Existence as predicate
Terry Firma
be a predicate:
Since everything is connected ("hangs together") - there are no absolute
dividing lines / there is no empty space - everything must have a *common
denominator*; this common denominator must be necessary (since everything is
necessary / has at least one cause); therefore general existence must have a
necessary component/aspect in order to exist (therefore existence is a
quality/predicate).
Immortalist
"Terry Firma" <tara...@online.no> wrote in message
news:txmYc.3877$WW4....@news4.e.nsc.no...
Everything is not a predicate but a subject? Cause and time could be qualities or
predicates of the subject existence.
EXISTENCE [A171/B220] Kant writes that the Analogies of Experience are concerned
"with the existence of...appearances and their relation to one another in respect
of existence....Since existence cannot be constructed, the principles can apply
only to the relations of existence, and can yield only regulative principles. We
cannot, therefore, expect either axioms or anticipations" about the existence of
appearances. Perhaps Kant means something like this: According to him, our
knowledge of existence is limited to knowledge of the relations among "given"
objects. We can only apply a coherence criterion of existence, that is, analyze
relations obtaining among given appearances and conclude that some are actual and
others are not. Apart from the bare knowledge that they must exist in some sense,
we cannot know anything about the existence of either the "transcendental
object=x" which an appearance represents, nor about the "affecting objects"
which" provoke the receptivity into producing intuitions--about things beyond the
transcendentally ideal realm of appearances, we can have knowledge neither about
what things exist nor about why they exist. Thus: (A226/B274) "Our knowledge of
the existence of things reaches...only so far as perception and its advance
according to empirical laws can extend".
----------------------------------
There are many philosophers today, following Hume, Kant, Frege, and Russell, who
claim that existence is not a property, or that 'exists' is not a predicate.
Sometimes they say that 'exists' is a second-order predicate (or "second-level"
predicate); or they make other sorts of claims about it, such as that it is a
unique sort of predicate. Typically, the discussions in which this claim arises
are discussions of the existence of physical objects. So, for example, the Eiffel
Tower exists. This is a true claim; what makes it true? One would like to be able
to say that it is the fact that the Eiffel Tower has the property of existence.
It seems that the claim asserts that existence is a property of the Eiffel Tower.
Yet the philosophers listed--with qualifications the philosophical Wikipedian is
encouraged to elaborate--deny that existence is a property. In fact, this is the
common view among philosophers today.
One might wonder why it matters at all whether or not existence is a property.
Consider: if existence is not a property, then the concept of existence cannot be
defined, or at least, not as it has been defined here. The foregoing definition
of 'exists' is incorrect, many philosophers would say, just because the
definition does treat existence as a property.
Immanuel Kant wrote:
By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing--even if we
completely determine it--we do not make the least addition to the thing when we
further declare that this thing is. Otherwise, it would not be exactly the same
thing that exists, but something more than we had thought in the concept; and we
could not, therefore, say that the exact object of my concept exists. If we think
in a thing every feature of reality except one, the missing reality is not added
by my saying that this defective thing exists. On the contrary, it exists with
the same defect with which I have thought it, since otherwise what exists would
be something different from what I thought. (Critique of Pure Reason, B627-8)
Suppose one listed out all the properties and relations of an apple sitting on a
table. It is red, it has a stem, it is four inches wide, it is juicy, it is on
the table, it is in a room, and so on. Kant says, then, once one has listed out
all the properties and relations of the apple, one could try claiming that the
apple exists (or "is," as he says). But that, Kant says, does not add any new
property to the thing. Therefore, existence is not another property over and
above all these. So in other words, Kant argues as follows: a complete list of an
apple's properties would not be expanded by adding another property, namely
existence; therefore, existence is not another property over and above all the
other properties.
Of this view, one might ask: does this entail that existence is not a property at
all? It seems not. If one lists out all the properties of the apple, the list
would include 'being located in the universe with which we are in contact'. An
advocate of the definability of 'existence' for physical objects might claim that
that particular property just is what constitutes the apple's existence. That
property would, of course, be included in a list of all of the apple's
properties; so Kant's claim, that existence is not another property over and
above all its other properties, seems true enough, but that by itself does not
mean that existence is not a property at all.
The existence of physical objects
http://www.fact-index.com/t/th/the_existence_of_physical_objects.html
-----------------------------------------
In "Section IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of
God,"[Bk.2Ch.3§IV,¶55 CPR] drawn from his Critique, Kant addresses the logical
problem of existential import. How do we talk or think about things without
supposing, in some sense at least, that they exist? Bertrand Russell expressed
one aspect of the problem this way: If it's false that the present King of France
is bald, then why doesn't this fact imply that it's true the present King of
France is not bald? When the existence of the subjects of our statements are in
question, the normal use of logic becomes unreliable. Kant argues that the use of
words (or "predicates") alone does not necessarily imply the existence of their
referents. We can only assume the existence of entities named by our words; we
cannot prove "existence" by means of the use of language alone.
"Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of something
which is added to the conception of some other thing."
http://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/introbook2.1/c3458.html
--------------------------------------
...Rather, P1 in both arguments is not an implicit claim that God already exists;
rather, it is intended as a claim about the meaning or definition of the word
“God”. P1 should be re-written as follows, adhering to conventions regarding use
and mention:
P1: “The word ‘God’ means ‘the greatest conceivable being’.”
The subject of P1 is now a word, not a being. So circularity isn’t the real
problem. The critiques that follow are more to the point.
1. The Humean critique: see DP p. 152 ff. Anselm’s Ontological Argument attempts
to give a logical derivation of the statement “God exists”. The demonstration
begins with the definition of the word “God” and is based on the principle of
non-contradiction. But definitions are relations of ideas (analytic, based on
linguistic conventions — we make them up), while statements about existence are
always matters of fact (synthetic, established by observation, not mere logical
demonstration). You can’t “define something into existence.”
2. The Kantian critique: “existence is not a predicate”. A “predicate” is an
attribute or property of something; it’s something you say about a subject. The
OA assumes existence is a property like other properties; but that’s not so.
Rather, other properties presuppose existence; something has to exist in the
first place in order to have any other property. In modern parlance, there’s a
category mistake in thinking of existence as the same kind of predicate (i.e., in
the same category) as regular predicates.
“Perfections,” whatever else they may be, are at least predicates. So by modus
tollens, if existence if not a predicate, it can’t be a perfection. The argument
goes:
P1: If existence is a perfection, it’s a predicate like other predicates.
P2: Existence is not a predicate like other predicates.
C: Therefore, existence is not a perfection.
http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/ONTARG.HTM
--------------------------------------
>
The Sophist
Let's see. David Lewis denied that everything is connected, and while
his view may be false, I know of no conclusive arguments to that effect.
I am not sure what you mean when you say that there is no empty space.
However, even if everything were connected, this would not entail the
existence of a common denominator. Even if we assume that things must
share something in common to be connected, object 1 might be connected
to object 2 by sharing A, and object 2 might be connected to object 3 by
sharing B, and objects 1 and 3 might then be connected without sharing
anything in common. You seem to assume that things which are not
necessary must have causes, which seems not to be the case (popular
interpretations of present quantum theory deny this). Finally, even if
everything that existed needed to have a component in common, that would
not entail that this common component would be existence.
Rather a stunning amount of mistakes for such a short argument, I must say.
--
Aaron Boyden
The main division between the so-called Continental and Analytic
traditions has been disputes over whether the task of being unclear
should be carried out in natural language or in a formal system.
Keynes
>Terry Firma wrote:
>> This is an attempt at refuting Kant's claim that a thing's existence can't
>> be a predicate:
>>
>> Since everything is connected ("hangs together") - there are no absolute
>> dividing lines / there is no empty space - everything must have a *common
>> denominator*; this common denominator must be necessary (since everything is
>> necessary / has at least one cause); therefore general existence must have a
>> necessary component/aspect in order to exist (therefore existence is a
>> quality/predicate).
>
>Let's see. David Lewis denied that everything is connected, and while
>his view may be false, I know of no conclusive arguments to that effect.
> I am not sure what you mean when you say that there is no empty space.
> However, even if everything were connected, this would not entail the
>existence of a common denominator. Even if we assume that things must
>share something in common to be connected, object 1 might be connected
>to object 2 by sharing A, and object 2 might be connected to object 3 by
>sharing B, and objects 1 and 3 might then be connected without sharing
>anything in common. You seem to assume that things which are not
>necessary must have causes, which seems not to be the case (popular
>interpretations of present quantum theory deny this). Finally, even if
>everything that existed needed to have a component in common, that would
>not entail that this common component would be existence.
>
>Rather a stunning amount of mistakes for such a short argument, I must say.
What is disconnected must be free of the web of causation.
Causal connections of the past are considered necessary to
produce the present. The past is all about necessity.
We consider the future to be conditional and the past to
be unconditional. This must be a flaw in our concept of time,
because we suppose the future to be of a different nature than
the past, and at the same time accept the past as a fossilization
of the future (of past 'times')..
Paul Holbach
> OaWdnTXyl-d...@comcast.com>...
> > This is an attempt at refuting Kant's claim that a thing's existence can't
> > be a predicate:
> There are many philosophers today,
> following Hume, Kant, Frege, and Russell, who
> claim that existence is not a property, or that 'exists' is not a predicate.
> Sometimes they say that 'exists' is a second-order predicate (or "second-level"
> predicate); or they make other sorts of claims about it, such as that it is a
> unique sort of predicate. Typically, the discussions in which this claim arises
> are discussions of the existence of physical objects. So, for example, the Eiffel
> Tower exists. This is a true claim; what makes it true? One would like to be able
> to say that it is the fact that the Eiffel Tower has the property of existence.
> It seems that the claim asserts that existence is a property of the Eiffel Tower.
> Yet the philosophers listed--with qualifications the philosophical Wikipedian is
> encouraged to elaborate--deny that existence is a property. In fact, this is the
> common view among philosophers today.
In my opinion "to exist" can and should be employed both as a
first-order and as a second-order predicate.
As you know, there are two basic types of existential statements:
(1)
- "Fs exists."
- "Fs do not exist."
(2)
- "a exists."
- "a does not exist."
The best interpretations of (1) are as follows:
- "There is something such that it is a F."
- "There is nothing such that it is a F."
or, as Frege would put it:
- "The number of Fs is a natural number other than zero."
- "The number of Fs is zero."
The best interpretations of (2) are as follows:
- "There is exactly one thing such that it is a F_1, ..., F_n, and is
called 'a'."
- "There is nothing such that it is a F_1, ..., F_n, and is called
'a'."
For example:
- "Pegasus exists."
--->
"There is exactly one thing such that it is a horse and winged, and is
called 'Pegasus'."
- "Pegasus doesn´t exist."
--->
"There is nothing such that it is a winged horse called 'Pegasus'."
"to exist" can also be treated rather unproblematically as a property
of individuals:
["E!": "exists"]
Everything exists and nothing does not exist: AxE!x
Everything, i.e. everything existent, has the property of
existence--and has it essentially, since nothing can exist without
existing. Of course, my existence and I can both cease to be, but we
cannot cease to be independently of each other.
But there´s one crucial point:
Seen from the strictly logical point of view, there are no true
sentences of the form "a does not exist", which would be
self-contradictory, but only ones of the form "It is not the case that
a exists"!
In classical logic, where--by stipulation--there are no irreferential
singular terms, "(~F)a" and "~(Fa)" are equivalent, so we can always
simply write "~Fa". But if empty names are explicitly allowed, as in
free logic, then this equivalence has to be annulled.
That is to say, concerning the negation of existential sentences the
difference between predicate and sentence negation (internal n. vs.
external n.) does matter!
#PH
Craig Franck
If I understand this correctly, it's an argument that things that exist can have
existence as a quality. This seems fairly reasonable on the face of it.
But when it comes to the conception of something that may or may not exist,
"exists" is not like "omnipotent." A major confusion with this argument is the
reasoning that if something were infinitely powerful, it would have to exist.
But we don't know if there are any Beings that are unlimited in all ways.
This is a classic example of putting reasoning before experience.
--
Craig Franck
craig....@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
ZZBunker
That is not flaw. Since the *past* is not considered
to be unconditional. *History* is considered to
be unconditional. But we know for a scientific
fact that the mushrooms Casteneda, and his even more idiotic
dream-scape science adviser-publishers, advertises
existed well-before Casteneda or even The US existed.
The Sophist
Well, presumably. Causation would be a kind of connection.
> Causal connections of the past are considered necessary to
> produce the present.
By who?
> The past is all about necessity.
What does that even mean?
> We consider the future to be conditional and the past to
> be unconditional.
You should be careful about using the pronoun "we."
> This must be a flaw in our concept of time,
> because we suppose the future to be of a different nature than
> the past, and at the same time accept the past as a fossilization
> of the future (of past 'times')..
Perhaps this is indeed a flaw in your conception of time.
rbb
I am afraid that if it comes to existance you all are right and wrong.
Keynes
What other kinds of connections are there?
>> Causal connections of the past are considered necessary to
>> produce the present.
>
>By who?
>
LOL
>> The past is all about necessity.
>
>What does that even mean?
>
More beer, Mr. Sophist?
>> We consider the future to be conditional and the past to
>> be unconditional.
>
>You should be careful about using the pronoun "we."
>
In your case, certainly.
>> This must be a flaw in our concept of time,
>> because we suppose the future to be of a different nature than
>> the past, and at the same time accept the past as a fossilization
>> of the future (of past 'times')..
>
>Perhaps this is indeed a flaw in your conception of time.
What is your conception of time?
(It must be quite unique.)
Immortalist
"Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote in message
news:881c8779.04082...@posting.google.com...
By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing--even if we
completely determine it--we do not make the least addition to the thing when we
further declare that this thing ("is"); Otherwise, it would not be exactly the
same thing that exists, but something more than we had thought in the concept;
and we could not, therefore, say that the exact object of my concept exists.
A complete list of an object's properties would not be expanded by adding another
property, namely existence; therefore, existence is not another property over and
above all the other properties.
"...physical object exists. This is a true claim; what makes it true? One would
like to be able to say that it is the fact that the physical object has the
property of existence. It seems that the claim asserts that existence is a
property of the physical object.
The foregoing definition of 'exists' is incorrect just because the definition
block
> What is your conception of time?
> (It must be quite unique.)
>
Time is something that there is never enough of if you are happy
The Sophist
>>>What is disconnected must be free of the web of causation.
>>
>>Well, presumably. Causation would be a kind of connection.
>
> What other kinds of connections are there?
I suppose it depends on how broadly you construe connection. Interstate
highways 90 and 95 are connected, but neither is a cause of the other.
They do interact causally, of course, but I think it would be a rather
loose use of language to call the nature of their connection causal
merely on the basis that they causally interact; their causal
interactions are on a very different level from what we're talking about
when we say they are connected.
>>>Causal connections of the past are considered necessary to
>>>produce the present.
>>
>>By who?
>
> LOL
I'm glad to see that you also appreciate how amusingly clumsy your
wording was in retrospect.
>>>The past is all about necessity.
>>
>>What does that even mean?
>
> More beer, Mr. Sophist?
Ah, so you think I'd understand you better if I were drunk. I suppose
that's possible.
>>>We consider the future to be conditional and the past to
>>>be unconditional.
>>
>>You should be careful about using the pronoun "we."
>
> In your case, certainly.
No, in general. Four-dimensionalism is by no means a fringe view.
>>>This must be a flaw in our concept of time,
>>>because we suppose the future to be of a different nature than
>>>the past, and at the same time accept the past as a fossilization
>>>of the future (of past 'times')..
>>
>>Perhaps this is indeed a flaw in your conception of time.
>
> What is your conception of time?
> (It must be quite unique.)
Hardly. For the most part, I'm an orthodox four-dimensionalist.
Paul Holbach
> > "Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote in message
> > news:881c8779.04082...@posting.google.com...
> > In my opinion "to exist" can and should be employed both as a
> > first-order and as a second-order predicate.
> > [...]
> > "to exist" can also be treated rather unproblematically as a property
> > of individuals:
> By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing--even if we
> completely determine it--we do not make the
> least addition to the thing when we
> further declare that this thing ("is"); Otherwise, it would not be exactly the
> same thing that exists, but something more
> than we had thought in the concept;
> and we could not, therefore, say that the exact object of my concept exists.
The concept of existence is pretty uninformative, and so is eg the
concept of self-identity. -- So what?!
This fact doesn´t mean that the objects which fall under these
concepts cannot possess them as their properties. [Frege: "I call the
concepts under which an object falls its properties."]
By the way, even if we regard the concept of necessary existence as a
possible property of an individual, no ontological "proof" will ever
work, for if I conceive of God as a/the being which exists
necessarily, this in no way implies that there actually is anything
which has the property of necessary existence!
There is absolutely no a priori route from the mere definition
"God is almighty, perfectly good, ..., and exists necessarily"
to the truth of
"There is something such that it is almighty, perfectly good, ..., and
exists necessarily" ,
because it is always logically possible that nothing exists
necessarily, that nothing falls under the concept of necessary
existence!
> A complete list of an object's properties
> would not be expanded by adding another
> property, namely existence; therefore,
> existence is not another property over and
> above all the other properties.
Existence is a property b e s i d e all the other properties. ;-)
The descriptive value of concepts such as existence and self-identity
is indeed close to zero.
You really don´t know much about me if you learn that I´m
self-identical.
This fact notwithstanding, I deny that the degree of informativeness
determines whether a concept can be had by individuals as a property!
> "...physical object exists. This is a true claim; what makes it true? One would
> like to be able to say that it is the fact that the physical object has the
> property of existence. It seems that the claim asserts that existence is a
> property of the physical object.
>
> The foregoing definition of 'exists' is incorrect just because the definition
> does treat existence as a property.
I´m afraid, you´re begging the question!
Generally, the possession of the logical properties of existence and
self-identity is a necessary condition for an entity´s existence, but
it´s not a sufficient one, because everything must also possess some
"substantial" properties other than existence and self-identity.
#PH
Barb Knox
paulholba...@freenet.de (Paul Holbach) wrote:
[snip]
>Existence is a property b e s i d e all the other properties. ;-)
>
>The descriptive value of concepts such as existence and self-identity
>is indeed close to zero.
[snip]
Not necessarily. Certainly the disputants think they are saying something
meaningful in exchanges like "God exists!", "No She doesn't!", ....
The usual sense of "exists" is "exists in physical reality", but there are
plenty of other reasonable senses. For example, Pegasus certainly "exists"
in the world of Greek mythology (which we today consider fictional, but the
ancient Greeks didn't). Napoleon "exists" in European history, although he
as a person does not exist today. And formally, in modal logics there are
various different conventions regarding whether an item that exists in some
particular possible world must also exist in others.
So, IMO, the predicate "exists" should almost always be qualified by the
domain in which the item is being asserted to exist (or not). That is,
Exists is usefully considered as a 2-place predicate, not a 1-place one.
--
---------------------------
| BBB b \ Barbara at LivingHistory stop co stop uk
| B B aa rrr b |
| BBB a a r bbb | Quidquid latine dictum sit,
| B B a a r b b | altum viditur.
| BBB aa a r bbb |
-----------------------------
Immortalist
> > "Immortalist" <Reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<
> > EYqdnUfMwtw...@comcast.com>...
> > > "Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote in message
> > > news:881c8779.04082...@posting.google.com...
>
>
> > > In my opinion "to exist" can and should be employed both as a
> > > first-order and as a second-order predicate.
> > > [...]
> > > "to exist" can also be treated rather unproblematically as a property
> > > of individuals:
>
>
> > By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing--even if we
> > completely determine it--we do not make the
> > least addition to the thing when we
> > further declare that this thing ("is"); Otherwise, it would not be exactly
the
> > same thing that exists, but something more
> > than we had thought in the concept;
> > and we could not, therefore, say that the exact object of my concept exists.
>
>
> The concept of existence is pretty uninformative, and so is eg the
> concept of self-identity. -- So what?!
> concepts cannot possess them as their properties. [Frege: "I call the
> concepts under which an object falls its properties."]
>
> By the way, even if we regard the concept of necessary existence as a
> possible property of an individual, no ontological "proof" will ever
> work, for if I conceive of God as a/the being which exists
> necessarily, this in no way implies that there actually is anything
> which has the property of necessary existence!
>
> There is absolutely no a priori route from the mere definition
>
> "God is almighty, perfectly good, ..., and exists necessarily"
>
> to the truth of
>
> "There is something such that it is almighty, perfectly good, ..., and
> exists necessarily" ,
>
> because it is always logically possible that nothing exists
> necessarily, that nothing falls under the concept of necessary
> existence!
>
Antinomies are contradictions that Kant believed follow necessarily from our
attempts to conceive the nature of transcendent reality. Kant thought the
Antinomies cannot be resolved and that attempts to conceive the transcendent will
always produce irresolvable contradictions. This does not mean that there is no
transcendent or that attempts to conceive the transcendent are meaningless. They
are, just as Kant said, necessitated by reason itself. It does mean, however,
that the transcendent defeats rational representation.
antinomies ('conflict of laws') which are usually described as 'paradox' or
'contradiction'. An example of one Kant sought to deal with is whether the
universe has a beginning (first cause) or whether it has always existed.
The contradiction arises because valid arguments
can be made in favour of both views. If
unresolved this antimony could lead to 'the
euthanasia of pure reason' (skepticism).
Thus Kant believed antinomies must be reconciled.
http://www.faithnet.org.uk/Philosophy/kant.htm
>
> > A complete list of an object's properties
> > would not be expanded by adding another
> > property, namely existence; therefore,
> > existence is not another property over and
> > above all the other properties.
>
>
> Existence is a property b e s i d e all the other properties. ;-)
>
> The descriptive value of concepts such as existence and self-identity
> is indeed close to zero.
> You really don愒 know much about me if you learn that I惴
> self-identical.
> This fact notwithstanding, I deny that the degree of informativeness
> determines whether a concept can be had by individuals as a property!
>
>
> > "...physical object exists. This is a true claim; what makes it true? One
would
> > like to be able to say that it is the fact that the physical object has the
> > property of existence. It seems that the claim asserts that existence is a
> > property of the physical object.
> >
> > The foregoing definition of 'exists' is incorrect just because the definition
> > does treat existence as a property.
>
>
> I惴 afraid, you愉e begging the question!
>
> Generally, the possession of the logical properties of existence and
> self-identity is a necessary condition for an entity愀 existence, but
> it愀 not a sufficient one, because everything must also possess some
> "substantial" properties other than existence and self-identity.
>
Define existence.
> #PH
Keynes
>Keynes wrote:
>
>>>>What is disconnected must be free of the web of causation.
>>>
>>>Well, presumably. Causation would be a kind of connection.
>>
>> What other kinds of connections are there?
>
>I suppose it depends on how broadly you construe connection. Interstate
>highways 90 and 95 are connected, but neither is a cause of the other.
>They do interact causally, of course, but I think it would be a rather
>loose use of language to call the nature of their connection causal
>merely on the basis that they causally interact; their causal
>interactions are on a very different level from what we're talking about
>when we say they are connected.
>
Obscure. Are we speaking of the world at a snapshot of time,
or as it is, an unbreakable web of necessary causes in time?
Try to hang on to the subject if you can.
>>>>Causal connections of the past are considered necessary to
>>>>produce the present.
>>>
>>>By who?
>>
>> LOL
>
>I'm glad to see that you also appreciate how amusingly clumsy your
>wording was in retrospect.
>
I won't dance. Don't ask me.
So you deny the necessity of the past to produce the present?
Wonderful. Have a cookie.
>>>>The past is all about necessity.
>>>
>>>What does that even mean?
>>
>> More beer, Mr. Sophist?
>
>Ah, so you think I'd understand you better if I were drunk. I suppose
>that's possible.
>
That's merely flattering the beer.
Your lack of comprehension is likely not curable by medication.
>>>>We consider the future to be conditional and the past to
>>>>be unconditional.
>>>
>>>You should be careful about using the pronoun "we."
>>
>> In your case, certainly.
>
>No, in general. Four-dimensionalism is by no means a fringe view.
>
It is a mathematical view with great practical difficulties.
>>>>This must be a flaw in our concept of time,
>>>>because we suppose the future to be of a different nature than
>>>>the past, and at the same time accept the past as a fossilization
>>>>of the future (of past 'times')..
>>>
>>>Perhaps this is indeed a flaw in your conception of time.
>>
>> What is your conception of time?
>> (It must be quite unique.)
>
>Hardly. For the most part, I'm an orthodox four-dimensionalist.
Then do you believe in space-time as a four dimensional artifact,
meaning that sequence is space-like, and all 'events' have already
occurred? The 4D space-time diagram doesn't really have any
'time' in it, does it? All events 'are' and do not unfold. There is
no distiction between past and future, since all times are of a
homogeneous piece. (And interchangeable with space!)
Then you must be a hard determinist who can't account for QM.
Where in the 4D diagram is 'now'? Without 'now' which is
past and which is future?
If all times exist simultaneously, why are past and future ungraspable?
block
> Existence is a property b e s i d e all the other properties. ;-)
I don't know how you would term Transactional Analysis (Berne)- I think that
is more psychology than philosophy, but taking into consideration the fact
that philosophy does cover all things, then there is a theory in
Transactional Analysis (/Father/Mother/Child) where ceasing to exist "as a
person" is possible.
It would depend what premise you start from, at this stage, forget whether a
cardboard box or a desk has any kind of sentient feelings and take this
premise as peculiar only to man. IF you give and give and give - either
through kindness or generosity or sympathy etc, then it is possible to give
so much that you would suffer from something called "burn out" which is
where you give so much and get nothing in return that there is nothing left
of you. In this philosophy/psychological explanation then it would have
been or could be possible, for you, me, God or whoever, to have helped and
aided and cared and done so much along those lines that we/you could,
logically, theoretically (etc) reach a stage where you do cease to exist.
That if you give and give and give and receive nothing in return then
ceasing to exist is the end result.
block
> Define existence.
Existence is where you do, think, feel, appear, look, express, sound (and
all connotations) something that would make any other thing, aware that you
are there. Existence surely is only quantified by another person's
reaction. Since no one is ever alone and we are all part of the one in some
way (there is only everything) then everything that is, is!
block
"The Sophist" <sop...@brown.edu> wrote in message
news:VgNYc.9170$gl.7246@okepread07...
> The main division between the so-called Continental and Analytic
> traditions has been disputes over whether the task of being unclear
> should be carried out in natural language or in a formal system.
Unclear or contradictory?
RoboTrax
Kant was an asshole. period
Find smething more interesting to waste life on.
Suggestion: What type of tits stir he most primitive feelngs in you.
I like small tits with half dollars size nipples that shake
violently when your on the bottom and she,s on the top
fucking you like a tomboy with a grudge from who knows when.
Then grabbing the swollen nipples and forcing her to lean
back till the head is punchng her g spot and your hand is
insuring your cock doesn,t slip out and punishing her clitoris
simultaneously as she starts biting your ankles to keep from
screaming out loud and frightening the neighbors into calling 911
Not to say I don,t like those hard medium sized small nippled greek tits
too.
Paul Holbach
> ch0l3h$rog$1...@lust.ihug.co.nz>...
> > In article <881c8779.04083...@posting.google.com>,
> > paulholba...@freenet.de (Paul Holbach) wrote:
> > Existence is a property b e s i d e all the other properties. ;-)
> >
> > The descriptive value of concepts such as existence and self-identity
> > is indeed close to zero.
> Not necessarily. Certainly the disputants think they are saying something
> meaningful in exchanges like "God exists!", "No She doesn't!", ....
Yes, you´re right, existential statements can be informative.
If, for example, you didn´t know that the Kremlin exists and I told
you that the Kremlin exists (and in fact said the truth by doing so),
your knowledge would certainly increase by your learning that "the
Kremlin" is not just an irreferential name.
But what I was trying to say is that "exists" doesn´t describe the
Kremlin as eg "is a fortress" does. So by merely knowing that there is
something called 'the Kremlin' I still don´t know anything 'material'
about it.
> The usual sense of "exists" is "exists in physical reality", but there are
> plenty of other reasonable senses.
Abstract entities such as numbers can be said to exist as well -- if
there are any such entities.
But abstract objects, if there are any, exist in the very same sense
of "exist" as concrete objects do.
There are many different *kinds* of existents, but there is only *one*
sense of "exist/-s"!
> For example, Pegasus certainly "exists"
> in the world of Greek mythology (which we today consider fictional, but the
> ancient Greeks didn't).
No, Pegasus doesn´t exist *at all*, and, hence, exists *nowhere*!
"The world of Greek mythology" is just a metaphorical phrase.
"There is, e.g., the relativistic doctrine according to which Cerberus
exists in the world of Greek mythology and not in the world of modern
science. This is a perverse way of saying merely that Greeks believed
Cereberus to exist and that (if we may trust modern science thus far)
they were wrong. Myths which affirm the existence of Cerberus have
esthetic value and anthropological significance; moreover they have
internal structures upon which our regular logical techniques can be
brought to bear; but it does happen that the myths are literally
false, and it is sheer obscurantism to phrase the matter otherwise.
There is really only one world, and there is not, never was, and never
will be any such thing as Cerberus."
[Quine, W. V. (1982). /Methods of logic/ (4th ed.). Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press. (p. 266)(Original work published 1950)]
> Napoleon "exists" in European history, although he
> as a person does not exist today.
Since Napoleon doesn´t exist *now*, "Napoleon exists" is false and
"Napoleon has existed" is true, which means that there was a time in
history when "Napoleon exists" was true.
I don´t believe in the existence of "past persons".
Following Quine, I hold that it is "sheer obscurantism" to claim that
Napoleon is somehow still with us, because he *absolutely* ceased to
exist on May 5, 1821.
> And formally, in modal logics there are
> various different conventions regarding whether an item that exists in some
> particular possible world must also exist in others.
It´s certainly possible for me to conceive of a world in which it is
not the case that the person I am exists. But semiotic entities such
as conceptions of possible worlds, i.e. of worlds different from the
existent one, are not on an ontological par with the existent
transsemiotic world.
Statements such as "There exists a world A in which 'Paul Holbach
exists' is true and there exists another world B in which 'Paul
Holbach exists' is false" don´t make any real sense to me.
If there were two distinct "world bubbles", A and B, 'Paul Holbach
exists' would be true both in A and in B, despite the circumstance
that he couldn´t exist both in A and in B.
Anyway, "exists" is definitely no indexical!
> So, IMO, the predicate "exists" should almost always be qualified by the
> domain in which the item is being asserted to exist (or not). That is,
> Exists is usefully considered as a 2-place predicate, not a 1-place one.
I reject all those befuddling relativizations, because I think
/existence/ is an *absolute* concept:
"The concept of existence cannot be relativized without destroying its
meaning completely."
[Gödel, Kurt (1949). A remark about the relationship between
relativity theory and idealistic philosophy. In P. Schilpp (Ed.),
/Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist/.]
#PH
Tarald Andresen
can't
> > be a predicate:
> >
> > Since everything is connected ("hangs together") - there are no absolute
> > dividing lines / there is no empty space - everything must have a
*common
> > denominator*; this common denominator must be necessary (since
everything is
> > necessary / has at least one cause); therefore general existence must
have a
> > necessary component/aspect in order to exist (therefore existence is a
> > quality/predicate).
>
> Let's see. David Lewis denied that everything is connected, and while
> his view may be false, I know of no conclusive arguments to that effect.
> I am not sure what you mean when you say that there is no empty space.
Nothingness/emptiness cannot exist (an "empty space" has no content - it
"consists" of nothingness - thus the concept 'empty space' must also be
empty, have no content). Thus there is nothing that can disconnect any
matter from other matter, and so everything is connected (to matter).
> However, even if everything were connected, this would not entail the
> existence of a common denominator. Even if we assume that things must
> share something in common to be connected, object 1 might be connected
> to object 2 by sharing A, and object 2 might be connected to object 3 by
> sharing B, and objects 1 and 3 might then be connected without sharing
> anything in common.
My point is that all these objects share one common trait; they are
*matter*! As matter then in principle is a continuous thing (that can't be
divided in an absolute sense), all matter must have a common denominator
(and not only a nominal one as belonging to the category "matter").
You seem to assume that things which are not
> necessary must have causes, which seems not to be the case (popular
> interpretations of present quantum theory deny this). Finally, even if
> everything that existed needed to have a component in common, that would
> not entail that this common component would be existence.
Anything that exists belong to the category "existence". And I don't much
care about popular interpretations of quantum theory; to say that something
can exist without a cause is like saying that things can exist without any
material characteristica - i.e. not belong to the physical/spatial world -
which is absurd.
Tarald Andresen
we
> completely determine it--we do not make the least addition to the thing
when we
> further declare that this thing ("is"); Otherwise, it would not be exactly
the
> same thing that exists, but something more than we had thought in the
concept;
> and we could not, therefore, say that the exact object of my concept
exists.
>
> A complete list of an object's properties would not be expanded by adding
another
> property, namely existence; therefore, existence is not another property
over and
> above all the other properties.
But one can't designate something as an object in an absolute sense (except
infinity itself); i.e. as something divisable from other "objects"/matter
(the division is an act of subjective interpretation of nature). "Objects"
then has a "double-nature"; both as "individuals" and as belonging to -
being "elements" in/aspects of - an undivisable nature; i.e. they are both
singular and in a sense belonging to the category "existence qua existence".
Thus the existence of an object has a quality beyond being an "object",
namely as existence per se, and this transcendental aspect of an object is
the common denominator it shares with everything else. Likewise this means
that the existence of an object has a a predicate *beyond* its
characteristica qua an *object*, namely the predicate of also being
*existence qua existence*.
> "...physical object exists. This is a true claim; what makes it true? One
would
> like to be able to say that it is the fact that the physical object has
the
> property of existence. It seems that the claim asserts that existence is a
> property of the physical object.
>
> The foregoing definition of 'exists' is incorrect just because the
definition
> does treat existence as a property.
But that's precisely what it (also) is, beyond refering to an object qua
object (its definition as something separate from other things)..
Enory Nolan
There is a simple, but absolute test to prove. beyond any doubt, that
you,we, and all else, exist. A simple tool is required, if you would
be so kind as to forgo logic for just this once. A hammer(the tool)
held in one hand, is forceably drawn forth upon one's other hand, the
hand to be affected by the hammer blow, is placed upon a surface that
will not, for reason of this experment, be allowed to render movement
so as to absorbe any force applied by the afore mentioned blow. The
results of the hammer blow will, A: Prove, you exsist, B: Prove,God
exist, C: Reafrime, we all exist.
A:The pain involved in this action will be, I fell, adaquet to allow
you to realize , in fact you do exist.
B:By reason of A:, you will envoke all knowledge avaliable in order to
make the results of A: go away, including, maybe not verbatum, the
powers of God. "God, please make this pain quit and I swear I'll never
try A: again.
C: The letter,and or phone calls you receive from the doctor's office,
threating leagel action if the bill you received from their care on
you caused by A: is not forth comming, sould be action enough to allow
you knowledge that, sure enough, you do, in fact exist. If you still
fell that more proof is needed, wait until the big, mean, weapon
toteing bill collector arrives and tell him, the bill collector, you
don't exist. If, this last is to be the case, one should be prepared
to find another doctor to remove any lingering doubts and that size 12
shoe you are wearing in the lower part of your torso.
Witt
>
> "Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote in message
> news:881c8779.04083...@posting.google.com...
> > > "Immortalist" <Reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<
> > > EYqdnUfMwtw...@comcast.com>...
> > > > "Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote in message
> > > > news:881c8779.04082...@posting.google.com...
> >
> >
> > > > In my opinion "to exist" can and should be employed both as a
> > > > first-order and as a second-order predicate.
Agreed.
In FOPL: E!x =df Ey(x=y), or, E!x =df x=x, or, E!x =df EyAz(z=x <-> z=x).
In SOPL: E!x =df EF[(F)x].
> > > > [...]
> > > > "to exist" can also be treated rather unproblematically as a
property
> > > > of individuals:
If we define a property as a predicate that deals directly with the object
x, then,
(F)x says that x has the property (F). (F) is a primary predicate of x.
x exists, EF[(F)x], is a secondary predicate of x.
> >
> > > By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a
thing--even if we
> > > completely determine it--we do not make the
> > > least addition to the thing when we
> > > further declare that this thing ("is"); Otherwise, it would not be
exactly
> the
> > > same thing that exists, but something more
> > > than we had thought in the concept;
> > > and we could not, therefore, say that the exact object of my concept
exists.
(E!x & Gx) <-> Gx. i.e. (EF[(F)x] & Gx) <-> Gx.
Existence is the logical sum of primary predicates.
(G)x -> E!x and (~G)x -> E!x and EF[(F)x] -> E!x, are valid.
But, ~(Gx) -> E!x and ~((~G)x) -> E!x and ~(E!x) -> E!x, are not valid.
> >
> >
> > The concept of existence is pretty uninformative, and so is eg the
> > concept of self-identity. -- So what?!
> > This fact doesn´t mean that the objects which fall under these
> > concepts cannot possess them as their properties. [Frege: "I call the
> > concepts under which an object falls its properties."]
> >
> > By the way, even if we regard the concept of necessary existence as a
> > possible property of an individual, no ontological "proof" will ever
> > work, for if I conceive of God as a/the being which exists
> > necessarily, this in no way implies that there actually is anything
> > which has the property of necessary existence!
Agreed.
Definitions do not presume existence. For example:
The existent present king of France exists, is false.
The existent present king of France is a king, is false.
> >
> > > A complete list of an object's properties
> > > would not be expanded by adding another
> > > property, namely existence; therefore,
> > > existence is not another property over and
> > > above all the other properties.
(E!x & Gx) <-> Gx.
> >
> >
> > Existence is a property b e s i d e all the other properties. ;-)
> >
> > The descriptive value of concepts such as existence and self-identity
> > is indeed close to zero.
> > You really don´t know much about me if you learn that I´m
> > self-identical.
> > This fact notwithstanding, I deny that the degree of informativeness
> > determines whether a concept can be had by individuals as a property!
> >
> >
> > > "...physical object exists. This is a true claim; what makes it
true? One
> would
> > > like to be able to say that it is the fact that the physical object
has the
> > > property of existence. It seems that the claim asserts that
existence is a
> > > property of the physical object.
> > >
> > > The foregoing definition of 'exists' is incorrect just because the
definition
> > > does treat existence as a property.
Existence is a secondary property/predicate not a primary
property/predicate.
> >
> >
> > I´m afraid, you´re begging the question!
> >
> > Generally, the possession of the logical properties of existence and
> > self-identity is a necessary condition for an entity´s existence, but
> > it´s not a sufficient one, because everything must also possess some
> > "substantial" properties other than existence and self-identity.
> >
>
> Define existence.
E!x =df EF[(F)x].
This definition of existence applies to concrete and to abstract entities.
OH
>
> > #PH
>
>
Witt
"Witt" <oori...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:aq%Yc.106914$pTn....@news01.bloor.is.net.cable.rogers.com...
>
> "Immortalist" <Reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:WuGdna-J5rc...@comcast.com...
> >
> > "Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote in message
> > news:881c8779.04083...@posting.google.com...
> > > > "Immortalist" <Reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:<
> > > > EYqdnUfMwtw...@comcast.com>...
> > > > > "Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote in
message
> > > > > news:881c8779.04082...@posting.google.com...
> > >
> > >
> > > > > In my opinion "to exist" can and should be employed both as a
> > > > > first-order and as a second-order predicate.
>
> Agreed.
> In FOPL: E!x =df Ey(x=y), or, E!x =df x=x, or, E!x =df EyAz(z=x <->
z=x).
> In SOPL: E!x =df EF[(F)x].
A typo ..
E!x =df EyAz(z=x <-> z=x), should be E!x =df EyAz(z=y <-> z=x).
That is to say .. E!x means, x is unique.
slider
Enory Nolan wrote
There is a simple, but absolute test to prove. beyond any doubt, that
you,we, and all else, exist. A simple tool is required, if you would
be so kind as to forgo logic for just this once. A hammer(the tool)
held in one hand, is forceably drawn forth upon one's other hand, the
hand to be affected by the hammer blow, is placed upon a surface that
will not, for reason of this experment, be allowed to render movement
so as to absorbe any force applied by the afore mentioned blow. The
results of the hammer blow will, A: Prove, you exsist, B: Prove,God
exist, C: Reafrime, we all exist.
A:The pain involved in this action will be, I fell, adaquet to allow
you to realize , in fact you do exist.
B:By reason of A:, you will envoke all knowledge avaliable in order to
make the results of A: go away, including, maybe not verbatum, the
powers of God. "God, please make this pain quit and I swear I'll never
try A: again.
C: The letter,and or phone calls you receive from the doctor's office,
threating leagel action if the bill you received from their care on
you caused by A: is not forth comming, sould be action enough to allow
you knowledge that, sure enough, you do, in fact exist. If you still
fell that more proof is needed, wait until the big, mean, weapon
toteing bill collector arrives and tell him, the bill collector, you
don't exist. If, this last is to be the case, one should be prepared
to find another doctor to remove any lingering doubts and that size 12
shoe you are wearing in the lower part of your torso.
### - lol... spelling seems bad for him... but this humour reminds me of 'clearhead'?
is that you clearhead? how's flippy these days? :)
lol :))
Paul Holbach
> Define existence.
Even though existential statements are paraphrasable as a whole, I
think "exist" as such is a semantic primitive (or semantic "prime")
that is virtually indefinable.
#PH
P.S.:
For logical purposes the following definition could be used:
E!x :<-> Ey(y = x)
Paul Holbach
> hCVYc.4155$WW4....@news4.e.nsc.no>...
> Nothingness/emptiness cannot exist (an "empty space" has no content - it
> "consists" of nothingness - thus the concept 'empty space' must also be
> empty, have no content). Thus there is nothing that can disconnect any
> matter from other matter, and so everything is connected (to matter).
No, your "thus" is a non sequitur.
There certainly cannot be any such thing as nothingness (I惴 not
saying there couldn愒 be nothing!), but nothingness is not emptiness!
"The so-called field equations of Einstein愀 general theory of
relativity--which forms the basis of modern scientific
cosmology--admit of solutions in which space is entirely devoid of
matter and energy. So, mathematically, at least, it seems that the
notion of perfectly 'empty' space is perfectly coherent."
[Lowe, E. J. (2002). /A survey of metaphysics/. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. (p. 256)]
#PH
Paul Holbach
> > In my opinion "to exist" can and should be employed both as a
> > first-order and as a second-order predicate.
> Agreed.
> In FOPL: E!x =df Ey(x=y), or, E!x =df x=x, or, E!x =df EyAz(z=x <-> z=x).
> In SOPL: E!x =df EF[(F)x].
I regard "E!" as a primitive concept.
> Existence is a secondary property/predicate not a primary
> property/predicate.
You have an odd tendency to contradict yourself.
A few sentences above you agreed with me that "to exist" can and
should be employed both as a *first-order* and as a second-order
predicate!
#PH
Paul Holbach
> A typo ..
> E!x =df EyAz(z=x <-> z=x), should be E!x =df EyAz(z=y <-> z=x).
> That is to say .. E!x means, x is unique.
The first-order predicate "E!", "exists", is not to be confused with
the special existential quantifier sign indicating uniqueness ("There
is exactly one thing such that ...), which contains the exclamation
mark too!
#PH
Ann
glad to hear (at last:), a more down to earth opinion in what has
become a highly intellectual (i.e. hi-tech:) thread. What I'm going to
do next is probably new for you, but is actually almost a trivial
'greeting' at a.d.castaneda. I termed it "crushing of words" (of
'reality' this time round:) or shaking firmly the 'reality' of the
Word... in our mind only, of course, only there and nowhere else, let
it for now remain a universal constant elsewhere/'outside':).
Following your inspiring example I'll try to use a 'Language' (i.e. the
old Greek 'Logos' meaning also 'concept', 'meaning', 'thought', 'Word',
of 'Reason') as simple as possible. I guess, you've already
experienced the 'phenomenon' of 'professionals' trying to hide their
'expertise' (or rather, not-knowing for sure:) behind the complex
jargon of... beautifully crafted (and 'double-digit':) words. So let us
this time be nice to the poor verbs 'to be' and 'to exist'. If you ask
me their case was solved by the early Eleatics thousands of years
ago... in a time when there were much fewer sources of confusion, i.e.
fewer words (and "universal forms"), both, in 'independent' reality
outside ("the lovers of sights" reality of the five senses, e.g. the
external, spoken words or written in a holy book or dictionary) as well
as in reality within... our 'meaningful' minds (the internal
reality/dialogue of the 'sixth'/common sense of Logos:).
{As a reference you may, for instance, check the "What is" of the
Parmenides' Goddess, or Zeno's view on the 'absolute' reality of all
measurement units, i.e. "he was [merely] concerned to show that our
understandings of time, motion, change, position, magnitude, unity,
singleness, and plurality are incoherent; or that they result in
contradictions", http://www.gmu.edu/courses/phil/ancient/pzm3.htm, and
as we both know paradoxes (like, What was the very first Beginning
like, with a Chicken or with an Egg? Was it first the Baby on the arrow
of time or the grown up Adult?) can be extremely damaging to linear
Reason, they mark the bounds to the 'almighty' rational mind.}
Similar is the situation with another word -- the Number (of the Beast:)
-- it turns out "naturally real numbers" are not so real after all but
"merely exist in the mental universe of mathematics".
{by the "Axiom of Choice":
The "existence" of f -- or of any mathematical object, even the
number "3" -- is purely formal. It does not have the same kind
of solidity as your table and your chair; it merely exists in
==> the mental universe of mathematics.
Many different mathematical universes are possible. When we
accept or reject the Axiom of Choice, we are specifying which
universe we shall work in. Both possibilities are feasible --
i.e., neither accepting nor rejecting AC yields a contradiction;
http://www.math.vanderbilt.edu/~schectex/ccc/choice.html}
Even if it seems obvious that there were only this hard reality of the
'corporeal' senses (of what we see, hear, smell or touch), we may still
recall that to Einstein it nevertheless seemed "generally relative",
the 'picture' was not one/universal but perspective-dependent (changing
with varying space-time points of view:), or as he said: "Reality is
merely an illusion, albeit a very persistent one."
Moreover, we have little way of knowing what 'other' animals 'see',
'hear' or 'feel', don't we :). I mean, can you predict an earthquake?
Do you think scientists can? Sometimes yes, but do you know how? Well,
'despite' of all geo-research the most reliable warning signal still
remains... "unusual animal behavior", go figure. How do you think,
where does "that esoteric form of animals' Secret Knowledge"
("considered so by the ancient Greeks",
http://www.levity.com/mavericks/quake.htm: "Etho-Geological
Forecasting: Unusual Animal Behavior & Earthquake Prediction") come
from? That is, they may as well 'see' and 'live' in a World different
from 'ours', may 'dwell' in a "separate reality" (Castaneda term), may
have a different notion of the 'single Truth'
{and of the 'Evolution', for that matter, take, for example, those wild
animals going extinct now as a result of 'profitable' human action.
(Alas, the link to the "Nature" article from 22 July "Biodiversity: A
tragedy with many players.. Ignorance is not bliss" is broken. It said
that "we remain scandalously ill informed about the processes that give
rise to biodiversity, and the consequences of its loss. We are
witnessing a catastrophic loss of species that is the direct result of
human activities.") Those unlucky 'species' killed off or 'just'
"naturally deselected" by the Intelligent Designer would probably 'see'
the technological 'revolution' and other modern discoveries of our
fittest intellect not as the highest but the lowest ladder, go
figure.}.
So what if instead we're living in parallel universes where there
weren't just a single truth (the supreme 'objectivity' of the observer
regardless:) but many subjective/competing ones. What is more, do "ALL
men" indeed share "by nature" the Aristotelian scholastic "desire to
know"; and do we really know what is there to be known in the first
place. {It sounds almost like an abstract/rhetoric question, doesn't
it, though wait a paragraph or two for the concrete ones.} I mean, do
we really know... the whereabouts of 'reality', and should "we prefer
seeing (one might say) to everything else", how much can we trust our
senses "and above all others the sense of sight... the sense that makes
us know"?
{from the opening paragraph of His "Metaphysics"
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.1.i.html that later
mutated into physics; 'unfortunately', as with many other fields, its
founder was again the Godfather of science. He even redefined/narrowed
down his teacher's meaning of the word 'philosophy' to almost equate it
with his "empirical" vision of the science of philosophy, no wonder most
philosophers I've met were keeping his party line, more or less being
reduced to warriors of science.}
Einstein, for one, believed (and proved it... with mysterious theories:)
"imagination was more important than knowledge", in case of doubt he
preferred to trust the "intuition, the only real valuable thing". He
even found the inherent imperfections in our eyesight, if you remember
he was causing straight parallels to cross and rays to bend, time to
slow down and space-time to warp: his "general relativity postulated an
entirely different physical picture to explain the force of gravity" -
it did not exist, there was no gravity, no force, go figure :)
...gravity is not a "force" but a byproduct of the warping of
==> space-time. In some sense, gravity does not exist; what moves the
planets and stars is the distortion of space and time.
Imagine, for the moment, dropping a heavy shot put on a large bed
spread. The shot put will, of course, sink deeply into the bed
spread. Now imagine shooting a small marble across the bed. Since
the bed is warped, the marble will execute a curved
path. However, for a person viewing the marble from a great
distance, it will appear that the shot put is exerting an
invisible "force" on the marble, forcing it to move in a curved
path. In other words, we can now replace the clumsy concept of a
"force" with the more elegant bending of space itself. We now
have an entirely new definition of a "force." It is nothing but
the byproduct of the warping of space.
In the same way that a marble moves on a curved bed sheet, the
earth moves around the sun in a curved path because space-time
itself is curved.
(Prof. Dr. Michio Kaku, author of "A Theory of Everything?"
http://home.flash.net/~csmith0/theryall.htm)
The problem is, there are many other 'objects' of a like kind that do
not necessarily exist 'outside' (of our hallucinating mind... and its
intellectual products like books, picturesque TV 'documentaries', etc:),
can you guess some of those? Which brings me back to your "hammer"
criterion: although it may sound convincing at first, there are
important special cases where it breaks down (similar to what happened
to the Newtonian three-dimensional mechanics and his favourite
"universals": the one and only "absolute space" and "absolute time":)
On 31 Aug 2004, Enory Nolan wrote:
> There is a simple, but absolute test to prove. beyond any doubt, that
> you, we, and all else, exist. A simple tool is required, if you would
> be so kind as to forgo logic for just this once. A hammer (the tool)
> held in one hand, is forceably drawn forth upon one's other hand...
The time has come now for the "proof", i.e. for the concrete/corporeal
questions like, do you believe in the "Origin of species" from a common
ancestor/cell as a fact? Does random "God play dice" (and if not then
who does, Nature perhaps:)? Does the "Evolutionary Process" exist
('independently' in nature, that is:)? Where does 'time' begin and
'space' end, is the "black hole" (the infinitesimal singleton of
infinite mass:) real? And (be careful now, before you rush to reply
confidently 'Yes!' remember that I'll next ask you for documented
proofs or 'just' to give me the recipe for how to 'see' them, or at
least how to smash them with your verifying "hammer":) what about the
other 'fairy tales' and storybook 'objects' like the invisible 'force'
of, 'gravity', the 'infinity' of, 'expanding', 'universe' and,
'galaxies', the 'helium stars', the 'virus', the 'gene', the 'Number',
do you really believe them to be real, for real?
Do you happen to absolutely trust the news, movies and TV
'documentaries' about certain... "Men on the Moon", for example, from
thirty five years ago? Or even about 9/11, for that matter, the other
day I read "The Coincidence Theorist's Guide to 9/11"
(http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/archive/scoop/stories/60/5a/200408231012.3bb72110.html)
and all of a sudden I did not 'know' any more... the official version,
let's say that my 100% percent confidence was violently shaken.
And what if the single 'Truth' was an illusion, that it didn't exist
anywhere in Nature, that there were many (often conflicting) points of
view of the word 'reality'. What if instead of 'hallucinating' (how
would any of us today 'know', let alone about the "millions" of
pre-historic times immemorial) the classic Greeks were really seeing
their 'irrational myths' and hearing their Gods, what if Homer wasn't
actually blind (as suggested by 'mythical' historians "responsible for
the image of Homer as a blind bard from Chios. We just don't know if
this is true." http://classics.allinfoabout.com/articles/homer.html).
What if "Homer's Iliad was no mere literary trope but an accurate
description of how people really experienced the world at the time", as
suggested by Julian Jaynes to whom it appeared that "our modern type of
consciousness was a recent development that began no more than 3,000
years ago"
(http://www.accampbell.uklinux.net/essays/skeptic/jaynes.html). There
may just as well be no such thing as 'One/Good version', no ultimate
'knowledge' of the absolute 'truth' but just another One of our
"persistent illusions" (like the Word of 'reality' itself:).
What if all there is in our books were Words?
Plain words, amazing, isn't it, but what a truism, why the rhetoric
question, you might ask. Well, as self-evident as it is we often tend to
forget about it, plus :) looks can be deceiving, for I've just started
shaking the Logos and 'His' idea of Word's Highest Goodness that
Aristotle and countable others were planting in our mind since 'day' one
(including later his major religions and holy books professing, not
without a sense of honesty, that "In the Beginning was the Word, and
Logos was God":). Whereas to me, I'm afraid, words and meanings are
relative and far from absolute, they vary with the individual and
his/her personal experience. That is, we may still be
storing/recollecting/having in mind different images for a given
symbol/word, different cultures (and times) may still disagree even on
words as simple as 'table', 'bed' or 'chair' and on their defining
properties (like the size, height, shape, form, number of legs or even
lack thereof:), the word (e.g. those characters on the screen:) may
emerge pretty much as the only "universal" about their "form".
{Which may explain why in his "universal" quest Plato found mathematical
numbers were the only absolute. Over the entry to his Academy (that
later evolved to the "skeptical Academy", perhaps too skeptical or just
enough to be 'recognised' in the beginning of the "dark ages", 529 AD,
"as a pagan establishment and closed down by the Christian Emperor
Justinian"
http://www-gap.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/Mathematicians/Plato.html) he
had hung the words "Let No One Un-versed in Geometry Enter". Of course,
in light of our discussion the topical question is: are numbers real?
They exist, but where?}
And if it was hard for simple words then what could we say about complex
ones, e.g. what does 'absolute' mean, does 'objective' really exist?
Anyway, the obvious conclusion is that it has become like a hobby of
mine to question ("The important thing is not to stop questioning. Never
lose a holy curiosity.. [it] has its own reason for existing.",
Einstein) the divine character of the Word. It is an ancient tradition
known by the name of 'skepticism' and dating back to at least Pyrrho
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-ancient/#EPE) and Tao/Zen
Buddhism (the most curious finding from the long "Logos reality:
genesis" post from last August analysing the "Hsin Hsin Ming" Verses on
the Faith Mind by the 3rd Zen Patriarch).
I liked it in part because that's how I felt about Logos (at the very
peak of 'His' information age) and also because I was a bit fed up
parroting what everybody else was telling/teaching me. The mandatory
education system, I mean ("no child left behind":), and if you think
about it did it not start again with the Godfather who "desired" to
educate the "imperfect souls of children", his Lyceum being a close
prototype of our modern schools. That is, aren't we now living out his
scholastic dream; hence, classic skepticism has become obsolete, 'a bad'
by default (as opposed to 'good gullibility', I guess:). Webster and
WordNet, on the other hand, merely say that:
Skepticism: incredulity, disbelief in any claims of ultimate knowledge
[syn: agnosticism]; the tenet that all knowledge is
uncertain; Pyrrohonism; universal doubt; critical
investigation or inquiry, as opposed to the positive
assumption or assertion of certain principles.
An undecided, inquiring state of mind; doubt; uncertainty:
That momentary amazement, and irresolution, and
confusion, which is the result of skepticism.
--Hune.
If you ask me what was the point of this typing exercise (a shorter
one, in fact, mere 260 lines), I probably wouldn't 'know'. It was
certainly your verifying "hammer" that prompted it, but beyond that I
could not tell. Yet :), one conclusion uncontroversially emerges,
almost suggesting itself: "The intuitive mind is a sacred gift and the
rational mind is a faithful servant. We have created a society that
honors the servant and has forgotten the gift." Albert Einstein
Immortalist
Then, how do we talk or think about things without ((supposing)), in some sense
at least, that they exist? When the existence of the subjects of our statements
are in question, the normal use of logic becomes unreliable. Kant argues that the
use of words (or "predicates") alone does not necessarily imply the existence of
their referents. We can only ((assume)) the existence of entities named by our
words; we cannot prove "existence" by means of the use of language alone.
Is that eqivalent to;
Like the concept being, existence is incapable of a real definition because there
is nothing in the understanding of the term that can be categorized by some
composition. We can say that existence is a perfection, indeed the ultimate
perfection of an essence. In all created things existence is the act of essence;
whatever a thing is, if it is in act, actual, it exists and therefore has being.
www.catholicism.org/Philosophia/glossary.htm
>
> >
> > > #PH
> >
> >
>
>
rbb
"Enory Nolan" <emory...@yahoo.com> wrote in message :
> There is a simple, but absolute test to prove. beyond any doubt, that
> you,we, and all else, exist. A simple tool is required, if you would
> be so kind as to forgo logic for just this once. A hammer(the tool)
> held in one hand, is forceably drawn forth upon one's other hand, the
> hand to be affected by the hammer blow, is placed upon a surface that
> will not, for reason of this experment, be allowed to render movement
> so as to absorbe any force applied by the afore mentioned blow. The
> results of the hammer blow will, A: Prove, you exsist, B: Prove,God
> exist, C: Reafrime, we all exist.
How do you call this? The Thor experiment? ;-)
Immortalist
"block" <bl...@nowhere.com> wrote in message
news:8BUYc.9$dm...@newsfe5-gui.ntli.net...
The state of existing or being; [actuality, animation, being, breath,
continuance, continuation, duration, endurance, entity, essence, individuality,
journey, lifing, permanence, perseity, presence, rat race, real world, reality,
something, subsistence, survival, thing, world]; actual possession of being;
continuance in being; as, the existence of body and of soul in union; the
separate existence of the soul; immortal existence; ([is]_to_{be}) abide, be, be
extant, be latent, be present, breathe, continue, endure, happen, last, lie,
live, move, obtain, occur, prevail, remain, stand, stay, subsist, survive.
1. The fact or state of existing; being. 2. The fact or state of continued being;
life: our brief existence on Earth. 3.1. All that exists: sang the beauty of all
existence. 3.2. A thing that exists; an entity. 4. A mode or manner of existing:
scratched out a meager existence. 5. Specific presence; occurrence: The Geiger
counter indicated the existence of radioactivity.
But if;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-order_predicate_calculus
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_logic
&&
yo mamma don't dance and yo pappa don't rock n' roll
http://www.google.com/search?q=%22Your+Mama+Don%27t+Dance%22+lyrics
then;
http://images.google.com/images?q=cross+eyed
>
>
>
>
Immortalist
"Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote in message
news:881c8779.04083...@posting.google.com...
What logic symbol is <-> in real symbolic logic?
Is the = sign for material equivalence?
Do you guys have a cheat sheet faq for symbols translated to inferior askii?
And why don't you make your logic in JavaScript so it can be read && run at the
same time?
Immortalist
"RoboTrax" <Bo...@TotallySchilling.Org> wrote in message
news:55VYc.263634$eM2.6598@attbi_s51...
>
>
> Kant was an asshole. period
>
> Find smething more interesting to waste life on.
>
Obviously a logical positivist or foundationalist who needs to skip over the
thing in itself to profess a strong belief in it? Don't give up if you have that
much ado about Kant you meight be more than half way there to relizing that he
has not been defeated yet.
>
> Suggestion: What type of tits stir he most primitive feelngs in you.
>
what the the left nut say to the right nut?
that dude in the middle thinks he's hard.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
#news flash#
THis just in! Snow white has been chucked out of disneyland following reports
that she was seen setting on pinoccios face yelling LIE YOU BARSTARD
LIE............
------------------------------------
PENIS: "I the peinis here by request a pay rise as i do hard labour in dark , wet
, smelly places , with poor venilation and I work until I vomit......"
++++++++++++++++++++
Confession
When nuns are admitted to Heaven they go through a special gate and are expected
to make one last confession before they become angels.
Several nuns are lined up at this gate waiting to be absolved of their last sins
before they are made holy.
"And so," says St. Peter, "have you ever had any contact with a penis?"
"Well," says the first nun in line, "I did once just touch the tip of one with
the tip of my finger."
"OK," says St. Peter, "dip your finger in the holy water and pass on into
heaven."
The next nun admits, "Well, yes, I did once get carried away and I, you know,
sort of massaged one a bit."
"OK," says St. Peter, "rinse your hand in the holy water and pass on into
heaven."
Suddenly there is some jostling in the line and one of the nuns is trying to cut
in front.
"Well now, what's going on here?" says St. Peter.
"Well, your excellency," says the nun who is trying to improve her position in
line, "If I'm going to have to gargle that stuff, I want to do it before Sister
Mary Thomas sticks her ass in it."
Immortalist
But even if "But one can't designate something as an object in an absolute sense
(except infinity itself); i.e. as something divisable from other "objects"/matter
(the division is an act of subjective interpretation of nature). "Objects" then
has a "double-nature"; both as "individuals" and as belonging to - being
"elements" in/aspects of - an undivisable nature; i.e. they are both singular and
in a sense belonging to the category "existence qua existence". Thus the
existence of an object has a quality beyond being an "object", namely as
existence per se, and this transcendental aspect of an object is the common
denominator it shares with everything else. Likewise this means that the
existence of an object has a a predicate *beyond* its characteristica qua an
*object*, namely the predicate of also being *existence qua existence*," by
whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing--even if we
completely determine it--we do not make the least addition to the thing when we
further declare that this thing ("is"); Otherwise, it would not be exactly the
same thing that exists, but something more than we had thought in the concept!
> > "...physical object exists. This is a true claim; what makes it true? One
> would
> > like to be able to say that it is the fact that the physical object has
> the
> > property of existence. It seems that the claim asserts that existence is a
> > property of the physical object.
> >
> > The foregoing definition of 'exists' is incorrect just because the
> definition
> > does treat existence as a property.
>
> But that's precisely what it (also) is, beyond refering to an object qua
> object (its definition as something separate from other things)..
>
Do you mean it is a concept or representation of it?
>
Mark Earnest
Tarald Andresen
Not something more, but something that *transcends* it; something in/about
it that of necessity belongs to existence in general. The object's existence
thus becomes a predicate of *existence per se*, not only of it's own limited
definition/characteristica. The point is that regardless of its definition
as a an "individual" it would also have a specific/necessary definition as
general existence, and so its *bare existence* (regardless of individual
characteristica) would be a predicate.
>
> > > "...physical object exists. This is a true claim; what makes it true?
One
> > would
> > > like to be able to say that it is the fact that the physical object
has
> > the
> > > property of existence. It seems that the claim asserts that existence
is a
> > > property of the physical object.
> > >
> > > The foregoing definition of 'exists' is incorrect just because the
> > definition
> > > does treat existence as a property.
> >
> > But that's precisely what it (also) is, beyond refering to an object qua
> > object (its definition as something separate from other things)..
> >
>
> Do you mean it is a concept or representation of it?
I'm not sure I understand what you mean; do I mean *what* as a concept or a
representation? Please bare over me if i'm somewhat slow; it's late (and
maybe I'm not so fast in general, anyway...).
Tarald Andresen
> > "consists" of nothingness - thus the concept 'empty space' must also be
> > empty, have no content). Thus there is nothing that can disconnect any
> > matter from other matter, and so everything is connected (to matter).
>
>
> No, your "thus" is a non sequitur.
> There certainly cannot be any such thing as nothingness (I惴 not
> saying there couldn愒 be nothing!), but nothingness is not emptiness!
>
> "The so-called field equations of Einstein愀 general theory of
> relativity--which forms the basis of modern scientific
> cosmology--admit of solutions in which space is entirely devoid of
> matter and energy. So, mathematically, at least, it seems that the
> notion of perfectly 'empty' space is perfectly coherent."
Well, it seems obvious enough to me that 'spatiality' in itself is merely an
abstract concept; one can't speak of extension without there being
*something* (of substance/matter, etc.) extended. 'Space' is a geometrical
concept, along with lines, planes, etc., and emptiness then is nothingness
in a (3-dimensional) geometrical context.
Immortalist
We can never know things-in-themselves but only things-as-they-appear. Are you
saying that this transcending the object adds more faith in the belief that
things-in-themselves really are like things-as-they-appear? I mean;
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoHowa.htm
1. Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical
beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose justification
does not depend on that of any further emperical beliefs.
2. For a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a reason
why it is likely to be true.
3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive possession
of such a reason.
4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he believes
with justification the premises from which it follows that the belief is
likely to be true.
5. The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least one
empirical premise.
6. So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends on the
justification of at least one other empirical belief, contradicting 1.
7. So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs including completely justified
sceptical beliefs.
The 7 propositions seem to eliminate the possibility of emperical
justification of any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to this
untruthfullness of human beliefs in three ways which deal with the apparent
"regress" of one belief depending upon another which depends upon another
and so on:
If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic
emperical beliefs, then it must either:
(1) terminate in unjustified beleifs
(2) go on infinitely (without circularity)
(3) circle back upon itself in some way.
Does this transcending land us in in a condition where we terminate in a
completely justified belief about existence?
We can only apply a coherence criterion of existence, that is, analyze
relations obtaining among given appearances and conclude that some are actual and
others are not. Apart from the bare knowledge that they must exist in some sense,
we cannot know anything about the existence of either the "transcendental
object=x" which an appearance represents, nor about the "affecting objects"
which" provoke the receptivity into producing intuitions--about things beyond the
transcendentally ideal realm of appearances, we can have knowledge neither about
what things exist nor about why they exist. Thus: (A226/B274) "Our knowledge of
the existence of things reaches...only so far as perception and its advance
according to empirical laws can extend".
> >
> > > > "...physical object exists. This is a true claim; what makes it true?
> One
> > > would
> > > > like to be able to say that it is the fact that the physical object
> has
> > > the
> > > > property of existence. It seems that the claim asserts that existence
> is a
> > > > property of the physical object.
> > > >
> > > > The foregoing definition of 'exists' is incorrect just because the
> > > definition
> > > > does treat existence as a property.
> > >
> > > But that's precisely what it (also) is, beyond refering to an object qua
> > > object (its definition as something separate from other things)..
> > >
> >
> > Do you mean it is a concept or representation of it?
>
> I'm not sure I understand what you mean; do I mean *what* as a concept or a
> representation? Please bare over me if i'm somewhat slow; it's late (and
> maybe I'm not so fast in general, anyway...).
>
*what* in your sentence equals existence from the above
"> > > > The foregoing definition of 'exists' is..."
>
Tarald Andresen
Or as Nietzsche put it: "how to philosophize with a hammer"...
Tarald Andresen
No, that's not what I meant. I mean that all "objects" (all existence) share
a *physical* trait, which means that it must represent a foundation for all
matter; that which all other structures, objects, principles, forces, etc.,
are a function of. And this has nothing to do with empirical evidence, of
course, but with analytical reasoning - as attempted in my post at the top
of this thread. As far as I can understand, it's possible to know things
with certainty about the very foundation of matter simply through
metaphysical analysis.
Well, as you probably have surmised, I couldn't agree less....
My whole argument in the first place was about *establishing* the relevance
of regarding 'existence' as a property/predicate; it did not *start* with
that definition.
Paul Holbach
> Then, how do we talk or think about things without ((supposing)), in some sense
> at least, that they exist?
This is a very important philosophical question, which has been
puzzling the minds of thinkers for many centuries (culminating in
Meinong愀 hypertrophic ontological jungle).
"The mistaken view that the word 'Cerberus' must name something in
order to mean anything turns on confusion of naming with meaning. But
the view is encouraged also by another factor, viz., our habit of
thinking in terms of the misleading word 'about'. If there is no such
thing as Cerberus, then, it is asked, what are you talking a b o u t
when you use the word 'Cerberus' (even to say that there is no such
thing)? Actually this protest could be made with the same cogency
(viz., none) in countless cases where no would-be name such as
'Cerberus' occurs at all: What are you talking about when you say that
there are no Bolivian battleships? The remedy here is simply to give
up the unwarranted notion that talking sense always necessitates there
being things talked about. The notion springs, no doubt, from
essentially the same confusion which was just previously railed
against; then it was confusion between meanings and objects named, and
now it is confusion between meanings and things talked about."
[Quine, W. V. (1982). /Methods of logic/ (4th ed.). Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press. (p. 265)(Original work published 1950)]
> Kant argues that the
> use of words (or "predicates") alone does not necessarily imply the existence of
> their referents. We can only ((assume)) the existence of entities named by our
> words; we cannot prove "existence" by means of the use of language alone.
That is correct.
(Of course, the use of language implies the existence of linguistic
entities, which can be taken for granted; but that愀 it.)
#PH
rbb
"Tarald Andresen" <tara...@online.no> wrote in message
news:RL8Zc.4337$WW4....@news4.e.nsc.no...
Meaning you have to nail it down?
RoboTrax
Now that i what I call definitive proof the ka dew spirit and the kant
do ghost.
Any shithead with a lick of knowledge knows only three thins exist and
they are forces.
Momentum
Counter Momentum ie: sometimes called resistance
& Friction in its many configurations
All else is the illusion of our sensory apparatus.
Take it away and we are dark clouds moving through dark clouds.
Three dead guys are waiting to get into heaven sitting on a bench.
St. Peter asks the first guy "what's your story"
The first guy says I caught my wife cheating on me and was so mad I got
in a violent
rage and pushed the refrigerator next to the window right out of it and
it landed on top
of him as he was slipping away across the back porch and down the back
steps.
That how mad I was .
So I was tried convicted and got the electric chair.
St. Peter asks the first guy " how did you know for sure your wife was
adulterating against you"
The first guy says " as I got to the third floor I could smell sex and
cigar smoke
and know she doesn't smoke and I know how she smells after good sex"
St. Peter asks the second guy "what's your story"
The second guy says "It seemed to be a typical day. I was delivering the
mail and there was
a wet paint sign on the front porch of one of my regular stops so I went
around back and
put the mail in neat little piles next to each back door that leads up
to correct floor and as
I'm coming off the back porch steps "Whammy" a refrigerator falls out
of a clear blue sky
and kills me dead right there on the spot haven't got a single clue how
it happened.
St. Peter asks the third guy "what's your story"
The third guy says " Well . I was visiting a lady friend I met recently
and smoking one of my
favorite cigars, minding my own business, when she suggests sitting in
her refrigerator
to check its cooling rate for a few minutes and the next thing I knew I
was dead as a doornail
sitting on the bench with these fine gentlemen.
St. Peter says " maybe you guys ought to think it over a while and
discuss it amongst
yourself for a while and I will come back in a bit and see what you can
come up with"
Tarald Andresen
that
> > > > you,we, and all else, exist. A simple tool is required, if you would
> > > > be so kind as to forgo logic for just this once. A hammer(the tool)
> > > > held in one hand, is forceably drawn forth upon one's other hand,
the
> > > > hand to be affected by the hammer blow, is placed upon a surface
that
> > > > will not, for reason of this experment, be allowed to render
movement
> > > > so as to absorbe any force applied by the afore mentioned blow. The
> > > > results of the hammer blow will, A: Prove, you exsist, B: Prove,God
> > > > exist, C: Reafrime, we all exist.
> > >
> > > How do you call this? The Thor experiment? ;-)
> >
> > Or as Nietzsche put it: "how to philosophize with a hammer"...
> >
>
> Meaning you have to nail it down?
Yeah, for example, or "deliver a crushing argument", or something like that
(I'm not exactly sure what he meant by it; maybe he for some reason saw in
carpenters a great promise for the philosophy of the future, or something?
I'll have to look into it.).
The Sophist
> Yeah, for example, or "deliver a crushing argument", or something like that
> (I'm not exactly sure what he meant by it; maybe he for some reason saw in
> carpenters a great promise for the philosophy of the future, or something?
> I'll have to look into it.).
Nietzsche's quote about "philosophizing with a hammer" comes from
_Twilight of the Idols_. The intent was that whacking an idol with a
hammer and listening to the sound would reveal how hollow it was inside.
--
Aaron Boyden
The main division between the so-called Continental and Analytic
traditions has been disputes over whether the task of being unclear
should be carried out in natural language or in a formal system.
Tarald Andresen
that
> > (I'm not exactly sure what he meant by it; maybe he for some reason saw
in
> > carpenters a great promise for the philosophy of the future, or
something?
> > I'll have to look into it.).
>
> Nietzsche's quote about "philosophizing with a hammer" comes from
> _Twilight of the Idols_. The intent was that whacking an idol with a
> hammer and listening to the sound would reveal how hollow it was inside.
Ok, thanks; btw.; I've got the book. According to a footnote there he also
used the term "a divine hammer" as a metaphor for an instrument for "an
artistic refashioning of mankind" in Beyond Good and Evil (I've got that
one, too...). Hmm, how artistic can you really get with a hammer alone,
btw.? :) I'm still a little uncertain about its value as a metaphor; I mean,
is he talking about the quality of his arguments, the severity of the
methods employed in his thinking, or what? Anyway, he must have felt he had
some punch as a thinker one way or another... And I guess he had - now and
then, anyway.
Immortalist
"Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote in message
news:881c8779.04083...@posting.google.com...
> > lYCdnSl1rIz...@comcast.com>...
>
>
> > Then, how do we talk or think about things without ((supposing)), in some
sense
> > at least, that they exist?
>
>
> This is a very important philosophical question, which has been
> puzzling the minds of thinkers for many centuries (culminating in
> Meinong愀 hypertrophic ontological jungle).
>
...though We cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in
position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be
landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything
that appears.
http://www.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/02pref-b.htm
> "The mistaken view that the word 'Cerberus' must name something in
> order to mean anything turns on confusion of naming with meaning. But
> the view is encouraged also by another factor, viz., our habit of
> thinking in terms of the misleading word 'about'. If there is no such
> thing as Cerberus, then, it is asked, what are you talking a b o u t
> when you use the word 'Cerberus' (even to say that there is no such
> thing)? Actually this protest could be made with the same cogency
> (viz., none) in countless cases where no would-be name such as
> 'Cerberus' occurs at all: What are you talking about when you say that
> there are no Bolivian battleships? The remedy here is simply to give
> up the unwarranted notion that talking sense always necessitates there
> being things talked about. The notion springs, no doubt, from
> essentially the same confusion which was just previously railed
> against; then it was confusion between meanings and objects named, and
> now it is confusion between meanings and things talked about."
>
> [Quine, W. V. (1982). /Methods of logic/ (4th ed.). Cambridge, MA:
> Harvard University Press. (p. 265)(Original work published 1950)]
>
In the dream state most muscles and senses are "turned off" by a particular group
of nerve cells. Whatever takes place in the dream takes place in the very areas
of the brain where they would occur in the waking state and with incoming sense
data. In this sense memories are re-stimulation of the areas of the brain the
sense data stimulated. As it would seem-to-exist in a waking state it would
seem-to-exist in the imagination;
IMAGINATION [A123] Kant writes that "the imagination is a faculty of a priori
synthesis". The transcendental function of the imagination "aims at nothing but
necessary unity in the synthesis of what is manifold in appearance". Without this
action, there could be no "unitary experience" and thus "experience itself...[is]
possible only by means of this transcendental function of the imagination".
[B152] Kant asserts that the synthesis of the imagination conforms to the
categories, that the imagination is "a faculty which determines the sensibility a
priori", and that this transcendental imagination "is spontaneity" and is "an
action of the understanding on the sensibility". He also calls the transcendental
imagination the productive imagination, which he distinguishes from the
reproductive imagination ("whose synthesis is entirely subject to empirical
laws"), which falls within the domain "not of transcendental philosophy but of
psychology".
>
> > Kant argues that the
> > use of words (or "predicates") alone does not necessarily imply the existence
of
> > their referents. We can only ((assume)) the existence of entities named by
our
> > words; we cannot prove "existence" by means of the use of language alone.
>
>
> That is correct.
> (Of course, the use of language implies the existence of linguistic
> entities, which can be taken for granted; but that愀 it.)
>
Space and Time Must Exist or we "don't" existing now?
That space and time are only forms of sensible intuition, and so only conditions
of the existence of things as appearances; that, moreover, we have no concepts of
understanding, and consequently no elements for the knowledge of things, save in
so far as intuition can be given corresponding to these concepts; and that we can
therefore have no knowledge of any object as thing in itself, but only in so far
as it is an object of sensible intuition, that is, an appearance...Thus it does
indeed follow that all possible speculative knowledge of reason is limited to
mere objects of experience.
...though We cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in
position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be
landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything
that appears.
http://www.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/02pref-b.htm
-------------------------------
Necessity of TIME
Metaphysical exposition of the Concept of Time
1. Time is not an empirical concept that has been derived from any experience.
For neither coexistence nor succession would ever come within our perception, if
the representation of time were not presupposed as underlying them a priori. Only
on the presupposition of time can we represent to ourselves a number of things as
existing at one and the same time (simultaneously) or at different times
(successively).
2. Time is a necessary representation that underlies all [A31/P075] intuitions.
We cannot, in respect of appearances in general, remove time itself, though we
can quite well think time as void of appearances. Time is, therefore, given a
priori. In it alone is actuality of appearances possible at all. Appearances may,
one and all, vanish; but time (as the universal condition of their possibility)
cannot itself be removed.
http://www.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/04aesth.htm#074
http://www.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/
Time itself does not alter, but only something which is in time. The concept of
time thus presupposes the perception of something existing and of the succession
of its determinations; that is to say, it presupposes experience.
http://www.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/04aesth.htm#082
http://www.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/
Necessity of SPACE
If we remove from our empirical concept of a body, one by one, every feature in
it which is [merely] empirical, the colour, the hardness or softness, the weight,
even the impenetrability, there still remains the space which the body (now
entirely vanished) occupied, and this cannot be removed. Again, if we remove from
our empirical concept of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties
which experience has taught us, we yet cannot take away that property through
which the object is thought as substance or as inhering in a substance (although
this concept of substance is more determinate than that of an object in general).
Owing, therefore, to the necessity with which this concept of substance forces
itself upon us, we have no option save to admit that it has its seat in our
faculty of a priori knowledge.
http://www.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/03intro.htm
> #PH
Immortalist
"RoboTrax" <Bo...@TotallySchilling.Org> wrote in message
All we know for certain is that we must have space to be in and time to do things
in it or else we wouldn't "be_doing" eh? The rest of it is inductive theory;
Here is a recent conversation with a physicist on CNN;
CARLSON: Ms. Scott -- hold on. That's not -- in some ways, that's not really
the question. I mean, the question is: Shall we admit the truth that
evolution is a theory? It's the theory of evolution, not the law of
evolution. And what's wrong with admitting that?
SCOTT: Well, in science, a theory is an explanation. Of course evolution is
a theory, just like gravitation. But what we should be...
CARLSON: Wait, I thought gravity was a law. The law of gravity, right...
SCOTT: No, gravity...
CARLSON: ... or is this so far over my head I don't know what you're talking
about? I thought it was a law.
SCOTT: Well, I'll tell you what, if you drop something, it's going to fall.
That's an observation: unsupported things fall. But you explain that
observation with the theory of gravity, which is that the mass of what
whatever it is you dropped, a pencil or a pen or something, is attracted by
the mass...
CARLSON: Well you are blowing my mind...
SCOTT: That's not an observation.
CARLSON: ... law of gravity. Honestly, is it not the law, it's really a
theory of gravity?
SCOTT: It's a theory of gravity. But remember, a theory is an explanation.
SPRIGG: ... should point out, Scott, though, that theories of origins and
theories that are testable in terms of current experimentation are somewhat
different in a scientific perspective. We can't experimentally confirm
evolution.
SCOTT: Sure we can...
CNN Crossfire:
Secret Court Stymies Justice Department; Creationists Square off with
Evolutionists; Should Bush Be Telling Americans to Exercise?
http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0208/24/cf.00.html
ZZBunker
> > > Yeah, for example, or "deliver a crushing argument", or something like
> that
> > > (I'm not exactly sure what he meant by it; maybe he for some reason saw
> in
> > > carpenters a great promise for the philosophy of the future, or
> something?
> > > I'll have to look into it.).
> >
> > Nietzsche's quote about "philosophizing with a hammer" comes from
> > _Twilight of the Idols_. The intent was that whacking an idol with a
> > hammer and listening to the sound would reveal how hollow it was inside.
>
> Ok, thanks; btw.; I've got the book. According to a footnote there he also
> used the term "a divine hammer" as a metaphor for an instrument for "an
> artistic refashioning of mankind" in Beyond Good and Evil (I've got that
> one, too...). Hmm, how artistic can you really get with a hammer alone,
> btw.? :)
Not very far. It took Bobby Fischer a chess board,
and also a World full of Commie Artists to show that
when you go beyond Good and Evil to a completely artistic
refashioning of mankind, you also need a Japanese
jail cell with Haikus, rather than just Fascist Existentialist verse,
to accomplish the Neitzchean hollow-idol trick with the "divine hammer".
I'm still a little uncertain about its value as a metaphor; I mean,
> is he talking about the quality of his arguments, the severity of the
> methods employed in his thinking, or what? Anyway, he must have felt he had
> some punch as a thinker one way or another... And I guess he had - now and
> then, anyway.
It's only value as a metaphor, is that Christ
was a carpenter, and also a much more famous
and dead philosopher than Neitzche.
And also founded a philosophic tradition that
lead to the downfall of the Roman Empire,
which German or French philosophers would
have problems doing.
rbb
May be the hammer of Nietze is more a submeaning.
In german you can say: Das war ein Hammer, when someone has said something
that was outrageous or really impressive.
In any way the audience had to notice.
A hammer is also the last thing in an auction. The last word so to speak.
Tarald Andresen
So which idols may Fischer be thrashing these days, then? Are there still
any commie artists left, or did they all vanish along with the Berlin wall?
Those Chinese artist just sold out, now, didn't they?
> I'm still a little uncertain about its value as a metaphor; I mean,
> > is he talking about the quality of his arguments, the severity of the
> > methods employed in his thinking, or what? Anyway, he must have felt he
had
> > some punch as a thinker one way or another... And I guess he had - now
and
> > then, anyway.
>
> It's only value as a metaphor, is that Christ
> was a carpenter, and also a much more famous
> and dead philosopher than Neitzche.
Well, yeah, if what we know (?) about him is sufficient to designate him as
such.. It's true Nietzsche was full of praise for the (historical) person
Jesus, although equally disrespectful for the Christian theological dogma as
formulated by Paul, and perhaps this is an indication that Nietzsche
identified just as much with "the crucified" as with Dionysos. Btw; in which
way is Christ "much more dead" than Nietzsche?
> And also founded a philosophic tradition that
> lead to the downfall of the Roman Empire,
> which German or French philosophers would
> have problems doing.
Well, maybe it was the "hybris" of the Nazis, partly inspired by Nietzsche,
that brought down their empire. But, of course, their empire didn't last
long, although the damage they did probably outshines that of the Roman
empire...
Tarald Andresen
Thanks for the info. The hammer indeed seems to have a certain status as
"metaphorical material". As a curiosity; I'm living in a place meaning
"hammer" (Hamar). I'm not really certain if this name refers to Thor's
hammer or a natural formation of the landscape, though. The latter is
probably true.
1Z
> > > Nothingness/emptiness cannot exist (an "empty space" has no content - it
> > > "consists" of nothingness - thus the concept 'empty space' must also be
> > > empty, have no content). Thus there is nothing that can disconnect any
> > > matter from other matter, and so everything is connected (to matter).
> >
> >
> > No, your "thus" is a non sequitur.
> > There certainly cannot be any such thing as nothingness (I惴 not
> > saying there couldn愒 be nothing!), but nothingness is not emptiness!
> >
> > "The so-called field equations of Einstein愀 general theory of
> > relativity--which forms the basis of modern scientific
> > cosmology--admit of solutions in which space is entirely devoid of
> > matter and energy. So, mathematically, at least, it seems that the
> > notion of perfectly 'empty' space is perfectly coherent."
>
> Well, it seems obvious enough to me that 'spatiality' in itself is merely an
> abstract concept; one can't speak of extension without there being
> *something* (of substance/matter, etc.) extended.
OTOH substantiality is an abstraction, since all material substances
exist in space..
Anyway, if you construct extension out of relative location, you
are no longer forced to deny that empty space exists.
Empty space would be seen as locations objects could have had but don't.
As such it is no more of a paradox than properties that an object
could have had, but doesn't.
>'Space' is a geometrical
> concept, along with lines, planes, etc., and emptiness then is nothingness
> in a (3-dimensional) geometrical context.
Unfulfilled possibilites aren't nothing.
Tarald Andresen
content - it
> > > > "consists" of nothingness - thus the concept 'empty space' must also
be
> > > > empty, have no content). Thus there is nothing that can disconnect
any
> > > > matter from other matter, and so everything is connected (to
matter).
> > >
> > >
> > > No, your "thus" is a non sequitur.
> > > There certainly cannot be any such thing as nothingness (I惴 not
> > > saying there couldn愒 be nothing!), but nothingness is not emptiness!
> > >
> > > "The so-called field equations of Einstein愀 general theory of
> > > relativity--which forms the basis of modern scientific
> > > cosmology--admit of solutions in which space is entirely devoid of
> > > matter and energy. So, mathematically, at least, it seems that the
> > > notion of perfectly 'empty' space is perfectly coherent."
> >
> > Well, it seems obvious enough to me that 'spatiality' in itself is
merely an
> > abstract concept; one can't speak of extension without there being
> > *something* (of substance/matter, etc.) extended.
>
> OTOH substantiality is an abstraction, since all material substances
> exist in space..
It not only exists in space, it *constitutes* it.
> Anyway, if you construct extension out of relative location, you
> are no longer forced to deny that empty space exists.
> Empty space would be seen as locations objects could have had but don't.
> As such it is no more of a paradox than properties that an object
> could have had, but doesn't.
Well, alright, but that would be *relative* emptiness, not absolute.
> >'Space' is a geometrical
> > concept, along with lines, planes, etc., and emptiness then is
nothingness
> > in a (3-dimensional) geometrical context.
>
> Unfulfilled possibilites aren't nothing.
Well, they sort of are, depending on your way of thinking. In an absolute
sense, an unfulfilled possibility wasn't really a possibility; only what
*actually* happens is possible (in a strict causal sense).
1Z
> > > > > Nothingness/emptiness cannot exist (an "empty space" has no
> content - it
> > > > > "consists" of nothingness - thus the concept 'empty space' must also
> be
> > > > > empty, have no content). Thus there is nothing that can disconnect
> any
> > > > > matter from other matter, and so everything is connected (to
> matter).
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > No, your "thus" is a non sequitur.
> > > > There certainly cannot be any such thing as nothingness (I惴 not
> > > > saying there couldn愒 be nothing!), but nothingness is not emptiness!
> > > >
> > > > "The so-called field equations of Einstein愀 general theory of
> > > > relativity--which forms the basis of modern scientific
> > > > cosmology--admit of solutions in which space is entirely devoid of
> > > > matter and energy. So, mathematically, at least, it seems that the
> > > > notion of perfectly 'empty' space is perfectly coherent."
> > >
> > > Well, it seems obvious enough to me that 'spatiality' in itself is
> merely an
> > > abstract concept; one can't speak of extension without there being
> > > *something* (of substance/matter, etc.) extended.
> >
> > OTOH substantiality is an abstraction, since all material substances
> > exist in space..
>
> It not only exists in space, it *constitutes* it.
Given your rejection of empty space, which is something you need
to be arguing for, not just assuming.
> > Anyway, if you construct extension out of relative location, you
> > are no longer forced to deny that empty space exists.
> > Empty space would be seen as locations objects could have had but don't.
> > As such it is no more of a paradox than properties that an object
> > could have had, but doesn't.
>
> Well, alright, but that would be *relative* emptiness, not absolute.
No, it doesn't mean 'relative' emptiness in the sense
of containg *less* stuff. The containment metaphor is
redundant either way -- space is not a series
of pre-existing locations which are either 'full' or 'empty' -- when
you adopt the relational metaphysics of space.
> > >'Space' is a geometrical
> > > concept, along with lines, planes, etc., and emptiness then is
> nothingness
> > > in a (3-dimensional) geometrical context.
> >
> > Unfulfilled possibilites aren't nothing.
>
> Well, they sort of are, depending on your way of thinking. In an absolute
> sense, an unfulfilled possibility wasn't really a possibility; only what
> *actually* happens is possible (in a strict causal sense).
ie assuming strict causal determinism, which is also a contentious
claim that needs support.
Witt
"Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote in message
news:881c8779.04083...@posting.google.com...
> > GJ%Yc.1166$b0_1...@news04.bloor.is.net.cable.rogers.com>...
>
>
> > A typo ..
> > E!x =df EyAz(z=x <-> z=x), should be E!x =df EyAz(z=y <-> z=x).
> > That is to say .. E!x means, x is unique.
>
>
> The first-order predicate "E!", "exists", is not to be confused with
> the special existential quantifier sign indicating uniqueness ("There
> is exactly one thing such that ...), which contains the exclamation
> mark too!
("There is exactly one thing such that ..Fx), means, EyAx(x=y <-> Fx).
(The x such that Fx) exists, means, EyAx(x=y <-> Fx).
i.e. (E!x)(Fx) <-> E!(the x: Fx).
I think that the unit quantifier is better expressed as: (E1x)Fx,
read ..there is exacly one x such that Fx.
Numerically definite quantifiers are then expressed easier, e.g.
(E2x)Fx, (E3)Fx, etc.
>
> #PH
Witt
> > > "Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote in message
> > > news:881c8779.04083...@posting.google.com...
>
>
> > > first-order and as a second-order predicate.
>
>
> > Agreed.
> > In FOPL: E!x =df Ey(x=y), or, E!x =df x=x, or, E!x =df EyAz(z=x <->
z=y).
> > In SOPL: E!x =df EF[(F)x].
>
>
> I regard "E!" as a primitive concept.
I think it must be primitive in FOPL without identity.
>
>
> > Existence is a secondary property/predicate not a primary
> > property/predicate.
>
>
> You have an odd tendency to contradict yourself.
??
> A few sentences above you agreed with me that "to exist" can and
> should be employed both as a *first-order* and as a second-order
> predicate!
Are you confusing 'second-order predicate' with 'secondary property' ?
>
> #PH
Witt
> news:aq%Yc.106914$pTn....@news01.bloor.is.net.cable.rogers.com...
> >
> > >
> > > "Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote in message
> > > news:881c8779.04083...@posting.google.com...
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > > In my opinion "to exist" can and should be employed both as
a
> > > > > > first-order and as a second-order predicate.
> >
> > Agreed.
> > In FOPL: E!x =df Ey(x=y), or, E!x =df x=x, or, E!x =df EyAz(z=x <->
> > In SOPL: E!x =df EF[(F)x].
> >
> > > > > > "to exist" can also be treated rather unproblematically as a
> > property
> > > > > > of individuals:
> >
> > If we define a property as a predicate that deals directly with the
object
> > x, then,
> > (F)x says that x has the property (F). (F) is a primary predicate of
x.
> >
> > x exists, EF[(F)x], is a secondary predicate of x.
> >
> > > >
> > > > > By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a
> > thing--even if we
> > > > > completely determine it--we do not make the
> > > > > least addition to the thing when we
> > > > > further declare that this thing ("is"); Otherwise, it would
not be
> > exactly
> > > the
> > > > > same thing that exists, but something more
> > > > > than we had thought in the concept;
> > > > > and we could not, therefore, say that the exact object of my
concept
> > exists.
> >
> > Existence is the logical sum of primary predicates.
> > (G)x -> E!x and (~G)x -> E!x and EF[(F)x] -> E!x, are valid.
> > But, ~(Gx) -> E!x and ~((~G)x) -> E!x and ~(E!x) -> E!x, are not
valid.
> >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > The concept of existence is pretty uninformative, and so is eg
the
> > > > concept of self-identity. -- So what?!
> > > > This fact doesn´t mean that the objects which fall under these
> > > > concepts cannot possess them as their properties. [Frege: "I
call the
> > > > concepts under which an object falls its properties."]
> > > >
> > > > By the way, even if we regard the concept of necessary existence
as a
> > > > possible property of an individual, no ontological "proof" will
ever
> > > > work, for if I conceive of God as a/the being which exists
> > > > necessarily, this in no way implies that there actually is
anything
> > > > which has the property of necessary existence!
> >
> > Agreed.
> > Definitions do not presume existence. For example:
> > The existent present king of France exists, is false.
> > The existent present king of France is a king, is false.
> >
>
> Then, how do we talk or think about things without ((supposing)), in
some sense
> at least, that they exist?
Things that have the possibilty of not existing, are always 'described
objects'.
In the case of non-reference of a description, all that exists is the
predicate used to describe it.
e.g. The present king of France, has no properties at all.
That x which is: (currently a king of France and there are no kings of
France at this time)
cannot exist!
All contradictory descriptions, have no reference.
> When the existence of the subjects of our statements
> are in question, the normal use of logic becomes unreliable.
Yes, e.g. AxFx -> F(the present king of France) is invalid.
We must preceed such statements with E!(the x:Fx).
i.e. (AxFx & E!(the x: Gx)) -> F(the x: Gx), is valid.
> Kant argues that the
> use of words (or "predicates") alone does not necessarily imply the
existence of
> their referents. We can only ((assume)) the existence of entities named
by our
> words; we cannot prove "existence" by means of the use of language
alone.
>
> > > >
> > > > > A complete list of an object's properties
> > > > > would not be expanded by adding another
> > > > > property, namely existence; therefore,
> > > > > existence is not another property over and
> > > > > above all the other properties.
> >
> > (E!x & Gx) <-> Gx.
> >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Existence is a property b e s i d e all the other properties.
;-)
> > > >
> > > > The descriptive value of concepts such as existence and
self-identity
> > > > is indeed close to zero.
> > > > You really don´t know much about me if you learn that I´m
> > > > self-identical.
> > > > This fact notwithstanding, I deny that the degree of
informativeness
> > > > determines whether a concept can be had by individuals as a
property!
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > "...physical object exists. This is a true claim; what makes
it
> > true? One
> > > would
> > > > > like to be able to say that it is the fact that the physical
object
> > has the
> > > > > property of existence. It seems that the claim asserts that
> > existence is a
> > > > > property of the physical object.
> > > > >
> > > > > The foregoing definition of 'exists' is incorrect just because
the
> > definition
> > > > > does treat existence as a property.
> >
> > Existence is a secondary property/predicate not a primary
> > property/predicate.
> >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > I´m afraid, you´re begging the question!
> > > >
> > > > Generally, the possession of the logical properties of existence
and
> > > > self-identity is a necessary condition for an entity´s
existence, but
> > > > it´s not a sufficient one, because everything must also possess
some
> > > > "substantial" properties other than existence and self-identity.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Define existence.
> >
> > E!x =df EF[(F)x].
> > This definition of existence applies to concrete and to abstract
entities.
> >
> > OH
>
> Is that eqivalent to;
>
> Like the concept being, existence is incapable of a real definition
because there
> is nothing in the understanding of the term that can be categorized by
some
> composition. We can say that existence is a perfection, indeed the
ultimate
> perfection of an essence. In all created things existence is the act of
essence;
> whatever a thing is, if it is in act, actual, it exists and therefore
has being.
>
> www.catholicism.org/Philosophia/glossary.htm
I hope not.
I do not consider catholicism an authority on any subject.
>
> >
> > >
> > > > #PH
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
>
>
Immortalist
Many contradictory descriptions can be put into "valid" arguments but they may
not be "sound."
But all you said was, "contradictory description are descriptions without
reference."
> > When the existence of the subjects of our statements
> > are in question, the normal use of logic becomes unreliable.
>
> Yes, e.g. AxFx -> F(the present king of France) is invalid.
> We must preceed such statements with E!(the x:Fx).
> i.e. (AxFx & E!(the x: Gx)) -> F(the x: Gx), is valid.
>
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form that
makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless
to be false. Otherwise, a deductive argument is said to be invalid.
A deductive argument is sound if and only if it is both valid, and all of its
premises are actually true. Otherwise, a deductive argument is unsound.
According to the definition of a deductive argument (see the entry on Deduction
and Induction), the author of a deductive argument always intends that the
premises provide the sort of justification for the conclusion whereby if the
premises are true, the conclusion is guaranteed to be true as well. Loosely
speaking, if the author's process of reasoning is a good one, if the premises
actually do provide this sort of justification for the conclusion, then the
argument is valid.
In effect, an argument is valid if the truth of the premises logically guarantees
the truth of the conclusion. The following argument is valid, because it is
impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to nevertheless be
false:
Either Elizabeth owns a Honda or she owns a Saturn.
Elizabeth does not own a Honda.
Therefore, Elizabeth owns a Saturn.
It is important to stress that the premises of an argument do not have actually
to be true in order for the argument to be valid. An argument is valid if the
premises and conclusion are related to each other in the right way so that if the
premises were true, then the conclusion would have to be true as well. We can
recognize in the above case that even if one of the premises is actually false,
that if they had been true the conclusion would have been true as well. Consider,
then an argument such as the following:
All toasters are items made of gold.
All items made of gold are time-travel devices.
Therefore, all toasters are time-travel devices.
Obviously, the premises in this argument are not true. It may be hard to imagine
these premises being true, but it is not hard to see that if they were true,
their truth would logically guarantee the conclusion's truth.
It is easy to see that the previous example is not an example of a completely
good argument. A valid argument may still have a false conclusion. When we
construct our arguments, we must aim to construct one that is not only valid, but
sound. A sound argument is one that is not only valid, but begins with premises
that are actually true. The example given about toasters is valid, but not sound.
However, the following argument is both valid and sound:
No felons are eligible voters.
Some professional athletes are felons.
Therefore, some professional athletes are not eligible voters.
Here, not only do the premises provide the right sort of support for the
conclusion, but the premises are actually true. Therefore, so is the conclusion.
Although it is not part of the definition of a sound argument, because sound
arguments both start out with true premises and have a form that guarantees that
the conclusion must be true if the premises are, sound arguments always end with
true conclusions.
It should be noted that both invalid, as well as valid but unsound, arguments can
nevertheless have true conclusions. One cannot reject the conclusion of an
argument simply by discovering a given argument for that conclusion to be flawed.
Whether or not the premises of an argument are true depends on their specific
content. However, according to the dominant understanding among logicians, the
validity or invalidity of an argument is determined entirely by its logical form.
The logical form of an argument is that which remains of it when one abstracts
away from the specific content of the premises and the conclusion, i.e., words
naming things, their properties and relations, leaving only those elements that
are common to discourse and reasoning about any subject matter, i.e., words such
as "all", "and", "not", "some", etc. One can represent the logical form of an
argument by replacing the specific content words with letters used as
place-holders or variables.
For example, consider these two arguments:
All tigers are mammals.
No mammals are creatures with scales.
Therefore, no tigers are creatures with scales.
All spider monkeys are elephants.
No elephants are animals.
Therefore, no spider monkeys are animals.
These arguments share the same form:
All A are B;
No B are C;
Therefore, No A are C.
All arguments with this form are valid. Because they have this form, the examples
above are valid. However, the first example is sound while the second is unsound,
because its premises are false. Now consider:
All basketballs are round.
The Earth is round.
Therefore, the Earth is a basketball.
All popes reside at the Vatican.
John Paul II resides at the Vatican.
Therefore, John Paul II is a pope.
These arguments also have the same form:
All A's are F;
X is F;
Therefore, X is an A.
Arguments with this form are invalid. This is easy to see with the first example.
The second example may seem like a good argument because the premises and the
conclusion are all true, but note that the conclusion's truth isn't guaranteed by
the premises' truth. It could have been possible for the premises to be true and
the conclusion false. This argument is invalid, and all invalid arguments are
unsound.
While it is accepted by most contemporary logicians that logical validity and
invalidity is determined entirely by form, there is some dissent. Consider, for
example, the following arguments:
My table is circular. Therefore, it is not square shaped.
Juan is bachelor. Therefore, he is not married.
These arguments, at least on the surface, have the form:
x is F;
Therefore, x is not G.
Arguments of this form are not valid as a rule. However, it seems clear in these
particular cases that it is, in some strong sense, impossible for the premises to
be true while the conclusion is false. However, many logicians would respond to
these complications in various ways. Some might insist--although this is
controverisal--that these arguments actually contain implicit premises such as
"Nothing is both circular and square shaped" or "All bachelors are unmarried,"
which, while themselves necessary truths, nevertheless play a role in the form of
these arguments. It might also be suggested, especially with the first argument,
that while (even without the additional premise) there is a necessary connection
between the premise and the conclusion, the sort of necessity involved is
something other than "logical" necessity, and hence that this argument (in the
simple form) should not be regarded as logically valid. Lastly, especially with
regard to the second example, it might be suggested that because "bachelor" is
defined as "adult unmarried male", that the true logical form of the argument is
the following universally valid form:
x is F and not G and H;
Therefore, x is not G.
The logical form of a statement is not always as easy to discern as one might
expect. For example, statements that seem to have the same surface grammar can
nevertheless differ in logical form. Take for example the two statements:
(1) Tony is a ferocious tiger.
(2) Clinton is a lame duck.
Despite their apparent similarity, only (1) has the form "x is a A that is F".
From it one can validly infer that Tony is a tiger. One cannot validly infer from
(2) that Clinton is a duck. Indeed, one and the same sentence can be used in
different ways in different contexts. Consider the statement:
(3) The King and Queen are visiting dignitaries.
It is not clear what the logical form of this statement is. Either there are
dignitaries that the King and Queen are visiting, in which case the sentence (3)
has the same logical form as "The King and Queen are playing violins," or the
King and Queen are themselves the dignitaries who are visiting from somewhere
else, in which case the sentence has the same logical form as "The King and Queen
are sniveling cowards." Depending on which logical form the statement has,
inferences may be valid or invalid. Consider:
The King and Queen are visiting dignitaries. Visiting dignitaries is always
boring. Therefore, the King and Queen are doing something boring.
Only if the statement is given the first reading can this argument be considered
to be valid.
Because of the difficulty in identifying the logical form of an argument, and the
potential deviation of logical form from grammatical form in ordinary language,
contemporary logicians typically make use of artificial logical languages in
which logical form and grammatical form coincide. In these artificial languages,
certain symbols, similar to those used in mathematics, are used to represent
those elements of form analogous to ordinary English words such as "all", "not",
"or", "and", etc. The use of an artifically constructed language makes it easier
to specify a set of rules that determine whether or not a given argument is valid
or invalid. Hence, the study of which deductive argument forms are valid and
which are invalid is often called "formal logic" or "symbolic logic".
In short, a deductive argument must be evaluated in two ways. First, one must ask
if the premises provide support for the conclusion by examing the form of the
argument. If they do, then the argument is valid. Then, one must ask whether the
premises are true or false in actuality. Only if an argument passes both these
tests is it sound. However, if an argument does not pass these tests, its
conclusion may still be true, despite that no support for its truth is given by
the argument.
Note: there are other, related, uses of these words that are found within more
advanced mathematical logic. In that context, a formula (on its own) written in a
logical language is said to be valid if it comes out as true (or "satisfied")
under all admissible or standard assignments of meaning to that formula within
the intended semantics for the logical language. Moreover, an axiomatic logical
calculus (in its entirety) is said to be sound if and only if all theorems
derivable from the axioms of the logical calculus are semantically valid in the
sense just described.
For a more sophisicated look at the nature of logical validity, see the articles
on "Logical Consequence" in this encyclopedia. The articles on "Argument" and
"Deductive and Inductive Arguments" in this encyclopedia may also be helpful.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/v/val-snd.htm
http://www.google.com/search?q=Validity+and+Soundness
Truth-Functional Deductive Logic: Test for Validity. (TGBowen)
http://servercc.oakton.edu/~tbowen/OnlineLogicTruthFunctionalLogic.htm
Logic: Validity
http://www.theology.edu/logic/logic22.htm
validity - encyclopedia article about validity.
http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/validity
Validity and Provability
http://www.risc.uni-linz.ac.at/people/schreine/courses/PTHA/tla1/tla1_8.html
Critically Evaluating the Logic and Validity of Information
http://academic.cuesta.edu/acasupp/as/403.htm
Validity: A syllogism, or any argument, is valid if the conclusion(s) drawn
logically follow from the premises; otherwise it is invalid
http://cas-courses.buffalo.edu/classes/psy/segal/416f2000/98logic2.html
Logic: Induction, Deduction, Validity, Soundness, Cogency, Forms
http://www.stenmorten.com/English/logic/logic.htm
VALID AND INVALID ARGUMENTS
http://www.uno.edu/~asoble/pages/validity.htm
Some Valid Logical Forms
http://oldweb.uwp.edu/academic/philosophy/logforms.htm
Analytic Sentences & Valid Arguments in 1st order Predicate Logic
http://www.lawrence.edu/fac/boardmaw/analytic_essay.html
Generation and Validity in Logic
http://www.lawrence.edu/fac/boardmaw/Gen_Val.html
Validity and Soundness (IEP)
http://www.iep.utm.edu/v/val-snd.htm
Vocabulary Describing Arguments
http://www.princeton.edu/~jimpryor/general/vocab/validity.html
Arguments and Their Evaluation
http://www.univnorthco.edu/philosophy/arg.html
An argument is a reason for believing something.
http://www.bcc.ctc.edu/artshum/materials/phil/Payne/arguments.htm
Validity
http://www.unlv.edu/faculty/coombs/val.htm
Deductive Arguments: Validity, Truth, Soundness
http://appliedphilosophy.mtsu.edu/logic/lecture1_4.htm
Paul Holbach
> > > "Witt" <oori...@yahoo.com> wrote
> > > Existence is a secondary property/predicate not a primary
> > > property/predicate.
> > A few sentences above you agreed with me that "to exist" can and
> > should be employed both as a *first-order* and as a second-order
> > predicate!
> Are you confusing 'second-order predicate' with 'secondary property' ?
I may have misconstrued your meaning.
So would you be so kind as to define "secondary predicate" and
"secondary property" for me.
(I know that in linguistics a secondary predicate is, for example, the
"open" in "Bill pushed the door open"; and I know what a secondary
quality in the Lockean sense is.)
#PH
Witt
> > "Witt" <oori...@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<
> > 1j4_c.195456$UTP.1...@twister01.bloor.is.net.cable.rogers.com>...
> > > "Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote in message
> > > news:881c8779.0408...@posting.google.com...
> > > > "Witt" <oori...@yahoo.com> wrote
>
>
> > > > Existence is a secondary property/predicate not a primary
> > > > property/predicate.
>
>
> > > A few sentences above you agreed with me that "to exist" can and
> > > should be employed both as a *first-order* and as a second-order
> > > predicate!
A primary predicate of a term says that the term 'has' the predicate.
e.g. (F)x means, x has the predicate F.
(F)a, where a is not a value of the individual variable x, means
>
>
> > Are you confusing 'second-order predicate' with 'secondary property'
?
>
>
> I may have misconstrued your meaning.
> So would you be so kind as to define "secondary predicate" and
> "secondary property" for me.
>
> (I know that in linguistics a secondary predicate is, for example, the
> "open" in "Bill pushed the door open"; and I know what a secondary
> quality in the Lockean sense is.)
>
> #P
A primary predicate talks directy about its subject.
e.g. The present king of France is bald.
A secondary predicate talks indirectly about its subject.
e.g. It is not the case that: the present king of France is bald.
See: Principia Mathematica, Russell-Whitehead, page 182.
"When (ix:Fx) does not exist, there are still true propositions in which
"(ix:Fx)"
occurs, but it has, in such occurrences, a 'secondary' occurrence, ...the
asserted proposition concerned is not of the form G(ixFx), but of the form
f(G(ix:Fx)), .."
See: Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, B. Russell, page 179.
" When descriptions occur in propositions, it is necessary to distinguish
what may be called 'primary' and 'secondary' occurrences.
See: Methods of Logic, W. V. Quine, pages 279-280.
"We can, however, decide the 'simple' contexts and then let the truth
value
of the compounds follow from those decisions."
ZZBunker
> "Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote in message
> news:881c8779.0409...@posting.google.com...
> > > "Witt" <oori...@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<
> > > 1j4_c.195456$UTP.1...@twister01.bloor.is.net.cable.rogers.com>...
> > > > "Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote in message
> > > > news:881c8779.0408...@posting.google.com...
> > > > > "Witt" <oori...@yahoo.com> wrote
> >
> >
> > > > > Existence is a secondary property/predicate not a primary
> > > > > property/predicate.
> >
> >
> > > > A few sentences above you agreed with me that "to exist" can and
> > > > should be employed both as a *first-order* and as a second-order
> > > > predicate!
>
> A primary predicate of a term says that the term 'has' the predicate.
> e.g. (F)x means, x has the predicate F.
But that's also where Quine went off the deep
with "predicate" calculus.
Since he's not even using *predicates*.
He's using QM "wave-ons" not variables
or an operational calculus.
Since he somehow believes not predicates,
but that entire *Theories* have the
same primary operations as predicates do.
So, his theory is not F(x), or (F)a,
but QM(Natural-Language) <=> (Natural-Language)QM.
Which is not even a calculus to start with,
it's a linear first-order logic.
Paul Holbach
> A primary predicate of a term says that the term 'has' the predicate.
> e.g. (F)x means, x has the predicate F.
>
> A primary predicate talks directy about its subject.
> e.g. The present king of France is bald.
> A secondary predicate talks indirectly about its subject.
> e.g. It is not the case that: the present king of France is bald.
Since the present king of France doesn´t exist, what you call a
"secondary predicate" doesn´t apply *to him* at all -- not even
indirectly.
We have here a case of a "secondary predication", which phrase refers
to the whole sentence; but, in my opinion, that doesn´t render the
predicate "is bald" secondary.
> See: Principia Mathematica, Russell-Whitehead, page 182.
>
> "When (ix:Fx) does not exist, there are still true propositions in which
> "(ix:Fx)"
> occurs, but it has, in such occurrences, a 'secondary' occurrence, ...the
> asserted proposition concerned is not of the form G(ixFx), but of the form
> f(G(ix:Fx)), .."
>
> See: Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, B. Russell, page 179.
>
> " When descriptions occur in propositions, it is necessary to distinguish
> what may be called 'primary' and 'secondary' occurrences.
>
> See: Methods of Logic, W. V. Quine, pages 279-280.
What Russell and Quine talk about are the modes of occurrence of
*descriptions*, i.e. of singular terms, and not of predicates.
#PH
Witt
> > "Witt" <oori...@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<
> > pnE_c.213900$UTP....@twister01.bloor.is.net.cable.rogers.com>...
>
>
> > A primary predicate of a term says that the term 'has' the
predicate.
> > e.g. (F)x means, x has the predicate F.
> >
> > A primary predicate talks directy about its subject.
> > e.g. The present king of France is bald.
> > A secondary predicate talks indirectly about its subject.
> > e.g. It is not the case that: the present king of France is bald.
>
>
> Since the present king of France doesn´t exist, what you call a
> "secondary predicate" doesn´t apply *to him* at all -- not even
> indirectly.
I disagree.
The present king of France has property F ..is false for all F.
i.e. ~EF((F)(the present king of France)), is true!
Because we can assert that there are no kings of France at this time,
we can also assert that there is not at least one either.
>
> We have here a case of a "secondary predication", which phrase refers
> to the whole sentence; but, in my opinion, that doesn´t render the
> predicate "is bald" secondary.
[It is not the case that: the present king of France is bald.]
"-- is bald" is a primary predicate of 'the present king of France'.
"It is not the case that: -- is bald" is a secondary predicate of 'the
present king of France'.
Even with existent entities: ~(x is bald) ..x has the seondary predicate
'~(-- is bald)'.
block
Oh sod it! Buy him a WIG!!!
"Witt" <oori...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:YZK_c.1807$wlx1...@news04.bloor.is.net.cable.rogers.com...
Paul Holbach
> [It is not the case that: the present king of France is bald.]
>
> "-- is bald" is a primary predicate of 'the present king of France'.
>
> "It is not the case that: -- is bald" is a secondary predicate of 'the
> present king of France'.
I don´t think so.
"~( )" is a function expression standing for the function that maps
statements onto truth values (true statements |---> the False / false
statements |---> the True), but "~" doesn´t belong to the predicate
"is bald".
#PH
eagleso...@yahoo.com
> This is an attempt at refuting Kant's claim that a thing's existence can't
> be a predicate:
>
> Since everything is connected ("hangs together") - there are no absolute
> dividing lines / there is no empty space - everything must have a *common
> denominator*; this common denominator must be necessary (since everything is
> necessary / has at least one cause); therefore general existence must have a
> necessary component/aspect in order to exist (therefore existence is a
> quality/predicate).
Kant was discussing existence as the totality of the conception.
And to give the form of logic existence equal to that which
logic applies is a fallacy.
And absolute dividing line is this distinction of subjective
existence relative to the objective.
Douglas Eagleson
Gaitherbsurg, MD USA
Pat Harrington
But "space" devoid of matter is what is "expanding" at the rate
of Hubble's constant. So this "empty space" has a quality of
elasticity. It acts like it is one huge elastic liquid through which
energy moves. This space, which has the property of elasticity, must
also exist for "it" to predicate itself by expansion. So, empty space
exists!!
1Z
>
> But "space" devoid of matter is what is "expanding" at the rate
> of Hubble's constant. So this "empty space" has a quality of
> elasticity. It acts like it is one huge elastic liquid through which
> energy moves. This space, which has the property of elasticity, must
> also exist for "it" to predicate itself by expansion. So, empty space
> exists!!
Translated into relativese "space is expanding" becomes "spatial
relations between objects are increasing over time". eg if galaxy
A is 100 million lingt years from galaxy B at time T1,
it is a 150 million at time T2. ie, there is a mutual
relation of being "being x light yeas from". Space is
the sum total of such relations. Relations cannot exist
without relata, so an empty universe is impossible.
It is not a good idea to derive ones metaphysics directly
from ones grammar.
Bob's Boyfriend
peter...@yahoo.com (1Z) wrote:
I may not be understanding you fully. You and I are in a room. At T1 we
are 3 feet apart. At T4, we are 6 feet apart. At T3, you leave the room.
At T4, I leave the room. As a mutual relationship has been established
between the boundaries of times, space and room, it is now impossible to
have an empty room.
Immortalist
"1Z" <peter...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:fd762132.04090...@posting.google.com...
[Leucippus] (about whom almost nothing is known) and Democritus (of Abdera, in
Thrace, born about 460), held that void (space with no matter) exists (against
the Eleatics, who held that what is not there cannot exist) and that this void
contains an infinite number of indivisible units (atoma , which means
"indivisibles") which are undifferentiated in material but different in size and
shape. By random movements they form vortexes, in which similar atoms come
together and form the sensible world. This theory was taken over later by the
Hellenistic philosopher, [Epicurus].
...Based on all we know today, the complete library of data from across the full
spectrum of the sciences is fully consistent with a surprisingly simple model:
the natural universe is composed, at the elementary level, of localized material
bodies that interact by colliding with one another. All these bodies move around
in an otherwise empty void. No continuous, etheric medium, material or
immaterial, need be postulated to occupy the space between bodies. Applying an
insight more ancient than Plato and Aristotle, but continually ignored because of
human propensities to wish otherwise, atoms and the void are sufficient to
account for observations with the human eye and the most powerful telescopes,
microscopes, or particle accelerators of today.
The four-dimensional space-time framework introduced by Einstein and Minkowski,
along with the associated rules of relativity and all the rest of physics, are
adequate to describe the motion of these primal bodies. Furthermore, we find that
the great foundational "laws" of physics the principles of energy, linear
momentum, and angular momentum conservation are not rules imposed on the universe
from outside. Rather they represent physicists' way of theoretically describing
the high degree of symmetry and simplicity that the universe, on the whole,
exhibits to their instruments....
http://spot.colorado.edu/~vstenger/Timeless/00-Preface.pdf
http://spot.colorado.edu/~vstenger/void.html
Immortalist
Updated Bookmarks for "Timeless Universe."
http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/
http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/void.html
>