Qubes Canary 025

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Andrew David Wong

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Dec 12, 2020, 9:22:58 AM12/12/20
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Dear Qubes Community,

We have published Qubes Canary 025. The text of this canary is
reproduced below.

Note: We have decided to make some minor formatting changes to the way
Qubes Canary and Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) numbers are printed,
such as dropping the '#' symbol and using hyphens instead of spaces.

This canary and its accompanying signatures will always be available in
the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).

View Qubes Canary 025 in the qubes-secpack:

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-025-2020.txt

Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and
read it:

https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/

View all past canaries:

https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canaries/

```


---===[ Qubes Canary 025 ]===---


Statements
-----------

The Qubes core developers who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:

1. The date of issue of this canary is December 8, 2020.

2. There have been 62 Qubes Security Bulletins published so far.

3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:

427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).

5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
two weeks of March 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary
is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without
plausible explanation.

Special announcements
----------------------

None.

Disclaimers and notes
----------------------

We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently
compromised. This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers
or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in
particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO
downloads.

This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other
means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce
us to produce false declarations.

The news feeds quoted below (Proof of freshness) serves to demonstrate
that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated.
It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance.

This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to
anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible
for any of the statements made here.

Proof of freshness
-------------------

Tue, 08 Dec 2020 16:46:42 +0000

Source: DER SPIEGEL - International
(https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Dangerous Accusations: German Tennis Star Alexander Zverev Faces Career
Turning Point
Skiing in the Pandemic: Alpine Rivalries Flare amid Resort Closures
Biden's Goal of Saving the Iran Deal Just Got Harder - A Murder and an
Ultimatum
Heiko Maas: Germany's Foreign Minister on the Future of Trans-Atlantic
Relations
Generation Corona: The Pandemic Is Changing Our Children's Lives for the
Worse

Source: NYT > World News
(https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Covid-19 Live Updates: Britain Begins Vaccinating Citizens
U.K. Covid Vaccine: Side Effects, Safety, and Who Gets It First
U.S. Leaves Behind Afghan Bases and a Legacy of Land Disputes
Covid Infections, and Blame, Rise Along Southeast Asian Borders
U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Chinese Officials Over Hong Kong Crackdown

Source: BBC News - World (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Safety data on Pfizer jab released by US
Lloyd Austin: Biden picks ex-general as defence secretary
The man saving monkeys in the Colombian Amazon
Charlie Hebdo attack: France seeks long jail terms in Paris trial
Christchurch massacre: Inquiry finds failures ahead of attack

Source: Blockchain.info
0000000000000000000c6550025327ca735099e0c621a9ad4599a49dab41f573

Footnotes
----------

[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this
canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures
on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]

[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!
```

This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2020/12/12/canary-25/

OpenPGP_signature

Andrew David Wong

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Dec 14, 2020, 8:58:56 AM12/14/20
to qubes...@googlegroups.com, qubes...@googlegroups.com
Dear Qubes Community,

Several users have pointed out a mistake in the canary below. "March
2020" should instead be "March 2021". This was just a typographical
error. We will be fixing this and updating the signatures on the canary.
Thank you.
--
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org

OpenPGP_signature

Andrew David Wong

unread,
Dec 16, 2020, 5:02:11 AM12/16/20
to qubes...@googlegroups.com, qubes...@googlegroups.com
On 12/14/20 5:58 AM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
> Dear Qubes Community,
>
> Several users have pointed out a mistake in the canary below. "March
> 2020" should instead be "March 2021". This was just a typographical
> error. We will be fixing this and updating the signatures on the canary.
> Thank you.
>

"March 2020" has now been corrected to "March 2021" in statement 5.
The original canary, the website announcement, and the signatures on the
canary have all been updated. Thank you.
OpenPGP_signature
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