[syzbot] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in __build_skb_around

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syzbot

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Nov 28, 2022, 8:42:31 AM11/28/22
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Hello,

syzbot found the following issue on:

HEAD commit: c35bd4e42885 Add linux-next specific files for 20221124
git tree: linux-next
console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=15e5d7e5880000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=11e19c740a0b2926
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fda18eaa8c12534ccb3b
compiler: gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2
syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1096f205880000
C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=10b2d68d880000

Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/968fee464d14/disk-c35bd4e4.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/4f46fe801b5b/vmlinux-c35bd4e4.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/c2cdf8fb264e/bzImage-c35bd4e4.xz

IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+fda18e...@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __build_skb_around+0x235/0x340 net/core/skbuff.c:294
Write of size 32 at addr ffff88802aa172c0 by task syz-executor413/5295

CPU: 0 PID: 5295 Comm: syz-executor413 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc6-next-20221124-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd1/0x138 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:253 [inline]
print_report+0x15e/0x45d mm/kasan/report.c:364
kasan_report+0xbf/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:464
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x141/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
memset+0x24/0x50 mm/kasan/shadow.c:44
__build_skb_around+0x235/0x340 net/core/skbuff.c:294
__build_skb+0x4f/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:328
build_skb+0x22/0x280 net/core/skbuff.c:340
bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x343/0x1e10 net/bpf/test_run.c:1131
bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3644 [inline]
__sys_bpf+0x1599/0x4ff0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4997
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5083 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5081 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x79/0xc0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5081
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f30de9aad19
Code: 28 c3 e8 2a 14 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffeaee34318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f30de9aad19
RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 000000000000000a
RBP: 00007f30de96eec0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f30de96ef50
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>

Allocated by task 5295:
kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:376 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:335 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xa5/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:385
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:212 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:955 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x5a/0xd0 mm/slab_common.c:968
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:575 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:711 [inline]
bpf_test_init.isra.0+0xa5/0x150 net/bpf/test_run.c:778
bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x22e/0x1e10 net/bpf/test_run.c:1097
bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3644 [inline]
__sys_bpf+0x1599/0x4ff0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4997
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5083 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5081 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x79/0xc0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5081
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802aa17000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 704 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffff88802aa17000, ffff88802aa17400)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea0000aa8400 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x2aa10
head:ffffea0000aa8400 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 subpages_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 00fff00000010200 ffff888012441dc0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd2040(__GFP_IO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 5295, tgid 5295 (strace-static-x), ts 57049914920, free_ts 56991966201
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2541 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x119c/0x2cd0 mm/page_alloc.c:4293
__alloc_pages+0x1cb/0x5b0 mm/page_alloc.c:5551
alloc_pages+0x1aa/0x270 mm/mempolicy.c:2285
alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1833 [inline]
allocate_slab+0x25e/0x350 mm/slub.c:1980
new_slab mm/slub.c:2033 [inline]
___slab_alloc+0xa91/0x1400 mm/slub.c:3211
__slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x56/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3310
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3395 [inline]
__kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1a9/0x430 mm/slub.c:3472
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:954 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x4a/0xd0 mm/slab_common.c:968
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:575 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:711 [inline]
tomoyo_init_log+0x1282/0x1ec0 security/tomoyo/audit.c:275
tomoyo_supervisor+0x354/0xf10 security/tomoyo/common.c:2088
tomoyo_audit_env_log security/tomoyo/environ.c:36 [inline]
tomoyo_env_perm+0x183/0x200 security/tomoyo/environ.c:63
tomoyo_environ security/tomoyo/domain.c:672 [inline]
tomoyo_find_next_domain+0x13d2/0x1f80 security/tomoyo/domain.c:879
tomoyo_bprm_check_security security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:101 [inline]
tomoyo_bprm_check_security+0x133/0x1c0 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:91
security_bprm_check+0x49/0xb0 security/security.c:897
search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1723 [inline]
exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1777 [inline]
bprm_execve fs/exec.c:1851 [inline]
bprm_execve+0x732/0x19f0 fs/exec.c:1808
do_execveat_common+0x724/0x890 fs/exec.c:1956
page last free stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1448 [inline]
free_pcp_prepare+0x65c/0xc00 mm/page_alloc.c:1498
free_unref_page_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:3379 [inline]
free_unref_page+0x1d/0x490 mm/page_alloc.c:3474
__unfreeze_partials+0x17c/0x1a0 mm/slub.c:2617
qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:168 [inline]
qlist_free_all+0x6a/0x170 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:187
kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x192/0x220 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:294
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:307
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:202 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:761 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3433 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3441 [inline]
__kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3448 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x1e3/0x430 mm/slub.c:3457
vm_area_alloc+0x20/0x100 kernel/fork.c:458
mmap_region+0x44c/0x1dd0 mm/mmap.c:2605
do_mmap+0x831/0xf60 mm/mmap.c:1412
vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1af/0x280 mm/util.c:520
ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x7d/0x5a0 mm/mmap.c:1458
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88802aa17180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff88802aa17200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88802aa17280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88802aa17300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88802aa17380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================


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pepsipu

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Dec 4, 2022, 1:16:38 PM12/4/22
to syzkaller-bugs
I believe this is a KASAN bug. 

I made an easier to read version that still triggers KASAN:

#define _GNU_SOURCE

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#include "bpf.h"

int main(void)
{
    __u64 insns[] = {
        (BPF_CALL | BPF_JMP) | ((__u64)0x61 << 32),
        (BPF_AND | BPF_ALU),
        (BPF_EXIT | BPF_JMP),
    };
    bpf_load_attr_t load_attr = {
        .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
        .insn_cnt = sizeof(insns) / sizeof(__u64),
        .insns = (__u64)insns,
        .license = (__u64) "GPL",
    };
    long prog_fd = syscall(__NR_bpf, BPF_PROG_LOAD, &load_attr, sizeof(bpf_load_attr_t));
    if (prog_fd == -1)
    {
        printf("could not load bpf prog");
        exit(-1);
    }
    bpf_trun_attr_t trun_attr = {
        .prog_fd = prog_fd,
        .data_size_in = 0x81,
        .data_size_out = -1,
        .data_in = (__u64) "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA",
    };

    syscall(__NR_bpf, BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN, &trun_attr, sizeof(bpf_trun_attr_t));
    return 0;
}

It looks like KASAN believes the tail access of SKB's backing buffer, the SKB shared info struct, allocated by bpf_test_init is out-of-bounds.
This is likely because when the SKB is setup, in build_skb, the tail is calculated as "data + ksize(data) - sizeof(skb_shared_info)". ksize returns the size of the slab, not the allocation, so the tail is much further past the allocation.
However, KASAN is usually supposed to correct for ksize calls by unpoisioning the entire slab it's called on... I'm not sure why this is happening.

Dmitry Vyukov

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Dec 5, 2022, 3:04:03 AM12/5/22
to pepsipu, syzbot+fda18e...@syzkaller.appspotmail.com, Kees Cook, Vlastimil Babka, kasan-dev, syzkaller-bugs, Andrii Nakryiko, a...@kernel.org, bpf, Daniel Borkmann, David Miller, Eric Dumazet, Hao Luo, Jesper Dangaard Brouer, John Fastabend, jo...@kernel.org, KP Singh, Jakub Kicinski, LKML, marti...@linux.dev, netdev, Paolo Abeni, Stanislav Fomichev, so...@kernel.org, Yonghong Song
Hi,

[+orignal CC list, please keep it in replies, almost none of relevant
receivers read syzkaller-bugs@ mailing list]

Also +Kees and kasan-dev for ksize.

After the following patch the behavior has changed and KASAN does not
unpoison the fail of the object:

mm: Make ksize() a reporting-only function
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221118035656...@kernel.org/

Kees, is this bpf case is a remaining ksize() use that needs to be fixed?

Kees Cook

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Dec 6, 2022, 1:31:50 PM12/6/22
to Dmitry Vyukov, pepsipu, syzbot+fda18e...@syzkaller.appspotmail.com, Vlastimil Babka, kasan-dev, syzkaller-bugs, Andrii Nakryiko, a...@kernel.org, bpf, Daniel Borkmann, David Miller, Eric Dumazet, Hao Luo, Jesper Dangaard Brouer, John Fastabend, jo...@kernel.org, KP Singh, Jakub Kicinski, LKML, marti...@linux.dev, netdev, Paolo Abeni, Stanislav Fomichev, so...@kernel.org, Yonghong Song
Hi, yes, this seems like a missed ksize() usage. I will take a look at
it -- nothing should be using ksize() to resize the allocation any
more: it should either fully allocate the bucket at the start, or use
krealloc().

-Kees
--
Kees Cook
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