The take home being that it only takes one (1) fingerprint hit through one (1) of the avenues available to tracking organizations to confirm that they are dealing with the same end-user (or household unit, or something close enough to pad their toxic dossier with) and thus to link every cookie fingerprint that they know for this user across both domains under the same umbrella.
A pretty thorough look at all of the strategies that I am at least aware of can be had at this url: https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/client-identification-mechanisms
So I am curious to what extent Qubes security domains may be sufficiently complete as to defeat potentially all of these mechanisms simultaneously? Especially if end-user configures one or more domains to pipe all network traffic over a VPN or tor to additionally differentiate their IP address?
I am especially interested to hear about how Qubes security domains interact with Flash LSOs, and .. whatever-it-is that Silverlight and other multi-browser plugins do, and whether *that* data leaks between domains. :/
Thank you for any insight you guys may have on this matter, as it sounds like it speaks directly to Qubes primary mission goals of security by compartmentalization. :D
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