Mr. President Obama is Lying: He Can Figure Out Our Every Personal Detail Through Signals Intelligence. This Is NOT NEW. We Did It To Enemies in WW II.

[Poutnik Knows All John Corliss q34wsk20-at-yahoo.com is the same as Dave U Random anonymous-at-anonymitaet-im-inter.net.Spam Corliss Please, Corliss Is Chris Caputo. BearPair, when did you stop lying to ACF?!! Tom Potter, when did you stop sniffing Hitlers Panties? Jax is Dead. Osama Bin Laden is the main ACF spammer and he works with the PLA Hacker Unit in Shanghai. I killed seven with one blow. Ask not what Frank-Lin can do for you, ask what you can do to help the Troika. KILL A GOONIE TODAY IN YOUR HEART YOU KNOW ITS RIGHT.]

I'm posting the preliminary information here, and will follow, if I
can get a hold of it, with what US SIGINT did in the beginning of WWII
in Hawaii. Here's background material, including an interesting
article about the use of SIGINT by the Krauts. I arrowed that.
Haby!
Poutnik Knows All John Corliss q34wsk20-at-yahoo.com is the same as
Dave U Random anonymous-at-anonymitaet-im-inter.net.Spam Corliss
Please, Corliss Is Chris Caputo. BearPair, when did you stop lying to
ACF?!! Tom Potter, when did you stop sniffing Hitlers Panties? Jax is
Dead. Osama Bin Laden is the main ACF spammer and he works with the
PLA Hacker Unit in Shanghai. I killed seven with one blow. Ask not
what Frank-Lin can do for you, ask what you can do to help the Troika.
KILL A GOONIE TODAY IN YOUR HEART YOU KNOW ITS RIGHT.
SIGINT:
"Signals intelligence
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

RAF Menwith Hill, a large site in the United Kingdom, part of ECHELON
and the UKUSA Agreement. (2005)
The last German message intercepted by the British during World War
II, signaling Germany's unconditional surrender

Signals intelligence (often contracted to SIGINT) is intelligence-
gathering by interception of signals, whether between people
("communications intelligence"—COMINT), involving electronic signals
not directly used in communication ("electronic intelligence"—ELINT),
or a combination of the two. As sensitive information is often
encrypted, signals intelligence often involves the use of
cryptanalysis. Also, traffic analysis—the study of who is signaling
whom and in what quantity—can often produce valuable information, even
when the messages themselves cannot be decrypted.

As a means of collecting intelligence, signals intelligence is a
subset of intelligence collection management, which, in turn, is a
subset of intelligence cycle management.
Contents

1 History
2 More technical definitions of SIGINT and its branches
3 Disciplines shared across the branches
3.1 Targeting
3.2 Need for multiple, coordinated receivers
3.3 Intercept management
3.4 Signal detection
3.4.1 Countermeasures to interception
3.5 Direction-finding
3.6 Traffic analysis
3.7 Electronic Order of Battle
4 COMINT
4.1 Voice interception
4.2 Text interception
4.3 Signaling channel interception
4.4 Monitoring friendly communications
5 Electronic signals intelligence
5.1 Complementary relationship to COMINT
5.2 Role in air warfare
5.3 ELINT and ESM
5.4 ELINT for meaconing
5.5 Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence
5.6 Counter-ELINT
6 SIGINT versus MASINT
7 Defensive signals intelligence
7.1 Strong and well-managed encryption
7.2 Appropriate transmission security
7.3 Appropriate receiving security
7.4 Protection against compromising emanations
7.4.1 The risk
7.4.2 Mitigation and countermeasures
7.5 Protection against side channel attacks and covert
channels
8 See also
9 References
10 Further reading
11 External links

History
For more details on this topic, see Signals intelligence in modern
history.

Intercepting written but encrypted communications, and extracting
information, probably did not wait long after the development of
writing. A simple encryption system, for example, is the Caesar
cipher. Electronic interception appeared as early as 1900, during the
Boer Wars. The Boers had captured some British radios, and, since the
British were the only people transmitting at the time, no special
interpretation of the signals was necessary.[1]
Unit 8200 (the SIGINT unit of the Israeli Intelligence Corps) base on
Mount Avital, Golan Heights
A52 Oste, an Oste class ELINT (Electronic signals intelligence) and
reconnaissance ship, of the German Navy
Satellite ground station of the Dutch Nationale SIGINT Organisatie
(NSO) (2012)
Description of how the Swedish Defence Radio Authority (FRA, Swedish
Försvarets radioanstalt) collects and processes communication.

Signals intelligence work can be dangerous even in peacetime. Numerous
peacetime international incidents involving the loss of life,
including the USS Liberty incident, USS Pueblo (AGER-2) incident, and
the shooting down of Flight 60528, occurred during signals
intelligence missions.
More technical definitions of SIGINT and its branches

In the United States and other nations involved with NATO, signals
intelligence is defined as:[2]

A category of intelligence comprising either individually or
in combination all communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic
intelligence (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals
intelligence, however transmitted.

Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and
foreign instrumentation signals.

The JCS definition may overemphasize "foreign instrumentation
signals". That part should be considered in combination with
measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), which is closely
linked to foreign instrumentation such as telemetry or radio
navigation. An ELINT sensor may find a radar, and then cue (i.e.,
guide) a COMINT sensor for listening in on the talk between the radar
and its remote users. A nonspecific SIGINT sensor can cue a Frequency
Domain MASINT sensor that can help identify the purpose of the signal.
If MASINT cannot identify the signal, then the intelligence
organization may task an IMINT aircraft or satellite to take a picture
of the source, so photo interpreters can try to understand its
functions.

Being a broad field, SIGINT has many sub-disciplines. The two main
ones are communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic
intelligence (ELINT). There are, however, some techniques that can
apply to either branch, as well as to assist FISINT or MASINT.
Disciplines shared across the branches
Targeting

A collection system has to know to look for a particular signal.
"System", in this context, has several nuances. Targeting is an output
of the process of developing collection requirements:

"1. An intelligence need considered in the allocation of
intelligence resources. Within the Department of Defense, these
collection requirements fulfill the essential elements of information
and other intelligence needs of a commander, or an agency.

"2. An established intelligence need, validated against the
appropriate allocation of intelligence resources (as a requirement) to
fulfill the essential elements of information and other intelligence
needs of an intelligence consumer."[2]

Need for multiple, coordinated receivers

First, atmospheric conditions, sunspots, the target's transmission
schedule and antenna characteristics, and other factors create
uncertainty that a given signal intercept sensor will be able to
"hear" the signal of interest, even with a geographically fixed target
and an opponent making no attempt to evade interception. Basic
countermeasures against interception include frequent changing of
radio frequency, polarization, and other transmission characteristics.
An intercept aircraft could not get off the ground if it had to carry
antennas and receivers for every possible frequency and signal type to
deal with such countermeasures.

Second, locating the transmitter's position is usually part of SIGINT.
Triangulation and more sophisticated radio location techniques, such
as time of arrival methods, require multiple receiving points at
different locations. These receivers send location-relevant
information to a central point, or perhaps to a distributed system in
which all participate, such that the information can be correlated and
a location computed.
Intercept management

Modern SIGINT systems, therefore, have substantial communications
among intercept platforms. Even if some platforms are clandestine,
there is a broadcast of information telling them where and how to look
for signals.[3] A United States targeting system under development in
the late 1990s, PSTS, constantly sends out information that helps the
interceptors properly aim their antennas and tune their receivers.
Larger intercept aircraft, such as the EP-3 or RC-135, have the on-
board capability to do some target analysis and planning, but others,
such as the RC-12 GUARDRAIL, are completely under ground direction.
GUARDRAIL aircraft are fairly small, and usually work in units of
three to cover a tactical SIGINT requirement, where the larger
aircraft tend to be assigned strategic/national missions.

Before the detailed process of targeting begins, someone has to decide
there is a value in collecting information about something. While it
would be possible to direct signals intelligence collection at a major
sports event, the systems would capture a great deal of noise, news
signals, and perhaps announcements in the stadium. If, however, an
anti-terrorist organization believed that a small group would be
trying to coordinate their efforts, using short-range unlicensed
radios, at the event, SIGINT targeting of radios of that type would be
reasonable. Targeting would not know where in the stadium the radios
might be, or the exact frequency they are using; those are the
functions of subsequent steps such as signal detection and direction
finding.

Once the decision to target is made, the various interception points
need to cooperate, since resources are limited. Knowing what
interception equipment to use becomes easier when a target country
buys its radars and radios from known manufacturers, or is given them
as military aid. National intelligence services keep libraries of
devices manufactured by their own country and others, and then use a
variety of techniques to learn what equipment is acquired by a given
country.

Knowledge of physics and electronic engineering further narrows the
problem of what types of equipment might be in use. An intelligence
aircraft flying well outside the borders of another country will
listen for long-range search radars, not short-range fire control
radars that would be used by a mobile air defense. Soldiers scouting
the front lines of another army know that the other side will be using
radios that must be portable and not have huge antennas.
Signal detection

Even if a signal is human communications (e.g., a radio), the
intelligence collection specialists have to know it exists. If the
targeting function described above learns that a country has a radar
that operates in a certain frequency range, the first step is to use a
sensitive receiver, with one or more antennas that listen in every
direction, to find an area where such a radar is operating. Once the
radar is known to be in the area, the next step is to find its
location.
Simplified spectrum analyzer display of superheterodyned, amplitude
modulated signals.

If operators know the probable frequencies of transmissions of
interest, they may use a set of receivers, preset to the frequencies
of interest. These are the frequency (horizontal axis) versus power
(vertical axis) produced at the transmitter, before any filtering of
signals that do not add to the information being transmitted. Received
energy on a particular frequency may start a recorder, and alert a
human to listen to the signals if they are intelligible (i.e.,
COMINT). If the frequency is not known, the operators may look for
power on primary or sideband frequencies using a spectrum analyzer.
Information from the spectrum analyzer is then used to tune receivers
to signals of interest. For example, in this simplified spectrum, the
actual information is at 800 kHz and 1.2 MHz.
Hypothetical displays from four spectrum analyzers connected to
directional antennas. The transmitter is at bearing 090 degrees.

Real-world transmitters and receivers usually are directional. In the
figure to the left, assume that each display is connected to a
spectrum analyzer connected to a directional antenna aimed in the
indicated direction.
Countermeasures to interception

Spread-spectrum communications is an electronic counter-
countermeasures (ECCM) technique to defeat looking for particular
frequencies. Spectrum analysis can be used in a different ECCM way to
identify frequencies not being jammed or not in use.
Direction-finding
Main article: Direction finding

The earliest, and still common, means of direction finding is to use
directional antennas as goniometers, so that a line can be drawn from
the receiver through the position of the signal of interest. See HF/
DF. Knowing the compass bearing, from a single point, to the
transmitter does not locate it. Where the bearings from multiple
points, using goniometry, are plotted on a map, the transmitter will
be located at the point where the bearings intersect. This is the
simplest case; a target may try to confuse listeners by having
multiple transmitters, giving the same signal from different
locations, switching on and off in a pattern known to their user but
apparently random to the listener.

Individual directional antennas have to be manually or automatically
turned to find the signal direction, which may be too slow when the
signal is of short duration. One alternative is the Wullenweber array
technique. In this method, several concentric rings of antenna
elements simultaneously receive the signal, so that the best bearing
will ideally be clearly on a single antenna or a small set.
Wullenweber arrays for high-frequency signals are enormous, referred
to as "elephant cages" by their users.

An alternative to tunable directional antennas, or large
omnidirectional arrays such as the Wullenweber, is to measure the time
of arrival of the signal at multiple points, using GPS or a similar
method to have precise time synchronization. Receivers can be on
ground stations, ships, aircraft, or satellites, giving great
flexibility.

Modern anti-radiation missiles can home in on and attack transmitters;
military antennas are rarely a safe distance from the user of the
transmitter.
Traffic analysis
Main article: Traffic analysis

When locations are known, usage patterns may emerge, from which
inferences may be drawn. Traffic analysis is the discipline of drawing
patterns from information flow among a set of senders and receivers,
whether those senders and receivers are designated by location
determined through direction finding, by addressee and sender
identifications in the message, or even MASINT techniques for
"fingerprinting" transmitters or operators. Message content, other
than the sender and receiver, is not necessary to do traffic analysis,
although more information can be helpful.

For example, if a certain type of radio is known to be used only by
tank units, even if the position is not precisely determined by
direction finding, it may be assumed that a tank unit is in the
general area of the signal. Of course, the owner of the transmitter
can assume someone is listening, so might set up tank radios in an
area where he wants the other side to believe he has actual tanks. As
part of Operation Quicksilver, part of the deception plan for the
invasion of Europe at the Battle of Normandy, radio transmissions
simulated the headquarters and subordinate units of the fictitious
First United States Army Group (FUSAG), commanded by George S. Patton,
to make the German defense think that the main invasion was to come at
another location. In like manner, fake radio transmissions from
Japanese aircraft carriers, before the Battle of Pearl Harbor, were
made from Japanese local waters, while the attacking ships moved under
strict radio silence.

Traffic analysis need not focus on human communications. For example,
if the sequence of a radar signal, followed by an exchange of
targeting data and a confirmation, followed by observation of
artillery fire, this may identify an automated counterbattery system.
A radio signal that triggers navigational beacons could be a landing
aid system for an airstrip or helicopter pad that is intended to be
low-profile.

Patterns do emerge. Knowing a radio signal, with certain
characteristics, originating from a fixed headquarters may be strongly
suggestive that a particular unit will soon move out of its regular
base. The contents of the message need not be known to infer the
movement.

There is an art as well as science of traffic analysis. Expert
analysts develop a sense for what is real and what is deceptive. Harry
Kidder, for example, was one of the star cryptanalysts of World War
II, a star hidden behind the secret curtain of SIGINT.[4]
Electronic Order of Battle

Generating an Electronic order of battle (EOB) requires identifying
SIGINT emitters in an area of interest, determining their geographic
location or range of mobility, characterizing their signals, and,
where possible, determining their role in the broader organizational
order of battle. EOB covers both COMINT and ELINT.[5] The Defense
Intelligence Agency maintains an EOB by location. The Joint Spectrum
Center (JSC) of the Defense Information Systems Agency supplements
this location database with five more technical databases:

FRRS: Frequency Resource Record System
BEI: Background Environment Information
SCS: Spectrum Certification System
EC/S: Equipment Characteristics/Space
TACDB: platform lists, sorted by nomenclature, which contain
links to the C-E equipment complement of each platform, with links to
the parametric data for each piece of equipment, military unit lists
and their subordinate units with equipment used by each unit.

EOB and related data flow

For example, several voice transmitters might be identified as the
command net (i.e., top commander and direct reports) in a tank
battalion or tank-heavy task force. Another set of transmitters might
identify the logistic net for that same unit. An inventory of ELINT
sources might identify the medium- and long-range counter-artillery
radars in a given area.

Signals intelligence units will identify changes in the EOB, which
might indicate enemy unit movement, changes in command relationships,
and increases or decreases in capability.

Using the COMINT gathering method enables the intelligence officer to
produce an electronic order of battle by traffic analysis and content
analysis among several enemy units. For example, if the following
messages were intercepted:

U1 from U2, requesting permission to proceed to checkpoint X.
U2 from U1, approved. please report at arrival.
(20 minutes later) U1 from U2, all vehicles have arrived to
checkpoint X.

This sequence shows that there are two units in the battlefield, unit
1 is mobile, while unit 2 is in a higher hierarchical level, perhaps a
command post. One can also understand that unit 1 moved from one point
to another which are distant from each 20 minutes with a vehicle. If
these are regular reports over a period of time, they might reveal a
patrol pattern. Direction-finding and radiofrequency MASINT could help
confirm that the traffic is not deception.

The EOB buildup process is divided as following:

Signal separation
Measurements optimization
Data Fusion
Networks build-up

Separation of the intercepted spectrum and the signals intercepted
from each sensors must take place in an extremely small period of
time, in order to separate the deferent signals to different
transmitters in the battlefield. The complexity of the separation
process depends on the complexity of the transmission methods (e.g.,
hopping or time division multiple access (TDMA)).

By gathering and clustering data from each sensor, the measurements of
the direction of signals can be optimized and get much more accurate
then the basic measurements of a standard direction finding sensor.[6]
By calculating larger samples of the sensor's output data in near real-
time, together with historical information of signals, better results
are achieved.

Data fusion correlates data samples from different frequencies from
the same sensor, "same" being confirmed by direction finding or
radiofrequency MASINT. If an emitter is mobile, direction finding,
other than discovering a repetitive pattern of movement, is of limited
value in determining if a sensor is unique. MASINT then becomes more
informative, as individual transmitters and antennas may have unique
side lobes, unintentional radiation, pulse timing, etc.

Network build-up among between each emitter (communication
transmitter) to another enables creation of the communications flows
of a battlefield.[7]
COMINT

COMINT (Communications Intelligence) is a sub-category of signals
intelligence that engages in dealing with messages or voice
information derived from the interception of foreign communications.
It should be noted that COMINT is commonly referred to as SIGINT,
which can cause confusion when talking about the broader intelligence
disciplines. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff defines it as "Technical
information and intelligence derived from foreign communications by
other than the intended recipients".[2]

COMINT, which is defined to be communications among people, will
reveal some or all of the following:

Who is transmitting
Where they are located, and, if the transmitter is moving, the
report may give a plot of the signal against location
If known, the organizational function of the transmitter
The time and duration of transmission, and the schedule if it
is a periodic transmission
The frequencies and other technical characteristics of their
transmission
If the transmission is encrypted or not, and if it can be
decrypted. If it is possible to intercept either an originally
transmitted cleartext or obtain it through cryptanalysis, the language
of the communication and a translation (when needed).
The addresses, if the signal is not a general broadcast and if
addresses are retrievable from the message. These stations may also be
COMINT (e.g., a confirmation of the message or a response message),
ELINT (e.g., a navigation beacon being activated) or both. Rather
than, or in addition to, an address or other identifier, there may be
information on the location and signal characteristics of the
responder.

Voice interception

A basic COMINT technique is to listen for voice communications,
usually over radio but possibly "leaking" from telephones or from
wiretaps. If the voice communications are encrypted, the encryption
first must be solved through a process of introelectric diagram in
order to listen to the conversation, although traffic analysis (q.v.)
may give information simply because one station is sending to another
in a radial pattern. It is important to check for various cross
sections of conversation. It is equally important to make sure that
you have the correct x pattern in relation to the a2 pattern.
[clarification needed] These can be found by using the signals
intelligence set given to all Naval communications officers and
enlisted personnel with direct access to signals intelligence
communications.[clarification needed][citation needed]

Obviously, the interceptor must understand the language being spoken.
In the Second World War, the United States used volunteer
communicators known as code talkers, who used languages such as
Navajo, Comanche and Choctaw, which would be understood by few people,
even in the U.S., who did not grow up speaking the language. Even
within these uncommon languages, the code talkers used specialized
codes, so a "butterfly" might be a specific Japanese aircraft. British
forces made more limited use of Welsh speakers for the additional
protection.

While modern electronic encryption does away with the need for armies
to use obscure languages, it is certainly possible that guerrilla
groups might use rare dialects that few outside their ethnic group
would understand.
Text interception

Not all communication is in voice. Morse code interception was once
very important, but Morse code telegraphy is now obsolescent in the
western world, although possibly used by special operations forces.
Such forces, however, now have portable cryptographic equipment. Morse
code is still used by military forces of former Soviet Union
countries.

Specialists scan radio frequencies for character sequences (e.g.,
electronic mail) and facsimile.
Signaling channel interception

A given digital communications link can carry thousands or millions of
voice communications, especially in developed countries. Without
addressing the legality of such actions, the problem of identifying
which channel contains which conversation becomes much simpler when
the first thing intercepted is the signaling channel that carries
information to set up telephone calls. In civilian and many military
use, this channel will carry messages in Signaling System 7 protocols.

Retrospective analysis of telephone calls can be made from call detail
records (CDR) used for billing the calls.
Monitoring friendly communications
DNI depiction of a NRO SIGINT satellite obtaining data on Western
Europe

More a part of communications security than true intelligence
collection, SIGINT units still may have the responsibility of
monitoring one's own communications or other electronic emissions, to
avoid providing intelligence to the enemy. For example, a security
monitor may hear an individual transmitting inappropriate information
over an unencrypted radio network, or simply one that is not
authorized for the type of information being given. If immediately
calling attention to the violation would not create an even greater
security risk, the monitor will call out one of the BEADWINDOW
codes[8] used by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom,
the United States, and other nations working under their procedures.
Standard BEADWINDOW codes (e.g., "BEADWINDOW 2") include:

Position: (e.g., disclosing, in an insecure or inappropriate
way, "Friendly or enemy position, movement or intended movement,
position, course, speed, altitude or destination or any air, sea or
ground element, unit or force."
Capabilities: "Friendly or enemy capabilities or limitations.
Force compositions or significant casualties to special equipment,
weapons systems, sensors, units or personnel. Percentages of fuel or
ammunition remaining."
Operations: "Friendly or enemy operation – intentions
progress, or results. Operational or logistic intentions; mission
participants flying programmes; mission situation reports; results of
friendly or enemy operations; assault objectives."
Electronic warfare (EW): "Friendly or enemy electronic warfare
(EW) or emanations control (EMCON) intentions, progress, or results.
Intention to employ electronic countermeasures (ECM); results of
friendly or enemy ECM; ECM objectives; results of friendly or enemy
electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM); results of electronic
support measures/tactical SIGINT (ESM); present or intended EMCON
policy; equipment affected by EMCON policy."
Friendly or enemy key personnel: "Movement or identity of
friendly or enemy officers, visitors, commanders; movement of key
maintenance personnel indicating equipment limitations."
Communications security (COMSEC): "Friendly or enemy COMSEC
breaches. Linkage of codes or codewords with plain language;
compromise of changing frequencies or linkage with line number/circuit
designators; linkage of changing call signs with previous call signs
or units; compromise of encrypted/classified call signs; incorrect
authentication procedure."
Wrong circuit: "Inappropriate transmission. Information
requested, transmitted or about to be transmitted which should not be
passed on the subject circuit because it either requires greater
security protection or it is not appropriate to the purpose for which
the circuit is provided."
Other codes as appropriate for the situation may be defined by
the commander.

In WWII, for example, the Japanese Navy made possible the interception
and death of the Combined Fleet commander, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto,
by BEADWINDOW 5 and 7 violations. They identified a key person's
movement over a low-security cryptosystem.
Electronic signals intelligence

Electronic signals intelligence (ELINT) refers to intelligence-
gathering by use of electronic sensors. Its primary focus lies on non-
communications signals intelligence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff define
it as "Technical and geolocation intelligence derived from foreign
noncommunications electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than
nuclear detonations or radioactive sources."[2]

Signal identification is performed by analyzing the collected
parameters of a specific signal, and either matching it to known
criteria, or recording it as a possible new emitter. ELINT data are
usually highly classified, and are protected as such.

The data gathered are typically pertinent to the electronics of an
opponent's defense network, especially the electronic parts such as
radars, surface-to-air missile systems, aircraft, etc. ELINT can be
used to detect ships and aircraft by their radar and other
electromagnetic radiation; commanders have to make choices between not
using radar (EMCON), intermittently using it, or using it and
expecting to avoid defenses. ELINT can be collected from ground
stations near the opponent's territory, ships off their coast,
aircraft near or in their airspace, or by satellite.
Complementary relationship to COMINT

Combining other sources of information and ELINT allows traffic
analysis to be performed on electronic emissions which contain human
encoded messages. The method of analysis differs from SIGINT in that
any human encoded message which is in the electronic transmission is
not analyzed during ELINT. What is of interest is the type of
electronic transmission and its location. For example, during the
Battle of the Atlantic in World War II, Ultra COMINT was not always
available because Bletchley Park was not always able to read the U-
boat Enigma traffic. But "Huff-Duff" (High Frequency Direction Finder)
was still able to find where the U-boats were by analysis of radio
transmissions and the positions through triangulation from the
direction located by two or more Huff-Duff systems. The Admiralty was
able to use this information to plot courses which took convoys away
from high concentrations of U-boats.

Yet other ELINT disciplines include intercepting and analyzing enemy
weapons control signals, or the Identification, friend or foe
responses from transponders in aircraft used to distinguish enemy
craft from friendly ones.
Role in air warfare

A very common area of ELINT is intercepting radars and learning their
locations and operating procedures. Attacking forces may be able to
avoid the coverage of certain radars, or, knowing their
characteristics, electronic warfare units may jam radars or send them
deceptive signals. Confusing a radar electronically is called a "soft
kill", but military units will also send specialized missiles at
radars, or bomb them, to get a "hard kill". Some modern air to air
missiles also have radar homing guidance systems, particularly for use
against large airborne radars.

Knowing where each surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery
system is and its type means that air raids can be plotted to avoid
the most heavily defended areas and to fly on a flight profile which
will give the aircraft the best chance of evading ground fire and
fighter patrols. It also allows for the jamming or spoofing of the
enemy's defense network (see electronic warfare). Good electronic
intelligence can be very important to stealth operations; stealth
aircraft are not totally undetectable and need to know which areas to
avoid. Similarly, conventional aircraft need to know where fixed or
semi-mobile air defense systems are so that they can shut them down or
fly around them.
ELINT and ESM

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) are really ELINT techniques, but the
term is used in the specific context of tactical warfare. ESM give the
information needed for Electronic Attack (EA) such as jamming. EA is
also called Electronic Counter-Measures. ESM provides information
needed for Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM), such as
understanding a spoofing or jamming mode so one can change one's radar
characteristics to avoid them.
ELINT for meaconing

Meaconing[9] is the combined intelligence and electronic warfare of
learning the characteristics of enemy navigation aids, such as radio
beacons, and retransmitting them with incorrect information.
Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence
Main article: FISINT

FISINT (Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence) is a sub-
category of SIGINT, monitoring primarily non-human communication.
Foreign instrumentation signals include (but not limited to) telemetry
(TELINT), tracking systems, and video data links. TELINT is an
important part of national means of technical verification for arms
control.
Counter-ELINT

Still at the research level are techniques that can only be described
as counter-ELINT, which would be part of a SEAD campaign. It may be
informative to compare and contrast counter-ELINT with ECCM.
SIGINT versus MASINT
Main article: Measurement and signature intelligence
A model of a German SAR-Lupe reconnaissance satellite inside a Russian
Cosmos-3M rocket.

Signals intelligence and measurement and signature intelligence
(MASINT) are closely, and sometimes confusingly, related.[10] The
signals intelligence disciplines of communications and electronic
intelligence focus on the information in those signals themselves, as
with COMINT detecting the speech in a voice communication or ELINT
measuring the frequency, pulse repetition rate, and other
characteristics of a radar.

MASINT also works with collected signals, but is more of an analysis
discipline. There are, however, unique MASINT sensors, typically
working in different regions or domains of the electromagnetic
spectrum, such as infrared or magnetic fields. While NSA and other
agencies have MASINT groups, the Central MASINT Office is in the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

Where COMINT and ELINT focus on the intentionally transmitted part of
the signal, MASINT focuses on unintentionally transmitted information.
For example, a given radar antenna will have sidelobes emanating from
other than the direction in which the main antenna is aimed. The
RADINT (radar intelligence) discipline involves learning to recognize
a radar both by its primary signal, captured by ELINT, and its
sidelobes, perhaps captured by the main ELINT sensor, or, more likely,
a sensor aimed at the sides of the radio antenna.

MASINT associated with COMINT might involve the detection of common
background sounds expected with human voice communications. For
example, if a given radio signal comes from a radio used in a tank, if
the interceptor does not hear engine noise or higher voice frequency
than the voice modulation usually uses, even though the voice
conversation is meaningful, MASINT might suggest it is a deception,
not coming from a real tank.

See HF/DF for a discussion of SIGINT-captured information with a
MASINT flavor, such as determining the frequency to which a receiver
is tuned, from detecting the frequency of the beat frequency
oscillator of the superheterodyne receiver.
Defensive signals intelligence
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There are a number of ways that a person or organization can defend
against signals intelligence. There is a delicate balance between the
level of protection and the actual threat, as expressed in the clichés
about "tinfoil hats".

One must begin by defining the threat. It is considerably more
difficult to defend against detection that one is signaling, as
opposed to defending against an opponent discovering the content of
the transmitted message. Appropriate encryption can protect against
content interception, but protecting against signal detection,
especially with a capable opponent, requires measures to make the
signal hard to detect – which can also make it difficult for the
intended recipient to receive the signal. Any defensive program needs
to consider the nature of the threat and the capabilities of the
opponent.
Strong and well-managed encryption

Encryption is central to the defense. The encryption process is
vulnerable if the cryptographic keys are not strong and protected,
and, on computers, if the cleartext is not deleted when not needed.
Appropriate transmission security

When using radio transmitters, use directional antennas that have as
little "spillover" into sidelobes as possible. If it is most important
to hide the location of a transmitter, the minimum is to cable the
antennas as far as possible away from the transmitter proper. In many
circumstances, aiming the antenna upward to a satellite will help hide
its location.

The amount of total transmission power needs to be minimized, and the
power preferably should be split into multiple and changing
frequencies using spread spectrum techniques. If possible, avoid
transmitting when hostile SIGINT satellites or monitoring aircraft are
overhead.

If in an urban area, avoid using regular commercial power to transmit.
There are ways in which the signal can "leak" into power and ground
lines. The adversary may turn off power to an area, which will tell
him there is a line-operated transmitter if the transmission stops,
and that there is a battery-powered transmitter if it continues.

Use highly variable transmission schedules and vary frequencies if
technically possible. Also see low probability of intercept radar.
Appropriate receiving security

If Operation RAFTER-style intercept is a threat, protect against this
form of unintentional radiation MASINT by using optoisolators or other
shielded techniques (e.g., waveguides) to bring in the radio frequency
received signal, and shield the local oscillator and intermediate
frequency stages in the superheterodyne receiver. This technique
should be far less effective against the new generation of software-
defined radio.

Unintentional radiation on power or ground circuits is a threat here
as well; use appropriate TEMPEST or other techniques.
Protection against compromising emanations

There are risks that electronic, acoustic, or other information could
"leak" from a computer system or other electronic communications
devices.
The risk

Understanding details of the risks requires a substantial knowledge of
electronics, but a simple example might serve. Many people have put a
radio receiver near a computer, to listen to music as they work, and
discovered that the radio suffered clicks, squeals, and other
interference. These interfering signals are radiating from various
parts of the computer, especially its display but often also from the
power and grounding system. TEMPEST is the name for one family of
protective measures against an opponent intercepting these emanations
and extracting sensitive information from them.

While not strictly within the scope of protecting against "leakage", a
place where sensitive information is processed or discussed needs
protection against hidden microphones, wiretaps, and other "bugging".
Sometimes, an electronic sweep to verify TEMPEST compliance reveals
the presence of hidden transmitters. Again, there is probably more
suspicion than reality in most cases. A member of a crime
organization, in the middle of a nasty divorce, or a foreign
intelligence agent might have reason to worry, but, even with the
serious questions about warrantless surveillance in the US and other
countries, there is little reason for someone to go to the risk and
expense of illegal surveillance on an ordinary citizen. TEMPEST is
usually associated with direct electromagnetic radiation from the
device, either free-space or through power and ground lines. TEMPEST
generically talks about acoustic isolation, but that is fairly easily
solved through physical security and noise damping, as well as
searches for microphones.

There are several threats that have not been officially defined in the
unclassified literature. Nevertheless, there are some informed guesses:
[11]

NONSTOP is a threat that involves some type of coupling of
compromising RF energy from a classified system, which "leaks" into an
independent RF-transmitting or -recording device such as cell phones,
PDAs, pager, alarm systems. Commercial AM/FM radios are not considered
a risk.
HIJACK is a similar threat of coupling, but to some type of
digital computer or related equipment.
TEAPOT is a very different vulnerability, which appears to
apply to incidental audio modulation of the backscatter from an RF,
typically microwave, directed into the secure area. A passive resonant
cavity bug of this type was discovered in a Great Seal of the United
States presented by the USSR, but containing a resonant cavity with a
wall that moved with sound in the room, thus imposing frequency
modulation onto the backscattered signal.

Mitigation and countermeasures

The word TEMPEST itself, and its meaning, are unclassified. Some of
the techniques for measuring the compliance of a piece of equipment,
or whether it is actually emitting compromising emanations, are
classified. A good deal of the information has come into public view
either through Freedom of Information Act queries,[12] books talking
about interception techniques, inferences drawn from partially
released documents, and straightforward thinking by electronic
engineers. Some documents released fully or partially under FOIA:

Red/Black Installation Guidance[13]
Specification for Shielded Enclosures[14]
Specification for Shielded Enclosures (partially redacted)[15]

A number of individuals have made a hobby of ferreting out TEMPEST and
related information,[16] and firms in the broader-than-TEMPEST
business of technical surveillance counter-measures (TSCM) also reveal
concepts.[17]
Protection against side channel attacks and covert channels

A side channel attack is an unintentional vulnerability of an
encryption device, not related to the encryption algorithm.[18]
Potential vulnerabilities include different processing and thus
transmission speeds for blocks of plaintext with certain statistical
characteristics, changes in power consumption, or compromising
emanations.

Covert channels are deliberate means to elude communications security.
[19] They send out an unauthorized signal by stealing bandwidth from a
legitimate, often encrypted channel. One low-bandwidth method would be
to send information by varying the inter-block transmission times. A
steganographic covert channel might use the low-order bit of pixels in
a graphic image, perhaps not even consecutive pixels, in a manner that
would not be obvious to a person looking at the graphic.
See also

Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Science & Technology
Geospatial intelligence
Human intelligence (espionage)
Imagery intelligence
Intelligence Branch (Canadian Forces)
List of intelligence gathering disciplines
Open-source intelligence
Radio Reconnaissance Platoon
RAF Intelligence
Signals intelligence by alliances, nations and industries
Signals intelligence operational platforms by nation for current
collection systems,

References

^ Lee, Bartholomew. "Radio Spies – Episodes in the Ether Wars".
Retrieved 2007-10-08.
^ a b c d US Department of Defense (12 July 2007). "Joint
Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms" (PDF). Retrieved 2007-10-01.
^ "Precision SIGINT Targeting System (PSTS)". Intelligence
Research Program (Federation of American Scientists).
^ Whitlock, Duane (Autumn 1995). "The Silent War against the
Japanese Navy". Naval War College Review. XLVIII (4). Retrieved
2007-09-30.
^ 743d Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion (August 1999).
"Warfighter Guide to Intelligence 2000". Joint Spectrum Center, (US)
Defense Information Services Agency. Archived from the original on
2007-08-14. Retrieved 2007-10-26.
^ Kessler, Otto. "SIGINT Change Detection Approach" (PDF). Dynamic
Database: Efficiently convert massive quantities of sensor data into
actionable information for actical commanders (Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency).
^ Terry, I. (2003). "US Naval Research Laboratory - Networked
Specific Emitter Identification in Fleet Battle Experiment Juliet".
NRL Review. Retrieved 2007-10-26.
^ Combined Communications-Electronics Board (CCEB) (January 1987).
"ACP 124(D) Communications Instructions: Radio Telegraph
Procedure" (PDF). ACP 224(D). Archived from the original on
2007-09-01. Retrieved 2007-10-02.
^ US Army (17 July 1990). "Chapter 4: Meaconing, Intrusion,
Jamming, and Interference Reporting". Field Manual 23-33,
Communications Techniques: Electronic Counter-Countermeasures. FM
23-33. Retrieved 2007-10-01.
^ Interagency OPSEC Support Staff (IOSS) (May 1996). "Operations
Security Intelligence Threat Handbook: Section 2, Intelligence
Collection Activities and Disciplines". IOSS Section 2. Retrieved
2007-10-03.
^ McNamara, Joel (2002). "The Complete, Unofficial TEMPEST
Information Page". McNamara 2002.
^ "Cryptome: various TEMPEST and related documents". 2003.
CryptomeTEMPEST. Retrieved 2007-10-16.
^ National Security Agency (2 December 1995). "NSTISSAM TEMPEST/
2-95, Red/Black Installation Guidance". TEMPEST/2-95. Retrieved
2007-10-16.
^ National Security Agency (24 October 1994). "Specification NSA
No. 94-106, Red/Black Installation Guidance". TEMPEST/94-106.
Retrieved 2007-10-16.
^ National Security Agency (29 September 1993). "NSTISSI No. 7000,
Tempest Countermeasures for Facilitiea". TEMPEST/7000. Retrieved
2007-10-16.
^ McNamara, Joel (2004). "The Complete, Unofficial TEMPEST
Information Page". McNamara 2004. Retrieved 2007-10-16.
^ Granite Island Group (2005). "Technical Surveillance
Countermeasures". Granite. Retrieved 2007-10-16.
^ Gibbs, W. Wyat. How Hackers Can Steal Secrets from Reflections.
Scientific American.
^ National Computer Security Center (November 1993). "NCSC-TG-030
VERSION-1 A Guide to Understanding Covert Channel Analysis of Trusted
Systems ("Light Pink Book")".

Further reading

Bamford, James, Body of Secrets: How America's NSA and Britain's
GCHQ eavesdrop on the world (Century, London, 2001)
West, Nigel, The SIGINT Secrets: The Signals Intelligence War,
1900 to Today (William Morrow, New York, 1988)
J. A. Biyd, D. B. Harris, D. D. King & H. W. Welch, Jr. (Editors)
(1979). Electronic Countermeasures. Los Altos, CA: Peninsula
Publishing (1961). ISBN 0-932146-00-7.

Paul Gannon, Colossus: Bletchley Park's Greatest Secret (Atlantic
Books, London, 2006) ISBN 978-1843543312

External links

NSA's overview of SIGINT
USAF Pamphlet on sources of intelligence

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German WWII SIGINT/COMINT

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

Intelligence Programs and Systems
The U.S. Intelligence Community by Jeffrey T. Richelson
Secrets of Signals Intelligence During the Cold War and Beyond by
Matthew Aid et. al.
Maritime SIGINT Architecture Technical Standards Handbook


Signals intelligence
Cryptography
Cyberwarfare
Intelligence gathering disciplines
Intelligence (information gathering)
Military intelligence