Qubes Canary #21

Andrew David Wong

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Oct 14, 2019, 9:21:03 PM10/14/19

to qubes...@googlegroups.com, qubes...@googlegroups.com

Dear Qubes Community,

We have published Qubes Canary #21. The text of this canary is
reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying signatures will
always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).

View Qubes Canary #21 in the qubes-secpack:

<https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-021-2019.txt>

Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read
it:

<https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/>

View all past canaries:

<https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canaries/>

```

---===[ Qubes Canary #21 ]===---

Statements
-----------

The Qubes core developers who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:

1. The date of issue of this canary is October 13, 2019.

2. There have been 51 Qubes Security Bulletins published so far.

3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:

427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).

5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
three weeks of January 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary
is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without
plausible explanation.

Special announcements
----------------------

None.

Disclaimers and notes
----------------------

We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently
compromised. This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers
or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in
particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO
downloads.

This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other
means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce
us to produce false declarations.

The news feeds quoted below (Proof of freshness) serves to demonstrate
that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated.
It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance.

This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to
anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible
for any of the statements made here.

Proof of freshness
-------------------

Sun, 13 Oct 2019 19:51:40 +0000

Source: SPIEGEL ONLINE - International
(https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Far-Right Terrorism: Deadly Attack Exposes Lapses in German Security
Apparatus
Opinion: This Isn't the Drill, It's the Catastrophe
The PiS Dynasty: Kaczynski Party in Control Ahead of Polish Vote
Time To Act: Trump's Impeachment Inquiry Is Imperative for the World
Predictable Chaos: Europe Braces for the Effects of Brexit

Source: NYT > World News
(https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Hundreds of ISIS Supporters Flee Detention Amid Turkish Airstrikes
12 Hours. 4 Syrian Hospitals Bombed. One Culprit: Russia.
Typhoon Hagibis: Helicopters and Boats Rescue the Stranded
Police Officer is Stabbed in Hong Kong During Flash-Mob Protests
Pullback Leaves Green Berets Feeling ‘Ashamed,’ and Kurdish Allies
Describing ‘Betrayal’

Source: BBC News - World (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Turkey-Syria offensive: US to evacuate 1,000 troops as Turkey advances
Hong Kong protests: President Xi warns of 'crushed bodies'
Black woman shot dead by Texas police through bedroom window
Simone Biles wins record 24th world medal
Hunter Biden to step down from China board amid Trump attacks

Source: Reuters: World News (http://feeds.reuters.com/reuters/worldnews)
Exclusive: U.S. could pull bulk of troops from Syria in matter of days
- officials
Exit polls project Tunisian landslide win for Kais Saied
Poland's ruling nationalists set to win election: exit poll
U.S. to pull last troops from north Syria as Turkey presses offensive
against Kurds
Russia takes part in talks between Syria and Kurdish-led SDF

Source: Blockchain.info
0000000000000000000a3b269b65134283e4f4e089768704b80727a31bdadd14

Footnotes
----------

[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this
canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures
on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]

[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!
```

This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/10/13/canary-21/

--
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org

m...@militant.dk

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Oct 16, 2019, 1:48:16 AM10/16/19

to qubes-users

tirsdag den 15. oktober 2019 kl. 03.21.03 UTC+2 skrev Andrew David Wong:

Dear Qubes Community,

We have published Qubes Canary #21. The text of this canary is
reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying signatures will
always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).

View Qubes Canary #21 in the qubes-secpack:

<https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-021-2019.txt>

Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read
it:

<https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/>

Hi Andrew,

I can see that Joanna's key's are still to be trusted(https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#how-to-obtain-verify-and-read), even though she is no longer an active member of the team (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/)

Is there a need for off-boarding former members, on-boarding newer ones(and their keys), or are there practical issues, regarding that, making it problematic?

Sincerely

Max

Andrew David Wong

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Oct 16, 2019, 11:21:43 PM10/16/19

to m...@militant.dk, qubes-users

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 2019-10-16 12:48 AM, max via qubes-users wrote:
> tirsdag den 15. oktober 2019 kl. 03.21.03 UTC+2 skrev Andrew David Wong:
>>
>> Dear Qubes Community,
>>
>> We have published Qubes Canary #21. The text of this canary is
>> reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying signatures will
>> always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).
>>
>> View Qubes Canary #21 in the qubes-secpack:
>>
>> <
>> https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-021-2019.txt>
>>
>>
>> Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read
>> it:
>>
>> <https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/>
>>
>
>
> Hi Andrew,
>
> I can see that Joanna's key's are still to be
> trusted(https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#how-to-obtain-verify-and-read),
> even though she is no longer an active member of the team
> (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/)
>

As we wrote in our Security Team Update last November [1], Joanna
continues to sign Qubes Canaries:

"However, due to the nature of PGP keys, there is no way to guarantee
that Joanna will not retain a copy of the QMSK after transferring
ownership to Marek. Since anyone in possession of the QMSK is a
potential attack vector against the project, Joanna will continue to
sign Qubes Canaries in perpetuity."

Therefore, a trusted signing key belonging to Joanna must remain in the
Qubes Security Pack (secpack) [2] for this purpose.

> Is there a need for off-boarding former members, on-boarding newer ones(and
> their keys), or are there practical issues, regarding that, making it
> problematic?
>

We do these things in a secure, transparent manner when necessary and
appropriate. For example, the Security Team Update [1] added Simon to
the Qubes Security Team, and you can see that his Security Team signing
key was added to the secpack shortly thereafter. [3] You can also see
that he has signed all Canaries and QSBs since then. [4]

> Sincerely
> Max
>

Thanks for your question!

[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/11/05/qubes-security-team-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
[3] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/commit/8e4125871ce0fc7db37ceeb5e89951cec5ff1ae9
[4] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/commits/master

- --

Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org

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