general protection fault in reiserfs_security_init

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syzbot

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Sep 21, 2020, 5:32:22 AM9/21/20
to linux-...@vger.kernel.org, reiserf...@vger.kernel.org, syzkall...@googlegroups.com
Hello,

syzbot found the following issue on:

HEAD commit: 325d0eab Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
git tree: upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1671c0e3900000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=b12e84189082991c
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=690cb1e51970435f9775
compiler: gcc (GCC) 10.1.0-syz 20200507
syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=15705a3d900000
C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=117b3281900000

IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+690cb1...@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

REISERFS (device loop0): journal params: device loop0, size 15748, journal first block 18, max trans len 256, max batch 225, max commit age 30, max trans age 30
REISERFS (device loop0): checking transaction log (loop0)
REISERFS (device loop0): Using tea hash to sort names
REISERFS (device loop0): using 3.5.x disk format
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000d: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f]
CPU: 0 PID: 6874 Comm: syz-executor834 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:d_really_is_negative include/linux/dcache.h:472 [inline]
RIP: 0010:reiserfs_xattr_jcreate_nblocks fs/reiserfs/xattr.h:78 [inline]
RIP: 0010:reiserfs_security_init+0x285/0x4d0 fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c:70
Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 2b 02 00 00 4d 8b ad a0 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8d 7d 68 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 23 02 00 00 49 83 7d 68 00 0f 84 62 01 00 00 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc90005827980 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000036 RCX: 000000000000006c
RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: ffffffff82009dd3 RDI: 0000000000000068
RBP: ffff88807d8441d0 R08: ffffc90005827a10 R09: ffffc90005827a18
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000005fa
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888094e60000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000001036880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f5a6fb90ab4 CR3: 000000009a1ab000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
reiserfs_mkdir+0x2c9/0x980 fs/reiserfs/namei.c:821
create_privroot fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:882 [inline]
reiserfs_xattr_init+0x4de/0xb52 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:1004
reiserfs_fill_super+0x215d/0x2df3 fs/reiserfs/super.c:2177
mount_bdev+0x32e/0x3f0 fs/super.c:1417
legacy_get_tree+0x105/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:592
vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1547
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2875 [inline]
path_mount+0x1387/0x20a0 fs/namespace.c:3192
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3205 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3413 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3390 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0x27f/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3390
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x447d9a
Code: b8 08 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7d a3 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 5a a3 fb ff c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fffe558f5c8 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fffe558f620 RCX: 0000000000447d9a
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007fffe558f5e0
RBP: 00007fffe558f5e0 R08: 00007fffe558f620 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 0000000000000006
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000003
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace e6a0a9f4ee2cea86 ]---
RIP: 0010:d_really_is_negative include/linux/dcache.h:472 [inline]
RIP: 0010:reiserfs_xattr_jcreate_nblocks fs/reiserfs/xattr.h:78 [inline]
RIP: 0010:reiserfs_security_init+0x285/0x4d0 fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c:70
Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 2b 02 00 00 4d 8b ad a0 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8d 7d 68 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 23 02 00 00 49 83 7d 68 00 0f 84 62 01 00 00 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc90005827980 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000036 RCX: 000000000000006c
RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: ffffffff82009dd3 RDI: 0000000000000068
RBP: ffff88807d8441d0 R08: ffffc90005827a10 R09: ffffc90005827a18
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000005fa
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888094e60000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000001036880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ff7d575b000 CR3: 000000009a1ab000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400


---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
syzbot engineers can be reached at syzk...@googlegroups.com.

syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
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syzbot can test patches for this issue, for details see:
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syzbot

unread,
Sep 21, 2020, 3:58:10 PM9/21/20
to baolin...@gmail.com, gre...@linuxfoundation.org, linh...@unisoc.com, linus....@linaro.org, linux-...@vger.kernel.org, raf...@kernel.org, reiserf...@vger.kernel.org, syzkall...@googlegroups.com
syzbot has bisected this issue to:

commit 1592c4b9935fa8a3b7c297955bb872a357e5a3b6
Author: Linhua Xu <linh...@unisoc.com>
Date: Wed Mar 25 08:25:28 2020 +0000

pinctrl: sprd: Add pin high impedance mode support

bisection log: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=111050d3900000
start commit: 325d0eab Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
git tree: upstream
final oops: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=131050d3900000
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=151050d3900000
Reported-by: syzbot+690cb1...@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1592c4b9935f ("pinctrl: sprd: Add pin high impedance mode support")

For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection

慕冬亮

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Nov 23, 2020, 2:03:16 AM11/23/20
to syzkaller-bugs
int reiserfs_xattr_init(struct super_block *s, int mount_flags)
{
        int err = 0;
        struct dentry *privroot = REISERFS_SB(s)->priv_root;

        err = xattr_mount_check(s);
        if (err)
                goto error;

        if (d_really_is_negative(privroot) && !(mount_flags & SB_RDONLY)) {
                inode_lock(d_inode(s->s_root));
                err = create_privroot(REISERFS_SB(s)->priv_root);
                inode_unlock(d_inode(s->s_root));
        }

        if (d_really_is_positive(privroot)) {
                inode_lock(d_inode(privroot));
                if (!REISERFS_SB(s)->xattr_root) {
                        struct dentry *dentry;

                        dentry = lookup_one_len(XAROOT_NAME, privroot,
                                                strlen(XAROOT_NAME));
                        if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
                                pr_alert("assign xattr_root with dentry = 0x%lx", dentry);
                                REISERFS_SB(s)->xattr_root = dentry;
                        }else
                                err = PTR_ERR(dentry);
                }
                inode_unlock(d_inode(privroot));
        }
        ......
}
From the implementation of reiserfs_xattr_init, only when d_really_is_positive(privroot) is true, xattr_root could be assigned with a dentry obtained from lookup_one_len. In other words, create_privroot is executed with REISERFS_SB(s)->xattr_root as NULL pointer. With improper implementation of mkdir operation in reiserfs filesystem or accessing the xattr_root in reiserfs_mkdir , it can lead to NULL pointer dereference. If you remove the red code in reiserfs_xattr_jcreate_nblocks, the crash never occurs, but it may affect nblocks calculation in the reiserfs filesystem. :( 

static inline size_t reiserfs_xattr_jcreate_nblocks(struct inode *inode)
{
        size_t nblocks = JOURNAL_BLOCKS_PER_OBJECT(inode->i_sb);

        pr_alert("5: inode = 0x%lx", inode);
        if ((REISERFS_I(inode)->i_flags & i_has_xattr_dir) == 0) {
                nblocks += JOURNAL_BLOCKS_PER_OBJECT(inode->i_sb);
                if (d_really_is_negative(REISERFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->xattr_root))
                      nblocks += JOURNAL_BLOCKS_PER_OBJECT(inode->i_sb);
        }

        return nblocks;
}

慕冬亮

unread,
Nov 24, 2020, 9:32:32 PM11/24/20
to baolin...@gmail.com, gre...@linuxfoundation.org, linh...@unisoc.com, linus....@linaro.org, linux-kernel, raf...@kernel.org, reiserf...@vger.kernel.org, syzkall...@googlegroups.com
static inline size_t reiserfs_xattr_jcreate_nblocks(struct inode *inode)
{
size_t nblocks = JOURNAL_BLOCKS_PER_OBJECT(inode->i_sb);

pr_alert("5: inode = 0x%lx", inode);
if ((REISERFS_I(inode)->i_flags & i_has_xattr_dir) == 0) {
nblocks += JOURNAL_BLOCKS_PER_OBJECT(inode->i_sb);
if (d_really_is_negative(REISERFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->xattr_root))
nblocks += JOURNAL_BLOCKS_PER_OBJECT(inode->i_sb);
}

return nblocks;
}

--
My best regards to you.

No System Is Safe!
Dongliang Mu
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