Secure Browsing - browserless?

59 views
Skip to first unread message

098'109348'109438'0194328'0918

unread,
Nov 6, 2016, 4:08:08 AM11/6/16
to qubes-users
Hallo,

It looks like I was wrong, this kind of browserless security setup is might not be a part of the far future, it is up and running (in the testmode)...

The Boing Black Phone...

http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/11/nsa-chief-has-phone-top-secret-messaging-heres-how-it-works/132845/?oref=d-river

http://www.boeing.com/defense/boeing-black/index.page

- Can switch between a open and a secure network (2 SIMs)
- Is highly encrypted
- Is working like a DispVM and stores data at a faraway secure place (physical security)
- Physical tamper proof and self-destructive (physical security)

Nice would be a Qubes DispVM optimized for screen sharing (browser less security) with and App running on a second bank-sided DispVM behind the first banking-firewall, so all banking transactions become secure and secret. But sure this needs also a clever encryption embedded.

Kind Regards

Jean-Philippe Ouellet

unread,
Nov 7, 2016, 1:36:49 PM11/7/16
to 098'109348'109438'0194328'0918, qubes-users
You are already free to do this in Qubes today, however I suggest that
doing so probably does not provide the properties you may expect.

You can do X-forwarding over SSH to another machine with your browser,
or whatever your preferred supposedly-secure remote-desktoping
application is.

However, beware that this has little benefit. Having a browser running
remotely does not magically remove your local machine from the
effective TCB [1] of browsing. If your local machine is compromised,
an attacker can use it to access your remote browser-machine just as
you would. In addition, the remote machine could be compromised
without compromising your local machine, and this would also
compromise whatever you were doing in your remote browser.

If you are trying to protect confidentiality of your browsing in the
event your local computer is stolen or whatever, then you *still*
require actually-working disk encryption. Securely providing keys to
remote machine is much more difficult than local machines.

The way I see it, running your browser remotely and connecting to it
actually /decreases/ security.

[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_computing_base

'17'41783'10'4321^14''4389

unread,
Nov 9, 2016, 4:20:06 PM11/9/16
to qubes-users
Hello,

no browserless - means you have no HTML at all any more!

Qt Banking-Portal
|
Screensharing App (bank)
|
QubesOS (as a Secure Endpoint of the Bank)
|
HW Firewall
| (web)
HW Firewall
|
QubesOS (as a Secure Endpoint)
|
Screensharing App (me)

The screensharing has an very strong encryption enabled, so als long my Endpoint is save and I assume that the banking-security is fine - I have now no flaws from the browser technologies.

The browsers are a very nice sweet target - very complex, comercial, always changing, too much featues, very convienient and make us lazy - nobody is asking about the browser security...

But do I really need HTML to do some bank-transfer - by or sell shares or other financial stuff?

For me not - but I don't like if money begins to leak out...

And today the bank is only half a bank - 50% is the online banking portal and this means today: HTML

Why?

I don't know...

Kind Regards

raah...@gmail.com

unread,
Nov 10, 2016, 12:51:11 AM11/10/16
to qubes-users, kerste...@gmail.com

with qubes browser is not as pressing cause you separate tasks with diff vms. Use as many vms as your memory can handle imo lol. It sounds crazy to people at first but you get more used to it. For example you can use a vm for only going to a single website all the time.

Reply all
Reply to author
Forward
0 new messages