies. And, within the limit of green, you are right. But not beyond.
You think that there is some metaphysically neutral philosophy, from which
you judge all, inc/Objectivism. But all views are from a specific
metaphysics. Thus, pick your metaphysics very carefully! This is not
standard Objectivism but my concern to systemize metaphysics even more than
in Objectivism. See my "Existence 2" in
etext.archive.umich.edu/pub/Objectivism/essays.
Also, i was referring to the existence of existence, not the meaning of
[Bexistence, as in Heidegger's _Being and Time_, a radically anti-metaphysical
[Bbook. Thus you remain in meaning, not existence. That's ok, within
subjectivity. But you have made no objective comment. Your mind remains
turned in upon itself. See _Alice In Wonderland_. It's author discovered
symbolic logic, a rejection of conceptual logic. I offer metaphysical
[A[A[A[Atherapy. Fast service, cheap, parking validation, green stamps.
Ex[Bistence is at best a second-order property (put another
: wa[By,n quantification). There is nothing in the world describable as
: `exi[Bstence' - there are things, which we can describe as exist[Bing.
Within your subjectivity, you are correct. You should say, "I feel as if
Existence is at best a second-order property (put another
: way, quantification)." Then we could all sympathize and recommend a good
drink, a [B[B[Bbrothel, a joint, or therapy. I feel as if we are havin[AA[Ag a
Marianne Faithf[Bull, "You've been trying to get high without having to pay."
Within the primac[By of existence, existence is prior to description or any
other consciousness[B. Within your subjectivity, you create things. Does your
mother know, you naughty boy? Could you describe your insanity as existing?
: > You are conscious of it automatically with
: > perception and volitionally/logically w/reason. Under no circumsrtances
will
: > I make internal criticism of your rationalization of your evasion of reason.
Apart from the sneering tone, it's difficult to make out what on
: earth this means.
You feel as if people who choose to be objective are sneering at you? How
dreadful. Do you sneer at drunks and Nazis? Is it proper to sneer?
I clearly and with unpleasant experience accept your expression of the
effect of anti-reason philosophy. You have lost the life and death
difference between reality and consciousness. Do you drink much? You have
lost control over your consciousness. Tell me about it.......
: > Ra[Bnd, like some Presocratics (at least), Aristotle and Aquinas, recognizes
: > the primacy of existence.
: [B I think that you ought to read and think about these philosophers
: - [Bthen go back to Rand. That is, if you don't mind losing your faith.
: Philosophy is about thinking - not about swallowing the derivative and
[B: muddled pronouncements of a second-rate writer.
I agree, within the limit of your subjectivity. I'm sure you appreciate my
carefully systematic metaphysics. Ie, whatever you say, I will limit it
(contextualize it) within your metaphysical basics, ie, that existence is
derivative from skepticism (or even nihilism). Intellectuals are skeptical.
The unwashed masses are confused.
: | Philosophy resources, plus |
: | lots more - both serious and recreational |
recreational philosophy! A new Heideggerian existential! Did Heidegger have
a frightened mood? Have a nice day!
Aaron Boyden
> You must spend much time with people who follow you down the subjectivist
> rabbit hole. Existence exists. You are conscious of it automatically with
> perception and volitionally/logically w/reason. Under no circumsrtances will
> I make internal criticism of your rationalization of your evasion of reason.
> Rand, like some Presocratics (at least), Aristotle and Aquinas, recognizes
> the primacy of existence. Most other philosophers posited the primacy of
> consciousness and created elaborate pseudo-philosophies to prove that
> existence corresponded to their consiousness.
It's obvious you know nothing about Kant. If you equate existence with
the Ding-an-sich, then you are mistaken in claiming that he attempted to
prove correspondence between existence and consciousness. If you do not
equate existence with the Ding-an-sich, then you are mistaken in claiming
that he posited the primacy of consciousness. As I understand
Objectivism, it seems most likely that you should take the second path;
existence is not the Ding-an-sich. According to Kant, the subjectivists
who preceded him, such as Descartes and Hume, were misled because they
made an artificial distinction between the unproblematic given of
consciousness and the problematic world which must be inferred from that
given. For Kant, there is no such distinction; the world is as much given
to us as our feelings. His arguments to this effect are slippery, but as
I said before they're not as slippery or as shallow as Rand's attempts to
reach a similar conclusion.
Since you do seem aware of the role the Ding-an-sich plays in Kantian
ethics, I suppose a word or two about that is in order. The Ding-an-sich
of Kantian epistemology and metaphysics is woefully inadequate to the role
Kant assigns to it in ethics and religion; it is in fact utterly useless.
Thus, I find Kantian ethics as absurd as you do. To read the mistakes of
his ethics back into his epistemology is, however, unnecessary,
unsupported by the text, and unenlightening.
Billy Beck
sgr...@pictac.com (Stephen Grossman) wrote:
>Peter J. King (shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
>: On 3 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
> Apart from the sneering tone, it's difficult to make out what on
>: earth this means.
>You feel as if people who choose to be objective are sneering at you? How
>dreadful. Do you sneer at drunks and Nazis? Is it proper to sneer?
>I clearly and with unpleasant experience accept your expression of the
>effect of anti-reason philosophy. You have lost the life and death
>difference between reality and consciousness. Do you drink much?
<snort>
*I* was going to ask him if he ever thought about getting on a
motorcycle.
The experience can be a remarkably deep lesson on the subjects of
"existence" and "reality".
Billy
http://www.mindspring.com/~wjb3/free/free.html
"Rant" updated 2/19/96
Robert Bergman
sgr...@pictac.com (Stephen Grossman) wrote:
>Karen Mercedes (merc...@access2.digex.net) wrote:
>: It doesn't necessarily imply that the world does not have an objective
>: existence, only that no human being on earth is capable of perceiving the
>: world objectively, and thus for human beings, the world can have only a
>: *subjective* existence. It would take a truly enlightened person indeed
>: to be able to view the world totally without reference to himself.
>: Indeed, that kind of detached omniscience is what I thought distinguished
>: God from man.
I agree. It is possible for a person to consider the world from an
outside viewpoint. Of course one must obtain a working knowledge of
the world around them. This takes a great deal of time. The world
is a large place. All things in it exist whether you know they do
or not. Things do not require that you know about them to exist.
Of course, there are many arguments that refute this. I do not personally
believe that they are true. It's not a line of thought that is worth
taking the time to consider.
Peter J. King
> Peter J. King (shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
> : On 3 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
>
> : > Existence exists.
>
> : Meaningless.
>
> Begging the question. Ie, meaningless within your philoosphy or Objectivism?
> Philosophy is more powerful than conventionally known. Each philosophy has a
> view, explicit or not, on everything. Within your philosophy, existence is
> meaningless.
Oh dear - you really should read what's written, not what you
expect (why??) to read. I didn't say that existence was meaningless, I
said that "Existence exists" was meaningless. Moreover, I gave reasons
for what I did say. As I've found to be usual with Objectivists, you've
ignored the arguments, misunderstood the conclusion, and gone off into
verbal diarrhoea. Tissue?
[The rest of what you wrote was so silly, I gave up responding.
It was a mistake even to begin. Forget I said anything.]
PJK
| http://sable.ox.ac.uk/~shil0124 |
| http://www.geocities.com/Athens/2648/ |
frank forman
Peter J. King <shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk> wrote:
>On 3 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
>
>> Peter J. King (shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
>> : On 3 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
>>
>> : > Existence exists.
>>
>> : Meaningless.
>>
>> Begging the question. Ie, meaningless within your philoosphy or Objectivism?
>> Philosophy is more powerful than conventionally known. Each philosophy has a
>> view, explicit or not, on everything. Within your philosophy, existence is
>> meaningless.
>
>expect (why??) to read. I didn't say that existence was meaningless, I
>said that "Existence exists" was meaningless. Moreover, I gave reasons
>for what I did say. As I've found to be usual with Objectivists, you've
>ignored the arguments, misunderstood the conclusion, and gone off into
>verbal diarrhoea. Tissue?
>
> [The rest of what you wrote was so silly, I gave up responding.
>It was a mistake even to begin. Forget I said anything.]
Can't either of you two do anything more than call each other names? I
mean the statement "existence exists" may not be the most grammatical way
of saying something, but I don't see why it is other than a trite
statement to begin with. My take on this statement is that Ayn Rand was
really saying, "Get real!" or "Stop letting other people make up your
mind for you!" I see Objectivism as more a theory of virtue than anything
else.
Steve, please give us a correct and exact URL for your essay "Existence 2."
Frank
John Alway
: On 3 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
: > Existence exists.
: Meaningless.
This has been explained to this poster _many_ times before, but
he just refuses to acknowledge the point. "Existence exists" is
a deliberate tautology. It is meant to _underscore_ the centrality,
and importance of the point. It is _not_ meant as a validation of
anything. So, in fact, it is not meaningless.
The validation is that you must use existence to deny it.
Any attempt to refute it, requires its use. Existence being
all that we see, feel, hear, taste, touch, experience. You
can not prove existence, because proof itself rests upon the
acceptance of existence.
...John
--
___________________________________________________________________
\_The most formidable weapon against errors of any kind is Reason._\
/_I have never used any other, and I trust I never shall.__________/
\_____________________________________________________Thomas Paine_\
/__John Alway jal...@icsi.net______________________________________/
Stephen Grossman
: On 3 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
: > Peter J. King (shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
: > : On 3 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
: >
: > : > Existence exists.
: >
: > : Meaningless.
: >
: > Begging the question. Ie, meaningless within your philoosphy or Objectivism?
: > Philosophy is more powerful than conventionally known. Each philosophy has a
: > view, explicit or not, on everything. Within your philosophy, existence is
: > meaningless.
: Oh dear - you really should read what's written, not what you
: expect (why??) to read. I didn't say that existence was meaningless, I
: said that "Existence exists" was meaningless. Moreover, I gave reasons
: for what I did say. As I've found to be usual with Objectivists, you've
: ignored the arguments, misunderstood the conclusion, and gone off into
: verbal diarrhoea. Tissue?
[B
Oxford U?! Isnt that the garbage school where my asshole President went? Its
unfortunate that you learned to memorize and arbitrarily manipulate symbols
of something or other instead of learning to think inprinciples. The
principle is that claims are validated within some specific philosophy, not
IW /home/sgross/.letter (Modifi Row 43 Col 1 9:53 Ctrl-K H for
help
: > view, explicit or not, on everything. W6thinol 1r philosophy, existence
is
Oxford U?! Isnt that the garbage school where my asshole President went? Its
unfortunate that you learned to memorize and arbitrarily manipulate symbols
of something or other instead of learning to think inprinciples. The
rinciple is that claims are validated within some specific philosophy, not
from some allegedly neutral view. Thus your claim that---- "Existence
exists"
was meaningless.-----is a claim made from within your philosophy, which you
labor mightily to evade identifying. Thus, from within the primacy of
onsciousness or subjectivism, you are right. Now, Mr. Bean, justify that
philosophy. From within Objectivism, ie, wh9n mind 5nd r9:54ty are
of something or other instead of learning to think inprinciples. The
principle is that claims are validated within some specific philosophy, not
rom some allegedly neutral view. Thus your claim that---- "Existence exists"
was meaningless.-----is a claim made from within your philosophy, which you
labor mightily to evade identifying. Ths" is meaningful.
[B[B
you. But tha's merely re right. Now, Mr. Bean, justify thatno meaning to e,
Even more basically is the consideration of the existence, rather than the
meaning. Im sure that you are honest, that the existence of existence, ie,
of fish, clouds, atoms, galaxies, ideas, purposes, etc, has no meaning to
you. But that's merely an expression of a suicidal consciousness. Of course,
ant opposed it so you must do your duty and suffer. And, like Kant, you'll
[Bfeel rage and express it in floating abstractions.
of fish, clouds, atoms, galaxies, ideas, purposes, etc, has no meaning to
you. But that's merely an expression of a suicidal consciousness. Of course,
Kant opposed it so you must do your duty and suffer. And, like Kant, youll
[Bfeel rage and express it in floating abstractions.
Aaron Boyden
> This has been explained to this poster _many_ times before, but
> he just refuses to acknowledge the point. "Existence exists" is
> a deliberate tautology. It is meant to _underscore_ the centrality,
> and importance of the point. It is _not_ meant as a validation of
> anything. So, in fact, it is not meaningless.
>
> The validation is that you must use existence to deny it.
> Any attempt to refute it, requires its use. Existence being
> all that we see, feel, hear, taste, touch, experience. You
> can not prove existence, because proof itself rests upon the
> acceptance of existence.
Two problems. First, and most importantly, virtually none of those whom
the Objectivists criticize have any interest in denying existence. What
they deny is that various Objectivist claims about what existence is like
are true. That is quite different from denying existence itself.
Secondly, I don't recall Objectivists criticizing the proof strategy of
reductio ad absurdum. Perhaps they should; they wouldn't be the first.
However, provided that reductio is taken as reasonable, it is perfectly
legitimate to prove not-P by assuming P and demonstrating that not-P is a
consequence.
John Alway
> On Thu, 4 Apr 1996, John Alway wrote:
> > This has been explained to this poster _many_ times before, but
> > he just refuses to acknowledge the point. "Existence exists" is
> > a deliberate tautology. It is meant to _underscore_ the centrality,
> > and importance of the point. It is _not_ meant as a validation of
> > anything. So, in fact, it is not meaningless.
> > The validation is that you must use existence to deny it.
> > Any attempt to refute it, requires its use. Existence being
> > all that we see, feel, hear, taste, touch, experience. You
> > can not prove existence, because proof itself rests upon the
> > acceptance of existence.
> Two problems. First, and most importantly, virtually none of those whom
> the Objectivists criticize have any interest in denying existence. What
> they deny is that various Objectivist claims about what existence is like
> are true. That is quite different from denying existence itself.
Slightly true. What is often denied is that we can know
things as they really are. This is more subtle. However, it
gets down to the same basic point, which is that our awareness
_is_ the awareness of things as they really are.
> Secondly, I don't recall Objectivists criticizing the proof strategy of
> reductio ad absurdum. Perhaps they should; they wouldn't be the first.
> However, provided that reductio is taken as reasonable, it is perfectly
> legitimate to prove not-P by assuming P and demonstrating that not-P is a
> consequence.
The point is that there is no assumption here. Existence is
_experienced_, not assumed.
You can't take as a hypothetical existence, because the very
concept of hypothetical relies on it.
Let me work the math out further to clarify the point.
A "Hypothesis - an assertion subject to verification or
proof."
An "assertion" is something stated, which requires a mouth
to speak, or a writing instrument to place text on a canvas.
All physical things.
"verify - to prove the truth of by the presentation of
evidence or testimony; substantiate."
"evidence" - would mean facts.
etc..
Aaron Boyden
> > Two problems. First, and most importantly, virtually none of those whom
> > the Objectivists criticize have any interest in denying existence. What
> > they deny is that various Objectivist claims about what existence is like
> > are true. That is quite different from denying existence itself.
>
> Slightly true. What is often denied is that we can know
> things as they really are. This is more subtle. However, it
> gets down to the same basic point, which is that our awareness
> _is_ the awareness of things as they really are.
Berkeley believed that our awareness was awareness of things as they
really are, and thus that we could know things as we really are. Would he
count as an Objectivist? I would think it obvious that he would not,
because Berkeley believed that things really are ideas. Ideas are what he
thought constituted reality.
Now, you maintain with an amazing degree of certainty that such a view
must be mistaken. It may be a logical triviality that experience exists,
and perhaps even that we experience something if experience is defined
suitably. However, I fail to see the logical triviality in maintaining
that what we experience must be Aristotelian substances rather than
Berkeleyan ideas. Personally, I'm inclined to think that the objects of
our experience are neither, but leave that aside for now. What is the
argument that the existence, which everybody grants is there, isn't made
up of ideas, or in general of anything apart from substances?
---
Aaron Boyden
"Any competent philosopher who does not understand something will take care
not to understand anything else whereby it might be explained." -David Lewis
Stephen Grossman
: they deny is that various Objectivist claims about what existence is like
: are true. That is quite different from denying existence itself.
most philosophers, in starting w/consciousness (experience, etc), implicitly
claim existence is derivative from conciousness, thus deny that existence
exists. sometimes they split existence and identity, denying that existence
_is_ existence. You need to learn conceptual hierarchy.
Peter J. King
> In article <Pine.OSF.3.91.960404...@sable.ox.ac.uk>,
> Peter J. King <shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk> wrote:
> > Oh dear - you really should read what's written, not what you
> >expect (why??) to read. I didn't say that existence was meaningless, I
> >said that "Existence exists" was meaningless. Moreover, I gave reasons
> >for what I did say.
> Can't either of you two do anything more than call each other names?
Do you mean that you didn't read the reasons I gave either? Or
that you object to my correcting the (frankly ludicrous) misreading of
what I'd written?
Yes, I can do more than call names, and I did. My interlocutor
seemed unable to think or write clearly, so I gave up, and stopped
responding.
PJK
| http://sable.ox.ac.uk/~shil0124 |
| http://www.geocities.com/Athens/2648/ |
Peter J. King
> Peter J. King (shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
> : On 3 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
>
> : > Existence exists.
> : Meaningless.
> This has been explained to this poster _many_ times before, but
> he just refuses to acknowledge the point. "Existence exists" is
> a deliberate tautology. It is meant to _underscore_ the centrality,
> and importance of the point. It is _not_ meant as a validation of
> anything. So, in fact, it is not meaningless.
A). False; it has never been explained to me. I've had longer or
shorter messages adding further fuzzy-minded meanderings to the initial
meaninglessness, but never an explanation.
B). And this is a case in point. First, my whole point was that
"Existence exists" is meaningless. To reply that it's a tautology is
simply to deny my claim, not to argue against it. "Existence exists"
isn't a tautology, it isn't even true, it isn't even meaningful.
C). I'm not sure what Alway means by `validation' here, but even
if "Existence exists" were a tautology, what point could it possibly be
underscoring? Tautologies, by definition, don't say anything.
If you want to continue making futile and misdirected criticisms
of me, why not cut "sci.philosophy.meta" out of the newsgroups line -
then you won't risk my reading your postings, and perhaps you'll get away
with posting such drivel.
PJK
| http://sable.ox.ac.uk/~shil0124 |
| http://www.geocities.com/Athens/2648/ |
Daniel Smith
[Big clip]
> C). I'm not sure what Alway means by `validation' here, but even
>if "Existence exists" were a tautology, what point could it possibly be
>underscoring? Tautologies, by definition, don't say anything.
Tautology--1. The needless repetition of the same sense in *different*
words. 2.(logic) A statement that includes all logical possibilities and is
therfore always true.
American Heritage dictionary 3rd ed.
No matter how you slice it tautologies say *something*! They are indeed
circular. But the question to be answered is whether or not it is vicious,
or just circularity. Vicious circularity uses a principle to *prove* the
very same principle. Just circularity occurs when demonstrating the
*validity* of an axiom. Hence the statement "A is A" (the law of identity).
It is certainly circular, but to deny its validity is to deny the validity
of one's own argument.
Respectfully,
Dan Smith
Stephen Grossman
: "Peter J. King" <shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk> writes:
: > C). I'm not sure what Alway means by `validation' here, but even
Metaphysics is the basis of epistemology, inc/justification, tautology, and
logic, not the reverse. Everyone knows that existence exists, even if they
havent conceptualized it. An honest person will recognize that "existence
exists" conceptualizes his experience. Dont waste time with those who deny
existence and their experience of it.
Stephen Grossman
: > Peter J. King (shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
: > : On 3 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
: >
: > : > Existence exists.
: > : Meaningless.
: > This has been explained to this poster _many_ times before, but
: > he just refuses to acknowledge the point. "Existence exists" is
: > a deliberate tautology. It is meant to _underscore_ the centrality,
: > and importance of the point. It is _not_ meant as a validation of
: > anything. So, in fact, it is not meaningless.
: A). False; it has never been explained to me. I've had longer or
: shorter messages adding further fuzzy-minded meanderings to the initial
: meaninglessness, but never an explanation.
Explanation within which philosophy? Your snobishness is absurd. This is a
group to discuss philosophy, not to express your postmodern denial of it.
: B). And this is a case in point. First, my whole point was that
: "Existence exists" is meaningless. To reply that it's a tautology is
: simply to deny my claim, not to argue against it. "Existence exists"
: isn't a tautology, it isn't even true, it isn't even meaningful.
True and meaningful within which philosophy?
: C). I'm not sure what Alway means by `validation' here, but even
: if "Existence exists" were a tautology, what point could it possibly be
: underscoring? Tautologies, by definition, don't say anything.
Definition within which philosophy? Do postmodenists find philosophy
intellectually...challenging?
: If you want to continue making futile and misdirected criticisms
: of me, why not cut "sci.philosophy.meta" out of the newsgroups line -
: then you won't risk my reading your postings, and perhaps you'll get away
: with posting such drivel.
Drivel within which philosophy? Get thee to a quackey!
Stephen Grossman
: > In article <Pine.OSF.3.91.960404...@sable.ox.ac.uk>,
: > Peter J. King <shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk> wrote:
: > > Oh dear - you really should read what's written, not what you
: > >expect (why??) to read. I didn't say that existence was meaningless, I
: > >said that "Existence exists" was meaningless. Moreover, I gave reasons
: > >for what I did say.
: > Can't either of you two do anything more than call each other names?
: Do you mean that you didn't read the reasons I gave either? Or
: that you object to my correcting the (frankly ludicrous) misreading of
: what I'd written?
Misreading within which philosophy? Scholarship is not philosophy.
: Yes, I can do more than call names, and I did. My interlocutor
: seemed unable to think or write clearly, so I gave up, and stopped
: responding.
Clear within which philosophy? Scholarship is not philosophy.
Stephen Grossman
: On 3 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
: > You must spend much time with people who follow you down the subjectivist
: > rabbit hole. Existence exists. You are conscious of it automatically with
: > perception and volitionally/logically w/reason. Under no circumsrtances
: >will
: > I make internal criticism of your rationalization of your evasion of
: >reason.
: > Rand, like some Presocratics (at least), Aristotle and Aquinas, recognizes
: > the primacy of existence. Most other philosophers posited the primacy of
: > consciousness and created elaborate pseudo-philosophies to prove that
: > existence corresponded to their consiousness.
: It's obvious you know nothing about Kant. If you equate existence with
: the Ding-an-sich, then you are mistaken in claiming that he attempted to
: prove correspondence between existence and consciousness. If you do not
: equate existence with the Ding-an-sich, then you are mistaken in claiming
: that he posited the primacy of consciousness. As I understand
: Objectivism, it seems most likely that you should take the second path;
: existence is not the Ding-an-sich. According to Kant, the subjectivists
: who preceded him, such as Descartes and Hume, were misled because they
: made an artificial distinction between the unproblematic given of
: consciousness and the problematic world which must be inferred from that
: given. For Kant, there is no such distinction; the world is as much given
: to us as our feelings. His arguments to this effect are slippery, but as
: I said before they're not as slippery or as shallow as Rand's attempts to
: reach a similar conclusion.
Kant started from a metaphysical noumena/phenomena split. There are no
metaphysical splits. Everything exists equally. "Nor is there more Being
here and less Being there but it is all together." [Parmenides]
Stephen Grossman
: On 3 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
: > Peter J. King (shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
: > : On 3 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
: >
: > : > Existence exists.
: >
: > : Meaningless.
: >
: > Begging the question. Ie, meaningless within your philoosphy or
: >Objectivism?
: > Philosophy is more powerful than conventionally known. Each philosophy
: > has a
: > view, explicit or not, on everything. Within your philosophy, existence is
: > meaningless.
: Oh dear - you really should read what's written, not what you
: expect (why??) to read. I didn't say that existence was meaningless, I
: said that "Existence exists" was meaningless. Moreover, I gave reasons
: for what I did say. As I've found to be usual with Objectivists, you've
: ignored the arguments, misunderstood the conclusion, and gone off into
: verbal diarrhoea. Tissue?
The concern with meaning is merely epistemological. Consider metaphysics.
Consider the existence of "Existence exists."
: | http://sable.ox.ac.uk/~shil0124 |
: | http://www.geocities.com/Athens/2648/ |
Stephen Grossman
: >> : On 3 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
: >>
: >> : > Existence exists.
: >>
: >> : Meaningless.
: >>
: >> Begging the question. Ie, meaningless within your philoosphy or
: >> Objectivism?
: >> Philosophy is more powerful than conventionally known. Each philosophy
: >> has a
: >> view, explicit or not, on everything. Within your philosophy, existence
is
: >> meaningless.
: > Oh dear - you really should read what's written, not what you
: >expect (why??) to read. I didn't say that existence was meaningless, I
: >said that "Existence exists" was meaningless. Moreover, I gave reasons
: >for what I did say. As I've found to be usual with Objectivists, you've
: >ignored the arguments, misunderstood the conclusion, and gone off into
: >verbal diarrhoea. Tissue?
: I mean the statement "existence exists" may not be the most grammatical way
: statement to begin with. My take on this statement is that Ayn Rand was
: really saying, "Get real!" or "Stop letting other people make up your
: mind for you!"
Trite within which philosophy? Subjectivism? Rand was trying to get people
to recognize existence.
I see Objectivism as more a theory of virtue than anything
Rand follows the classical view in starting philosophy w/metaphysics.
Objectivism is much more than a mere part (virtue) of a derivative part
(ethics).
: Steve, please give us a correct and exact URL for your essay "Existence 2."
I dont know its URL.
Ftp etext.archive.umich.edu/pub/Objectivism/Existence-2. Anyone who wants it
and cant access it, please tell me. I'll sock it to you.
Richard
Aaron Boyden <650...@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> wrote:
> On Fri, 5 Apr 1996, John Alway wrote:
>
> > > Two problems. First, and most importantly, virtually none of those whom
> > > the Objectivists criticize have any interest in denying existence. What
> > > they deny is that various Objectivist claims about what existence is like
> > > are true. That is quite different from denying existence itself.
> >
> > Slightly true. What is often denied is that we can know
> > things as they really are. This is more subtle. However, it
> > gets down to the same basic point, which is that our awareness
> > _is_ the awareness of things as they really are.
>
> Berkeley believed that our awareness was awareness of things as they
> really are, and thus that we could know things as we really are. Would he
> count as an Objectivist? I would think it obvious that he would not,
> because Berkeley believed that things really are ideas. Ideas are what he
> thought constituted reality.
>
> Now, you maintain with an amazing degree of certainty that such a view
> must be mistaken. It may be a logical triviality that experience exists,
> and perhaps even that we experience something if experience is defined
> suitably. However, I fail to see the logical triviality in maintaining
> that what we experience must be Aristotelian substances rather than
> Berkeleyan ideas. Personally, I'm inclined to think that the objects of
> our experience are neither, but leave that aside for now. What is the
> argument that the existence, which everybody grants is there, isn't made
> up of ideas, or in general of anything apart from substances?
>
> ---
> Aaron Boyden
>
> "Any competent philosopher who does not understand something will take care
> not to understand anything else whereby it might be explained." -David Lewis
Hello,
Just my first time through this vale of jeers, but isn't this (the above)
roughly where Husserl came in? Phenomenology tries to cut through the
substance/mind debate by providing a radical approach to knowing
(epistemology). Just a thought. --Richard
Aaron Boyden
> Kant started from a metaphysical noumena/phenomena split. There are no
> metaphysical splits. Everything exists equally. "Nor is there more Being
> here and less Being there but it is all together." [Parmenides]
You misunderstand the noumena/phenomena split, as you'd realize if you'd
read my message before responding to it. Since you didn't bother last
time, I won't bother to repeat myself.
Stephen Grossman
: On 1 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
: > Since you are discussing this in an Objectivist group, you might learn
: > some
: > Objectivist basics. Eg, Rand's objectivity is not conventional
objectivity.
: > You have refuted conventional objectivity. Within Objectivism, objectivity
: > is connecting mind, via volition and logic, to reality. And this is
humanly
: > possible, tho many evade it and construct insanely elaborate
: > rationalizations. Eg, Kant.
: You give Kant too little credit. You say that objectivity is some kind of
: relation between mind and reality. I take it that you mean that
: objectivity is present when our beliefs match up with the world in a
: certain way. Now, how could we check and see if our beliefs match up with
: the world? It seems that in order to do this, we'd have to take our
: beliefs, on the one hand, and the world, on the other hand, and compare
: the two. But when exactly do we have access to the world, separate from
: our beliefs, so that we can compare it to our beliefs? That is the
: problem Kant tried so hard to solve, and complex and flawed as his
: attempted solution was, I find it considerably more insightful than
: Randian hand-waving.
Ive had compute problems. Was my prior reply posted?
Stephen Grossman
: Aaron Boyden <650...@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> wrote:
: >On Sun, 31 Mar 1996, Karen Mercedes wrote:
: >> It doesn't necessarily imply that the world does not have an objective
: >> existence, only that no human being on earth is capable of perceiving the
: >> world objectively, and thus for human beings, the world can have only a
: >> *subjective* existence.
: Why do we keep talking as if "objective" and "subjective" are
: *absolutely exclusive* domains? It is too late in my evening to go
: into why they are not and cannot be. But will do so if challenged.
*absolutely exclusive* within what philosophy?
Stephen Grossman
: sgr...@pictac.com (Stephen Grossman) wrote:
: >Peter J. King (shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
: >: On 3 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
: > Apart from the sneering tone, it's difficult to make out what on
: >: earth this means.
: >You feel as if people who choose to be objective are sneering at you? How
: >dreadful. Do you sneer at drunks and Nazis? Is it proper to sneer?
: >I clearly and with unpleasant experience accept your expression of the
: >effect of anti-reason philosophy. You have lost the life and death
: >difference between reality and consciousness. Do you drink much?
: <snort>
thats a snort of jack, right?
: *I* was going to ask him if he ever thought about getting on a
: motorcycle.
: The experience can be a remarkably deep lesson on the subjects of
: "existence" and "reality".
deep within which philosophy?
John Alway
: You give Kant too little credit. You say that objectivity is some kind of
: relation between mind and reality. I take it that you mean that
: objectivity is present when our beliefs match up with the world in a
: certain way. Now, how could we check and see if our beliefs match up with
: the world? It seems that in order to do this, we'd have to take our
: beliefs, on the one hand, and the world, on the other hand, and compare
: the two.
Aaron, have you read Ayn Rand? She answers this quite well,
with not one iota of handwaving, I might add.
There is a distinction between the perceptual realm, and
the conceptual realm. Error is _only_ possible on the
conceptual realm, because this is where you have volition.
This is where you make assessments. Percepts are the given.
We don't choose whether we see black or white. We either
do or we don't. We do decide whether what we are seeing is
an asteroid or not, for example.
...John
Ghostboy
>Daniel Smith (dls...@psu.edu) wrote:
>: "Peter J. King" <shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk> writes:
>: > C). I'm not sure what Alway means by `validation' here, but even
>: >if "Existence exists" were a tautology, what point could it possibly be
>: >underscoring? Tautologies, by definition, don't say anything.
>: Tautology--1. The needless repetition of the same sense in *different*
>: words. 2.(logic) A statement that includes all logical possibilities and is
>: therfore always true.
>: American Heritage dictionary 3rd ed.
>: No matter how you slice it tautologies say *something*! They are indeed
>: circular. But the question to be answered is whether or not it is vicious,
>: or just circularity. Vicious circularity uses a principle to *prove* the
>: very same principle. Just circularity occurs when demonstrating the
>: *validity* of an axiom. Hence the statement "A is A" (the law of identity).
>: It is certainly circular, but to deny its validity is to deny the validity
>: of one's own argument.
> Metaphysics is the basis of epistemology, inc/justification, tautology, and
>logic, not the reverse. Everyone knows that existence exists, even if they
>havent conceptualized it. An honest person will recognize that "existence
>exists" conceptualizes his experience. Dont waste time with those who deny
>existence and their experience of it.
Saying existence exists is meaningless....it is redundant.
I think the problem here is in what people think existence is.
Is existence a perception....only ideas
Is existence matter... atoms and quarks
We as humans do not percieve the world in the same way all the
time....does it exist as a set thing and it is us that change or is
the world changing....
if you center reality in the mind.....then ideas are reality...
if you center reality....somewhere ....out there....then it is not.
I say I cannot know if my senses tell me the truth about existence...
I do not deny that I experience something....but to say that it is
'matter' to define it...requires a huge leap of faith.
Something like %90 of an atom is empty space (forgive the highschool
physics) but we still percieve things as being solid....
What I see....feel..hear...is not the thing itself....but a
representation of sensory data IN my mind...
I hope this is on topic for all of these newsgroups....
if not I collect flames....;)
Ghostboy --- A Non-practicing Atheist
Ghostboy
X-Newsreader: Forte Free Agent 1.0.82
sgr...@pictac.com (Stephen Grossman) annoyed the censors with:
>Peter J. King (shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
>: On Thu, 4 Apr 1996, John Alway wrote:
>: > Peter J. King (shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
>: > : On 3 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
>: >
>: > : > Existence exists.
>: > : Meaningless.
>: > This has been explained to this poster _many_ times before, but
>: > he just refuses to acknowledge the point. "Existence exists" is
>: > a deliberate tautology. It is meant to _underscore_ the centrality,
>: > and importance of the point. It is _not_ meant as a validation of
>: > anything. So, in fact, it is not meaningless.
>: A). False; it has never been explained to me. I've had longer or
>: shorter messages adding further fuzzy-minded meanderings to the initial
>: meaninglessness, but never an explanation.
>Explanation within which philosophy? Your snobishness is absurd. This is a
>group to discuss philosophy, not to express your postmodern denial of it.
>: B). And this is a case in point. First, my whole point was that
>: "Existence exists" is meaningless. To reply that it's a tautology is
>: simply to deny my claim, not to argue against it. "Existence exists"
>: isn't a tautology, it isn't even true, it isn't even meaningful.
>True and meaningful within which philosophy?
>: C). I'm not sure what Alway means by `validation' here, but even
>: if "Existence exists" were a tautology, what point could it possibly be
>: underscoring? Tautologies, by definition, don't say anything.
>Definition within which philosophy? Do postmodenists find philosophy
>intellectually...challenging?
>: If you want to continue making futile and misdirected criticisms
>: of me, why not cut "sci.philosophy.meta" out of the newsgroups line -
>: then you won't risk my reading your postings, and perhaps you'll get away
>: with posting such drivel.
>Drivel within which philosophy? Get thee to a quackey!
Didnt your moma ever tell you:
if you cant say something nice dont say anything at all....
I have watched you posts and you seem more interested in insulting
those who disagree with you than actually discussing philosophical
ideas.
just an observation from another
meaningless-absurdly-subjective-postmodernist-who-belongs-in-a-......quackey?????
uh er ok....whatever you say.
Aaron Boyden
> There is a distinction between the perceptual realm, and
> the conceptual realm. Error is _only_ possible on the
> conceptual realm, because this is where you have volition.
> This is where you make assessments. Percepts are the given.
> We don't choose whether we see black or white. We either
> do or we don't. We do decide whether what we are seeing is
> an asteroid or not, for example.
This would seem to make my other complaint particularly acute.
Objectivists seem quite attached to physical objects, at least the ones
that I have talked to. Yet if this is the Objectivist line, then it
would seem that Objectivist resources for criticizing Berkeleyan idealism
are quite limited; Berkeley is in full agreement with Objectivism about
the given, so he would apparently not be subject to the standard
Objectivist complaint that philosophers deny reality.
Billy Beck
sgr...@pictac.com (Stephen Grossman) wrote:
>Billy Beck (wj...@mindspring.com) wrote:
>: >I clearly and with unpleasant experience accept your expression of the
>: >effect of anti-reason philosophy. You have lost the life and death
>: >difference between reality and consciousness. Do you drink much?
>: <snort>
>thats a snort of jack, right?
Actually, it was two fingers of derision, straight up.
It's Crown Royal, when I'm in the mood.
>: *I* was going to ask him if he ever thought about getting on a
>: motorcycle.
>: The experience can be a remarkably deep lesson on the subjects of
>: "existence" and "reality".
>deep within which philosophy?
Why, all of them, of course.
It only *validates* those which accept the fundamental premise:
"existence exists".
I have two pounds of steel and five bolts in my right femur which
illustrate the point.
Billy
http://www.mindspring.com/~wjb3/free/free.html
"Rant" updated 2/19/96
Stephen Grossman
: 8$h...@wizard.pn.com>
: X-Newsreader: Forte Free Agent 1.0.82
: sgr...@pictac.com (Stephen Grossman) annoyed the censors with:
: >: of me, why not cut "sci.philosophy.meta" out of the newsgroups line -
: >: then you won't risk my reading your postings, and perhaps you'll get
away
: >: with posting such drivel.
: >Drivel within which philosophy? Get thee to a quackey!
: I have watched you posts and you seem
nay, i know not seems
: more interested in insulting
: those who disagree with you than actually discussing philosophical
: ideas.
you're a liar and a philosophical incompetent
: just an observation from another meaningless-absurdly-subjective-
: postmodernist-who-belongs-in-a-......quackey?????
quackery; as in Hamlet's nunnery and fraud.
I see you know who and what you are.
Stephen Grossman
: Objectivists seem quite attached to physical objects, at least the ones
yes, we're "attached" to food, shelter and clothing. are you for real? maybe
thats a bad question. The philosophy of objectivism evokes bizzare responses
in subjectivists. boyden obviously thinks that valuing reality is optional
and a matter of taste.
: that I have talked to.
youve talked to physical objects? How dreadful for you!
: Yet if this is the Objectivist line,
if? Objectivism is a constant stress on physical objects (as known by
systematic reason).
:then it
: would seem that Objectivist resources for criticizing Berkeleyan idealism
: are quite limited; Berkeley is in full agreement with Objectivism about
[B: the given, so he would apparently not be subject to the standard
: [BObjectivist complaint that philosophers deny reality.
you are authentically bizarre. idealism contradicts the objectivity of
reality. B said physical objects were in the mind of God. B thus accepted
the primacy of consciousness. Rand accepted the primacy of existence. This
is t[Bhe basic philosophical alternative.
: "Any competent philosopher who does not understand something will take care
Ghostboy
X-Newsreader: Forte Free Agent 1.0.82
sgr...@pictac.com (Stephen Grossman) annoyed the censors with:
> <DpqF5...@watserv3.uwaterloo.ca>
>NNTP-Posting-Host: scorpio.pictac.com
>X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL2]
Point made....thank you...I knew you would help me on this.
Ghostboy --- A Non-practicing Atheist
PS I hope you and your ego are very happy together.
Ernest Brown
I believe that the problem lies in the fact that the Objectivists consider
tautologies to be -productive-. The problem with using "existence exists"
as a bald statement of fact is that anyone, including solipsists, can
assent to it given their definition of "exists." Once the Objectivists
import their realist definition of "existence exists" into it, (a
definition I fully agree with, BTW) it is no longer a tautology but a
premise that needs defense. Is this an accurate summary of your critique?
Ernest Brown
Peter J. King
> There is a distinction between the perceptual realm, and
> the conceptual realm. Error is _only_ possible on the
> conceptual realm, because this is where you have volition.
> This is where you make assessments. Percepts are the given.
> We don't choose whether we see black or white. We either
> do or we don't. We do decide whether what we are seeing is
> an asteroid or not, for example.
How do you deal with the standard (and some of them pretty strong)
arguments against Descartes' version of this thesis? Indeed, how does
this differ from what Descartes says in _Meditations_ IV? Except insofar
as the use of the notion of *choice* or *decision* (rather than the more
subtle notion of will) makes for even more obvious problems.
I don't decide what I'm seeing in any normal sense of `decide' -
the theory-ladenness involved isn't really at the level of theory for most
observations, though some sort of interpretation is clearly going on (as
it is when we see black or white).
It seems to me then that in one direction what you say
oversimplifies matters, interpreting the exercise of the will in terms of
choice in every situation; in another direction, you overcomplicate
matters, distinguishing between different sorts of perception in a way
that isn't really tenable.
On top of that, you either make error unavoidable, or you raise
the spectre of an infinite regress of the will operating on the will
operating on the will...
Peter J. King
TWEETY BIRD
: Professor King,
: Ernest Brown
:
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Peter J. King
> I believe that the problem lies in the fact that the Objectivists consider
> tautologies to be -productive-. The problem with using "existence exists"
> as a bald statement of fact is that anyone, including solipsists, can
> assent to it given their definition of "exists." Once the Objectivists
> import their realist definition of "existence exists" into it, (a
> definition I fully agree with, BTW) it is no longer a tautology but a
> premise that needs defense. Is this an accurate summary of your critique?
I suppose that I have two worries now. First, I'm suspicious of
any writer (or school) who expresses herself so obscurely that one has to
know everything about what she says before one can know anything about
what she says. The slogan "existence exist" is, as it stands nonsense.
Perhaps, if one redefines the terms being used, it can be made to make
sense - but why not have said it in plain English in the first place?
(Rand is by no means alone in this, but she differs in that she has
followers who treat her work in an almost religious way, rather than using
it to go on and do philosophy; that exacerbates the problem.)
Secondly, so many Randians have such a poor grasp of philosophy
outside their own little (and very obscure) corner that they have no real
idea of what non-Randians think. Thus we get people assuming that if
you're not a Randian "Objectivist" you must be a subjectivist, or that
everyone else is wedded to anti-realism. I very strongly suspect that
this is the main reason for the cult-like nature of Randism - its
proponents think of themselves as the sole holders of an important set of
positions, whereas philosophy is full of people who work within the same
basic set of approaches, though generally with more sophistication and
less dogmatism.
When I first discovered Randism it was a little like stumbling
across a group who insisted loudly but in obscure terms that the world
wasn't flat, nor the centre of the universe, and who were so devoted to
defending this claim against imagined opposition that they were stuck in
the same stagnant position, unaware of the outside world, their language
becoming more and more ritualistic, less and less meaningful.
A slightly exaggerated analogy, but only slightly I think.
[Incidentally, my use of "Randian" and "Randism" isn't meant to express
anything evaluative - it's just that the term `objectivism' has a distinct
meaning out in the world of philosophy (I'm an objectivist myself), and I
don't want to get into the habit of confusing the two.]
TWEETY BIRD
: Peter J. King
: | http://sable.ox.ac.uk/~shil0124 |
: | http://www.geocities.com/Athens/2648/ |
: | Philosophy resources, plus |
: | lots more - both serious and recreational |
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Ernest Brown
To: "Peter J. King" <shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk>
Re: questions??
On Sun, 14 Apr 1996, Ernest Brown wrote (in response to me):
> I believe that the problem lies in the fact that the Objectivists
consider
> tautologies to be -productive-. The problem with using "existence exists"
> as a bald statement of fact is that anyone, including solipsists, can
> assent to it given their definition of "exists." Once the Objectivists
> import their realist definition of "existence exists" into it, (a
> definition I fully agree with, BTW) it is no longer a tautology but a
> premise that needs defense. Is this an accurate summary of your critique?
PJK:
I suppose that I have two worries now. First, I'm suspicious of
any writer (or school) who expresses herself so obscurely that one has to
know everything about what she says before one can know anything about
what she says. The slogan "existence exist" is, as it stands nonsense.
Perhaps, if one redefines the terms being used, it can be made to make
sense - but why not have said it in plain English in the first place?
(Rand is by no means alone in this, but she differs in that she has
followers who treat her work in an almost religious way, rather than using
it to go on and do philosophy; that exacerbates the problem.)
My response:
Rand is, if anything, very clear on how she defines "existence exists."
She strongly defends what Peter Van Inwagen calls the "Common Western
Metaphysic," (1) affirming moderate realism but denying Aristotelian
essentialism. She calls this view "the primacy of existence" in contrast to
any view that has the human mind involved in a primary construction of
perceived reality (the Kantian notion of the ideality of space and time is
her classic bugbear, as you have already gathered [g]) which she calls the
"primacy of consciousness."
PJK:
Secondly, so many Randians have such a poor grasp of philosophy
outside their own little (and very obscure) corner that they have no real
idea of what non-Randians think. Thus we get people assuming that if
you're not a Randian "Objectivist" you must be a subjectivist, or that
everyone else is wedded to anti-realism. I very strongly suspect that
this is the main reason for the cult-like nature of Randism - its
proponents think of themselves as the sole holders of an important set of
positions, whereas philosophy is full of people who work within the same
basic set of approaches, though generally with more sophistication and
less dogmatism.
My reply:
Why do many academic philosophers reject Rand? I propose a few reasons; A)
They think that Rand's philosophy (especially her realism) is naive, B) She
refused to respect the "rules" of the philosophical community, C) She wrote
for a popular audience, and was immensely successful in doing so, hence
jealousy on the part of the professors, D) A glorification of
(metaphysical) irrationality in both major schools of philosophy [Anglo
American and Continental] during the time of her greatest productivity,
along with a fascination with collectivist social and political philosophy
on both sides of the Atlantic also drove a rejection of her thought. Of the
four, I think only (A), the first one, has any merit as far as a criticism
of her thought goes.
I do find Rand's realism "naive" in the sense that she merely asserts that
it is self-contradictory to deny the existence of the external world and
logic and doesn't go on to make the indirect demonstration of the mind-
independence of the real world which is necessary for her argument. By
failing to do that, and making her premises "axioms," she presents what you
and many other philosophers rightly feel to be an "appeal to force."
(anyone who denies her premises is morally and intellectually bankrupt.)
You undoubtedly know this, but the problem question for philosophical
objectivists is how to answer the charge that logic is a mere necessity of
language and not an intrinsic part of the world.
Also in support of your point is Leonard Peikoff's book, OBJECTIVISM: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF AYN RAND, which is a fairly decent overview of Rand's
thought, but it illuminates her weaknesses. The section on religion,
especially pages 30-33, really shows ignorance of the Thomistic heritage of
the Christian religion and its influence in Western Culture, ironically
enough including Rand's thought. Rand and Peikoff assert that ALL religious
believers insist on "the primacy of consciousness" vs. "the primacy of
existence," conveniently forgetting that Aquinas asserted that God's
EXISTENCE is a primary, not God's consciousness. (For example, God "can't
think" another God into existence since that violates the principle of
non-contradiction, among other things.) The official Objectivist take on
Aquinas is that he is a great intellectual hero who reintroduced Aristotle
to the West, but in reality he is the "crazy uncle" kept in the attic due
to his theism. This has interesting consequences for Objectivism, which I
discuss below.
PJK:
When I first discovered Randism it was a little like stumbling
across a group who insisted loudly but in obscure terms that the world
wasn't flat, nor the centre of the universe, and who were so devoted to
defending this claim against imagined opposition that they were stuck in
the same stagnant position, unaware of the outside world, their language
becoming more and more ritualistic, less and less meaningful.
My reply:
Michael Huemer has already brought up some of this in his response to you
on the Kant topic, but there is more going on in Objectivism than crying.
Remember that Rand was writing her fiction and philosophy during the period
in which existentialism dominated Continental philosophy and logical
positivism had a hammerlock on Anglo-American analysis. The former, with
its emphasis on groundless choice, and the latter, denying any possibility
of a systematic philosophy in the traditional sense and dominated by a
powerful anti-metaphysical reductionism, not only were repellent to Rand
but many young philosophy students who inarticulately held onto the Common
Western Metaphysic and felt Rand spoke to their intellectual needs.
Nathaniel Branden is quite candid about his distress at having to take
philosophy courses under Sartre's American epigone William Barrett (author
of IRRATIONAL MAN), calling his philosophy one of "blood and guts." (2)
Even today, the Objectivists see individuals such as Rorty (the anti
humanistic "professor of humanities") and schools of philosophy on the
order of deconstructionism and postmodernism to be the heirs of this
irrationality. (3) I don't necessarily disagree with their assessments!
PJK-
A slightly exaggerated analogy, but only slightly I think.
[Incidentally, my use of "Randian" and "Randism" isn't meant to express
anything evaluative - it's just that the term `objectivism' has a distinct
meaning out in the world of philosophy (I'm an objectivist myself), and I
don't want to get into the habit of confusing the two.]
My response:
I am a philosophical objectivist myself, within the Aristotelian-Thomistic
does) and critical of the Objectivist interpretation of that branch of
tradition, so I am both sympathetic to attempts to promote it (as Rand
does) and skeptical of the Objectivist interpretation of that area of
philosophy. Rand's attempt to fuse atheism with Aristotle has the unhappy
effect of making her philosophy of religion and attitude towards cosmology
purely Kantian in its outcome, ironically enough! That is for another post,
however.
Ernest Brown
(1) Van Inwagen, Peter. METAPHYSICS. Dimensions of Philosophy Series.
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc.) 1993, pp. 20-21.
(2) Rand's attitude towards both schools is neatly summarized in the
entries on "Logical Positivism" and "Subjectivism" in the excellent
anthology THE AYN RAND LEXICON, ed. Henry Binswanger (New York: Meridian
Trade Paperback Edition) 1986, 1988 pp. 264-266, 486-491.
(3) For an Objectivist analysis of current philosophical trends, consult
the audiotaped lecture, "The Black Hole of Contemporary Philosophy" by Gary
Hull (now Dr. Hull) 1992, available from Second Renaissance Books.
Stephen Grossman
: I suppose that I have two worries now. First, I'm suspicious of
: any writer (or school) who expresses herself so obscurely that one has to
: know everything about what she says before one can know anything about
: what she says. The slogan "existence exist" is, as it stands nonsense.
: Perhaps, if one redefines the terms being used, it can be made to make
: sense - but why not have said it in plain English in the first place?
: (Rand is by no means alone in this, but she differs in that she has
: followers who treat her work in an almost religious way, rather than using
: it to go on and do philosophy; that exacerbates the problem.)
Imagine, if you will, a person who, faced, as all humans are, with the choice
to survive by reasoning or die by evading reason, chooses evasion. This
evasion has two basic effects: practical (existential) and psychological.
Practically, since he has evaded the basic means of survival, he will suffer
and die. Psychologically, he experiences a lack of his basic method of
survival and that he is responsible for this lack, that he has
chosen a course of death. This is psychologically intolerable. There are
three possible reponses: suicide, insanity, or rationalization. Choosing
rationalization is the method most people accept. When those choosing this
are also philosophers, they pervert thought into anti-thought. They erect an
elaborate, comprehensive, profound state of consciousness which forms a
barrier to a rational conciousness of concrete reality. When confronted by
any concrete reality, their anti-thougt tells them that it isnt real, that
its caused by consciousnes (supernatural (Plato), subjective (Kant), or social
(postmodernism). They tell themselves and their cultures that the reality
they hate doesnt exist, that nothing exists, that existence doesnt exist,
that existence has no meaning (which, for them, is true). The primacy of
consciousness must be refuted as bad philosophy but never forget it is a
rationalization not an honest error.
Peter J. King
> Remember that Rand was writing her fiction and philosophy during the period
> in which existentialism dominated Continental philosophy and logical
> positivism had a hammerlock on Anglo-American analysis. The former, with
> its emphasis on groundless choice, and the latter, denying any possibility
> of a systematic philosophy in the traditional sense and dominated by a
> powerful anti-metaphysical reductionism, not only were repellent to Rand
> but many young philosophy students who inarticulately held onto the Common
> Western Metaphysic and felt Rand spoke to their intellectual needs.
> Nathaniel Branden is quite candid about his distress at having to take
> philosophy courses under Sartre's American epigone William Barrett (author
> of IRRATIONAL MAN), calling his philosophy one of "blood and guts." (2)
> Even today, the Objectivists see individuals such as Rorty (the anti
> humanistic "professor of humanities") and schools of philosophy on the
> order of deconstructionism and postmodernism to be the heirs of this
> irrationality. (3) I don't necessarily disagree with their assessments!
This might be a valid historical explanation of Rand's (and
others') wish to find an alternative (and I agree that existentialism is
pretentious bosh and logical positivism dry bosh - though even so, the
latter at least can't be said to have had no positive effects on what
followed); it doesn't suffice as a defence of the Randian cult *now*.
I agree, incidentally, about Rorty, deconstructionism, and
post-modernism - pretentious twaddle all (but again, once we've got
completely past them, who knows what [perhaps unintended] positive
effects they mightn't prove to have?).
(Incidentally, when I called myself an objectivist, I was
thinking of the approach to ethics being developed by, among others,
John McDowell, rather than anything wider.)
Ernest Brown
The following is my friend Bill Ramey's response to an Objectivist
sympathizer on the link between Kant and Rand's views on the philosophy of
religion and the question of cosmology (reprinted with his permission):
What I am going to do in this post is very simple. Ernest and I contend
that Peikoff's critique of theism is Kantian and hence inconsistent with
the whole of Objectivism. To that end, I will quote Peikoff, Kant, and
Aristotle. Then I will let you and others in this topic draw your own
conclusions about where Peikoff's assumptions come from.
We'll begin with the oft-posted quote from Peikoff:
"God" as traditionally defined is a systematic contradiction of
every valid metaphysical principle. The point is wider than just
the Judeo-Christian concept of God. *No argument will get you
from this world to a supernatural world.* No reason will lead
you to a world contradicting this one. *No method of inference
will enable you to leap from existence to a "super-existence."*
(187, emphasis mine)
Peikoff is very clear here; one cannot reason from the existence of the
universe to the existence of God. If Peikoff is right, then so long to
the
cosmological argument. Notice that Peikoff makes this argument, not on
empirical grounds, but on *a priori* logical grounds; he rejects theism on
the grounds that it contradicts what the human mind can know, e.g., the
law
of identity.
Now we can ask a question: does Peikoff here have more in common with Kant
or with Aristotle? The latter does not agree at all with Peikoff:
[W]e must assert that it is necessary that there should be an
eternal unmovable substance. For substances are the first of
existing things, and if they are all destructible, all things are
destructible. But it is impossible that movement should either
have come into being or cease to be (for it must always have
existed) ...
... [S]ince there is something which moves while itself unmoved,
existing actually, this can in no way be otherwise than as it is.
For motion in space is the first of the kinds of change, and
motion in a circle the first kind of spatial motion; and this the
first mover produces. The first mover, then, exists of
necessity; and in so far as it exists by necessity, its mode of
being is good, and it is in this sense a first principle.
On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world of
nature.... God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and
eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal,
most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal
belong to God; for this is God. (Book XII, chs. 6-7)
It would seem that (1) Aristotle believes we can reason from this universe
to the existence of God and that (2) God, far from contradicting "every
valid metaphysical principle," is actually the First Principle, upon which
the universe depends. Of course, this is one of the earliest statements
of
the cosmological argument, and it had a great impact on Aquinas, a
Christian thinker for whom Ayn Rand had great respect.
Turning to a philosopher whom Rand despised, let's look at Immanuel Kant's
attitude toward cosmology and the cosmological argument:
We should no doubt gladly desist from wishing to have our
questions answered dogmatically, if we understood beforehand that
... it would only increase our ignorance ... This is the great
advantage of the sceptical treatment of questions which pure
reason puts to pure reason. We get rid by it ... of a great
amount of dogmatical rubbish, in order to put in its place sober
criticism which ... removes successfully all illusion with its
train of omniscience.
If, therefore, I could know beforehand that a cosmological idea
[is] either *too large or too small* for any *concept of the
understanding*, I should understand that, as that cosmological
idea refers only to an object of experience which is to
correspond to a possible concept of the understanding, it must be
empty and without meaning, because the object does not fit into
it, whatever I may do to adapt it. And this must really be the
case with all cosmical concepts, which on that very account
involve reason, so long as it remains attached to them, in
inevitable antinomy.
... We have thus been led at least to a well-founded suspicion
that the cosmological ideas, and with them all the conflicting
sophistical assertions, may rest on an empty and merely imaginary
conception of the manner in which the object of those ideas can
be given ... (343-45, emphasis Kant's)
Despite the stilted language, Kant's train of argument is clear; the
cosmological idea ends in antinomy, i.e., in contradiction. Ironically,
Kant is more consistent than Peikoff, because Kant draws the proper
inferences from his philosophical premises; if we perceive reality through
*a
priori* categories, then empirical statements about the universe are
illusory. But Peikoff is supposed to be a realist who believes that
reality exists outside of the human mind; and if it does exist outside of
the human mind, the universe becomes a legitimate object of rational
enquiry. That is why it is puzzling that you remarked:
Reason is a capability (faculty) of human beings, not a "property
of the universe."
This is a Kantian premise, not a realist or an Aristotelian one. On this
premise, the human mind becomes the focus of rational enquiry (a la Kant's
critique of pure reason), not reality itself--note again that Peikoff
relies on *a priori* logical arguments about what the mind can know. You
also suggested:
That was one of Rand's most fundamental breakthru's - that you
don't HAVE to explain what IS. It simply IS ...
Kant believed that all we can do is elucidate the categories that govern
our perception of phenomena; conversely, we must remain silent about
noumena, i.e., we must remain silent about why the universe exists. In
this regard, Kant is a philosophical idealist. The question is why would
Objectivist, who reject Kant with a vengeance, use his premises for any
purpose whatsoever?
Bill Ramey (75041...@CompuServe.COM)
Peter J. King
> The following is my friend Bill Ramey's response to an Objectivist
> sympathizer on the link between Kant and Rand's views on the philosophy of
> religion and the question of cosmology (reprinted with his permission):
>
>
> What I am going to do in this post is very simple. Ernest and I contend
> that Peikoff's critique of theism is Kantian and hence inconsistent with
> the whole of Objectivism. To that end, I will quote Peikoff, Kant, and
> Aristotle. Then I will let you and others in this topic draw your own
> conclusions about where Peikoff's assumptions come from.
>
> [...]
Thanks for the article. The problem with the arguments in it,
though, is that they're purely ad hominem. That is, they don't show that
Peikoff is wrong, only at best that his position conflicts with other
positions that he holds. And even then they only do this by assuming
that, if one rejects the theories of a certain philosopher, one must
reject everything that that philosopher believed (and the same, mutatis
mutandis, for philosophers with whom one agrees).
It's perfectly acceptable to reject Kant's basic metaphysical
position and accept Aristotle's, yet agree with Kant on some things and
disagree with Aristotle on others. The only criterion that should be
applied is: are the arguments sound?
It's true, of course, that many of those who write most
aggressively and often in defence of Randism treat philosophy like
football, cheering for one team, jeering at the other (but that's true of
many undergraduates studying philosophy, at least until they can be
persuaded to do philosophy instead of merely taking sides).
John Alway
> ... snip ... <
> Peikoff is very clear here; one cannot reason from the existence of the
> universe to the existence of God. If Peikoff is right, then so long to
> the
> cosmological argument.
> Notice that Peikoff makes this argument, not on
> empirical grounds, but on *a priori* logical grounds; he rejects theism on
> the grounds that it contradicts what the human mind can know, e.g., the
> law of identity.
First a disclaimer, I don't speak for Peikoff, and don't have any
where near the understanding of this that he would have, but I
see problems right off the top.
The law of identity is an *empirical law.* It is the connection
between the epistemological and the metaphysical. In Objectivism
it is an *axiom,* afterall. Not something which is provable, rather
something which is ostensively validated. Further, Objectivism
rejects the "a priori" concept. All understanding arises from
experience and can never be severed from it. IOWs, your very
premise is not conceded.
So, it is certainly not a priori. Not in the least. It is
quintessential experience: the starting point. The starting
point for reason itself. Experience and identity are _one__,
a whole.
One thing is certain about Aristotle's scientific method, it
is very much in line with Peikoff's approach (differences in
views of cause and effect noted.) For a quite good analysis
of Aristotle's scientific method see John Herman Randall's
book "Aristotle."
...John
--
___________________________________________________________________
\_The most formidable weapon against errors of any kind is Reason._\
/_I have never used any other, and I trust I never shall.__________/
\_____________________________________________________Thomas Paine_\
/__John Alway jal...@icsi.net______________________________________/
Stephen Grossman
: On 9 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
: > Kant started from a metaphysical noumena/phenomena split. There are no
: > metaphysical splits. Everything exists equally. "Nor is there more Being
: > here and less Being there but it is all together." [Parmenides]
: You misunderstand the noumena/phenomena split, as you'd realize if you'd
: read my message before responding to it. Since you didn't bother last
: time, I won't bother to repeat myself.
Within which philosophy do i misunderstand it? Im not disagreeing, merely
asking for context.
Stephen Grossman
: Professor King,
: I believe that the problem lies in the fact that the Objectivists consider
: tautologies to be -productive-. The problem with using "existence exists"
: as a bald statement of fact is that anyone, including solipsists, can
: assent to it given their definition of "exists." Once the Objectivists
: import their realist definition of "existence exists" into it, (a
: definition I fully agree with, BTW) it is no longer a tautology but a
: premise that needs defense. Is this an accurate summary of your critique?
Existence cannot be defined. Existence, identity, and conscious are the
context of definition. Tautology and all other secondary issues are
contextualized within existence, identity, and conscious. Control your
context.
Stephen Grossman
: It's true, of course, that many of those who write most
: aggressively and often in defence of Randism treat philosophy like
: football, cheering for one team, jeering at the other (but that's true of
: many undergraduates studying philosophy, at least until they can be
: persuaded to do philosophy instead of merely taking sides).
Sophist King continues to search for metaphysical neutrality, ie, a
perspective from which he would judge existence. But the only thing he'll
find is non-existence, ie, death. King and the other creatures who inhabit
contemporary philosophy are subjectivists, burrowing ever deeper into
subjectivity to escape from an meaningless existence.
Peter J. King
> The law of identity is an *empirical law.* It is the connection
> between the epistemological and the metaphysical. In Objectivism
> it is an *axiom,* afterall.
It's an empirical law *and* an axiom? You are trying to *defend*
Randism aren't you? (What his second sentence means I can't make out;
could someone help?)
PJK
haskell jack
>> Peikoff is very clear here; one cannot reason from the existence of the
>> universe to the existence of God. If Peikoff is right, then so long to
>> the cosmological argument.
>> Notice that Peikoff makes this argument, not on
>> empirical grounds, but on *a priori* logical grounds; he rejects theism on
>> the grounds that it contradicts what the human mind can know, e.g., the
>> law of identity.
> First a disclaimer, I don't speak for Peikoff, and don't have any
> where near the understanding of this that he would have, but I
> see problems right off the top.
You see only what you are supposed to see. You completely missed the
shift from arguing from universals to arguing about the universe.
> The law of identity is an *empirical law.* It is the connection
> between the epistemological and the metaphysical.
Considered on the whole, (that is, A=A) that is true, but the emphysis
is different between Rand and Aristotle.
One says a=A, the other A=a. That reflects the difference between
essence and essential.
> In Objectivism it is an *axiom,* afterall. Not something which is
> provable, rather something which is ostensively validated.
> Further, Objectivism rejects the "a priori" concept.
Who said that, Peikoff? If he did, he's a fool. The syllogism can be
easily defended on the basis of a priori reasoning, and just because
someone attempts to substitute it in place of "axioms" is no reason to
disregard its usefullness. In fact, if I wanted to attack the idea of
a priori, that would be a clever way of doing it.
>All understanding arises from experience and can never be severed
>from it.
Let us hope not. Experience can be rational or irrational behavior.
Tis far better to incorporate rationality and experience into an
autonomous unity, than to have them exist separately.
> One thing is certain about Aristotle's scientific method, it
> is very much in line with Peikoff's approach (differences in
> views of cause and effect noted.) For a quite good analysis
> of Aristotle's scientific method see John Herman Randall's
> book "Aristotle."
Alas, It's no longer available.
/jack
Tony Donadio
: > The law of identity is an *empirical law.* It is the connection
: > between the epistemological and the metaphysical. In Objectivism
: > it is an *axiom,* afterall.
: It's an empirical law *and* an axiom?
Yes, of course. That is what an axiom is: a perceptual self-evidency, a
principle that is implicit in every thought and experience.
: You are trying to *defend* Randism aren't you?
Looks it to me.
--
Tony * Money is the material shape of the principle that men who wish
Donadio * to deal with one another must deal by trade and give value for
* value. - Francisco D'Anconia, in ATLAS SHRUGGED, by Ayn Rand
Stephen Grossman
: On Mon, 22 Apr 1996, John Alway wrote:
:
: > The law of identity is an *empirical law.* It is the connection
: > between the epistemological and the metaphysical. In Objectivism
: > it is an *axiom,* afterall.
: It's an empirical law *and* an axiom? You are trying to *defend*
: Randism aren't you? (What his second sentence means I can't make out;
: could someone help?)
Within Objectivism, there is no empirical/logical split. Rational knowledge is
both empirical and logical. This is an application of Rand's historically
important recognition that existence is identity. It is not the case that
subjective mental structures are
used to know contingent experience. Objective reality, possessing identity
and causality, is known by a mind in contact, thru perception, with it. Mind
also has identity and causality. Identity is primarily metaphysical and, on
that basis, then logical.
Peter J. King
> Peter J. King (shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
> : On Mon, 22 Apr 1996, John Alway wrote:
>
> : > The law of identity is an *empirical law.* It is the connection
> : > between the epistemological and the metaphysical. In Objectivism
> : > it is an *axiom,* afterall.
>
> : It's an empirical law *and* an axiom?
>
> Yes, of course. That is what an axiom is: a perceptual self-evidency, a
> principle that is implicit in every thought and experience.
It seems that Randism has a new definition for every term.
Unfortunately, even using this odd sense of `axiom', an axiom can't be an
empirical law. Unless you mean something strange by "empirical law".
Randian: This disk is a cube.
Questioner: It's a disk *and* a cube?
Randian: Yes of course. That is what a cube is - a potentially
malleable three-dimensional object that is in everyone's
pocket.
Questioner (backing away slowly and carefully): Ah yes, I see...
Peter J. King
Daniel Smith
>>
>> : On Mon, 22 Apr 1996, John Alway wrote:
>>
>> : > The law of identity is an *empirical law.* It is the connection
>> : > between the epistemological and the metaphysical. In Objectivism
>> : > it is an *axiom,* afterall.
>> Peter J. King (shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
>> : It's an empirical law *and* an axiom?
On 24 Apr 1996, Tony Donadio wrote:
>>
>> Yes, of course. That is what an axiom is: a perceptual self-evidency, a
>> principle that is implicit in every thought and experience.
Peter J. King (shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
> It seems that Randism has a new definition for every term.
>Unfortunately, even using this odd sense of `axiom', an axiom can't be an
>empirical law. Unless you mean something strange by "empirical law".
> Randian: This disk is a cube.
> Questioner: It's a disk *and* a cube?
> Randian: Yes of course. That is what a cube is - a potentially
> malleable three-dimensional object that is in everyone's
> pocket.
> Questioner (backing away slowly and carefully): Ah yes, I see...
American Heritage dictionary:
Empirical -- based on *observation*.
Law -- (science/logic) a *principle* or generalization based on *observed*
phenomena or consistent experience.
Axiom -- a *principle* that is accepted as true without proof.
[emphasis added to the above]
First things first Mr. King.
A=A: the *law* of identity/the *law* non-contradiction.
Do you agree with this?
If you do, then do you agree that this *law* has its foundations in
sensory evidence?
If you are still in agreement, then why isn't the law of identity an
empirical law? And since an empirical law is a principle based on observed
phenomena why aren't axioms (principles) empirical laws? Doesn't all
knowledge have its foundations in sensory evidence?
As to your vignette above, if you believe an Objectivist would say any such
thing, you misunderstand Objectivism.
If you disagree with the above (definitions etc.) please let me know. I'd
like to understand your reasoning. Perhaps there is something I misunderstand
or maybe I missed something in previous posts that would create a better
context for understanding.
Respectfully,
Dan Smith
John Alway
: On Mon, 22 Apr 1996, John Alway wrote:
: > The law of identity is an *empirical law.* It is the connection
: > between the epistemological and the metaphysical. In Objectivism
: > it is an *axiom,* afterall.
: It's an empirical law *and* an axiom? You are trying to *defend*
: Randism aren't you? (What his second sentence means I can't make out;
: could someone help?)
Yes, it is axiomatic, in that it is the starting point, a
primary fact which is ostensive, and can not be reduced any
further.
*pause*
That is, you can't explain identity in terms of anything
else. It just is. (Not any particular identity, but identity
itself.)
*pause*
All you can do is experience it. You know of identity
_because_ you experience *kinds of things,* otherwise you
could not know of it. Further, you could not, and can not,
derive it. Derivations require *identity* as a foundation.
To derive I need stuff to manipulate. For example, to derive
the force on a charge I need to know the quantitiative *identity*
of the charge and the *identity* of another charge acting on it,
i.e. *kinds of things.*
*pause*
It is *empirical* in that it is direct evidence, i.e. it is
perceived. All that I percieve has a _nature_, i.e. an identity.
I learn this empirically.
I really believe that the only people who could have trouble
with this must be raving rationalists who don't realize that
there is a legitimate starting point. Some people seem hell
bent on proving everything in terms of something else. Well,
the world doesn't work that way. Somethings can be derived,
and somethings must be accepted. Not on faith, mind you, but
because ones senses shove it down ones throat.
Peter J. King
(I had questioned John Alway's claim that the law of identity was an axiom
*and* and empirical law.)
> American Heritage dictionary:
>
> Empirical -- based on *observation*.
>
> Law -- (science/logic) a *principle* or generalization based on *observed*
> phenomena or consistent experience.
>
> Axiom -- a *principle* that is accepted as true without proof.
>
> [emphasis added to the above]
OK, let's accept these definitions for the sake of argument (I
think that relying on a general dictionary for philosophical - or any
technical - terms is risky, but these are close enough, if rather crude).
So far they seem clearly to back up my point; a law is based upon
observation, an axiom is accepted without the need for such evidence.
> First things first Mr. King.
>
> A=A: the *law* of identity/the *law* non-contradiction.
>
> Do you agree with this?
Yes.
> If you do, then do you agree that this *law* has its foundations in
> sensory evidence?
No. Someone who had to look around in order to know that A=A would be in
a bad way. It's an a priori truth, not an empirical truth.
If you can't see this, I'm not sure what to say (I'd feel like
Achilles in Lewis Carroll's sketch). Perhaps this: if someone (per
impossibile) didn't know that A=A, how would they make empirical
observations in order to discover its truth?
> If you are still in agreement, then why isn't the law of identity an
> empirical law? And since an empirical law is a principle based on observed
> phenomena why aren't axioms (principles) empirical laws? Doesn't all
> knowledge have its foundations in sensory evidence?
No, it doesn't. Mathematical knowledge doesn't, for example.
Peter J. King
(Incidentally, if you really want to be formal, it's "Dr"; I prefer
being called Peter.)
haskell jack
>First things first Mr. King.
>A=A: the *law* of identity/the *law* non-contradiction.
>Do you agree with this?
No, I'm not King, and -no, this is not correct.
You've seen too many Certs commercials, dearheart, for it's not "TWO,,
TWO, Two laws in one! "
There are three laws of thought, the TWO mentioned and the law of
excluded middle.
Rand make use of them in sectioning Atlas Shrugged.
/jack
John Adelsberger
Daniel Smith (dls...@psu.edu) wrote:
: "Peter J. King" <shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk> writes:
: >>
: >> : On Mon, 22 Apr 1996, John Alway wrote:
: >>
: >> : > The law of identity is an *empirical law.* It is the connection
: >> : > between the epistemological and the metaphysical. In Objectivism
: >> : > it is an *axiom,* afterall.
Apparently John Alway's thinking isn't so clear. Empirical 'laws' _are_
based in observation. Thus the word, 'empirical.' On the other hand,
axioms, to 'Randians' (Objectivists, if you please; we call you your silly
titles, so we're entitled to ours:-) are those things which are true because
of context; they are true because any attempt to prove them wrong must
invariably have as a premise their truth. For example, A is A. You cannot
deny this, because in order to explain your argument, you must concede that
you are here, that I am here, and that we are thinking beings. Otherwise,
your 'explaining' makes no sense - the context just isn't there. "Well,
maybe I'm here," you say. Well then, maybe I'm leaving, because I don't
want to be accused of listening to a ghost...(insert laugh here, for the
sarcasm impaired.)
: On 24 Apr 1996, Tony Donadio wrote:
: >>
: >> Yes, of course. That is what an axiom is: a perceptual self-evidency, a
: >> principle that is implicit in every thought and experience.
Axioms cannot be understood previous to perception because of the nature
of consciousness; ie that it is first conscious of other things before
recognizing itself or the rules that govern the things it is aware of.
Nevertheless, axioms are not perceptual in nature. See above paragraph
by me.
: Peter J. King (shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
: > It seems that Randism has a new definition for every term.
: >Unfortunately, even using this odd sense of `axiom', an axiom can't be an
: >empirical law. Unless you mean something strange by "empirical law".
Again, the term is, I believe(last I checked) Objectivist, not Randian, and
Objectivism, not Randism. Mr. King's conclusion is based on bad testimony;
if he would read the material himself instead of trusting people who, from
all that they say on these newsgroups, don't know what they speak of, he
would have more luck in understanding the subject matter(assuming that
understanding is what he wants, of course.)
: American Heritage dictionary:
: Empirical -- based on *observation*.
: Law -- (science/logic) a *principle* or generalization based on *observed*
: phenomena or consistent experience.
: Axiom -- a *principle* that is accepted as true without proof.
I'm fairly sure that Objectivism agrees with these definitions. I won't
speak for the literature though, so you should probably read it yourself.
The only one that we would quibble with is the last, the definition of
axiom; I might well say that an axiom proves itself, and that an attempt
to deny it is an attempt to deny the utility of logic and the ability of
man to comprehend his surroundings(in which case philosophy is a moot
point to begin with.)
: A=A: the *law* of identity/the *law* non-contradiction.
Assuming you mean what you say, then yes, _I_ would(don't know about
Mr. King.)
: If you do, then do you agree that this *law* has its foundations in
: sensory evidence?
No. Our recognition of it depends on a well developed consciousness that
has integrated various sensory evidence, but the law would hold regardless
of our comprehension of it. (This is the primacy of existance.)
: If you are still in agreement, then why isn't the law of identity an
: empirical law? And since an empirical law is a principle based on observed
: phenomena why aren't axioms (principles) empirical laws? Doesn't all
: knowledge have its foundations in sensory evidence?
Empirical laws are those observed directly. The integrations(generalizations,
for those who aren't familiar with Objectivist epistemology) we make are
not empirical in nature; we can point at an apple and say "red";
we cannot point at an apple, say, "A is A," and hope to be understood.
: As to your vignette above, if you believe an Objectivist would say any such
: thing, you misunderstand Objectivism.
I do believe Objectivism differentiates between axioms and empirical laws.
After reading Ayn Rand's works, I _know_ she did. Axioms are the basis
of a logical structure; empirical laws are often it's furthest reaches.
--
John J. Adelsberger III "I swear by my life and my love of
j...@umr.edu it that I will never live for the
sake of another man, nor ask
Send all flames to ro...@127.0.0.1 another man to live for mine."
- Ayn Rand
Brook Young
>>
>>
>
>
>> If you do, then do you agree that this *law* has its foundations in
>> sensory evidence?
>
>a bad way. It's an a priori truth, not an empirical truth.
>
> If you can't see this, I'm not sure what to say (I'd feel like
>Achilles in Lewis Carroll's sketch). Perhaps this: if someone (per
>impossibile) didn't know that A=A, how would they make empirical
>observations in order to discover its truth?
How could you discover an "a priori" truth without empirical observations?
From this premise one doesn't even have to exists for him to acquire knowledge.
Knowledge isn't acquired by logic divorced from experience or experience divorced
from logic;it is acquired by applying logic *to* experience.
Brook b_y...@cc.colorado.edu
"From the simplest necessity to the highest religious
abstraction, from the wheel to the skyscraper, everything
we are and everything we have comes from a single attribute
of man - the function of his reasoning mind." - Ayn Rand
Daniel Smith
(haskell jack) writes:
>dls...@psu.edu (Daniel Smith) wrote:
>>First things first Mr. King.
>>A=A: the *law* of identity/the *law* non-contradiction.
>>Do you agree with this?
>No, I'm not King, and -no, this is not correct.
Isn't the law of identity the same the law of non-contradiction?
>You've seen too many Certs commercials, dearheart, for it's not "TWO,,
>TWO, Two laws in one! "
If I'm wrong I'd appreciate a clarification other than a reference to
Certs commercial.
>There are three laws of thought, the TWO mentioned and the law of
>excluded middle.
>Rand make use of them in sectioning Atlas Shrugged.
>/jack
I am not implying you are wrong, only that I do not understand. If you would
be so kind, please explain how these laws of thought differ from each other.
sincerely,
Dan
Daniel Smith
jja@sun4 (John Adelsberger) writes:
[snip]
>Dan Smith wrote:
>: American Heritage dictionary:
>: Empirical -- based on *observation*.
>: Law -- (science/logic) a *principle* or generalization based on *observed*
>: phenomena or consistent experience.
>: Axiom -- a *principle* that is accepted as true without proof.
>I'm fairly sure that Objectivism agrees with these definitions. I won't
>speak for the literature though, so you should probably read it yourself.
>The only one that we would quibble with is the last, the definition of
>axiom; I might well say that an axiom proves itself, and that an attempt
>to deny it is an attempt to deny the utility of logic and the ability of
>man to comprehend his surroundings(in which case philosophy is a moot
>point to begin with.)
>: A=A: the *law* of identity/the *law* non-contradiction.
>Assuming you mean what you say, then yes, _I_ would(don't know about
>Mr. King.)
>: If you do, then do you agree that this *law* has its foundations in
>: sensory evidence?
>No. Our recognition of it depends on a well developed consciousness that
>has integrated various sensory evidence, but the law would hold regardless
>of our comprehension of it. (This is the primacy of existance.)
Why doesn't all knowledge (including laws which are principles) have its
*foundations* in sensory evidence?
>: If you are still in agreement, then why isn't the law of identity an
>: empirical law? And since an empirical law is a principle based on observed
>: phenomena why aren't axioms (principles) empirical laws? Doesn't all
>: knowledge have its foundations in sensory evidence?
>Empirical laws are those observed directly. The integrations(generalizations,
>for those who aren't familiar with Objectivist epistemology) we make are
>not empirical in nature; we can point at an apple and say "red";
>we cannot point at an apple, say, "A is A," and hope to be understood.
I am not sure I understand.
Maybe you can me help to understand by providing me with an example of an
empirical law, and of a law that is not empirical.
Thanks in advance,
Dan
John Adelsberger
Daniel Smith (dls...@psu.edu) wrote:
: jja@sun4 (John Adelsberger) writes:
: [snip]
: >No. Our recognition of it depends on a well developed consciousness that
: >has integrated various sensory evidence, but the law would hold regardless
: >of our comprehension of it. (This is the primacy of existance.)
: Why doesn't all knowledge (including laws which are principles) have its
: *foundations* in sensory evidence?
If you mean the knowledge as knowledge of a man and not as a fact, then yes,
it requires sensory evidence, sort of. Try to imagine even being able to
_basically_ comprehend sensory input without the law of identity, though....
: >: If you are still in agreement, then why isn't the law of identity an
: >: empirical law? And since an empirical law is a principle based on observed
: >: phenomena why aren't axioms (principles) empirical laws? Doesn't all
: >: knowledge have its foundations in sensory evidence?
: >Empirical laws are those observed directly. The integrations(generalizations,
: >for those who aren't familiar with Objectivist epistemology) we make are
: >not empirical in nature; we can point at an apple and say "red";
: >we cannot point at an apple, say, "A is A," and hope to be understood.
: I am not sure I understand.
:
: Maybe you can me help to understand by providing me with an example of an
: empirical law, and of a law that is not empirical.
Hopefully, someone will, because I have a class that started 30 seconds
ago, and must leave _now_ :(
Peter J. King
On 26 Apr 1996, John Adelsberger wrote:
> : Peter J. King (shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
>
> : > It seems that Randism has a new definition for every term.
> : >Unfortunately, even using this odd sense of `axiom', an axiom can't be an
> : >empirical law. Unless you mean something strange by "empirical law".
>
> Again, the term is, I believe(last I checked) Objectivist, not Randian, and
> Objectivism, not Randism. Mr. King's conclusion is based on bad testimony;
> if he would read the material himself instead of trusting people who, from
> all that they say on these newsgroups, don't know what they speak of, he
> would have more luck in understanding the subject matter(assuming that
> understanding is what he wants, of course.)
I've explained elsewhere why I use "Randian" and "Randianism" -
the terms "Objectivism" and "Objectivist" have their own meanings in
philosophy (I'm an ethical objectivist, for example), and I prefer not to
use the terms confusingly. It's not meant to be anything more than that.
As to the rest, it seems that we agree in much of what we say
about John Alway's confusions.
Peter J. King
Peter J. King
On 26 Apr 1996, Brook Young wrote:
> "Peter J. King" <shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk> wrote (in reply to the claim
that "A=A [...] has its foundations in sensory evidence"):
> >No. Someone who had to look around in order to know that A=A would be in
> >a bad way. It's an a priori truth, not an empirical truth.
> > If you can't see this, I'm not sure what to say (I'd feel like
> >Achilles in Lewis Carroll's sketch). Perhaps this: if someone (per
> >impossibile) didn't know that A=A, how would they make empirical
> >observations in order to discover its truth?
> How could you discover an "a priori" truth without empirical observations?
> From this premise one doesn't even have to exists for him to acquire knowledge.
I'm not completely sure what you mean; it may be that you don't
understand the term "a priori" (but then you'd have looked it up,
presumably), or that you don't accept that there are any a priori truths
(but then what are your arguments?), or that you think that not making
empirical observations implies not existing (surely not).
Perhaps you're simply making the point that one can't have any
knowledge without perception; that's not a necessary truth, but I think
that in fact it's true. It doesn't, however, affect what I say about a
priori truths.
> Knowledge isn't acquired by logic divorced from experience or experience divorced
> from logic;it is acquired by applying logic *to* experience.
Knowledge of logical truths *is* acquired by logic divorced from
experience; of course, knowledge of empirical truths is acquired by
experience - but I haven't denied that.
Peter J. King
On 26 Apr 1996, Stephen Grossman wrote:
> Peter J. King (shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
> : On Wed, 24 Apr 1996, Daniel Smith wrote:
>
> : > A=A: the *law* of identity/the *law* non-contradiction.
> : >
> : > do you agree that this *law* has its foundations in
> : > sensory evidence?
> : No. Someone who had to look around in order to know that A=A would be in
> : a bad way. It's an a priori truth, not an empirical truth.
> : If you can't see this, I'm not sure what to say (I'd feel like
> : Achilles in Lewis Carroll's sketch). Perhaps this: if someone (per
> : impossibile) didn't know that A=A, how would they make empirical
> : observations in order to discover its truth?
> King claims he's conscious of existence before hes conscious of existence.
> Ie, that he somehow knows something other than reality.
Now if someone can tell me how he reaches this conclusion from
what I said, please e-mail me.
By the way, I'm not "conscious of existence" at all - I perceive
things in the world, which (surprise!) exist. That's not the same thing.
The notion of being conscious of existence sounds like quasi-mystical
gobbledegook to me.
[I've ignored and snipped the mixture of infantile scatology and
impenetrable maunderings that followed. I don't know why I even
responded to the first two sentences.]
Peter J. King
| http://sable.ox.ac.uk/~worc0337 |
Stephen Grossman
: > A=A: the *law* of identity/the *law* non-contradiction.
: >
: > do you agree that this *law* has its foundations in
: > sensory evidence?
[A
: No. Someone who had to look around in order to know that A=A would be in
[A: a bad way. It's an a priori truth, not an empirical truth.
: If you can't see this, I'm not sure what to say (I'd feel like
: Achilles in Lewis Carroll's sketch). Perhaps this: if someone (per
: impossibile) didn't know that A=A, how would they make empirical
: observations in order to discover its truth?
King claims he's conscious of existence before hes conscious of existence.
Ie, that he somehow knows something other than reality. So do mental
patients. Query: if the mainstream of contempory philosophers exchanged
places w/mental patients, would their students and therapists notice? This
is an old fraud, going back, at least to Plato. And it is a fraud.
Philosophers like King have long known what they are doing. The next step
for subjectivists is emotional appeals to doubt, intellectual cowardice,
tradition, authority, the need to justify sacrifice (Kant), etc.
Implicit in any perceptual consciousness of reality is the consciousness that
reality exists (existent), exists as entities, and that entities exist as
specific
things (identity). [The next step is the consciousness of
similarities and differences (units) among entities. This allows
conceptualization and is not important here]. This contains all the
knowledge that is possible. Nothing need be projected from subjectivity onto
reality to explain knowledge. King is implying that reality is chaotic but
for [his, God's, society's) consciousness, ie, that reality has no intrinsic
identity, ie, that reality is not reality. But it is. It doesnt need
consciousness to exist. Reality is independent of conscousness.
There is no a priori/empirical split since there are no epistemological
splits since there are no metaphysical splits. Existence is identity, not
contradiction (into metaphysically different parts [eg, contingent
experience or reality and subjectivity], each of which has an
epistemology [eg, a priori, empirical] valid only for one metaphysical
part). All philosophies except Objectivism are based on an impossible
metaphysical split, as if there were different kinds of existence. Eg,
Aristotle's "species of being as being." Species, kinds, categories, forms,
etc. are epistemologial, not metaphysial. Existence/identity simply exists.
Thats all. There are no form/matter, potentiality/actuality, body/mind, etc.
splits in existence as existing. A piece of shit exists just exactly as God
exists. They exist. Thats all.
Thus, only one epistemology to know existence. The consciousness of
existence gets to all of existence. Thats all. Perception and reason know
all of existence. There are no realms closed to us. We can even know the
evil hidden in the deepest recesses of subjectivists, ie, their hatred of
reality.
Steve Smolinski
Peter J. King (shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
[about axioms being non-empirical...]
: So far they seem clearly to back up my point; a law is based upon
: observation, an axiom is accepted without the need for such evidence.
Don't equate "proof" with "evidence" or with "validation".
"Validation" is wider than "proof", that is, all proofs are validations,
but not all validations are proofs. For example, take an axiom (as
used in Objectivism). The axioms, (particularly "Identity") are the
*basis* for proofs (a proof is, roughly, a non-contradictory derivation
of some premises to a conclusion, inductive or deductive). Being
non-contradictory is part of being a proof. But we know that it must
be non-contradictory because we already know that A=A, ie., we must
already have validated the law of identity. So, in this way, the
axioms are the *precondition* of proof.
But they still must be validated. Aristotle did this for Identity.
It's not news. Since it is a perceptual self-evidency, one must point it
out. That's the evidence. No proof -- but you still need evidence.
: No. Someone who had to look around in order to know that A=A would be in
: a bad way. It's an a priori truth, not an empirical truth.
And to what would this "a priori" truth refer if not to what one
observes? How is one to discover an "a priori" truth with no content
in their consciousness (no observation)? It all has to start with
perceptual evidence.
Steve
Stephen Grossman
: > [A: Achilles in Lewis Carroll's sketch). Perhaps this: if someone (per
: > : impossibile) didn't know that A=A, how would they make empirical
: [A> : observations in order to discover its truth?
[A
: > King claims he's conscious of existence before hes conscious of existence.
: > Ie, that he somehow knows something other than reality.
: Now if someone can tell me how he reaches this conclusion from
: what I said, please e-mail me.
King claims[A:
1. First, one knows A=A.
2. Then, one makes empirical observations.
Ie, prior to knowledge, one has knowledge; ie,prior to perception of
reality, one has some mystical "knowledge" which structures and justifies
perception of reality. I could claim that I havent experienced King's
Platonic/Kantian crap but that my reason finds itself constrained to take
refuge in principles which exceed every possible experimental application,
and nevertheless seem so unobjectionable that even ordinary common sense
[Bagrees with them. Hoping that somebody, anybody, recogizes my contemptous
us[Be of Kant (trans. Muller, Anchor, 1966, paperback, xxii), on this basis I
can [Bclaim that my mental structures include King=crap, a general truth,
which at the same time bears the character of an inward necessity, must be
indepe[Bndent of experience, -clear and certain by itself (Kant, 1) This is
merely r[B[Bestated Plato and Kant,
other, obvio[Busly influential, fools whose philosophies are rationalizations
of the desire to defraud others (and self) into evading their knowledge of
reality by a retreat into emotion. The fact that it is merely emotion (thus
deriva[Btive from knowledge) was evaded by Plato who said we recall a prior
existenc[Be. Of course, when actress Shirley MacLaine says she's in contact
with a man who lived 40,000 years ago, she's using the same principle,
albeit without the requisite academic post, degree, technical jargon, and
above all, t[Benure. Bullshit, however, is bullshit. A=A. Ie, a priori, King
is full of crap. He will now claim that his noumenal soul is good, that
despite his in[Btellectual fraud, deep down, he's really a different person,
if only others w[Bould do their duty and recognize what a sensitive flower he
really is, deep down, that. King intends to be a philosopher and thus, given
Kant, can safely [Bignore the experiental effects of his evasion of reality
on his students and [Breaders. "The intellect...has become a disease of life,"
said another student of Kant, Hitler, another sensitive flower with good
intentions.[B
[B
: [B By the way, I'm not "conscious of existence" at all
And teaches at Oxford! This should provide multicultural inspiration for
other epistemologically-disabled people. Can we now expect blind,
parapalegic surgeons and catatonic airline pilots? Would you like to buy
some swampland in Florida, cheap? Don't consult your experience, look
inward.
: - I perceive
: things in the world, which (surprise!) exist. That's not the same thing.
So your world both exists and doesnt, hmmmm.....OK, you'e discussing
contradictions, the limit of your values. OK, within contradictions, I agree
with all of your crap.
: Th[Be [B[notion of being conscious of existence sounds like quasi-mystical
: gobbledegook to me.
Mysticism is a claim to non-sensory, non-rational knowledge, ie, your claim
that A=A is "known" prior knowledge of reality. You're not even a competent
scholar.
: [I've ignored and snipped the mixture of infantile scatology and
: impenetrable maunderings that followed.
That mixture was a discussion of existence as not divided into metaphysically
different realms, one allegedly for "A=A" and the other for experience.
Since you find Objectivist epistemology beyond your intellectual competence,
stop rejecting it. I know, I know, inwardly, you intuit a wisdom beyond
experience. So do mental patients.
:I don't know why I even responded to the first two sentences.]
It must have been your noumenal soul indignant that reality should be so
crass as to-oh, the horror, the horror-exist. Its a good thing that Kant
rejected suicide even if "the mind of that friend (HAH!) of mankind was
clouded by a sorrow of his own..." Just continue spewing forth this nihilist
evil "only from duty and without any inclination-then for the first time
[your] action has true moral worth.
I'll bet that your subjectivity didnt predict that philosophy could be
so...exciting.
Stephen Grossman
Gary VDH
jja@sun2 (John Adelsberger) wrote:
>Daniel Smith (dls...@psu.edu) wrote:
>: jja@sun4 (John Adelsberger) writes:
>: [snip]
>: >Our recognition of it depends on a well developed consciousness that
>: >has integrated various sensory evidence, but [an empirical] law would hold regardless
>: >of our comprehension of it. (This is the primacy of existance.)
>: Why doesn't all knowledge (including laws which are principles) have its
>: *foundations* in sensory evidence?
>If you mean the knowledge as knowledge of a man and not as a fact, then yes,
>it requires sensory evidence, sort of. Try to imagine even being able to
>_basically_ comprehend sensory input without the law of identity, though....
It isn't so hard to imagine to _basically_ comprehend input from the
senses, ourselves, or our relation to the universe without the law of
identity.
Imagine sensory flow fields assuming spatial and temporal arrays in
neural circuitary. From whence they come, who knows? Descartes'
Demon, perhaps! The flow fields aren't things, per se. They are
electrochemical activities entraining other electrochemical
activities, all held together in a dynamic spatial and/or temporal
array. Such arrays vary considerably in duration and stability. And
both so-called "true" and "false" arrays can be stable. This is
knowledge as neurophysiological fact. And the standard of fact is
just as rigorous there as elsewhere.
Because the arrays seemingly take on a life of their own in the
pseudo-autonomous matrix, the brain, they seem dissociated from our
sense of Self. So, we project them (especially the more stable ones)
as being actual objects with separate identities (for example, who
still believes that Jews have horns?).
That we project is knowledge as fact, although not fully understood.
And epistemologically, both "true" and "untrue" projections are
equally projections. Another question concerns their differing
ontological status.
In our pragmatic concerns, we learn that treating these projections as
real objects with their own identity works pretty consistently, so we
come up with something called a Law of Identity. Those "objects"
become the furniture of our universe.
Even the identity of the electron, however, is problematical. Such
fundamentals of matter seem to be more energy flow fields than
particulate objects. And their identity depends upon *how* we choose
to observe. Only feelings of pragmatism give us the undying sense of
"rightness" that electrons are electrons despite the role of the
observer. In this case, we have had to settle for living with two
incompatible identities. Ain't this a Catch-22. . . .
And, am I a man imagining a butterfly or am I a butterly imagining I'm
a man?
The mystery is that the _pragmatic_ assumption, the Law of Identity,
works so successfully at the macroscopic level of our experience. And
philosophical alternatives have equally, if not more, severe problems.
So we may as well keep it. . . . . . It is more convenient than
trying to get rid of it.
>: >: If you are still in agreement, then why isn't the law of identity an
>: >: empirical law? And since an empirical law is a principle based on observed
>: >: phenomena why aren't axioms (principles) empirical laws? Doesn't all
>: >: knowledge have its foundations in sensory evidence?
From my argument above, it should be clear why the law of identity is
not "empirical."
And don't confuse "axioms" with "principles" or "empirical laws."
Axioms are starting assumptions, truths that we hold as self-evident
(e.g., American society holds as self-evident that life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness are inalienable rights. These are starting
assumptions upon which the society functions). Principles or laws are
derived from starting assumptions. Physical examples are given below
a bit.
Any system must begin with certain unprovable assumptions. These are
axioms. If we don't accept the same starting assumptions, there is no
way we will ever come to common ways of thinking. If we do accept the
starting assumptions, we can generalize to "empirical laws" or
principles.
Then, of course, there is the additional problem in applying the laws.
Isaac Newton came up with some pretty convincing natural laws that
*model* astronomical phenomena. Then, our thinking took a picture of
that model, so generations "saw" a mechanical, predetermined universe
in which there seemed to be no free will (never mind the social and
legal problems that assumption brings).
Is it empirical that the solar system and the fate of the universe and
all its inhabitants are precisely determined? What does it mean that
"empirical laws" hold regardless of our comprehension of them? There
is no empirical observation without a conceptual system to lodge it.
In the late 20th century, the sciences of complexity are demonstrating
many physical systems are not precisely determined (even the movements
of the solar system, even though it is quite stable). Weather
systems, for example, will _never_ be predicted with much certainty
beyond 48 hours.
.......................
>: Maybe you can me help to understand by providing me with an example of an
>: empirical law, and of a law that is not empirical.
There are empirical (that is, sensory) observations, but I don't know
of any empirical "laws," which are generalized concepts by which we
understand groups of phenomena.
An example of a physical law that is not empirical is the "Law of
Gravitation." My "good friend" Susanne K. Langer, again, says it so
well:
"The relation of two masses, i.e., of apple and earth, respectively,
as masses, in terms of which Newton described the fall, was not a
visible relationship at all; for neither the quantitative proportion
nor the mutual attraction of the two objects was a sensible aspect of
the event he witnessed. Were it not for the concepts of mass and
gravitation, which do not themselves denote any natural objects or
events, but are purely conceptual terms, there would be no similarity
at all between the fall of an apple to the ground and the motion of
the moon round the earth--let alone the swing of the tides under the
influence of moon and sun."
And gravitation remains very problematical. It *is* geometry. Will
we someday find that our observations play into that, too? Although
the neurophysiological arrays are macroscopic, occurring at vibratory
frequencies that are not quantum level, mind may still prove to be
quantum mind. Then "inside" and "outside" become meaningless (except
for pragmatic reasons at the macroscopic level of experience). What
happens to gravitation and identity, then?
There are no empirical laws; empirical observations simply provide a
feedback loop to see if our conceptual frame has a good fit. If it
does, we generalize to "laws" or "principles." When they no longer
fit, we revise or discard the law.
Once discarded, history is revised for pedagogical reasons and we
collectively forget the old. With our attention fixated on the
current "laws" we find it hard to imagine anything else.
So whad'ya think of that, huh?
More stone-cold silence??
--
Gary
Neither Here Nor There
/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
All is one, e.g.,
"The same regulating forces, that have created nature in all its forms are
responsible for the structure of our psyche and also for our capacity to think."
-- Werner Heisenberg, physicist, circa 1927
"Then last of all, caught from these shores, this hill,
Of you O tides, the mystic human meaning:
Only by law of you, your swell and ebb, enclosing me the same,
The brain that shapes, the voice that chants this song."
-- Walt Whitman, poet, 1888-89
\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
Daniel Smith
gv...@calhoun.lakes.com (Gary VDH) writes:
[snip]
I like preface my questions by clarifyning that my curiosity is genuine.
I have also "snipped" a large portion of Gary's post. Please read his post if
you are interested in what he has said.
>Because the arrays seemingly take on a life of their own in the
>pseudo-autonomous matrix, the brain, [snip]
What do you mean by pseudo autonomous matrix?
>And don't confuse "axioms" with "principles" or "empirical laws."
>Axioms are starting assumptions, truths that we hold as self-evident
>(e.g., American society holds as self-evident that life, liberty, and
>the pursuit of happiness are inalienable rights. These are starting
>assumptions upon which the society functions). Principles or laws are
>derived from starting assumptions. Physical examples are given below
>a bit.
Why isn't an axiom a principle? And how would you defend life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness as self-evident axioms?
American Heritage dictionary 3rd ed
Principle -- a basic truth, law or assumption
Axiom -- a *principle* that is accepted as true without proof
[emphasis added]
Again I reiterate, my questions are not sarcastic.
>Any system must begin with certain unprovable assumptions. These are
>axioms. If we don't accept the same starting assumptions, there is no
>way we will ever come to common ways of thinking. If we do accept the
>starting assumptions, we can generalize to "empirical laws" or
>principles.
I agree axioms cannot be proven, but they can, and must, be validated.
Maybe you can provide me with a better example of what you consider to be
an axiom?
This is a request, NOT a challenge.
>So whad'ya think of that, huh?
>More stone-cold silence??
>--
>Gary
>Neither Here Nor There
No not silence, just a lack of understanding. And btw where, then, are you?
I look forward to your response.
Respectfully,
Dan Smith
Brook Young
>
>> "Peter J. King" <shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk> wrote (in reply to the claim
>
>> >No. Someone who had to look around in order to know that A=A would be in
>> >a bad way. It's an a priori truth, not an empirical truth.
>
>> >impossibile) didn't know that A=A, how would they make empirical
>
>> From this premise one doesn't even have to exists for him to acquire knowledge.
>
> I'm not completely sure what you mean; it may be that you don't
>understand the term "a priori" (but then you'd have looked it up,
>presumably), or that you don't accept that there are any a priori truths
>(but then what are your arguments?), or that you think that not making
>empirical observations implies not existing (surely not).
>
> Perhaps you're simply making the point that one can't have any
>knowledge without perception; that's not a necessary truth, but I think
>that in fact it's true. It doesn't, however, affect what I say about a
>priori truths.
>> Knowledge isn't acquired by logic divorced from experience or experience divorced
>> from logic;it is acquired by applying logic *to* experience.
>
> Knowledge of logical truths *is* acquired by logic divorced from
>experience; of course, knowledge of empirical truths is acquired by
>experience - but I haven't denied that.
Knowledge of "logical truths" is valid knowledge *only* if it can accurately
describle something in reality. All knowledge must be referenced to reality.
You could say that 2+2 = 5 and call it a "logical truth," but in reality
this is nonsense. I would call "a priori" knowledge untested knowledge. It
isn't true knowledge until it is validated by experience.
Gary VDH
sgr...@pictac.com (Stephen Grossman) wrote:
........................................
>Implicit in any perceptual consciousness of reality is the consciousness that
>reality exists (existent), exists as entities, and that entities exist as
>specific
>things (identity).
In other words, there is a felt conviction of rightness that you take
as axiomatic. This is a priori.
> [The next step is the consciousness of
>similarities and differences (units) among entities. This allows
>conceptualization and is not important here].
This would be the next step, yes.
>This contains all the
>knowledge that is possible. Nothing need be projected from subjectivity onto
>reality to explain knowledge.
Here, you assume that there is a distinct subjectivity versus a
distinct objectivity. I agree with you as long as it is understood
that your use of the term, "subjectivity," is the definition
traditional to our thinking only since Samuel Taylor Coleridge
introduced the subjective/objective conceptual distinction into
English in the early 19th century (which we now find hard to imagine
getting along without!)
>King is implying that reality is chaotic but
>for [his, God's, society's) consciousness, ie, that reality has no intrinsic
>identity, ie, that reality is not reality. But it is. It doesnt need
>consciousness to exist. Reality is independent of conscousness.
How many angels can dance on the head of a pin? (In the late
Scholastic period this was a truly important philosophical question).
Some today say philosophy is dead. IMHO, here is where it dies.
Let's introduce some biological facts into philosophy to resuscitate
it.
>There is no a priori/empirical split since there are no epistemological
>splits since there are no metaphysical splits.
So, how do you address the issues I raised in (today's) post
responding to John Adelsberger in this same thread? And what about an
ontological split?
Unless, by this viciously circular statement, you agree with me that
"inside" and "outside" become meaningless except for pragmatic reasons
at the macroscopic level of experience.
>Existence is identity, not
>contradiction (into metaphysically different parts [eg, contingent
>experience or reality and subjectivity], each of which has an
>epistemology [eg, a priori, empirical] valid only for one metaphysical
>part).
Are you sure you know what you are saying? I do not doubt that you
have an intuitive sense of rightness to this felt conviction, but have
you reasoned it through independently of the gospel of Rand?
>All philosophies except Objectivism are based on an impossible
>metaphysical split, as if there were different kinds of existence. Eg,
>Aristotle's "species of being as being."
That is certainly over assumptive and demonstrably untrue.
>Species, kinds, categories, forms,
>etc. are epistemologial, not metaphysial.
Yes.
>Existence/identity simply exists.
>Thats all. There are no form/matter, potentiality/actuality, body/mind, etc.
>splits in existence as existing. A piece of shit exists just exactly as God
>exists. They exist. Thats all.
Pragmatically speaking, we all must live as if this were true.
Taking it as an epistemological, not metaphyscal, stance, which I have
not problem doing, I ask: don't you need epistemological axioms, a
priori, in order to "know," that is, to differentiate similarities and
differences, by which species, kinds, categories, forms,
etc. are created?
Whether we agree or disagree on a given axiom is metaphysical, and
probably is determined largely by temperament, not reason. So at
bottom, aren't you splitting hairs? Again I refer you to my post
responding to John Adelsberger.
>Thus, only one epistemology to know existence. The consciousness of
>existence gets to all of existence. Thats all. Perception and reason know
>all of existence. There are no realms closed to us. We can even know the
>evil hidden in the deepest recesses of subjectivists, ie, their hatred of
>reality.
I don't even necessarily disagree with you, at bottom. But, how does
such certainty, bordering on arrogance, keep one from being a Nazi?
You find a category of humans "evil." I've never met a humble
Randian.
--
Gary
Neither Here Nor There
/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
"The same regulating forces, that have created nature in all its forms are
responsible for the structure of our psyche and also for our capacity to think."
-- Werner Heisenberg, physicist
\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
Gary VDH
yu12...@yorku.ca (Steve Smolinski) wrote:
>Peter J. King (shil...@sable.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
>[about axioms being non-empirical...]
>: So far they seem clearly to back up my point; a law is based upon
>: observation, an axiom is accepted without the need for such evidence.
> Don't equate "proof" with "evidence" or with "validation".
>"Validation" is wider than "proof", that is, all proofs are validations,
>but not all validations are proofs.
Well said. And both validations and proofs are dependent upon
"evidence" as axiomatic starting points.
> For example, take an axiom (as
>used in Objectivism). The axioms, (particularly "Identity") are the
>*basis* for proofs
Your first parenthetical statement seems to imply that axioms are
somehow used differenly in Objectivism.
>(a proof is, roughly, a non-contradictory derivation
>of some premises to a conclusion, inductive or deductive). Being
>non-contradictory is part of being a proof.
And mathematician Kurt Godel proved in 1933 that *any* mathematical
system (and by extension, it is commonly concluded that any conceptual
system) must either be internally contradictory or incomplete.
Conceptual systems of any type do not walk upon the firmament. It is
wrong to conclude, however, that all conceptual systems are equal.
Some are more complete without internal contradiction than others.
>But we know that it must
>be non-contradictory because we already know that A=A, ie., we must
>already have validated the law of identity.
"It" here is proof. If you can demonstrate that it is indeed
non-contradictory, then it must be incomplete. How do you validate
the law of identity, according to your definition above? You can
merely assume it as self-evident, to get you started down some
thoughtful path. Either contradiction or incompleteness (maybe both)
are lurking in your thoughts.
>So, in this way, the
>axioms are the *precondition* of proof.
Yes.
> But they still must be validated. Aristotle did this for Identity.
>It's not news.
As you said, all proofs are validations, but not all validations are
proofs. Aristotle proved nothing about identity. His validation is
assumed self-evident from his assumptions about "primary substance."
That 2000+ year old concept is rather naive. What is substance,
period? Energy = matter.
I assume it is my inalienable right to pursue happiness. Is that as
self-evident to you as it is to me?
Bertrand Russell and A.N. Whitehead took around 200 pages (# from
memory) to prove 1 + 1 = 2. They proved and validated. Aristotle
validated but did not prove. Identity is at least as problematical as
1 + 1 = 2.
>Since it is a perceptual self-evidency, one must point it
>out. That's the evidence. No proof -- but you still need evidence.
Evidence based on a naive realism, founded in pragmatic concerns,
which are filled with *a priori* assumptions. See my post responding
to John Adelsberger in this same thread. I accept the law of identity
as a working assumption, too, but I know its limitations. I wouldn't
build a philosophical system based on it.
>: No. Someone who had to look around in order to know that A=A would be in
>: a bad way. It's an a priori truth, not an empirical truth.
> And to what would this "a priori" truth refer if not to what one
>observes? How is one to discover an "a priori" truth with no content
>in their consciousness (no observation)? It all has to start with
>perceptual evidence.
A priori does not infer "without content of consciousness." It is
_precisely_ the contents of consciousness that are a priori to a given
observation. The a priori determine what is selected and assumed
about the perceived. There is no observation without a conceptual
framework.
ATP, adenosine 5-triphosphate, is by far the most important chemical
form of energy used by our body cells to make life possible. In order
for a biochemical reaction to produce ATP, there must be ATP. The old
chicken and the egg story.
Likewise, the Cretan Epimenides said, "All Cretans are liars." This
is one of the better known knots pervasive throughout the study of
language and mathematics. It is called recursivity and is
inescapable.
And studies of the nervous system show the same (most likely why the
study of language and mathematics has such recursivity).
If we are to be consistent in our philosophizing, we have two
important consequences of our experience to consider. In the words of
biologist, Francisco J. Varela:
1) We cannot step outside the domain specified by our body and
nervous system. There is no world except that experienced through
those processes given to us and which make us what we are. We find
ourselves in a cognitive domain, and we cannot leap out of it or
choose its beginnings or modes.
2) We cannot trace a given experience to its origins in a unique
fashion. In fact, whenever we do try and find the source of, say, a
perception or an idea, we find ourselves in an ever-receding fractal,
and wherever we choose to delve we find it equally full of details and
interdependencies. It is always the perception of a perception of a
perception.
M.C. Escher's prints visually demonstrate these principles.
So get with the 21st century if you want to philosophize. The
Scholastic Age is over, and so is the Modern Age.
The assumption that the subjective and objective somehow oppose each
other is outdated and useless. Anything that ever needed to be said
about it has been said and always ends up digging deepr holes. Dance,
dance, you angels. I am on my way out.
The new, biologically-based starting point must be a
mind/body/environment unit where reality is "no-ground" or
"no-foundataion."
Again Varela:
"The age-old ideal of objectivity and communication as progressive
elimination of error for gradual attunement is, by its own scientific
standards, a chimera. We should do better to fully accept the
notoriously different and more difficult situation of existing in a
world where no one in particular can have a claim to better
understanding in a universal sense.
"This is indeed interesting: that the empirical world of the living
and the logic of self-reference, that the whole of the natural history
of circularity should tell us that ethics -- tolerance and pluralism,
detachment from our own perceptions and values to allow for those of
others -- is the very foundataion of knowledge, and also its final
point. At this point, actions are clearer than words."
So what'dya think, huh?
Stone-cold silence?
--
Gary
Neither Here Nor There
/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
All is one, e.g.,
"The same regulating forces, that have created nature in all its forms are
responsible for the structure of our psyche and also for our capacity to think."
-- Werner Heisenberg, physicist, circa 1927
"Then last of all, caught from these shores, this hill,
Of you O tides, the mystic human meaning:
Only by law of you, your swell and ebb, enclosing me the same,
The brain that shapes, the voice that chants this song."
-- Walt Whitman, poet, 1888-89
\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
Newton Love
sgr...@pictac.com (Stephen Grossman) wrote:
>Imagine, if you will, a person who, faced, as all humans are, with the choice
>to survive by reasoning or die by evading reason, chooses evasion. This
>evasion has two basic effects: practical (existential) and psychological.
- - - snip - - -
> . . . must be refuted as bad philosophy but never forget it is a
>rationalization not an honest error.
I think that i like the way you think, therefore, i am.
-newton
haskell jack
dls...@psu.edu (Daniel Smith) wrote:
>Isn't the law of identity the same the law of non-contradiction?
>>There are three laws of thought, the TWO mentioned and the law of
>>excluded middle.
>>Rand make use of them in sectioning Atlas Shrugged.
>I am not implying you are wrong, only that I do not understand. If you would
>be so kind, please explain how these laws of thought differ from each other.
If you don't have Peter A. Angeles "Dictionary of Thought" (aka the
Harper Collins Dictionary of Philosophy), and Copleston's History of
Philosophy, you are arguing from a philosophical rut. For example,
you'll never know that Kant used 'a priori' in a different sense than
Aristotle, such that it supported his idea if intuition.
From THE Dictionary:
Laws of Thought, the Three - also called the three principles of
thought, the formulation of what have been called the Three Laws of
Thought goes back to Plato and Aristotle. These laws have been
regarded as ontologically real (describing the ultimate features of
reality); as cognitively necessary (no consistent thinking is possible
without their use; all coherent thought, and all logical systems, rely
on them for justification; their denial presupposes their use in
denying them); and as uninferred knowledge (the immediate and direct
results of an rational examination of the relations of timeless
universals). In modern times, these Laws of Thought have been regarded
as the only three among many principles, or rules, of inference that
can be invented and used in logic; or as definitionally true
(tautologous) and hence irrefutable.
1. The Law of Identity: If 'p' is true, then 'p' is true. (If 'p' is
false, then 'p' is false). If a thing A is A, then it is A. A is A.
Everything is what it is (and cannot, at the same time it is what it
is, be something else).
2. the Law of Noncontradiction (also called the Law of Contradiction):
'p' cannot be both true and false (at the same time and in the same
respect). A thing A cannot be both A and not A. (at the same time it
is A).
3. the Law of Excluded Middle: either 'p' is true or 'p' is false; one
or the other, but not both at the same time and in the same respect..
A thing A is either A or it is not A.
Now, you have to admit that it certainly is much easier simply to say
that certs is certs.
Since I'm on the subject, I throw this in for free. The two laws other
than the law of identy are sometimes claimed to be refuted. However,
this is only accomplished by pulling the old switcher-roo. That is,
they argue against A and NON A rather than as Old Ari meant it to be;
A and NOT A.
And one more thing, now go back and look at the sections of Atlas
Shrugged and learn something new.
/jack
Daniel Smith
mei...@chelsea.ios.com (haskell jack) writes:
>dls...@psu.edu (Daniel Smith) wrote:
>From THE Dictionary:
>/jack
Jack -
I have most definitely learned something new! Your time and consideration is
appreciated. Thank you.
Sincerely,
Dan Smith
Ghostboy
On 27 Apr 1996 18:40:48 GMT, sgr...@pictac.com (Stephen Grossman)
annoyed the censors with:
>
>And teaches at Oxford! This should provide multicultural inspiration for
>other epistemologically-disabled people. Can we now expect blind,
>parapalegic surgeons and catatonic airline pilots? Would you like to buy
>some swampland in Florida, cheap? Don't consult your experience, look
>inward.
>
where do you exactly think 'experience' is...dont we all have
different ones..as in my experience tells me....you need to look
inward to get to experience because your experience is a part of
you...not some external thing...
Ghostboy --- A Non-practicing Atheist
haskell jack
That a triangle has 180 degrees is considered a priority knowledge.
Some would hold that "killing is wrong" is as well.
Also a batchlor is not married.
And some would say that my brother was an only child.
/jack
Gary VDH
dls...@psu.edu (Daniel Smith) writes
>gv...@calhoun.lakes.com (Gary VDH) writes:
>[snip]
>I like preface my questions by clarifyning that my curiosity is genuine.
>I have also "snipped" a large portion of Gary's post. Please read his post if
>you are interested in what he has said.
>>Because the arrays seemingly take on a life of their own in the
>>pseudo-autonomous matrix, the brain, [snip]
>What do you mean by pseudo autonomous matrix?
The human brain far out-paces body requirements of cybernetic control
for biological survival. Evolutionary theory includes many converging
factors in the hominid stock that allowed the brain to outstrip this
original function. They include walking on hind legs, forelimbs free
for other functions, opposable thumb, prolonged childhood that
provides the basis for complex social organization, a braincase that
allows the cortical anatomy to expand, etc.
Our brains have become matrixes of activity not directly contingent
upon or associated with the body. In other words, many of our
behaviors are cognitive. These behaviors form a relatively continuous
locus of response experienced as outside, or other than, body
response. They are looping neural circuits of electrochemical
activities entraining other neural circuits of electrochemical
activities, all held together in dynamic spatial and/or temporal
arrays.
This matrix is a virtual locus of events, a functional domain where
the overall felt _sense of self_ -- that source of sensation and
spring of action -- expresses centrally produced field strategies in a
relatively continuous and controllable space of "envisaged" situations
and relations not dependent upon the actual presence of the
"envisaged" objects. These centrally produced field strategies give
us greater freedom or autonomy than other animals (as far as we can be
certain).
Brains of animals can have many intervening steps in the neural
circuits mediating between stimulus and response, and still have no
mind. The neural circuitry must be integrated enough to produce
relatively continuous spatial and/or temporal arrays (that is, visual,
auditory, felt images, etc.) and be able to order those arrays in a
process we call thinking.
Still, the cognitive activities of the brain are not really autonomous
from the body. Therefore, I called them pseudo-autonomous. As the
world reknowned neurophysiologist Dr. Antonio Damasio postulates,
1) the human brain and the rest of the body constitute an
indissociable organism, integrated by means of mutually interactive
biochemical and neural regulatory circuits, including endocrine,
immune, and autonomic neural components.
2) The organism interacts with the environment as an ensemble: the
interaction is neither of the body alone nor of the brain alone. And
given much of the environment is a product of the organism's activity
itself, the ensemble is really a body/brain/environment complex of
interactions. That should rightfully become the singular unit from
which we philosophize.
3) The physiological operations that we call mind are derived from
the structural and functional ensemble rather than from the brain
alone: mental phenomena can be fullly undertood only in the context
of an organism's interacting in an environment.
There are two neural loops within the body. One Damasio calls the
body state. The brain uses successions of body states as felt markers
to organize pragmatic affairs and to reason.
Damasio calls the other neural loop the "as-if" loop, which are the
dynamic spatial and/or temporal arrays I referred to above.
I could provide specific examples, but this post is too long as is.
If you want some, just let me know which part you want examples for.
>>And don't confuse "axioms" with "principles" or "empirical laws."
>>Axioms are starting assumptions, truths that we hold as self-evident
>>(e.g., American society holds as self-evident that life, liberty, and
>>the pursuit of happiness are inalienable rights. These are starting
>>assumptions upon which the society functions). Principles or laws are
>>derived from starting assumptions. Physical examples are given below
>>a bit.
>Why isn't an axiom a principle? And how would you defend life, liberty and
>the pursuit of happiness as self-evident axioms?
>American Heritage dictionary 3rd ed
>Principle -- a basic truth, law or assumption
>Axiom -- a *principle* that is accepted as true without proof
>[emphasis added]
>Again I reiterate, my questions are not sarcastic.
You don't come across as sarcastic. We are having a semantic problem
here. Words are like weasels. Their meanings slip out of our hands
before the ink is dry (or as in this case, before the bytes appear as
characters on our screens.
I was responding to this question: "And since an empirical law is a
principle based on observed phenomena why aren't axioms (principles)
empirical laws?"
The question's wording is confusing. I merely attempted to
distinguish between 1) axioms or premises, which must exist as
unprovable starting points for thinking and 2) "laws" derived from
those premises.
The word "principle" may equate to either 1) or 2).
If we are going to talk about such things, we had better use our terms
carefully so as not to use a word, such as "principle" as a derived
"law" in one context and then use it as an "axiom" or "premise" in the
next.
As long as the distinction is clear, it doesn't matter if "principle"
is used as equivalent to "axiom."
>>Any system must begin with certain unprovable assumptions. These are
>>axioms. If we don't accept the same starting assumptions, there is no
>>way we will ever come to common ways of thinking. If we do accept the
>>starting assumptions, we can generalize to "empirical laws" or
>>principles.
>I agree axioms cannot be proven, but they can, and must, be validated.
>Maybe you can provide me with a better example of what you consider to be
>an axiom?
>This is a request, NOT a challenge.
Oh, go ahead and challenge, if you like. I can take it!! I even find
it fun. I don't appreciate unnecessary flaming, though. Nobody does.
There is no reason we can't show mutual respect.
If you agree axioms cannot be proved, then you must understand what I
consider an axiom. I think you weren't clear about what I said
because of the semantic difficulties addressed above. If I am wrong,
please let me know.
But what do you mean when you say axioms can and must be validated.
If they can't be proved, don't you "validate" them with further axioms
or assumptions, so that you become recursive ad infinitum?
>>So whad'ya think of that, huh?
>>More stone-cold silence??
>>--
>>Gary
>>Neither Here Nor There
>No not silence, just a lack of understanding. And btw where, then, are you?
>I look forward to your response.
>Respectfully,
>Dan Smith
I appreciate the break of silence (I also appreciate the breaking of
silence by 2 individuals in private email). I would like to see the
net start to approximate what the hype claims it to be.
Oh, and if I'm neither here nor there, where, then, am I?
My postings are based on an axiom used in Indian logic, "an object
neither exists nor not exists."
We need to accept the challenges that science automatically gives to
philosophy. We must get with the 21st century. The Scholastic Age
seriously argued over how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.
It was really an important question about the nature of "substance"
and Spirit's transubstantiality. The Scholastic Age is over and its
arguments sound absurd. And so is the Modern Age over.
The assumption that the subjective and objective somehow oppose each
other is outdated and useless. Anything that ever needed to be said
about it has been said and always ends up digging deeper holes.
Dance, dance, angels. I am on my way out.
The new, biologically-based starting point must be a
mind/body/environment unit where reality is "no-ground" or
"no-foundataion."
If we are to be consistent in our philosophizing, we have two
important consequences of our experience to consider. In the words of
biologist, Francisco J. Varela:
1) We cannot step outside the domain specified by our body and
nervous system. There is no world except that experienced through
those processes given to us and which make us what we are. We find
ourselves in a cognitive domain, and we cannot leap out of it or
choose its beginnings or modes.
2) We cannot trace a given experience to its origins in a unique
fashion. In fact, whenever we do try and find the source of, say, a
perception or an idea, we find ourselves in an ever-receding fractal,
and wherever we choose to delve we find it equally full of details and
interdependencies. It is always the perception of a perception of a
perception.
M.C. Escher's prints visually demonstrate these principles.
--
Daniel Smith
mei...@chelsea.ios.com (haskell jack) writes:
>That a triangle has 180 degrees is considered a priority knowledge.
>Some would hold that "killing is wrong" is as well.
>Also a batchlor is not married.
>/jack
I am not sure if you are referring to a priori knowledge. But the argument
that has been going back and forth has dealt with the issue of a
priori knowledge without experience.
For example:
I asked:
>> Doesn't all knowledge have its foundations in sensory evidence?
Peter J. King responded:
> No, it doesn't. Mathematical knowledge doesn't, for example.
> Peter J. King
All of the above require previous inductive reasoning to provide
a foundation for their assertion. My apologies if you were making another
point.
Respectfully,
Dan Smith
Daniel Smith
gv...@calhoun.lakes.com (Gary VDH) writes:
[BIG snip]
>>>So whad'ya think of that, huh?
>>>More stone-cold silence??
>>>--
>>>Gary
>>>Neither Here Nor There
>>No not silence, just a lack of understanding. And btw where, then, are you?
>>I look forward to your response.
>>Respectfully,
>>Dan Smith
>I appreciate the break of silence (I also appreciate the breaking of
>silence by 2 individuals in private email). I would like to see the
>net start to approximate what the hype claims it to be.
Gary -
I just wanted to take the time to thank you publicly for taking the time to
post such an extensive response to my questions. I must say that I do not
agree with everything you said, but your post raises some interesting
questions. I must say, that I lack the requisite knowledge to continue this
debate within your context of knowledge. So I will leave it to someone who
may have a better understanding of your argument. And once again, thanks.
Sincerely,
Dan Smith