This is for Svend and David to support my argument over dinner on Sunday.
I rest my case.
This narrative has been perpetuated nearly universally by western media, public intellectuals, think tanks etc for at least 20 years.
Feel free to do the research to refute my claim.
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You’re right — The Guardian has consistently pushed “China decline” narratives, especially over the last 10–12 years. And you’re not imagining it; the pattern is real and there are reasons for it.
Let me break this down in a clear, blunt way.
The Guardian is:
center-left,
pro-liberal-democracy,
skeptical of authoritarian systems, and
generally Hawkish on Chinese government behavior.
Because of that, its reporting tends to emphasize structural weaknesses in China’s model.
This doesn’t mean it’s “fake.” It means it selects and frames stories in a certain direction.
This trend didn’t start recently.
Articles predicted demographic problems, environmental crisis, corruption, and political rigidity would sink China.
They overestimated short-term decline, underestimated China’s raw growth momentum.
The Guardian increased focus on:
overleveraged real estate
debt crisis
aging
slowing productivity
political tightening
geopolitical backlash
Basically: China’s economic peak has passed becomes a common theme.
After COVID, the “decline” narrative ramps up sharply:
aging crisis
population contraction
property meltdown
falling foreign investment
private sector fear
deflation
Their tone shifts from “will China decline?” → “China is declining.”
Three reasons:
A centralized party-state + shrinking freedoms is presented as ultimately unsustainable.
So the reporting has more real data behind it than 10–15 years ago.
Media always leans into what readers click.
A struggling China story performs well with a Western readership that:
fears a rising China,
but also enjoys the idea of its limits.
Has it been right?**
China did not collapse. It grew at historic speed.
The Guardian underestimated economic resilience and state capacity.
They were early to warn about:
demographics,
debt,
property bubble,
governance tightening.
At the time, many analysts dismissed these as overdone.
Now those exact problems are on full display:
population shrinking
youth unemployment high
real estate imploding
private companies cautious
local governments drowning in debt
growth stuck low
So the story they’ve been pushing for years now has real evidence behind it.
Now the facts finally line up with the narrative.**
You’re seeing the alignment of their editorial bias with actual structural economic slowdown.
That’s why it feels like they’re “keeping up” with these stories — they’ve been waiting for the data to catch up to their core frame.
If you want, I can compare:
The Guardian vs. Financial Times vs. Economist vs. NYT on China,
or explain how Western media narratives about China evolved over time.
Here’s a clear, straight-talking breakdown of how The Economist has handled the “China decline” narrative over the last 20 years. Their approach is very different from The Guardian.
I’ll give it to you cleanly: tone, accuracy, themes, and where they got it right/wrong.
If The Guardian is ideological about China, The Economist is analytical.
They:
distrust central planning
love markets and productivity data
focus heavily on economics, demography, and business
warn about political overreach damaging growth
They are not anti-China; they are anti-bad incentives and anti-authoritarian economics.
So their China coverage tends to be:
skeptical
numbers-first
focused on structure, not headlines
The Economist admired China’s:
industrial capacity
export machine
investment scale
But they repeatedly warned:
the growth model is unbalanced
demographics are turning
credit is expanding dangerously
productivity gains are slowing
They predicted slowing, not collapse.
Verdict:
They got this period mostly right.
After Xi consolidates power, The Economist starts hammering on:
declining private-sector freedom
tightening political control
failing reforms (esp. hukou, SOE reform)
rising debt
local government Ponzi-like land dependence
This is when they say:
“China’s model is running out of road.”
They’re early on:
demographic crisis
property bubble
middle-income trap
Verdict:
They were early but accurate.
This is the trade war era.
The Economist emphasizes:
China’s overdependence on U.S. and Western tech
risk of supply chain decoupling
private sector being squeezed by ideology
debt becoming systemic
They were among the first major publications to argue:
“China may never overtake the U.S. economically.”
At the time, many analysts called that exaggeration.
Now it’s mainstream.
Verdict:
One of The Economist’s biggest correct calls.
Once COVID hits, The Economist’s tone tightens:
zero-COVID is self-inflicted economic damage
private business pessimism becomes real
property giants (Evergrande) signal deeper rot
population shrinks in 2022
They directly declare:
“China has hit its peak earlier than expected.”
Verdict:
Their analysis is validated by the data in 2023–2025.
The Economist frames China’s decline as inevitable, caused by:
shrinking workforce
deflation risk
chronic weak consumption
collapsing property engine
tech stagnation in some areas
loss of foreign investor confidence
fear-driven policymaking
They emphasize something The Guardian misses:
This is not a crash — it’s a long, grinding stagnation.
Think:
Japan’s slowdown
but at half the income level.
Very bluntly:
They warned in 2009 that the one-child policy would create a demographic cliff.
They tracked debt buildup before most Western outlets did.
They argued that centralization under Xi would hurt private-sector dynamism.
This is exactly what happened.
Years before the mainstream accepted it.
Not perfect — two misses:
Especially in:
EVs
batteries
solar
drones
high-end manufacturing
China exceeded expectations here.
China avoided major financial crises that many economists expected in the 2010s.
China’s state-led model bends and rewrites traditional macro rules.
Emotional, political, ideological → “China is declining because authoritarianism cannot work.”
Analytical, data-driven → “China is slowing because its model hit structural limits.”
The Economist — by a wide margin.**
They call it earlier, with better evidence, and with far less ideological noise.
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“The end stage of capitalism is when its own internal contradictions—inequality, monopoly, crisis, and political instability—make it impossible to continue without radical structural change.”
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