Why not make it possible to use a custom key combination for changing the keyboard layout when installing Qubes OS ?

[A]

When installing Qubes OS, it’s possible to choose between some predetermined key combinations for changing the keyboard layout.

Why not also make it possible for the user to make his or her own key combination for changing the keyboard layout when installing Qubes OS ?

If the reason is to prevent the user from choosing key combinations that is already used by Qubes OS, then why is it possible to chose for example Ctrl + Shift for changing the keyboard layout when the same keys are used for secure copy and paste ? - Be aware that if a user chooses to use Ctrl + Shift for changing the keyboard layout, then it isn’t possible to use the same key combination for secure copy and paste, because Qubes OS just change the keyboard layout immediately when these two keys are pressed and thereby it will perceive the key combination as used before the user press C or V.

If there aren’t any good reasons for not to give the user the option to enter a custom key combination for changing the keyboard layout when installing Qubes OS, I’ll suggest to create this option.

This would also mean that an intruder would have to try a much larger amount of key combinations to change the keyboard layout. And that it wouldn’t be enough just to print a list with the predetermined key combinations and try them out one by one. Although an intruder probably would try to get entrance in some other way.

[tetra...@danwin1210.me]

On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 03:33:54AM -0800, A wrote:
>When installing Qubes OS, it’s possible to choose between some predetermined key combinations for changing the keyboard layout.
>
>Why not also make it possible for the user to make his or her own key
>combination for changing the keyboard layout when installing Qubes OS ?

I still haven't figured out how to change the key combination once the
install is complete...

[M]

You can't.

It's made as so as a security measure.

[tetra...@danwin1210.me]

This makes no sense to me. The Qubes security model is that dom0 is assumed clean, and if dom0 is compromised the whole machine is compromised. How would making it impossible to change the key combination from dom0 improve security?