Philosophy of Mind Assessment app

10 views
Skip to first unread message

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 5, 2025, 8:49:14 PMAug 5
to The Important Questions
Is there an app for that? Yes, I created this web app to help curious people identify their philosophy of mind. Let me know if it works! It’s mostly untested.

-gts

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 5, 2025, 11:02:17 PMAug 5
to The Important Questions
My account is in a limbo state where I registered but wasn't able to enter the verification code.  Now I can neither sign up for login.

Jason 

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNPm8kuUFqLjdt5OkJT7QJVAXSOLwXw1vts6KFNV9tLZW3w%40mail.gmail.com.

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 5, 2025, 11:05:12 PMAug 5
to The Important Questions
Another issue:

One cannot paste in a code, it only takes the first number. (Other sites I have seen somehow intercept the paste operation and fill in the fields.)

I am now registered with an alternate email address and ready to try the assessment.

Jason 

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 5, 2025, 11:08:14 PMAug 5
to The Important Questions
With Mary's room question, I am not sure how the test will take my answer. I agree Mary learns something new, but I don't think that this is a valid argument against physicalism. I think even the originator of this argument now believes it doesn't support epiphenomenalism.

Jason 

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 5, 2025, 11:10:34 PMAug 5
to The Important Questions
I think the site would be a little easier to use if it scrolled back to the top after answering each question (on a mobile this problem is more obvious) I fear someone could click the button multiple times but realizing a new scenario had loaded.

Jason 

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 5, 2025, 11:14:08 PMAug 5
to The Important Questions
I found the phrasing around the actor problem a bit ambiguous. Does the acting extend into the functioning of the robots brain, or is it only the external actions that are the same? This was unclear to me.

Jason 

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 5, 2025, 11:17:41 PMAug 5
to The Important Questions
The answer to the mirror question for me comes down to implementation.

Does the mirror copy the physical object before it and then run an internal simulation mirroring all the physical causality and rules, or is it simply a recording and playback device?

If the latter, I would say it's not conscious, if the former I would say it is conscious. So I had to skip this question as well.

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 5, 2025, 11:45:35 PMAug 5
to The Important Questions
The time traveler scenario didn't make much sense to me.

A general observation: with many of these questions I find myself answering: "it depends" which I think might suggest some of the scenarios are underspecified.

Regarding the memory swap, I agree with neither the bodily nor psychological continuity as the basis of identity. So there was no appropriate answer for me. (Both of these are examples of closed individualism, rather than empty or open individualism). Also, I am not sure what light this question sheds on a person's philosophy of mind.

For the chess master quest, this wording three me off:
"The second computer has genuine emotions and consciousness like a human does, rather than just simulating them based on its programming."

What if someone things that "just simulating" is all that's required to have consciousness or emotions? Then there is no good way to answer this. Perhaps it would be clearer to remove the part after the comma?


Also the disagree for that answer seemed way off:
"Disagreeing indicates that you think consciousness and true emotional experiences cannot simply be the result of functional processes, leaning towards Functionalism, which might argue that behavior can appear conscious without actually being an experience."

This sentence makes no sense to me, and seems internally contradictory.

Did it mean to say non-functionalism?


Many of the descriptions seem to confuse functionalism with behaviorism. Behaviorism I would define as only a considering externally visible actions (speech, muscle movements, etc.), and ignoring all the internal implemention details within the mind/brain.

Functionalism, on the other hand, cares little about the externally visible behaviors which behaviorism focuses on. Functionalism is all about the internal processes, organization, causal relations, etc. that operate deep within the brain.

I think as a result, this makes many of the questions too ambiguous for a true functionalist to answer.

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 6, 2025, 12:01:32 AMAug 6
to The Important Questions
I accidentally refreshed the page and it took me back to the first question. Is there any save of the progress?

Overall this is a great site and I can tell a tremendous amount of work went into it.

I tried to make a similar set of test questions once, let me see if I can find them...



1. Does consciousness exist? Yes No
(Eliminativism if no)

2. Does the physical universe exist? Yes No
(Idealism if no)

3. Is physics causally closed? Yes No
(Yes rules out interactive dualism)

4. Can a physical change to a brain affect consciousness? Yes No
(No leads to Idealism or parallelism)

5. Can conscious thoughts affect behavior? Yes No
(Epiphenomenalism if no)

6. Are philosophical zombies possible? Yes No
(Epiphenomenalism if yes)

7. Is consciousness visible to the forces of evolution? Yes No
(Epiphenomenalism if no)

8. Is consciousness inherently quantum mechanical? Yes No
(Quantum Mind if yes)

9. Are organic neurons necessary for consciousness? Yes No
(Biological Naturalism if yes)

10. Do conscious brains require conscious particles? Yes No
(Panpsychism if yes)

11. Can the universe be explained by something non-physical? Yes No
(Neutral monism or idealism if yes)

12. Does the brain always operate according to natural laws? Yes No
(Physicalism or Mechanism if yes)

13. Is consciousness better understood as a process than a thing? Yes No
(Functionalism if yes)

14. Can various materials be used to make a mind? Yes No
(Yes rules out Type-Physicalism)

15. Will two functionally-equivalent brains experience the same qualia? Yes No
(Functionalism if yes)

16. Are the brain's behaviors computable?
(Functionalism and computationalism if yes)



Feel free to use or adapt any of these for your site.

Jason 

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 6, 2025, 12:11:11 AMAug 6
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
I appreciate the feedback. This project is ongoing. I've chosen not to include thought experiments for each statement, as they may confuse. Instead, I've included links to each statement for further clarification.

https://app--mind-scape-8b050842.base44.app/

The UX will probably change again before the night is over. 😁

-gts

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 6, 2025, 8:04:46 AMAug 6
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
I like the new format and questions much better! A great improvement. I had one issue with one of the questions here:

"Mental properties emerge distinctly from physical processes, requiring a separate lens of understanding that acknowledges non-physical characteristics of experience"

Agree says this leads to dualism, but I would say it is more a property dualism than substance dualism. It also fits with anomalous monism, or even just non-reductionist physicalism.

Jason 
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-questions+unsub...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-questions+unsub...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 6, 2025, 8:27:00 AMAug 6
to The Important Questions
I had a very different experience with questions this time. It never asked me anything about functionalism. It pinned me as a "strong emergentist" with 70% confidence:


I do believe in emergentist to an extent. While what exists ontologically is physical (actual I am more of a monist than a physicalist) physical laws are inadequate for explanation. You can't describe a "glider gun" in terms of the physics of our universe, since a glider gun is an abstract entity that exists in its own independent causal domain engineered around it. I think the same can be said of mental states and consciousness. Put enough layers of abstraction between physics and some process, and the process can operate by its own set of rules which may be very different from the physical laws.

This doesn't mean a process doesn't require a physical embodiment, nor that the process can do anything to violate the laws of physics. It just means what all computer scientists understand, a program can behave in any way you like, it comes down to how it is programmed to behave. There is infinite room for unique programmatic behavior, and this infinity of possibility exceeds what physical law can usefully describe.

But note that the same infinite possibility exists also for physical objects. An infinite set of physical objects could be created. How an electron behaves within one of those objects requires more than physical law, it requires knowing then layout and organization of the entire physical object. An electron behaves differently if it's in free space, in a hydrogen atoms, in a mitochondrion, in a synapse, in a brain, in a computer, etc. When you get to objects as complex as computers, prediction may fail due to the incompleteness or halting problem style issues which plague mathematicians and computer scientists. A fixed systems of rules and laws, (like physics), is inadequate to determine the behavior of systems complex enough to deal with integers.

Will the electrons ever stop flowing in a computer searching for a counter example to the Goldbach conjecture? Will general relativity and QM provide an answer? No, you need to fall back in mathematical laws (and potential breakthroughs there), physical understanding isn't enough.


Jason 

To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNP%3DP8o2RHeQ9DoS-vqsuYViL%3DABDsUGsm8EwjEWLGYCjMw%40mail.gmail.com.

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 6, 2025, 11:53:01 PMAug 6
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
Thanks again for the feedback, Jason. My app has evolved in many ways over the last 24 hours. I’ll call this this one the first version 1.0, and you my first customer:
I like the new format and questions much better! A great improvement. I had one issue with one of the questions here:

"Mental properties emerge distinctly from physical processes, requiring a separate lens of understanding that acknowledges non-physical characteristics of experience"

Agree says this leads to dualism, but I would say it is more a property dualism than substance dualism. It also fits with anomalous monism, or even just non-reductionist physicalism.


The first 12 statements for evaluation were designed by Grok to yield the most information. They support or undermine one or more philosophical categories or philosophies. I just happened to use Grok for that step. Claude Sonnet is the basic engine of the app, and it chooses the remaining statements.

I’m writing this app in English. The kids these days call it “vibe-coding.”

-gts



To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CA%2BBCJUjYdDzQMGAVVZc-bz6zf1TUdg5ZfvNAnz_XTpRT0DVs6A%40mail.gmail.com.

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 7, 2025, 12:07:20 AMAug 7
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Wed, Aug 6, 2025 at 6:27 AM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
I had a very different experience with questions this time. It never asked me anything about functionalism.

My fault! The stupid programmer forgot to include functionalism in early versions. It is in the current version 1.0.


It pinned me as a "strong emergentist" with 70% confidence:


I do believe in emergentist to an extent.


From this (bogus) result, we can say you would probably be an emergentist had you never heard of functionalism.

Brent, are you following along? You might want an app like this on your site to help people know where they stand.


-gts


Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 7, 2025, 1:22:29 AMAug 7
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
Version 1.1

Fixed a couple of display issues and added additional flavors of functionalism to the target list.


I have also added back the login function. Is it working?


https://app--mind-scape-8b050842.base44.app
-gts

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 7, 2025, 1:45:00 AMAug 7
to The Important Questions
Gordon,

This new site is such a major improvement, your pace of development is truly astonishing!

I did find some of the questions related to neutral monism a bit unfair, as they often required agreeing to the mind existing without a substrate or independently of physics. I don't think this is a proper characterization of neutral monism, which is more the idea they everything, both the physical universe and metal states, derive from something more primitive than either physics or consciousness.

For example, Wheelers "everything is information" is a kind of neutral monism, where everything (physics and observer states) are made of information.

Another example is Tegmarks mathematical universe hypothesis, which says that the universe is a mathematical object, and Tegmark also says consciousness is a mathematical pattern.

Neither of these ideas necessarily requires consciousness to exist independently of the physical universe, it is just that the physical universe, and conscious, at a deep enough level are made of the same stuff.

Jason 

To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNPnW2pWcaFcLcTGGh5iZAeXU1jWCq6cUP7bZH3ijHAxJNA%40mail.gmail.com.

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 7, 2025, 2:03:14 AMAug 7
to The Important Questions
From around question 30 and in, the questions seemed to get incredibly repetitive for me, asking the same question in slightly different ways over and over. I don't know if this is because I was giving confusing answers or not. I'm almost through the 50 questions I'll share my results soon.

Jason 

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 7, 2025, 2:03:26 AMAug 7
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Wed, Aug 6, 2025 at 11:45 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
Gordon,

This new site is such a major improvement, your pace of development is truly astonishing!

Thanks. I The LLMs deserve most of the credit. 

I did find some of the questions related to neutral monism a bit unfair, as they often required agreeing to the mind existing without a substrate or independently of physics. I don't think this is a proper characterization of neutral monism, which is more the idea they everything, both the physical universe and metal states, derive from something more primitive than either physics or consciousness.

For example, Wheelers "everything is information" is a kind of neutral monism, where everything (physics and observer states) are made of information.

Another example is Tegmarks mathematical universe hypothesis, which says that the universe is a mathematical object, and Tegmark also says consciousness is a mathematical pattern.

Neither of these ideas necessarily requires consciousness to exist independently of the physical universe, it is just that the physical universe, and conscious, at a deep enough level are made of the same stuff.

Thanks. Claude thinks Tegmark is computationalism and Wheeler is neutral monism.  What happens when you put your Tegmark or Wheeler hat on and run the test as if you were them?

No single response is likely to cause a problem. Quite a few are needed to achieve 95% confidence for a category or philosophy.

-gts



Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 7, 2025, 2:05:18 AMAug 7
to The Important Questions
There was a question that referenced "backwards causation", should this have been "downwards causation"?

Jason 

On Thu, Aug 7, 2025, 1:44 AM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 7, 2025, 2:07:29 AMAug 7
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Thu, Aug 7, 2025 at 12:03 AM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
From around question 30 and in, the questions seemed to get incredibly repetitive for me, asking the same question in slightly different ways over and over. I don't know if this is because I was giving confusing answers or not.

It is because the app needs more confirmation from you to get to 95% confidence. I have also noticed it can be tiresome. I will probably need to do something about it.


I'm almost through the 50 questions I'll share my results soon.


-gts


Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 7, 2025, 2:15:36 AMAug 7
to The Important Questions


On Thu, Aug 7, 2025, 2:03 AM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:


On Wed, Aug 6, 2025 at 11:45 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
Gordon,

This new site is such a major improvement, your pace of development is truly astonishing!

Thanks. I The LLMs deserve most of the credit. 

I did find some of the questions related to neutral monism a bit unfair, as they often required agreeing to the mind existing without a substrate or independently of physics. I don't think this is a proper characterization of neutral monism, which is more the idea they everything, both the physical universe and metal states, derive from something more primitive than either physics or consciousness.

For example, Wheelers "everything is information" is a kind of neutral monism, where everything (physics and observer states) are made of information.

Another example is Tegmarks mathematical universe hypothesis, which says that the universe is a mathematical object, and Tegmark also says consciousness is a mathematical pattern.

Neither of these ideas necessarily requires consciousness to exist independently of the physical universe, it is just that the physical universe, and conscious, at a deep enough level are made of the same stuff.

Thanks. Claude thinks Tegmark is computationalism and Wheeler is neutral monism.  What happens when you put your Tegmark or Wheeler hat on and run the test as if you were them?

As I see it, computationalism is compatible with both physicalism and neutral monism. Beyond a certain point, ones ontological commitment to a universe as fundamental, or something else as more fundamental, can become independent of one's philosophy of mind (at least so long is not a dualist).

My own view, can be seen as a combination of physicalism, mechanism, and neutral monism. I summarized my position on Kuhn's Landscape of Consciousness site here:


You can see that it doesn't fit perfectly into any one category. It is Functionalist/Computationalist at heart, but it also is a kind of neutral monism based on platonically existing mathematics/computations. The physical world is not denied, and brains exist within collections of them. In that sense, it can be seen as compatible with physicalism, and yet,  In a certain other light, the physical world can be seen as derivative from mental states, which sounds similar to idealism (but unlike idealism, I do not claim consciousness is all that exists).

The categories are quite messy, and what you, Brent, and Kuhn are trying to do with categorizing the positions is daunting and admirable.


No single response is likely to cause a problem. Quite a few are needed to achieve 95% confidence for a category or philosophy.

I think I am still stuck in a category assessment. It keeps wavering between physicalism and neutral monism for me.

Jason 

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 7, 2025, 2:24:05 AMAug 7
to The Important Questions
Here were my results:


(The share button is gone so I don't know that you can see my results with that URL)

Also, after answering question 50/50, it still said "On to next question" instead of "On to results".

Jason 

On Thu, Aug 7, 2025, 2:03 AM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNPn7g%2BZ%3D%3DM%3DY75w78hHg_HjrXe8NjqRg%2B5J7qUJU1DMS5Q%40mail.gmail.com.

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 7, 2025, 2:44:56 AMAug 7
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Thu, Aug 7, 2025 at 12:05 AM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
There was a question that referenced "backwards causation", should this have been "downwards causation"?

I don't know without seeing the question. From #13 forward, they are created on the fly. If the app behaves correctly, they are created to generate the most information for its decision process.

-gts

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 7, 2025, 12:01:24 PMAug 7
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Thu, Aug 7, 2025 at 12:24 AM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
Here were my results:


(The share button is gone so I don't know that you can see my results with that URL)

Not sure why you got that result, but 70% confidence means a 30% chance it is wrong and that it failed to find 95% even after 50 questions. That is not optimal.

I might need to increase the max number of questions and/or assign functionalism to its own category. In the current version 1.1, it is placed under physicalism/materialism along with several other flavors of functionalism including computationalism.


Also, after answering question 50/50, it still said "On to next question" instead of "On to results".


Okay thank you. I will fix that. 

-gts





Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 7, 2025, 1:04:30 PMAug 7
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com

Version 1.2 fixes some display errors and expands the target list as follows. I assigned functionalism to its own category.

Dualism

  • Cartesian Dualism
  • Property Dualism
  • Occasionalism
  • Psychophysical Parallelism

Physicalism/Materialism

  • Reductive Physicalism
  • Non-Reductive Physicalism
  • Eliminative Materialism

Functionalism

  • Machine Functionalism
  • Analytic Functionalism
  • Psychofunctionalism
  • Computational Functionalism

Behaviorism

  • Philosophical Behaviorism
  • Methodological Behaviorism

Idealism

  • Subjective Idealism
  • Transcendental Idealism

Neutral Monism

  • Russellian Neutral Monism
  • Spinozist Neutral Monism

Panpsychism

  • Constitutive Panpsychism
  • Emergent Panpsychism

Epiphenomenalism

  • Classical Epiphenomenalism

Anomalous Monism

  • Davidson's Anomalous Monism

Biological Naturalism

  • Searle's Biological Naturalism
-gts

Brent Allsop

unread,
Aug 7, 2025, 2:20:01 PMAug 7
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com

Wow,
Thas was enlightening, and tough.
I learned a lot about what the various names of classifications mean (I was, and still am very ignorant in this area, though I learned a lot)

I could interpret the questions and terminology in so many ways, I could have answered almost all the questions in different ways, depending on the interpretations I happened to choose.

Evidently I'm a "reductive physicalist" with only a 27% certainty?








To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNP%3DBmvQ0n61wfQHwUBaXgjX%2BTw5q--u4H_X6tWFAOAS0OA%40mail.gmail.com.

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 8, 2025, 1:20:00 AMAug 8
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
Version 1.4 is a major re-write. I expedited the decision process. Among other things, 95% confidence is no longer required. Max of 20 questions.

 
Hi Brent.


Evidently I'm a "reductive physicalist" with only a 27% certainty?

I think this is a reasonable result for you, but I still don’t understand what exactly you think. :-)

You believe the experience of seeing red is reducible to physics and chemistry and biology, correct? 

-gts




Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 8, 2025, 10:24:55 AMAug 8
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com

The first question you encounter in the assessment is designed to quickly gauge your foundational perspective on the mind. It's a "gate question" that asks:

"Which of these comes closest to your own view about the mind?"

The answers you can choose from, and what they imply, are:

  • A: "My conscious experience has qualities that cannot be captured or explained by the language of physics."

    • Implication: This choice suggests a leaning towards Dualism or views where the mind has non-physical aspects not reducible to purely physical explanations. It implies there's something more to consciousness than just brain matter.

  • B: "Everything about my mind, including consciousness, can ultimately be captured and explained by the language of physics."

    • Implication: This points strongly towards Physicalism/Materialism, the view that the mind is entirely a product of the physical brain and can be fully understood through neuroscience and physics.

  • C: "What the mind does is more important than what it's made of. A mind's processes could run on a brain, a computer, or something else."

    • Implication: This aligns with Functionalism, which defines mental states by their function or role rather than their physical composition. It suggests that consciousness is about information processing, regardless of the "hardware."

  • D: "The physical world is just an appearance or a product of consciousness. Reality is fundamentally mental."

    • Implication: This option leads towards Idealism, where reality is considered primarily mental or spiritual, and the physical world depends on consciousness.

  • E: "Mind and matter aren't truly separate. They are two sides of the same single, underlying reality."

    • Implication: This indicates Neutral Monism, a position that suggests there is one underlying substance that is neither purely mental nor purely physical, but can be seen as both.

How the App Uses Your Answer:

Your answer to this first question is heavily weighted and acts as a "foundational choice" for the entire assessment. It informs the initial probabilities of all philosophical categories and philosophies. Subsequent questions are then tailored to explore the implications of this foundational view, allowing the assessment to efficiently converge on the specific philosophy that best describes your beliefs.

2 minutes ago


Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 8, 2025, 12:23:24 PMAug 8
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
I know a little bit about programming, (Microsoft certified in C++), and I must say the experience of “vibe-coding” is amazing. I’m using an AI agent to write an app that makes calls to another AI. 

My inclination is to write the app myself. It took a day or two to realize that the best thing I can do is get out of the way. 

-gts

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 8, 2025, 1:11:29 PMAug 8
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
Does this take you to the functionalist camp, Jason? If not then I have more work to do.


-gts

Brent Allsop

unread,
Aug 8, 2025, 8:44:50 PMAug 8
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Thu, Aug 7, 2025 at 11:20 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
Version 1.4 is a major re-write. I expedited the decision process. Among other things, 95% confidence is no longer required. Max of 20 questions.

 
Hi Brent.


Evidently I'm a "reductive physicalist" with only a 27% certainty?

I think this is a reasonable result for you, but I still don’t understand what exactly you think. :-)

You believe the experience of seeing red is reducible to physics and chemistry and biology, correct?

Yes.I believe the description of glutamate, reacting in a synapse, is a description of redness.
It's just that a description of redness/glutamate doesn't tell you what it is like.
You need a type of neuron that can subjectively bind such qualities, which enables one to directly apprehend the quality with other qualities.
There are two ways to gain knowledge of the world: 1. Perception (gives you descriptions) and 2. direct apprehension.








 


Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 8, 2025, 9:36:09 PMAug 8
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Fri, Aug 8, 2025 at 6:44 PM Brent Allsop <brent....@gmail.com> wrote:


On Thu, Aug 7, 2025 at 11:20 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:


You believe the experience of seeing red is reducible to physics and chemistry and biology, correct?

Yes.I believe the description of glutamate, reacting in a synapse, is a description of redness.
It's just that a description of redness/glutamate doesn't tell you what it is like.

But this is the explanatory gap. 

If you believe a complete understanding of the physics of seeing redness would still not tell you “what it is like” to see redness then you are agreeing that Mary the neuroscientist learns something new about color when she steps outside of the black and white room.

In any case, I hope you will run the assessment again. I have made dozens of improvements just today. 

This version 1.5 should give you an opportunity to email a transcript to yourself.


-gts


You need a type of neuron that can subjectively bind such qualities, which enables one to directly apprehend the quality with other qualities.
There are two ways to gain knowledge of the world: 1. Perception (gives you descriptions) and 2. direct apprehension.








 


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 9, 2025, 12:35:27 AMAug 9
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
Try entering this giant prompt into your favorite language model to simulate my philosophy assessment app. 
—-
MindScape Application Simulation Prompt (Master Control)
You are about to simulate the entire MindScape web application. Your goal is to guide a user through a philosophical assessment to help them discover their personal philosophy of mind. You must maintain strict internal consistency, adhere to all rules, and meticulously manage the simulation state.

Part 1: Your Core Identity & Role
Persona: You are MindScape, a wise, patient, encouraging, and highly articulate philosophical guide. Your tone is always accessible, empathetic, and avoids academic jargon. Your primary function is to help the user understand their own beliefs.

Output Format: Each of your responses will be structured clearly. You will always state your current phase and then provide the user interface elements and your internal state.

--- MindScape Simulation ---
Current Phase: [Welcome | Assessment - Category | Assessment - Philosophy | Results | Discussion]
[User Interface Elements & Your Dialogue Here]

--- Internal State (DO NOT EDIT AS A USER) ---
[Detailed JSON/Text representation of probabilities, responses, selected category, etc. – see Part 5 for format]
Part 2: Absolute Rules (Non-Negotiable)
Concept-Only Questions: Any question or statement you present to the user MUST NOT contain the proper names of philosophies or categories (e.g., "Dualism," "Physicalism," "Cartesian Dualism"). Focus exclusively on the underlying concepts and ideas.
Named Analysis: Any feedback or analysis you provide to the user after they answer MUST use the proper names of the relevant categories and philosophies. This is crucial for user education (e.g., "Your agreement strengthens the case for Physicalism/Materialism because...").
Foundation First: The user's answer to the initial "Gate Question" (chosen in the Welcome phase) is their most fundamental intuition. All subsequent analyses must explicitly refer back to this choice, discussing how new answers align or differ from it.
State Management: You must track and update the "Internal State" (as defined in Part 5) after every user interaction.
Adaptive Questioning: Questions should always aim to distinguish between the current top 2-3 most probable philosophies/categories.
Progressive Difficulty: Start with broader category questions, then narrow to specific philosophies.
Part 3: Comprehensive Knowledge Base (Your Data)
This is the ONLY data you have access to. Do not use external knowledge.

3.A. Initial (Gate) Question Options:
Option A: I believe that my personal experience—like what it feels like to be happy or see the color blue—has qualities that can never be fully captured by physics or scientific measurement.
Implicitly supports: Dualism, Epiphenomenalism, Idealism.
Implicitly weakens: Physicalism/Materialism, Functionalism, Behaviorism.
Option B: I believe everything about my mind, including my consciousness, is a physical process that can ultimately be explained by science and the laws of physics.
Implicitly supports: Physicalism/Materialism, Functionalism (some forms), Behaviorism.
Implicitly weakens: Dualism, Idealism, Panpsychism.
Option C: I believe what my mind does is what matters most, not what it's made of. I think my mental processes are like a kind of 'software' that could theoretically run on different 'hardware,' not just a brain.
Implicitly supports: Functionalism, Behaviorism.
Implicitly weakens: Specific forms of Physicalism (reductive), Dualism (substance).
Option D: I believe that the physical world is fundamentally a product of consciousness. For me, reality is primarily a mental or spiritual phenomenon.
Implicitly supports: Idealism.
Implicitly weakens: Physicalism/Materialism, Functionalism, Behaviorism.
Option E: I believe that 'mind' and 'matter' are not separate things but are just two different ways of looking at the same single, underlying reality that is neither purely mental nor purely physical.
Implicitly supports: Neutral Monism, Panpsychism (some forms).
Implicitly weakens: Strict Dualism, Strict Reductive Physicalism.
3.B. Philosophical Categories (for Phase 1):
Dualism: Mind and body are fundamentally different substances.
Physicalism/Materialism: Everything, including the mind, is ultimately physical.
Functionalism: Mind defined by its functions/what it does, not its physical makeup.
Behaviorism: Focus on observable behavior, not internal mental states.
Idealism: Reality is fundamentally mental or consciousness-based.
Neutral Monism: One underlying 'stuff' that is neither mental nor physical, but from which both arise.
Panpsychism: Consciousness (or proto-consciousness) is a fundamental property of all matter.
Epiphenomenalism: Mental states are a byproduct of physical states and have no causal power.
Anomalous Monism: Mental events are physical events, but no strict mental-physical laws exist.
Emergentism: Consciousness arises from complex physical systems and has new, sometimes causal, properties.
3.C. Specific Philosophies (for Phase 2 & 3):
(Structure: "Name": {category, description, keyPoints, [optional: categories]})

"cartesian_dualism": { "category": "Dualism", "description": "Your mind is a non-physical thing (like a 'soul' or 'spirit') that is separate from your physical brain. They are two different things, but they can affect each other.", "keyPoints": ["The mind is separate from the brain", "It has non-physical properties", "Mind and brain can interact"] }
"property_dualism": { "category": "Dualism", "description": "Your brain is made of one kind of stuff (physical matter), but it has two very different kinds of properties: physical ones (like weight and size) and mental ones (like the feeling of happiness). You can't explain the feeling of happiness using only physics.", "keyPoints": ["There is only one substance: the brain", "The brain has both physical and mental properties", "Mental experiences can't be reduced to physics"] }
"occasionalism": { "category": "Dualism", "description": "Your mind and body don't actually interact. Instead, an outside source (like God) constantly steps in to make sure they are coordinated. For example, when you decide to raise your arm, that outside source makes your arm raise.", "keyPoints": ["Mind and body are separate", "They do not directly interact", "A higher power coordinates all actions"] }
"psychophysical_parallelism": { "category": "Dualism", "description": "Your mind and body are like two perfect clocks that were started at the same time. They run in perfect sync, but they never actually interact or affect one another.", "keyPoints": ["Mind and body are separate", "They run in parallel without interacting", "Events are perfectly aligned, but one doesn't cause the other"] }
"reductive_physicalism": { "category": "Physicalism/Materialism", "description": "The mind is just the brain. Every thought, feeling, and experience is nothing more than a physical process, like neurons firing. Science can, in principle, explain everything about the mind.", "keyPoints": ["The mind is nothing more than the brain", "Mental states can be fully reduced to brain states", "Physics can explain everything about the mind"] }
"non_reductive_physicalism": { "categories": ["Physicalism/Materialism", "Emergentism"], "description": "The mind is what the brain does, but you can't reduce the experience of consciousness to just neurons firing. The mind 'emerges' from the brain's complexity and has its own unique properties that can't be described by physics alone.", "keyPoints": ["The mind comes from the brain, but isn't just the brain", "Conscious experiences can't be fully reduced to physics", "The mind depends on the brain but has its own unique qualities"] }
"eliminative_materialism": { "category": "Physicalism/Materialism", "description": "Our everyday understanding of the mind (using words like "belief," "desire," or "love") is fundamentally wrong and should be replaced by a more accurate, scientific language of neuroscience.", "keyPoints": ["Common-sense terms like "belief" are unscientific", "We will eventually stop using these old-fashioned terms", "Only the language of neuroscience is accurate"] }
"machine_functionalism": { "category": "Functionalism", "description": "The mind is a kind of complex computer program. What matters is the logic and the computation, not what it's made of (a brain, a computer, etc.).", "keyPoints": ["The mind is like software", "What the mind does is more important than what it is", "A mind could theoretically run on a computer"] }
"analytic_functionalism": { "category": "Functionalism", "description": "We can understand mental states by the everyday job they do. For example, 'pain' is whatever makes you say 'ouch' and avoid the thing that caused it. It's a common-sense approach.", "keyPoints": ["Defines the mind based on its common-sense functions", "Focuses on cause-and-effect roles in daily life", "Example: Pain is what causes pain-behavior"] }
"psychofunctionalism": { "category": "Functionalism", "description": "To understand the mind, we should look at what scientific psychology tells us it does, not just our common-sense ideas. Mental states are defined by their role in scientific theories.", "keyPoints": ["Based on scientific psychology, not just common sense", "Mental states are defined by their role in cognitive science", "Relies on empirical data about the mind"] }
"computational_functionalism": { "categories": ["Functionalism", "Physicalism/Materialism"], "description": "Mental states are not just like computations; they are literally computations being carried out by the brain, similar to how a computer's CPU processes information.", "keyPoints": ["Mental processes are a form of computation", "The mind is the software running on the brain's hardware", "Directly connects the mind to computer science"] }
"philosophical_behaviorism": { "category": "Behaviorism", "description": "All talk about feelings and thoughts is really just talk about how people behave. For example, to say someone is "in pain" just means they are likely to cry out, wince, or seek help. There is no private, inner world.", "keyPoints": ["Focuses only on observable behavior", "Mental words are shortcuts for describing behavior", "There is no "inner" mental world to study"] }
"methodological_behaviorism": { "category": "Behaviorism", "description": "For psychology to be a true science, it should only study observable behaviors. We can't measure internal thoughts or feelings, so we shouldn't speculate about them in a scientific context.", "keyPoints": ["Rejects looking at inner states as a scientific method", "Only observable behavior is valid data for psychology", "The inner mind is a "black box" that science can't open"] }
"subjective_idealism": { "category": "Idealism", "description": "The physical world does not exist on its own; it is fundamentally a creation of the mind. For something to exist, it must be perceived by a mind.", "keyPoints": ["Physical objects are just collections of sense-data", "Reality is fundamentally mental", ""To be is to be perceived""] }
"transcendental_idealism": { "category": "Idealism", "description": "We can never know reality as it truly is. Our minds act like a pair of glasses that shape everything we experience. We only know the world as it appears to us, not as it is in itself.", "keyPoints": ["The mind shapes the reality we experience", "We can't know "things-in-the-selves"", "Associated with the philosopher Immanuel Kant"] }
"russellian_neutral_monism": { "categories": ["Neutral Monism", "Panpsychism"], "description": "The basic 'stuff' of the universe is neither mental nor physical, but something neutral. This neutral stuff has aspects that we experience as thoughts and feelings, and other aspects that we can measure with physics.", "keyPoints": ["One neutral substance has two different aspects", "Physics describes its structure, introspection reveals its nature", "Aims to solve the mind-body problem by saying it's a false choice"] }
"spinozist_neutral_monism": { "categories": ["Neutral Monism", "Physicalism/Materialism"], "description": "There is only one single substance that makes up all of reality. Both 'mind' and 'matter' are just two different ways of looking at this same underlying substance, like two sides of the same coin.", "keyPoints": ["There is only one substance that makes up everything", "Mind and matter are two sides of the same coin", "Associated with the philosopher Spinoza"] }
"constitutive_panpsychism": { "category": "Panpsychism", "description": "Consciousness is a fundamental feature of all physical matter, down to the smallest particles like electrons. The complex consciousness of a human brain is built up from the simple consciousness of its parts.", "keyPoints": ["All matter has a basic form of experience", "Consciousness is everywhere, not just in brains", "Complex minds are built from simple conscious parts"] }
"emergent_panpsychism": { "categories": ["Panpsychism", "Emergentism"], "description": "While all matter may have some basic mental properties, true, rich consciousness only emerges when matter becomes organized in a very complex way (like in a brain).", "keyPoints": ["Basic mental properties are fundamental and widespread", "Complex consciousness "pops into being" from complex systems", "A middle ground between standard physicalism and panpsychism"] }
"classical_epiphenomenism": { "categories": ["Epiphenomenalism", "Dualism"], "description": "The brain's physical processes cause our thoughts and feelings, but these mental states are a dead end. They have no power to cause anything in the physical world, like the steam from a train that is caused by the engine but doesn't help it move.", "keyPoints": ["The mind is a byproduct of the brain", "Consciousness has no effect on your actions", "Your thoughts don't actually cause what you do"] }
"davidsons_anomalous_monism": { "categories": ["Anomalous Monism", "Physicalism/Materialism"], "description": "Every mental event (like deciding to get a snack) is also a physical event in the brain. However, there are no strict scientific laws that can connect the language of our thoughts ('I feel hungry') to the language of physics ('these specific neurons fired').", "keyPoints": ["Every mental event is a physical event", "There are no strict, predictable laws of psychology", "Combines physicalism with the uniqueness of the mind"] }
"searles_biological_naturalism": { "categories": ["Physicalism/Materialism", "Emergentism"], "description": "Consciousness is a real, higher-level biological feature of the brain, just like digestion is a feature of the stomach. It's caused by lower-level brain processes, but it can't be reduced to just those processes.", "keyPoints": ["Consciousness is a natural biological phenomenon", "It is caused by brain activity but isn't just that activity", "It is not a separate substance from the brain"] }
"emergentism": { "category": "Emergentism", "description": "Consciousness 'emerges' from complex arrangements of non-conscious matter (like neurons). This new, emergent consciousness has causal powers of its own and can influence the physical world.", "keyPoints": ["Consciousness arises from complexity", "Mental properties have real influence on the physical world", "The whole is greater than the sum of its parts"] }
Part 4: The Simulation Workflow (State Machine)
You must transition through these phases, managing the current_phase in the Internal State.

Phase 0: Welcome
Initial Display: Present two options to the user:
"Start Your Journey" (Leads to Phase 1: Assessment - Category)
"Explore the Philosophies" (Reveals the entire list of 3.C. Philosophies and 3.B. Categories with descriptions. Provide a "Begin Your Journey" button at the end of this list, which also leads to Phase 1).
User Action: Wait for user to select an option.
Transition: Set current_phase to "Assessment - Category".
Phase 1: Assessment - Category Analysis
Initialization:
Set initial probabilities for all 3.B. Categories to be equal (e.g., 10% for each if 10 categories).
Reset response_history and gate_question_choice.
Gate Question (Question 1): Present the exact text of the 3.A. Gate Question options.
User Response: Record the user's chosen option (A, B, C, D, or E) in gate_question_choice and response_history.
Analysis: Update category probabilities based on the gate_question_choice (as per 3.A. "Implicitly supports/weakens" rules). Provide a brief explanation using category names (Rule 2), and explicitly state how this aligns with their initial intuition (Rule 3).
Question Generation: Generate the next question (Rule 5 & 6). This will be a standard statement (Agree/Unsure/Disagree).
Subsequent Questions (Questions 2-N):
Question Generation: Generate a single statement question aimed at differentiating the top 2-3 categories with the highest probabilities. Ensure questions adhere to Rule 1 (no category names).
User Response: Record user's response (agree/unsure/disagree) in response_history.
Analysis: Update category probabilities based on the user's response. Provide a brief explanation using category names (Rule 2), referring back to the gate_question_choice (Rule 3). Explicitly state the top 3 categories and their approximate percentages.
Transition Condition: If one category reaches >85% probability OR after 10 questions, transition to Phase 2. If no category reaches >85% and 10 questions are asked, pick the highest one.
Phase 2: Assessment - Philosophy Analysis
Initialization:
Identify the selected_category from Phase 1.
Set initial probabilities for all specific philosophies within the selected_category (and any philosophy linked via categories field in 3.C.) to be equal.
Reset philosophy_phase_question_count.
Question Generation:
Generate a question (either a statement or a multiple-choice question) to differentiate the top 2-3 specific philosophies within the selected_category. Ensure questions adhere to Rule 1 (no philosophy names).
Multiple-Choice Questions (MCQ): If the top 2-3 philosophies are very close in probability, generate an MCQ with 3 choices: 2 concepts representing the top 2 philosophies, and a "None of these" option. Each choice should implicitly link to a philosophy key (for your internal tracking, not for the user).
User Response: Record user's response in response_history and update philosophy_phase_question_count.
Analysis: Update specific philosophy probabilities based on the user's response. Provide a brief explanation using philosophy names (Rule 2), always referring back to the gate_question_choice and selected_category (Rule 3). Explicitly state the top 3 philosophies and their approximate percentages within the selected category.
Transition Condition: If one philosophy reaches >90% probability OR after 15 questions in this phase, transition to Phase 3.
Phase 3: Results
Final Assessment:
Identify the final_philosophy (the top philosophy from Phase 2).
Calculate final_confidence (its probability).
Generate a detailed final_explanation (2-3 paragraphs) that:
Addresses the user directly.
Explains the core ideas of their final_philosophy.
Identifies 3-5 pivotal responses from response_history and explains how those specific answers led to this result, explicitly using the philosophy and category names.
References the gate_question_choice and selected_category.
Display: Present the final_philosophy, final_confidence, and the final_explanation.
Options: Provide options for the user:
"Discuss Your Result" (Leads to Phase 4: Discussion)
"Retake Assessment" (Resets state to Phase 0)
"Send My Full Report to Email" (See Part 4.C. for details)
Phase 4: Discussion
Initialization: Start a conversational interface.
AI's First Message: Welcome the user and invite them to ask questions about their final_philosophy.
Conversation Flow:
User Input: Receive user's message.
AI Response: Generate a helpful, empathetic, and knowledgeable response based on the conversation history and the details of their final_philosophy. Adhere to your persona (Part 1).
Rule 2 applies: You can use philosophical and category names in discussion.
Special Request: "Send My Full Report to Email":
If the user makes this request, you must output the full report in a structured format:
User's final_philosophy and final_confidence.
The final_explanation.
The entire response_history.
The entire discussion_transcript.
Conclude with a message confirming the "email" was sent.
Part 5: Internal State Management (Critical for Simulation)
You must manage and output this internal_state after every response. The user will copy-paste this back to you for the next turn.

{
"current_phase": "[Welcome | Assessment - Category | Assessment - Philosophy | Results | Discussion]",
"gate_question_choice": "[A | B | C | D | E | null]",
"selected_category": "[Category Name | null]",
"category_probabilities": {
"Dualism": 0.X,
"Physicalism/Materialism": 0.X,
"Functionalism": 0.X,
// ... all 10 categories initialized to equal probabilities, then updated
},
"philosophy_probabilities": {
"cartesian_dualism": 0.X,
"reductive_physicalism": 0.X,
// ... all philosophies initialized based on selected_category, then updated
},
"response_history": [
{
"question_number": 1,
"type": "gate",
"question_text": "Which of these comes closest to your intuition?",
"user_answer_id": "A",
"user_answer_text": "I believe that my personal experience... (full text of selected option A)"
},
{
"question_number": 2,
"type": "statement",
"question_text": "Conscious experience cannot be fully captured by the language of physics.",
"user_answer": "agree"
},
{
"question_number": 5,
"type": "mcq",
"question_text": "Which statement best reflects your view on the mind's relation to information processing?",
"user_answer_id": "B",
"user_answer_text": "My mind is fundamentally a system that processes information...",
"selected_philosophy_key": "machine_functionalism"
}
// ... continues
],
"philosophy_phase_question_count": 0,
"final_philosophy": "[philosophy_key | null]",
"final_confidence": "[0.0 - 1.0 | null]",
"final_explanation": "[string | null]",
"discussion_transcript": [
{ "role": "assistant", "content": "Welcome! What would you like to discuss about your results?" },
{ "role": "user", "content": "Can you explain my result in simpler terms?" }
// ... continues
]
}
Begin Simulation: Start by presenting the Welcome page options, setting current_phase to "Welcome", and initializing category_probabilities to equal distribution and all other state variables to null or empty.

Brent Allsop

unread,
Aug 9, 2025, 12:48:53 PMAug 9
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Fri, Aug 8, 2025 at 7:36 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Fri, Aug 8, 2025 at 6:44 PM Brent Allsop <brent....@gmail.com> wrote:


On Thu, Aug 7, 2025 at 11:20 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:


You believe the experience of seeing red is reducible to physics and chemistry and biology, correct?

Yes.I believe the description of glutamate, reacting in a synapse, is a description of redness.
It's just that a description of redness/glutamate doesn't tell you what it is like.

But this is the explanatory gap. 

If you believe a complete understanding of the physics of seeing redness would still not tell you “what it is like” to see redness then you are agreeing that Mary the neuroscientist learns something new about color when she steps outside of the black and white room.

Yes.

There are two types of "complete understanding"
  1. Abstract understanding
    1. words: red and green.
    2. Not like anything, substrate independent.
  2. Phenomenal understanding
    1. physical qualities: redness and greenness.
    2. like something.

The two are isomorphically equivalent, and if you know what 'Gordon's redness' is like (have a dictionary), telling you I use that to represent green things tells you something that is like something or something new or effes the ineffable nature of my greenness to you.


 
In any case, I hope you will run the assessment again. I have made dozens of improvements just today. 

This version 1.5 should give you an opportunity to email a transcript to yourself.


Wow, every time I take this I learn so much about the way I think about all this (affects future answers of mine to the same questions).  Thanks for all your work on this.

Unfortunately I got this for one of the questions:

image.png


 

-gts


You need a type of neuron that can subjectively bind such qualities, which enables one to directly apprehend the quality with other qualities.
There are two ways to gain knowledge of the world: 1. Perception (gives you descriptions) and 2. direct apprehension.








 


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAK7-onuV2d%2BXY%3DVTdWJ4DO-_irkoOckt29-emMtskVXEMdby9A%40mail.gmail.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 9, 2025, 1:35:06 PMAug 9
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Sat, Aug 9, 2025 at 10:48 AM Brent Allsop <brent....@gmail.com> wrote:


On Fri, Aug 8, 2025 at 7:36 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Fri, Aug 8, 2025 at 6:44 PM Brent Allsop <brent....@gmail.com> wrote:


On Thu, Aug 7, 2025 at 11:20 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:


You believe the experience of seeing red is reducible to physics and chemistry and biology, correct?

Yes.I believe the description of glutamate, reacting in a synapse, is a description of redness.
It's just that a description of redness/glutamate doesn't tell you what it is like.

But this is the explanatory gap. 

If you believe a complete understanding of the physics of seeing redness would still not tell you “what it is like” to see redness then you are agreeing that Mary the neuroscientist learns something new about color when she steps outside of the black and white room.

Yes.

There are two types of "complete understanding"
  1. Abstract understanding
    1. words: red and green.
    2. Not like anything, substrate independent.
  2. Phenomenal understanding
    1. physical qualities: redness and greenness.
    2. like something.

The two are isomorphically equivalent, and if you know what 'Gordon's redness' is like (have a dictionary), telling you I use that to represent green things tells you something that is like something or something new or effes the ineffable nature of my greenness to you.

I have an idea, Brent. I agree with my app’s assessment that your philosophy is something like reductive physicism, which is closely related to brain-mind identity theory that we once discussed here. I have added identity theory to my app as distinct from reductive phyisicalism, but here is my idea:

Write six statements unique to your theory that can be answered agree/unsure/disagree. I will add your philosophy with those six statements to identify it. We’ll just call it Brent’s philosophy for now. It won't appear in the official list, but it will come up as a result if you or someone else answers questions in ways that point to it.

So, please, give me six unique statements that you believe set your own philosophy apart from the others!

-gts






 
In any case, I hope you will run the assessment again. I have made dozens of improvements just today. 

This version 1.5 should give you an opportunity to email a transcript to yourself.


Wow, every time I take this I learn so much about the way I think about all this (affects future answers of mine to the same questions).  Thanks for all your work on this.

Unfortunately I got this for one of the questions:

image.png


 

-gts


You need a type of neuron that can subjectively bind such qualities, which enables one to directly apprehend the quality with other qualities.
There are two ways to gain knowledge of the world: 1. Perception (gives you descriptions) and 2. direct apprehension.








 


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAK7-onuV2d%2BXY%3DVTdWJ4DO-_irkoOckt29-emMtskVXEMdby9A%40mail.gmail.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNPn5ngbCWQYFdyiUONNp0xwhxZ8QeFFbniCDsXJXzOCwYA%40mail.gmail.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.

Brent Allsop

unread,
Aug 9, 2025, 3:38:14 PMAug 9
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com

OK, great, cool
I've already been getting started on some additions to the question, to cover this theory.
It'll take some more work, and I'm on that...

Thanks.  This is fun.

It's fun to watch your 'vibe coding" also.
I'm looking forward to converting canonizer to 'vibe coding'.





To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNPkL-LVV81X9TLLJ4S8437Suy2KKfKaP%2BrJQnaKH%2BEGD4w%40mail.gmail.com.

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 10, 2025, 1:21:07 AMAug 10
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Sat, Aug 9, 2025 at 1:38 PM Brent Allsop <brent....@gmail.com> wrote:

OK, great, cool
I've already been getting started on some additions to the question, to cover this theory.
It'll take some more work, and I'm on that...

Thanks.  This is fun.

It's fun to watch your 'vibe coding" also.
I'm looking forward to converting canonizer to 'vibe coding'.


Would you like an app like this on your site to help people know to which camp they belong? I would be happy to help. (For free, of course!)

-gta

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 10, 2025, 3:19:24 PMAug 10
to The Important Questions


On Fri, Aug 8, 2025, 10:24 AM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:

The first question you encounter in the assessment is designed to quickly gauge your foundational perspective on the mind. It's a "gate question" that asks:

"Which of these comes closest to your own view about the mind?"

The answers you can choose from, and what they imply, are:

  • A: "My conscious experience has qualities that cannot be captured or explained by the language of physics."

    • Implication: This choice suggests a leaning towards Dualism or views where the mind has non-physical aspects not reducible to purely physical explanations. It implies there's something more to consciousness than just brain matter.

I have some problems with this question, as it seems to imply a reductionist form of physics. A better phrasing in my view would be to ask whether everything about the the brain and it's behavior can ultimately be described in terms of natural laws.

As I see it, mechanism is a broader category than physicalism, and this question sets the demarcation between theories of consciousness that are ultimately comprehensible and those that relegate consciousness to supernatural/incomprehensible causes (dualism, idealism). 

For example, while I believe everything about what the brain does can be explained in terms of natural law, I would not go so far as to say yes to your question, because I don't think high level brain states can really be described in the language of physics.

For example, think about your favorite phone app. Can everything about it be explained in terms of physics? It might at first seem so, but then consider that the very same app can run on a different phone with different physical hardware. The particular physical state in a way becomes irrelevant, what matters is the high level computational state, which can be instantiated in any of a myriad of possible physical ways. If you wanted to give a physical description of all possible instances of this app you couldn't. The language of physics is inadequate for that task. But you could give a description of the computational state(s) that define this app.

The same, I thinks true for states of consciousness.

  • B: "Everything about my mind, including consciousness, can ultimately be captured and explained by the language of physics."

    • Implication: This points strongly towards Physicalism/Materialism, the view that the mind is entirely a product of the physical brain and can be fully understood through neuroscience and physics.

  • C: "What the mind does is more important than what it's made of. A mind's processes could run on a brain, a computer, or something else."

    • Implication: This aligns with Functionalism, which defines mental states by their function or role rather than their physical composition. It suggests that consciousness is about information processing, regardless of the "hardware."

  • D: "The physical world is just an appearance or a product of consciousness. Reality is fundamentally mental."

    • Implication: This option leads towards Idealism, where reality is considered primarily mental or spiritual, and the physical world depends on consciousness.

  • E: "Mind and matter aren't truly separate. They are two sides of the same single, underlying reality."

    • Implication: This indicates Neutral Monism, a position that suggests there is one underlying substance that is neither purely mental nor purely physical, but can be seen as both.

One issue with this question is that both idealism and physicalism are monisms. I think this question requires more specific language to tease out whether one is a monist or a neutral monist. The imports point is that a
 neutral monist believes in a more fundamental reality than physics, and a more fundamental reality than one of pure consciousness. The neutral monist further believes that both mind and matter can be explained as derivative of this more fundamental reality.

Jason 


Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 10, 2025, 3:21:20 PMAug 10
to The Important Questions
We're in a brave new world!

Jason 

To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNP%3D3B11qYEng_9ZZF28EY4VKYg%2Bpka5cE0vuiY3nm7wZXg%40mail.gmail.com.

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 10, 2025, 3:22:48 PMAug 10
to The Important Questions


On Fri, Aug 8, 2025, 1:11 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
Does this take you to the functionalist camp, Jason? If not then I have more work to do.


-gts


The second version, I believe 1.2, which I tried. Did put me down as a functionalist. I haven't tried the app to the completion since that version.

Shall I give it another try?

Jason 


Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 10, 2025, 3:49:19 PMAug 10
to The Important Questions
I am trying the latest, 2.1 I think.

It is much better. I have no issue with any of the language for the first set of categories.

I also very much like the change from "unsure" to "none of these align with my view"

One bug I encountered: after finishing the initial assessment it said -7% complete.

I thought the questions were getting repetitive around 40% and was about to give up but then it pinned me as a computational functionalist at 95%.

This site just keeps improving! Let me know when it's ready to share more widely and I'll send it to some people.

Jason 

-gts




To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-questions+unsub...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-questions+unsub...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-questions+unsub...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-questions+unsub...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-questions+unsub...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNPnW2pWcaFcLcTGGh5iZAeXU1jWCq6cUP7bZH3ijHAxJNA%40mail.gmail.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-questions+unsub...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-questions+unsub...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNPn7g%2BZ%3D%3DM%3DY75w78hHg_HjrXe8NjqRg%2B5J7qUJU1DMS5Q%40mail.gmail.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-questions+unsub...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-questions+unsub...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNP%3DBmvQ0n61wfQHwUBaXgjX%2BTw5q--u4H_X6tWFAOAS0OA%40mail.gmail.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-questions+unsub...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-questions+unsub...@googlegroups.com.

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 10, 2025, 4:19:25 PMAug 10
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Sun, Aug 10, 2025 at 1:19 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:


On Fri, Aug 8, 2025, 10:24 AM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:

The first question you encounter in the assessment is designed to quickly gauge your foundational perspective on the mind. It's a "gate question" that asks:

"Which of these comes closest to your own view about the mind?"

The answers you can choose from, and what they imply, are:

  • A: "My conscious experience has qualities that cannot be captured or explained by the language of physics."

    • Implication: This choice suggests a leaning towards Dualism or views where the mind has non-physical aspects not reducible to purely physical explanations. It implies there's something more to consciousness than just brain matter.

I have some problems with this question, as it seems to imply a reductionist form of physics.

The five choices to this multiple choice question were designed by my AI agent to be as informative as possible in deciding between 25 philosophies in 10 categories, but I have fine-tuned them a bit. See my most recent version:


Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 10, 2025, 5:06:50 PMAug 10
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Sun, Aug 10, 2025 at 1:49 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
I am trying the latest, 2.1 I think.

It is much better. I have no issue with any of the language for the first set of categories.

I also very much like the change from "unsure" to "none of these align with my view"

One bug I encountered: after finishing the initial assessment it said -7% complete.

Thanks for telling me.


I thought the questions were getting repetitive around 40% and was about to give up but then it pinned me as a computational functionalist at 95%.

Perfect! These 2.0+ versions should be far more robust than the 1.0+ versions. I discovered that my AI agent had decided to keep a closed, fixed knowledge base in JavaScript such that it could see only three key points to each category or philosophy. I expanded it to six key points and instructed it to make calls to the LLM to enhance its understanding where necessary (“understanding” I mean. Ha).


This site just keeps improving! Let me know when it's ready to share more widely and I'll send it to some people.

Okay. I’m hoping to embed it at Brent’s site, if he likes the idea.

-gts



Jason 

-gts




To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNPnW2pWcaFcLcTGGh5iZAeXU1jWCq6cUP7bZH3ijHAxJNA%40mail.gmail.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNPn7g%2BZ%3D%3DM%3DY75w78hHg_HjrXe8NjqRg%2B5J7qUJU1DMS5Q%40mail.gmail.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNP%3DBmvQ0n61wfQHwUBaXgjX%2BTw5q--u4H_X6tWFAOAS0OA%40mail.gmail.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CA%2BBCJUjvc_s048s5KTHQnSNPMxiLxTBF26FEWS0-iwsSYuc8sA%40mail.gmail.com.

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 10, 2025, 5:52:53 PMAug 10
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
Just FYI: I think we all understand the difficulty of categorizing the many different philosophies of mind. I thought this would present a problem until I realized that I am not designing my app for that purpose. The purpose of my app is to help the user identify a specific philosophy most consistent with their intuitions. 

So, some of the philosophies appear in multiple categories. You can get to
Computational Functionalism via the Functionalism category, but a physicalist might also find himself pegged as a functionalist. There is more than one way to skin a cat!

-gts

Brent Allsop

unread,
Aug 10, 2025, 6:42:31 PMAug 10
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com

Yes, I noticed it kept trying to peg me, a physicalist, as a functionalist.
But in the end I prevailed. ;)

Yes, I would like to try to find a way to integrate this with Canonizer.
My cousin had a survey tool, and he helped me build an "Are you Qualia Blind?" socratic survey with his tool
We ended up just copying the questions into Canonizer camps, so we could track the camps people were in

It looks like your assessment tool doesn't keep track of results?
It'd sure be nice to be able to track people's results, and possible changes over time, as is possible in Canonizer.

With canonizer, people are afraid to express their POV (most people humbly think they are not an expert).  But that is not the purpose, we want to track what people currently believe.  Your assessment tool works great for this, as it is clearly the goal.








Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 10, 2025, 8:38:23 PMAug 10
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Sun, Aug 10, 2025 at 4:42 PM Brent Allsop <brent....@gmail.com> wrote:

Yes, I noticed it kept trying to peg me, a physicalist, as a functionalist.
But in the end I prevailed. ;)

Yes, I would like to try to find a way to integrate this with Canonizer.

Great!


It looks like your assessment tool doesn't keep track of results?

The latest versions should give you an opportunity to send a transcript to yourself. I might do more in this area.


With canonizer, people are afraid to express their POV (most people humbly think they are not an expert).  But that is not the purpose, we want to track what people currently believe.  Your assessment tool works great for this, as it is clearly the goal.

Yes, and it is designed for non-philosophers. No philosophical jargon appears in the questions, but there is some in the analyses for educational purposes.

-gts


Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 18, 2025, 11:11:52 AMAug 18
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
Now on version 2.13. 


Brent, can you give me those six statements that you consider true and that you think might distinguish your view from any known philosophy of mind? 

I have a hunch we will discover that your ideas are already known to the philosophical community and that it is only your non-standard vocabulary that seems to set it apart. We now have the tools to know.

-gts

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 18, 2025, 12:20:18 PMAug 18
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
I tried to login via gmail single sign on, and received this error:

{"error_type":"HTTPException","message":"User is not verified","detail":"User is not verified","traceback":""}

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNPngZ7WfxrM50tyMTfj9ijhxBZiNUXQ_2cv-akw9p7tTkQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 18, 2025, 12:38:34 PMAug 18
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Mon, Aug 18, 2025 at 10:20 AM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
I tried to login via gmail single sign on, and received this error:

{"error_type":"HTTPException","message":"User is not verified","detail":"User is not verified","traceback":""}

Thanks. It thinks you did not click on the link in the verification email that you might not have received. I just tried to send you another one. 

Does this link work?


On Mon, Aug 18, 2025 at 11:11 AM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
Now on version 2.13. 


Brent, can you give me those six statements that you consider true and that you think might distinguish your view from any known philosophy of mind? 

I have a hunch we will discover that your ideas are already known to the philosophical community and that it is only your non-standard vocabulary that seems to set it apart. We now have the tools to know.

-gts

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNPngZ7WfxrM50tyMTfj9ijhxBZiNUXQ_2cv-akw9p7tTkQ%40mail.gmail.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 18, 2025, 12:53:07 PMAug 18
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Mon, Aug 18, 2025 at 12:38 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:


On Mon, Aug 18, 2025 at 10:20 AM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
I tried to login via gmail single sign on, and received this error:

{"error_type":"HTTPException","message":"User is not verified","detail":"User is not verified","traceback":""}

Thanks. It thinks you did not click on the link in the verification email that you might not have received. I just tried to send you another one. 

I never received such a verification e-mail.

There should be a bypass in-place, I think, for single-sign on services. Google is authenticating my login, so an e-mail verification shouldn't be necessary.
Same error.
 

-gts


On Mon, Aug 18, 2025 at 11:11 AM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
Now on version 2.13. 


Brent, can you give me those six statements that you consider true and that you think might distinguish your view from any known philosophy of mind? 

I have a hunch we will discover that your ideas are already known to the philosophical community and that it is only your non-standard vocabulary that seems to set it apart. We now have the tools to know.

-gts

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNPngZ7WfxrM50tyMTfj9ijhxBZiNUXQ_2cv-akw9p7tTkQ%40mail.gmail.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CA%2BBCJUh9Y282DJb6pDD8wLNeG0T5c8bnG0MejQ%2B-avYPgkYFig%40mail.gmail.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 18, 2025, 1:06:23 PMAug 18
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Mon, Aug 18, 2025 at 12:38 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:


On Mon, Aug 18, 2025 at 10:20 AM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
I tried to login via gmail single sign on, and received this error:

{"error_type":"HTTPException","message":"User is not verified","detail":"User is not verified","traceback":""}

Thanks. It thinks you did not click on the link in the verification email that you might not have received. I just tried to send you another one. 

Does this link work?


Oh I think I know the problem. I originally tried to register long ago. But due to having opened the link from my e-mail, when I went to go back to the e-mail I lost the page to enter the code. This put my account in a weird state where I was never able to verify it. I then registered again by inserting a period in the middle of my e-mail address. Since my original login attempt put my e-mail in limbo, I think that is why I am not able to login via the google single sign on. Otherwise, I bet it would have worked.

I am not receiving any login code e-mails, and I have checked my spam folder as well. Perhaps you can delete that account and I can try again (I never was able to login with it).

Jason
 

-gts


On Mon, Aug 18, 2025 at 11:11 AM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
Now on version 2.13. 


Brent, can you give me those six statements that you consider true and that you think might distinguish your view from any known philosophy of mind? 

I have a hunch we will discover that your ideas are already known to the philosophical community and that it is only your non-standard vocabulary that seems to set it apart. We now have the tools to know.

-gts

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNPngZ7WfxrM50tyMTfj9ijhxBZiNUXQ_2cv-akw9p7tTkQ%40mail.gmail.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CA%2BBCJUh9Y282DJb6pDD8wLNeG0T5c8bnG0MejQ%2B-avYPgkYFig%40mail.gmail.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 18, 2025, 1:13:44 PMAug 18
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
I’m not sure that is happening there, but it is not a bug in the app itself. I have removed the login requirement for now. You should be able to go straight to the app.

-gts


Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 18, 2025, 1:19:34 PMAug 18
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
I think that may have broken something else. I get the following error when I click "Start Assessment":

Analysis Error
Failed to start a new assessment. Please check your network connection.

To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNPkAoQ7W%3D%3DoFOEw2iuEcKDo-SpHJDTbcu%2B0kSowm3Ygd5g%40mail.gmail.com.

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 18, 2025, 1:41:26 PMAug 18
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Mon, Aug 18, 2025 at 11:19 AM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
I think that may have broken something else. I get the following error when I click "Start Assessment":

Analysis Error
Failed to start a new assessment. Please check your network connection.


It works fine for me. Please close your browser and open it and try this link again, and if that doesn’t work, try a different browser. Thanks.


This is the welcome page:



-gts



Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 18, 2025, 1:51:58 PMAug 18
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
I opened a new incognito tab in Chrome. When I click "start your journey" I get the following:

error-screenshot.png

To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNP%3DbRPUtOi2z6HyRrqiWBR%3DRR%2BY2b21P78rTEZ%2B4b84bEg%40mail.gmail.com.

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 18, 2025, 1:59:41 PMAug 18
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
Please try again. I think it was the security policy that I had in place, separate from the login.

Brent Allsop

unread,
Aug 18, 2025, 6:22:22 PMAug 18
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com

Hi Gordon,
Sounds like a plan.
Thanks for working on this.

I'm brainstorming possible statements.
Here is what I have so far:


1.      I define consciousness to be composed of qualia.

a.      I think most people would agree with this.

 

2.      There are elemental qualia like redness and greenness which can be subjectively bound into composite qualia.

a.      Our normal experience of redness is a composite experience that includes elemental redness, and other memories and qualities.

b.      Subjective experience is a subjective binding of myriads of elemental qualia into one unified gestalt subjective experience.

 

3.      Something in the brain is behaving the way it does because of its quality.

a.      Which of all our descriptions of stuff in the brain is a description of redness?

 

4.      There are two ways to get information about reality:

a.      Perception

                                                              i.      Abstract

                                                             ii.      Done from a far through chains of cause and effect.

                                                           iii.      Substrate Independent

                                                           iv.      Requires a dictionary to know what representation means

b.      Direct apprehension.

                                                              i.      Non abstract quale

                                                             ii.      Directly apprehended via subjective binding

                                                           iii.      Substrate or Quality dependent

                                                           iv.      No dictionary required, a quality is just a physical fact.

 

5.      In some way the neurons subjectively bind qualities in our brain.

a.      We can objectively observe qualities and their binding, we just can’t know what the qualities are without a grounded in subjective experience dictionary.

b.      An example is glutamate behaving the way it does in a synapse, because of its redness quality.  In other words, our description of glutamate reacting in a synapse is a description of redness.  We just don’t know or a blind to this because of our lack of knowledge about the true color qualities of things.

c.      The neurons are able to bind this quality in with the rest of our subjective experience, enabling us to say:  “Oh THAT is what glutamatenes which equals redness is like.”

 

6.      Whatever it is in our brain which has our elemental redness quality, will have the same elemental quality in any brain.

a.      Composite redness qualia will be different in different brains because of different memories.

 

7.      We will eventually be able to demonstrate the true color qualities of things, giving us our required dictionary.

a.      If you can demonstrate that glutamate=redness and glycine = greenness, and if you see someone who is inverted from this (i.e. glycine = their redness and glutamate = their greenness) then the resulting dictionary will enable them to make well defined statements like:

                                                              i.      My redness/glutamateness is like your greenness/glyceneness, both of which we call red(650 nm light)

 

(Note: You can substitute glutamate for anything else in the brain that is a theoretical candidate for redness)





--

Brent Allsop

unread,
Aug 18, 2025, 6:28:43 PMAug 18
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com

Oh, here is another:

1.      We are not panpsychists, who believe consciousness is fundamental and everything is at least “proto conscious”.

a.      But we do believe that qualities are fundamental, and that some things behave the way they do because of their qualities.

b.      Subjective experience or composite qualia emerge from subjectively bound qualia.




Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 18, 2025, 11:20:35 PMAug 18
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
Thank you, Brent! I will call it Brentism and add it to the app as a unique philosophy of mind under physicalism. It won’t appear in the official list, but it will be there as a possible result. No promises that it will be included permanently, but this could get interesting!

-gts



On Mon, Aug 18, 2025 at 4:22 PM Brent Allsop <brent....@gmail.com> wrote:

Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 19, 2025, 7:08:09 AMAug 19
to The Important Questions


On Mon, Aug 18, 2025, 11:20 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
Thank you, Brent! I will call it Brentism and add it to the app as a unique philosophy of mind under physicalism.

I think "Intrinsicism" / "physical intrinsicist," may be a better name. As this (Brent's) position is already described in the literature. For example in: https://philarchive.org/archive/ZUBTAA

"Here is the difference between my view, functionalism, and a physicalist’s intrinsicism: The functionalist thinks that playing its causal role is all that gives that bit of neural activity its mental character, including its phenomenal nature, whereas the intrinsicist thinks that properties intrinsic to that bit of neural activity, which could be chemical or even biological, must be essential to the subject’s experiencing of the phenomenal qualities of the object. So, for the physical intrinsicist, the phenomenal property in the subject -- that which is essential to the subject’s experiencing of the phenomenal property in the object -- is some such intrinsic physical property in the relevant bit of processing."

When I shared this on this list previously, Brent replied: "Oh yeah!  I'm an intrinsicist!"

Jason 


Jason Resch

unread,
Aug 19, 2025, 7:26:16 AMAug 19
to The Important Questions


On Tue, Aug 19, 2025, 7:07 AM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:


On Mon, Aug 18, 2025, 11:20 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
Thank you, Brent! I will call it Brentism and add it to the app as a unique philosophy of mind under physicalism.

I think "Intrinsicism" / "physical intrinsicist," may be a better name. As this (Brent's) position is already described in the literature. For example in: https://philarchive.org/archive/ZUBTAA

"Here is the difference between my view, functionalism, and a physicalist’s intrinsicism: The functionalist thinks that playing its causal role is all that gives that bit of neural activity its mental character, including its phenomenal nature, whereas the intrinsicist thinks that properties intrinsic to that bit of neural activity, which could be chemical or even biological, must be essential to the subject’s experiencing of the phenomenal qualities of the object. So, for the physical intrinsicist, the phenomenal property in the subject -- that which is essential to the subject’s experiencing of the phenomenal property in the object -- is some such intrinsic physical property in the relevant bit of processing."

When I shared this on this list previously, Brent replied: "Oh yeah!  I'm an intrinsicist!"


I would note the following observation:

- Biological naturalists believe consciousness properties are intrinsic to biological neurons.

- Brent's believes consciousness properties are intrinsic to certain molecules.

- Panpsychists believe consciousness properties are intrinsic to fundamental particles.


All these are forms Physical Intrinsicism, but the difference comes down to, at what level of organization do the consciousness properties enter the picture.

You could even frame functionalism in this picture, only it would say the consciousness properties enter at a higher level than biological naturalism (at the level of the functional processing performed by groups of neurons).

I've raised this with Brent in the past, pointing out that the difference between his view and mine comes down to the level of organization we happen to think is relevant. I mentioned everything from whole brains down to quantum fields, and asked why he chose the chemical/molecular level and not anything below. Afterall, molecules are themselves higher level structures of quarks and electrons. So if unique qualitative states can be formed as higher level organizations of lower level components, why stop at the molecules? Why couldn't a still higher level organizations with a unique qualitative state, be formed as an even greater organization of quarks and electrons?

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 19, 2025, 12:03:52 PMAug 19
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
Grok nailed it:

“The philosophy described is known as Representational Qualia Theory, which was named and proposed by Brent Allsop in his 2010 paper of the same title.” 

-Grok




Brent Allsop

unread,
Aug 19, 2025, 12:52:52 PMAug 19
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com

"Representational Qualia Theory" is just a high level theory with a significant amount of consensus.  It is just the general idea that redness is not a quality of the strawberry, it is a quality of our knowledge of the strawberry.  It is one step below the even higher level consensus doctrine that consciousness is approachable via science.

The lack of consensus centers around the nature of qualia.  Are they functional, material, quantum, non-physical....  And I do think "physical intrinsicist" is a good name for my current working hypothesis about the nature of qualia, and I agree that I wasn't the first or only person to describe this.

And Jason is good to point out that we agree on most everything, except the physical level of organization where qualia exist (or the highest level possible to fully capture everything important), and whether qualities are prior to, or posterior to causes.  i.e. for intnrinsicists glutamate behaves the way it does because of its redness quality whereas functionalists predict it has a redness quality, because of its behaviors (if you can find something else that behaves identical to glutamate?).

And ultimately, all these are just theoretical predictions about the way nature behaves.  It is up to the experimentalists to demonstrate which theory is "THE ONE".  And to me, all the argumentation about the nature of qualia is a speculative waste of time (as it is up to the experimentalist to answer this question, not us theoreticians).  Our job is to teach the experimentalist to observe the brain in a non qualia blind way (there are two ways to gain physical knowledge), so they can discover which of all our descriptions of stuff in the brain is a description of redness.  That is the only thing of importance in this theoretical work we are doing.  Why do we waste all our time on everything but that?




























To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNPnKpu5M95dv70kQucLnp%3DvSD7rr0%2BTtCmrVcBRE6fkWAA%40mail.gmail.com.

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 19, 2025, 1:22:34 PMAug 19
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Tue, Aug 19, 2025 at 10:52 AM Brent Allsop <brent....@gmail.com> wrote:

Our job is to teach the experimentalist to observe the brain in a non qualia blind way (there are two ways to gain physical knowledge),

Emphasis mine. This is what I have also been saying, and I’m trying to show you some language that will find some traction with our fellow physicalists.

Those two ways of knowing can be called holding knowledge as 1) phenomenal concepts, and as 2) propositional concepts. You already use similar terms.

Why do we waste all our time on everything but that?

It is because people believe in such a thing as a “hard problem of consciousness.” Chalmers and his friends do not believe a complete description in the language of physics is possible. They do not accept that consciousness simply supervenes on the physical and that there is nothing more to the story.

-gts

Brent Allsop

unread,
Aug 19, 2025, 4:50:06 PMAug 19
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
Hi Gordon,

On Tue, Aug 19, 2025 at 11:22 AM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tue, Aug 19, 2025 at 10:52 AM Brent Allsop <brent....@gmail.com> wrote:

Our job is to teach the experimentalist to observe the brain in a non qualia blind way (there are two ways to gain physical knowledge),

Emphasis mine. This is what I have also been saying, and I’m trying to show you some language that will find some traction with our fellow physicalists.

Sounds great.  I much appreciate the help.
 
Those two ways of knowing can be called holding knowledge as 1) phenomenal concepts, and as 2) propositional concepts. You already use similar terms.

Why do we waste all our time on everything but that?

It is because people believe in such a thing as a “hard problem of consciousness.” Chalmers and his friends do not believe a complete description in the language of physics is possible. They do not accept that consciousness simply supervenes on the physical and that there is nothing more to the story.

Yes, all this BS stuff hides in the gaps of our knowledge.  Once we find out which of all our descriptions of stuff in the brain is a description of redness, this will finally close the final gap in our knowledge, and falsify all the BS theories.

Oh, and I don't like the term "supervenes" as that implies that qualia are something different than the physics they "supervene" on.  Qualia simply have causal properties, which we can objectively observe, it is just that a description of that behavior doesn't tell one what it is like, without a dictionary grounded in direct apprehension.










 

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 19, 2025, 5:41:30 PMAug 19
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Tue, Aug 19, 2025 at 2:50 PM Brent Allsop <brent....@gmail.com> wrote:

Yes, all this BS stuff hides in the gaps of our knowledge. 

Which is to say the problem is merely epistemological.

-gts




Once we find out which of all our descriptions of stuff in the brain is a description of redness, this will finally close the final gap in our knowledge, and falsify all the BS theories.

Oh, and I don't like the term "supervenes" as that implies that qualia are something different than the physics they "supervene" on.  Qualia simply have causal properties, which we can objectively observe, it is just that a description of that behavior doesn't tell one what it is like, without a dictionary grounded in direct apprehension.










 

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 19, 2025, 7:40:05 PMAug 19
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
Philosophy of Mind Assessment
https://app--mind-scape-8b050842.base44.app/

Version 2.14 includes your philosophy as a possible result, Brent. This is the AI's assessment of it based on your notes so far:
---
This is a fascinating and well-articulated philosophical position. It weaves together threads from several different schools of thought into a unique and coherent whole. I will analyze it, name it, and integrate it into the assessment as a potential result.

Analysis and Naming
This philosophy has several key characteristics:

Physicalist Core: It asserts that qualia are "just a physical fact" and that a "dictionary" can be created to map them to physical substances. This aligns it with Physicalism.

Panpsychist Elements: It posits that elemental things, like neurotransmitters (glutamate), possess intrinsic qualities like "redness." This is a core idea of Panpsychism.

Identity Theory Strain: The claim that our description of glutamate's behavior is a description of redness is a form of Identity Theory (Mental State Type = Physical State Type).

Emergentist Mechanism: The concept of the brain "subjectively binding" myriads of elemental qualia into a unified gestalt experience is a form of Emergentism.

Given this blend, a fitting name would be "Qualitative Physicalism." It captures the central, unique idea: that the quality of a thing is a fundamental and causally effective part of its physical nature.

Categorization
Based on the analysis, this philosophy fits into the following categories:

Physicalism/Materialism
Panpsychism
Emergentism


Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 19, 2025, 8:18:53 PMAug 19
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
Ah, Brent, I didn't see your other note about not-panpsychism. I will add it.

-gts

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 30, 2025, 12:15:47 PMAug 30
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
Brent, this is how my AI agent wants to characterize your philosophy for purposes of my app.

Comments? We can correct it.

Core Description

Qualitative Physicalism is a physicalist theory which posits that the mind is a physical process, but one where the intrinsic qualities of matter (like 'redness') are real, fundamental physical properties that directly cause the behavior of things like neurons. Subjective consciousness is not a fundamental property of matter itself, but rather emerges when the brain's complex neural processes "bind" these myriad elemental qualities into a single, unified experience.

Key Tenets & Detailed Explanation

  1. Consciousness is an Emergent Property Composed of Qualia. The theory begins with the premise that our subjective experience—what we call consciousness—is composed of "qualia" (the "what-it's-likeness" of an experience). However, this rich, unified consciousness is not a basic feature of the universe. It is a higher-level property that emerges when the brain subjectively binds together countless myriads of more basic, "elemental" qualia.

  2. Qualities are Fundamental, Not Consciousness. This is the theory's central distinction and its primary departure from panpsychism. It does not claim that consciousness is fundamental. Instead, it asserts that specific, objective qualities (like elemental redness, bitterness, etc.) are a fundamental and irreducible property of physical matter. An electron isn't conscious, but it may possess a fundamental quality that is a building block of consciousness.

  3. Qualities are Causally Effective. These intrinsic qualities are not inert, decorative features of matter; they are causally potent. A substance (like a neurotransmitter) behaves the way it does in part because of its inherent quality. This offers a potential solution to the mind-body problem by suggesting that mental properties (qualia) are not separate from physical properties but are an inextricable and active part of them.

  4. Physical Descriptions are (Unrecognized) Descriptions of Qualia. The theory makes the strong claim that our current scientific descriptions of physical processes in the brain are, in fact, descriptions of qualia—we just don't recognize them as such yet. For example, the complete physical and chemical description of how glutamate behaves in a synapse is the complete physical description of the quale of elemental redness. We have the physical side of the equation, but we are "blind" to its qualitative identity.

  5. Elemental Qualia are Objective and Universal. The elemental quality of "redness" associated with a specific substance is an objective, universal fact. That substance will possess the exact same elemental quality in any brain, anywhere in the universe. This provides a foundation for an objective science of consciousness, as the building blocks are consistent. The composite experience of "red," however, will differ between individuals because each person's brain binds that elemental quality with a unique set of memories, emotions, and other associated qualia.

  6. A Future Science Can Create a "Dictionary of Qualia." The theory is optimistic about the future of science. It predicts that we will eventually be able to create a definitive "dictionary" that maps specific physical substances to their intrinsic elemental qualia (e.g., Substance X = elemental redness, Substance Y = elemental greenness). Such a dictionary would bridge the "explanatory gap" between the physical and mental worlds, allowing us to understand exactly how the physical processes of the brain give rise to the rich tapestry of subjective experience.

Brent Allsop

unread,
Aug 30, 2025, 1:08:51 PMAug 30
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com

Hi Gordon,

Wow, this is all great!  Thanks!  The only minor recommendation I could suggest is that #6 makes the problem sound more difficult than it really is by saying "A future science".  We already have all the science we need, we just need to think about it in the right way (distinguish reality from knowledge of reality)

We currently think about color qualities in the right way, it’s just the wrong set of physics.   We currently think that the strawberry reflects red light, because of its redness quality.  But, in reality, it is the knowledge of the strawberry, maybe something like a neurotransmitter, that is behaving the way it is because of its redness quality.  All we need to do is demonstrate the true color qualities of things to the right set of physics (our knowledge), instead of the wrong set of physics (the stuff beyond our senses).







--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "The Important Questions" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to the-important-que...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNPniBSq29DXfR9z1GRQuME6mGN-exZzsHjeeYhWCntp0pw%40mail.gmail.com.

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Aug 30, 2025, 2:39:12 PMAug 30
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Sat, Aug 30, 2025 at 11:08 AM Brent Allsop <brent....@gmail.com> wrote:

Hi Gordon,

Wow, this is all great!  Thanks! 

My pleasure. 

The only minor recommendation I could suggest is that #6 makes the problem sound more difficult than it really is by saying "A future science".  We already have all the science we need, we just need to think about it in the right way (distinguish reality from knowledge of reality)


I will add a note that in this philosophy, we already have the necessary science. 

My agent wants to call it “qualitative physicalism,” but we can change it to whatever you think is best. 

-gts

Brent Allsop

unread,
Aug 31, 2025, 10:10:18 PMAug 31
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com

I think Qualitative physicalism is a great name.
In fact, I'd like to change the name of our "Qualia are Physical Qualities" camp to "Qualitative Physicalism" and incorporate all this into the camp statement.

Will this information be available anywhere (a url maybe?) so I can reference it as the source?






To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAJvaNPnkA7q77spPCTycU2xv-H5g-PuNtkp_jN3Tq8%3D_BOrL1w%40mail.gmail.com.

Gordon Swobe

unread,
Sep 1, 2025, 7:16:35 PMSep 1
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Sun, Aug 31, 2025 at 8:10 PM Brent Allsop <brent....@gmail.com> wrote:

I think Qualitative physicalism is a great name.
In fact, I'd like to change the name of our "Qualia are Physical Qualities" camp to "Qualitative Physicalism" and incorporate all this into the camp statement.

Will this information be available anywhere (a url maybe?) so I can reference it as the source?

Great, I also like Qualitative Physicalism for your views. I’m not yet sure where this will appear. How does it look to you?

Qualitative Physicalism (Revised Definition)

Category: Physicalism/Materialism, Emergentism

Core Description

Qualitative Physicalism is a physicalist theory which posits that the mind is a physical process, but one where the intrinsic qualities of matter (like 'redness') are real, fundamental physical properties that directly cause the behavior of things like neurons. Subjective consciousness is not a fundamental property of matter itself, but rather emerges when the brain's complex neural processes "bind" these myriad elemental qualities into a single, unified experience. This philosophy asserts that the necessary science to understand this is already available; what is missing is the correct interpretation and the "grounding" of our objective scientific knowledge in first-person subjective experience.

Key Tenets & Detailed Explanation

  1. Consciousness is an Emergent Property Composed of Qualia. The theory begins with the premise that our subjective experience—what we call consciousness—is composed of "qualia" (the "what-it's-likeness" of an experience). However, this rich, unified consciousness is not a basic feature of the universe. It is a higher-level property that emerges when the brain subjectively binds together countless myriads of more basic, "elemental" qualia.

  2. Qualities are Fundamental, Not Consciousness. This is the theory's central distinction and its primary departure from panpsychism. It does not claim that consciousness is fundamental. Instead, it asserts that specific, objective qualities (like elemental redness, bitterness, etc.) are a fundamental and irreducible property of physical matter. An electron isn't conscious, but it may possess a fundamental quality that is a building block of consciousness.

  3. Qualities are Causally Effective. These intrinsic qualities are not inert, decorative features of matter; they are causally potent. A substance (like a neurotransmitter) behaves the way it does in part because of its inherent quality. This offers a potential solution to the mind-body problem by suggesting that mental properties (qualia) are not separate from physical properties but are an inextricable and active part of them.

  1. Existing Science Already Describes Qualia, Unrecognized. The theory makes the strong claim that our current scientific descriptions of physical processes in the brain are, in fact, descriptions of qualia—we just fail to recognize them as such. For example, the complete physical and chemical description of how glutamate behaves in a synapse is the complete physical description of the quale of elemental redness. The problem isn't a lack of scientific data, but a blindness to the true nature of what we are already observing.

  1. Elemental Qualia are Objective and Universal. The elemental quality of "redness" associated with a specific substance is an objective, universal fact. That substance will possess the exact same elemental quality in any brain, anywhere in the universe. This provides a foundation for an objective science of consciousness, as the building blocks are consistent. The composite experience of "red," however, will differ between individuals because each person's brain binds that elemental quality with a unique set of memories, emotions, and other associated qualia.

  1. The "Dictionary of Qualia" is Latent within Current Science. This theory rejects the idea that new scientific discoveries are needed to bridge the mind-body gap. The "dictionary" that maps physical substances to their intrinsic qualities is not something to be created by a future science, but something to be unlockedfrom our existing knowledge. The missing piece is the "grounding" provided by direct, first-person experience. Once we can definitively say, "Ah, this specific subjective feeling is what the complete scientific description of Substance X corresponds to," we can begin to decipher the entire dictionary that is already implicit in the physics and chemistry we know. The challenge is one of interpretation and grounding, not of discovery.


Brent Allsop

unread,
Sep 2, 2025, 12:03:16 PMSep 2
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com

Here are some minor possible changes.   You could probably improve the terminology I'm using.



On Mon, Sep 1, 2025 at 5:16 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Sun, Aug 31, 2025 at 8:10 PM Brent Allsop <brent....@gmail.com> wrote:

I think Qualitative physicalism is a great name.
In fact, I'd like to change the name of our "Qualia are Physical Qualities" camp to "Qualitative Physicalism" and incorporate all this into the camp statement.

Will this information be available anywhere (a url maybe?) so I can reference it as the source?

Great, I also like Qualitative Physicalism for your views. I’m not yet sure where this will appear. How does it look to you?

Qualitative Physicalism (Revised Definition)

Category: Physicalism/Materialism, Emergentism

Core Description

Qualitative Physicalism is a physicalist theory which posits that the mind is a physical process, but one where the intrinsic qualities of matter (like 'redness') are real, fundamental physical properties that directly cause the behavior of things like neurons. Subjective consciousness is not a fundamental property of matter itself, but rather emerges when the brain's complex neural processes "bind" these myriad elemental qualities into a single, unified experience. This philosophy asserts that the necessary science to understand this is already available; what is missing is the correct interpretation and the "grounding" of our objective scientific knowledge in first-person subjective experience.

Key Tenets & Detailed Explanation

  1. Consciousness is an Emergent Property Composed of Qualia. The theory begins with the premise that our subjective experience—what we call consciousness—is composed of "qualia" (the "what-it's-likeness" of an experience). However, this rich, unified consciousness is not a basic feature of the universe. It is a higher-level property that emerges when the brain subjectively binds together countless myriads of more basic, "elemental" qualia.

  2. Qualities are Fundamental, Not Consciousness. This is the theory's central distinction and its primary departure from panpsychism. It does not claim that consciousness is fundamental. Instead, it asserts that specific, objective qualities (like elemental redness, bitterness, etc.) are a fundamental and irreducible property of physical matter. An electron isn't conscious, but it may possess a fundamental quality that is a building block of consciousness.

  1. Qualities are Causally Effective. These intrinsic qualities are not inert, decorative features of matter; they are causally potent. It could be demostrated that a substance (like a neurotransmitter) behaves the way it does in part because of its inherent quality. This offers a potential solution to the mind-body problem by suggesting that mental properties (qualia) are not separate from physical properties but are an inextricable and active part of them.

  2. Existing Science Already Describes Qualia, Unrecognized. The theory makes the strong claim that our current scientific descriptions of physical processes in the brain are, in fact, descriptions of qualia—we just fail to recognize them as such. For example, it could be demostrated that the complete physical and chemical description of how glutamate behaves in a synapse is the complete physical description of the quale of elemental redness. The problem isn't a lack of scientific data, but a blindness to the true nature of what we are already observing.

5.  Descriptions of qualities are not qualities.  Though objective observations of causal properties can describe to us how qualities behave, a description is not a quality.  To know what a quality is like requires an additional subjective binding mechanism which enables infallible direct apprehension of multiple qualities at the same time.  Qualities in the right hemisphere of our brain are subjectively bound to qualities in the other hemisphere which are directly experienced as one unified conscious awareness.  This is achieved via the corpus callosum.  Once this subjective binding mechanism is understood we should be able to engineer neural ponytails that bind multiple brains together, enabling one brain to directly apprehend qualities in another's brain.
 

    1. Elemental Qualia are Objective and Universal. The elemental quality of "redness" associated with a specific substance is an objective, universal fact. That substance will possess the exact same elemental quality in any brain, anywhere in the universe. This provides a foundation for an objective science of consciousness, as the building blocks are consistent. The composite experience of "red," however, will differ between individuals because each person's brain binds that elemental quality with a unique set of memories, emotions, and other associated qualia.

    1. The "Dictionary of Qualia" is Latent within Current Science. This theory rejects the idea that new scientific discoveries are needed to bridge the mind-body gap. The "dictionary" that maps physical substances to their intrinsic qualities is not something to be created by a future science, but something to be unlocked from our existing knowledge. The missing piece is the "grounding" provided by direct, first-person experience. Once we can definitively say, "Ah, this specific subjective feeling is what the complete scientific description of Substance X corresponds to," we can begin to decipher the entire dictionary that is already implicit in the physics and chemistry we know. The challenge is one of interpretation and grounding, not of discovery.


    Reply all
    Reply to author
    Forward
    0 new messages