looking for quickest way to copy text from dom0-Terminal to another VM

[gone]

1st of all, I have read this:
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/copy-from-dom0/

Maybe I just draw a mental blank but I can't find a really
quick way to copy text (not files) from dom0-Terminal to
another VM (into a post like this for instance). I thinking
of some easy and logical keyboardcshortcuts like the ones
that exist for copying text between domUs.
When I've marked some arbitrary textlines in the dom0
terminal and then use "copy" from the right-clic-menu, how
can I go on most easily?

[haaber]

I am annoyed by the same thing, but maybe there is a security
consideration I do not know. So I copy a text with mouse, cat it in a
txt file and copy-to-vm it away in my mail-vm for example. Don't know if
there is faster. Bernhard

[799]

Hello,

Am Fr., 25. Jan. 2019, 21:04 hat gone <su...@posteo.net> geschrieben:

1st of all, I have read this:
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/copy-from-dom0/

Maybe I just draw a mental blank but I can't find a really
quick way to copy text (not files) from dom0-Terminal to
another VM (into a post like this for instance). I thinking
of some easy and logical keyboardcshortcuts like the ones
that exist for copying text between domUs.

Feel free to use this script, which needs xclip to be installed in dom0 and also the AppVM.

https://github.com/one7two99/my-qubes/blob/master/home/bin/qvm-xclip-from-vm

There is also a never version which can copy from/to dom0 in one command.

Haven't uploaded it to GitHub yet.

Not that nice as the qubes clipboard but it does its job and I have always a dom0 terminal open.

- O

[gone]

haaber wrote on Sat, 26 January 2019 00:01

> --

Thanks Bernhard, that's what I also did so far, however it's
not very convenient.

[gone]

799 wrote on Sat, 26 January 2019 00:40
> Hello,

>
> Feel free to use this script, which needs xclip to be
> installed in dom0 and
> also the AppVM.
>
> https://github.com/one7two99/my-qubes/blob/master/home/bin/q
> vm-xclip-from-vm
>
> There is also a never version which can copy from/to
> dom0 in one command.
> Haven't uploaded it to GitHub yet.
> Not that nice as the qubes clipboard but it does its job
> and I have always
> a dom0 terminal open.

> --

Thank you 799, that sounds very interesting.

[Eric]

Personally I will not instal anything into dom0 that is not
from an ITL authorised repo.

Is a real PITA that the inter appVM cut and paste does not
work for dom0 - can there be a switch somewhere that says I
am going to be careful and do it? Feature request?

Only for package names into dom0 and error text out when
things don't work - like just recently.

Thanks, Eric

[Andrew David Wong]

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Please take a look at this issue:

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3571

- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org

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[799]

Am Sa., 26. Jan. 2019, 04:33 hat Andrew David Wong <a...@qubes-os.org> geschrieben:

Please take a look at this issue:

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3571

Happy to see that this topic (no clipboard from dom0) is at least known.
I don't agree that copying from dom0 is dangerous because "The user could have secrets in dom0, e.g., keyfiles".

My passwords are in a vault VM and if someone messes up handling from dom0 it is very likely that he/she didn't understand the security concept behind Qubes and therefore the user is likely the biggest attack surface NOT the clipboard.

Please offer a solution where the user can choose (free software!!) to enable/disable the clipboard (choosing means freedom).

It seems there is a workaround, can this be bound to a key (maybe also using xclip in dom0)?
echo -n dom0 > qubes-clipboard.bin.source .

- O

[Stuart Perkins]

Since dom0 exists to do the sole job of managing the other VM's, one must question why the text you wish to insert into another domain is "in" dom0 to begin with. The less you do with dom0 the better. Everything you do in dom0 which is NOT simply managing the other domains is a potential security hole.

Stuart - Qubes 3.2 user on a Ghosted Lenovo T520.

[gone]

Stuart Perkins wrote on Sat, 26 January 2019 13:32

> On Sat, 26 Jan 2019 01:01:44 +0100

> Since dom0 exists to do the sole job of managing the
> other VM's, one must question why the text you wish to
> insert into another domain is "in" dom0 to begin with.

> --

That's completely right and also the reason why I would not
want to create my questions about qubesOS to this board
somehow in dom0. But when I have a question about dom0 I
often have to quote several lines of text from a dom0
terminal and get those to an www- or mailagent in an appVM.
In order to avoid frustration, I think this should not be
too laborious to handle.

[Andrew David Wong]

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Hash: SHA512

On 26/01/2019 2.39 AM, 799 wrote:
> Am Sa., 26. Jan. 2019, 04:33 hat Andrew David Wong
> <a...@qubes-os.org> geschrieben:
>
>>
>> Please take a look at this issue:
>>
>> https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3571
>
>
>
> Happy to see that this topic (no clipboard from dom0) is at least
> known. I don't agree that copying from dom0 is dangerous because
> "The user could have secrets in dom0, e.g., keyfiles".
>
>
> My passwords are in a vault VM and if someone messes up handling
> from dom0 it is very likely that he/she didn't understand the
> security concept behind Qubes and therefore the user is likely the
> biggest attack surface NOT the clipboard.
>

There are legitimate uses for secrets in dom0. For example, the
Qubes backup system requires the encryption secret for the backup to
be in dom0.

> Please offer a solution where the user can choose (free
> software!!) to enable/disable the clipboard (choosing means
> freedom).
>

Well, "free software" doesn't mean that anyone else is forced to
implement whichever features you personally want for you in order to
give you all the choices you want. Rather, it means that you're free
to modify the software yourself in order to use it the way you want:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_software

- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org

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[unman]

Of course there's a workaround:
<some command> | tee file
qvm-copy-to-vm <qube> file

You can script this and create a key binding yourself.