I am also looking for an icon for Backup/Restore.
As long as I can't find this option I can't restore my VMs and this release is useless for me.
I was able to restore all of my VMs via CLI but after restoring I couldn't start any VM.
Will downgrade to 3.2 and will wait for final release of 4.0 and I hope that this will then be fixed.
I can't start any VM (AppVM & Template VM) even the Template VM that was created freshly with 4.0 installation can't start.
Thanks for all the work on 4.0 BTW. And 3.2. And 3.1 ...
oh ok I see, so a taskbar widget or something to replace the manager. I thought they lost their minds for a second. My immediate thought was what about attaching drives, and seeing if updates available? Joanna addressed all my concerns but I'm gonna have to wait and see what happens with this. Hopefully it doesn't turn out to be more confusing then the manager.
Right now my mother and family are able to use qubes no problem with no terminal actions required. none at all. I don't know why that shocks some people when I tell them. I hope that remains the same becvause they wouldn't be using Qubes without it.
On Monday, July 31, 2017 at 5:23:20 PM UTC-4, Micah Lee wrote:
> On 07/31/2017 04:43 AM, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
(...), when I boot up, grub
> works, but then as soon as Qubes starts to boot the computer reboots,
> and I end up back in grub.
Having the EXACT same issue with my T430s
On a thinkpad x1, after removing iommu=no-igfx I got to initial-setup-graphical but that is failing on "qubes-prefs default-template fedora-25" with qubesadmin.exc.QubesVMNotFoundError: "No such domain: "fedora-25"'.
I see a qubesd warning a little before:
WARNING: Sum of all thin volume sizes (226.01 Gib) exceeds the size of thin pool qubes_dom0/pool00 and the size of the whole volume group (222.57 GiB)!
perhaps related.
FWIW: setup completed successfully after a re-install.
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On 08/02/2017 03:04 AM, cooloutac wrote:
> oh ok I see, so a taskbar widget or something to replace the
> manager. I thought they lost their minds for a second. My
> immediate thought was what about attaching drives, and seeing if
> updates available? Joanna addressed all my concerns but I'm gonna
> have to wait and see what happens with this. Hopefully it doesn't
> turn out to be more confusing then the manager.
It is a miscalculation. How about the words "we must make Qubes user
friendly for all users non IT advanced" and release Qubes without
manager? :(
Maybe, widgets is not a good idea, but Qubes Manager is one of the
important part that make Qubes useful to manage all vms with mouse.
Some UX to old one QM + start menu links to right mouse action and it
will be amazing.
- --
Regards
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Obvious bugs during alpha/beta stages aside, I do feel sorrow for the lack of the Qubes VM Manager as well., and some other minor things that may have major user impact for some people.
- VM Backup GUI seems missing. Is this perhaps something still being worked on and is coming later? Seems really odd that it's missing. I am by no means worried about using the terminal, but it's often extra work. Which is really bad when it takes away valuable time, especially when on the move and in a hurry. It is also a disadvantage for people who are visually stronger to gather a mental overview of their system.
- Seems like there is a missing ability to see inactive VM's for the visual users (Just like the 3.2 VM Manager can show inactive VM's). This is really important for some people, while not important for some others. Albeit, perhaps I just missed the feature to turn it on in the widget?
- Not sure of this one, it might just be due to the VM starting bug, but it seems like we can't easily have an overview of used memory/drive space for each VM anymore? If true, this is a big problem for people on limited hardware resources, who need to be mindful of what is currently running in order not to spend it all up. For example (A contrast example), I never worry if I use all memory, it's essentially almost impossible for me to use it all up inside normal use cases. However on my "8GB ram/128GB SDD" laptop/tablet hybrid running Qubes, this is a very, very different story altogether.
Devices are only getting smaller, the inability to upgrade drives or memory in the near future, seems to make smart software more important than ever before. Having good overview of VM resources is imho a really, really good thing.
Especially because not everyone runs around with laptops that have 12-16+ GB memory.
- VM colors? It might be my limited knowledge here, but adding extra colors, even if just a few, shouldn't take long? 5-10 minutes to add? I might just be super naive here. But having said that, even a few extra colors would be really nice. Heck, even light and dark color versions, like for example light/dark variants of (blue,red,purple,green, etc.).
I did not have much time to look around, so perhaps I just missed some of the changes, but this is my first impression nontheless.
Having said that, I'm really, really excited about the increased virtualization security and the AdminVM features. Can't say nothing else but that it's an amazing job you guys did there (and a lot of hard work too, which we end users should appreciate more).
Most of them
rarely touch the Manager.
Qubes is moving towards business users, we already know that much. But are the regular users getting ignored now as a result? or are both still being seen as primary users?
It's clear that Qubes 4 took a lot of hard work, so perhaps there just wasn't enough time to work on everyday touch and feels, like proper GUI and user experience.
But the deep worry that Qubes might or might not be giving up on normal users, is definitely there for me. I have high hopes for Qubes to change the PC/Mobile environment of the future, forcing the hand on any other OS out there. There should be no issues to support both users and businesses.
It's not that I believe this, but the elephant is still in the room. Are users getting ignored now? or was it just because Qubes 4 had so much work that there was little time left for anything else?
If the latter is indeed the case, what is the next everyday user experience development in planning? Gnome 3? Return of GUI tools such as backup? Graphics in VM's for high end graphics? Gaming even? I mean, I do believe if these mentioned issues were fixed, Qubes could draw in quite a lot of new users.
Heck many gamers care about privacy and security too, there is a large user-base there if you manage to make gaming through virtualization work smoothly.
Think about it, how highly connected gamers are through gaming news etc., if gaming worked in Qubes, it'd in my opinion draw a lot of positive attention, and a likely substantial Qubes userbase growth. Getting graphics to work in Qubes is being seen as a low priority, for the life of me, I cannot see why this is the case, with so many potential new Qubes users laying in wait.
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We have just released Qubes 4.0-rc1:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/07/31/qubes-40-rc1/
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On Fri, Aug 04, 2017 at 10:28:45PM
> Start failed: internal error: libxenlight failed to create new domain
> 'sys-firewall'
Make sure you have VT-x and VT-d enabled in BIOS.
(...)
Probably yes - without VT-x and VT-d, initial configuration failed.
Hello,
Am 05.08.2017 10:28 vorm. schrieb "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki" <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>:(...)Probably yes - without VT-x and VT-d, initial configuration failed.
I have no restarted installation on my Lenovo X200 with VT-x and VT-d enabled but it seems that the installation hangs after booting up.I have removed rhgb quiet and set console=vga to see what is happening. After the first few lines the displays clears and I get a black screen while the drive LED is on (so there seems to be some activity, but nothing happens.I remember that there were some issues with installing Qubes on a X200.
(...)
ANY DUMMY CAN USE QUBES!!!! Any old dumb computer illiterate windows user can learn how to use Qubes in 10 minutes. If you think I am exaggerating you really need to come down to earth, you're not special.
The hardrd part of Qubes is forcing yourself to compartmentalize and thinking of the system in that way. Some people can't do it. But that has nothing to do with a technical learning curve, which is no different then windows. But it seems people in this community want to change that, probably for the reasons I stated in my previous post.
Although itl isn't the typical linux type, and from Joanna's github post it seems like its more of her thinking the Qubes-manager is ugly and bulky. So i'm crossing my fingers we don't lose any UI functionality.
But I also wouldn't mind if they turned me into a money asset like windows so they can keep designing it for home users...lol
I look at things differently. You are referring to linux architecture and developers, while I'm referring to the majority of its users and community members, as the Product.
The forever problem of linux, is the self fulfilling prophecies from people who want to feel superior over others.
Alright, I respect that, we see some things differently. But the discussion is good, it does not have to come down to agreeing in the end.
I don't like customers being turned into assets though. The way I see it, it essentially make people "not people" anymore, customer service is out of the window, it's all about cheating and manipulating people into making the best use of them, rather than making a fair trade between a company and a customer. So I kind of black out when I see business models that turn people into assets, I really, really don't like that approach.
But I do really agree that I wouldn't mind Qubes taking a fee, ask for more donations, or focus partly or entirely on business users. They do a lot of hard work, and regardless of the target group, the change will be for the better of humanity. Perhaps it's asking too much for Qubes to focus on both companies and end-users at the same time, nontheless, I do hope they can manage to do that.
It's obvious they had their hands full on Qubes 4 too, so it might just be that and we're reading too much into the issue here at hand. But lets see, with time comes answers. I just hope it wiill be in good time rather the long wait.
You are going to be someones asset or product as part of nature, whether you know it or not.
The ends justify the means to me. Especially if it means being able to use Qubes or not.
I also think its silly to not support secure boot, simply because the idea was created by Microsoft. FSF/Richard Stallman supporters who are against secure boot, is like Bernie supporters not voting for hillary. Seems more spiteful then practical.
Well yeah, only if one allows oneself to become a victim. We can oppose and create balance in the world.
Also secure boot is entirely pointless in a stateless computer. A non-stateless computer has a lot of closed source firmware which can be either buggy (which closed software have proven to almost always be), and backdoored, which is either illegal, can be abused by other than for the intended, and is at the fringe limit crossing into the realm of human rights.
We don't need closed source firmware, it only creates problems, and no benifit or solutions, other than maintaining market shares through force, rather than surviving on good customer service and customer support.
We don't need companies that leech on society.
I gather you think the world is ruled by bullies, and that you think it's okay. If so, using that perspective, we just have to become the bullies towards to big companies who wants to make use of us. By the end of the day, we the people are what matter, humanity matter, not some greedy individuals behind a large company. Having said that, I'm not a fanatic against big companies, but they must behave, or I'll be against them.
You can promote change, but we have to work with what we got right now.
And right now secure boot would of stopped hacking teams insyde bios attacks, which some experts said could be exploited remotely, and would of worked on most ami bios as well. Without it whats the point? Why even bother with Qubes? Like you said hardware has backdoors, and if bios also has no protections. Whats the point then?
The problem for me is this is not a cool tech experiment. Its for practical use.
ah I see, I follow you now.
I'm not entirely sure how effective Anti-Evil-Maid is into detecting change in the BIOS/UEFI, perhaps someone can enlighten us on the topic? Can AEM be tricked or bypassed? Practically or theoretically?
Though Joanna (head of Qubes) have said it might just be some years, if I remember correctly, before we might see true stateless computers. I'm not sure if anyone with resources would want to commit to such a thing, but it would definitely help us all out. I hope she can convince someone with resources with her goal for a true stateless pc.
But meanwhile, we have to live with closed off firmware indeed, and it would be interesting to know how effective and trustworthy AEM is.
I suppose it might also be possible to hardware firewall off any incoming signals to the computers BIOS/UEFI, which most routors do by default these days. At this point, it should be a simple matter to have a team to test if any BIOS/UEFI are phoning home.
The only way someone can attack a BIOS/UEFI is if they have a leak through the firewall, which be be gained by trojan horses by either user mistakes and hidden software malware.
The only other method, would be to have the BIOS/UEFI to phone home regularly, so that it can open up the hardware firewall, and these can be detected easily if someone keeps taps on them.
In other words, our BIOS/UEFI should only be exploitable if our firewalls are not set up properly or we make mistakes on the internet.
If I'm not mistaken, I don't want to claim to be an expert on this topic, I'm definitely not an expert. But as far as I understand the issue, this is the limit.
We should probably try stirrer back on-topic though, this is more Qubes general discussion than Qubes 4 discussion.
Unlike secure boot, aem does not stop a compromise, only notifies you of a change which might indicate a compromise has happened, which basically is a prompt to buy a new pc.
Reading posts on the forums tells me it can be buggy and false alarms happen though.
Intel says you need 3 things for the best boot protection. Secure boot, trusted boot, and measured boot. I'm a total noob but I believe aem falls into trusted boot category? So I wonder if its possible to use both? And I have no idea what measured boot is.
Another thing to consider is that if you use a usb key, which makes most sense to use with aem, then you can't use a sys-usb at the same time. So it depends on your threat model and how you use your system. Someone might have to correct me on this but I believe this to be the case.
Well yeah, most people with resources and knowhow to attack the BIOS/UEFI are governments. If you become a target of those, you really need to watch your step, in all liklihood, most if not all, would eventually get caught if they repeatedly appear on the internet with something that can tie them previous instances. Eventually you build up a profile that can lead to your detection, or vulnerabilities to use against your system.
I don't think we need to worry about regular and everyday hackers meaning to do harm, after all, these attacks are mostly only worth it on high profile people.
ALso in your scenario, BIOS/UEFI is still closed source firmware. It can be backdoored, and backdoors can be used by others than the creators. But it remains a fact (for now at least), that only groups with a lot of resources, can use these attacks, and they will only invest it into high target profile people.
Regarding the USB while Qubes isn't booted, that is a really good point. I've been thinking about that too, maybe create our own USB with open source firmware which can be hash value verified after it is turned into a binary package sitting on the USB sticker. But my knowledge is too limited to say for sure if this is possible, but it's worth studying more. There are some tools out there already as it is, but it's a bit cumberstone and "do it yourself".
Albeit for now, these USB attacks appear to be exotic and rare enough to ignore for low profile targets (for now).
However AEM should detect changes between reboots at least.
Hello,
after having problems to install Qubes on my X200 I have installed 4rc1 on my other laptop (Lenovo W540). Installation was sucessfull and the only tweak I needed was to remove iommu=no-igfx from grub boot.
I have uses Qubes 4rc1 now for ~2,5 hours, my feedback so far:
positive:
feedback so far, I continue to test.
- PhR
> IDEA "QuickstartBar": Could we get something like a shortcut
> so that a launch bar will open up, where I can enter either bash
> commands or something like: untrusted:firefox and then Firefox
> opens in my AppVM named untrusted (general syntax:
> AppVM:Command/Program? task completion would even be easier?
Beyond what you can do with alt-f2 (in xfce) + searching + arrow key navigation?
> The AppVM widget is only showing sys-usb, sys-net,
> sys-firewall, not other AppVMs which are running.
If this concerns VMs you've created yourself, this should probably be fixed in the next update. Or do you mean the 'devices' widget?
> The "Create Qubes VM" menu entry could also be enhanced so
> that we have the option to create a clone from an existing VM.
> Maybe via something like an additional option "Clone from
> <LIST>"
Not sure I'd use this often enough for it to make sense -- isn't this part of what dispvms are for?
> Working with USB devices: Could we improve the handling of usb
> devices. Currently it seems that it is impossible to add a
> usb-device to a VM without touching the terminal.
Huh? That should be there now, even if it doesn't look the part, and isn't very intuitive (devices widget in notification area? Or doesn't that do usb devices yet? (I can't test this myself due to a different bug)).
> From user perspective I would like to get a notification popup
> as soon as I attach something to my laptop, then allowing me to
> choose with the next click where to attach this device to.
>
> If I am attaching a device it is most time because I need to get
> this device into an AppVM.
> Fonts/Display Resolution seems to be different compared to
> Qubes 3.2.
>
> My Laptop has a 3K resolution 2880x1620 Pixels. In 4rc1 the
> qubes window frames (which seems to be rendered in dom0) are
> small, but the content in the window (content of the AppVM) is
> using a bigger font (DPI-size).
>
> How can this be resolved?
Does this help? https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/qubes-users/hidpi$20vm|sort:relevance/qubes-users/GQOLttJeJTg/hubZ7gX8AwAJ ?
> qvm-top ... seems to be gone, how can I quickly get a list of
> all running VMs?
try qvm-ls
> I now have to enter the name of the target AppVM when pasting
> via global clipboard (Shift+Ctrl+V). While this adds more
> security, it is a pain for the user, when copying a lot. Could
> it make possible to have the option to get a slightly easier
> copy&paste process:
>
> the current appvm, to which the window belongs is already
> selected in the list of the target VM.
>
> If the user hits Enter two (!) times, the content of clipboard
> would be pasted into this AppVM clipboard.
Agreed.
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On Tue, Aug 01, 2017 at 12:42:01PM -0700, mikih...@gmail.com wrote:
> Some bugs, one pretty deal breaking:
Thanks for the report.
> If I remove an application from the appmenu, I am unable to set it again. More specifically I can set it in the VM-settings, but it won't show up in the Appmenu again.
> The color of a VM can be changed, but again this is not reflected in the Appmenu. The VM itself (the running apps) have the correct window color.
Created ticket for this:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2952
You can see there for a workaround.
> Overall performance is OK, starting a Fedora VM takes longer than usual, about 1min. Work VM (not app) didn't start when I selected the chromium app from the appmenu. I had to start the VM from cli and then I could start Chromium.
That's weird, did you get any error?
> The Qubes Manager is greatly missed! Especially the backup-restore. I tried to restore VMs from 3.2 which didn't work at all:
> First it showed a lot of my VMs with the prefix "disps" ? (The backup had only templates and 2 AppVms).
This is because how 4.0 deals with different DispVM settings. To restore
setting of 3.2 as much as possible, it create dispvm for each netvm used
there.
> I had to exclude -x a lot of Vms, honestly a pain when I just wanted one important VM to restore,
Instead of excluding, you can list VMs to include, just after backup
path.
> but got several python errors STDOUT and read errors. Restoring all was the same and I had a list with 20 broken VMs, no apps in their menu, starting gave libxl error. I used verbose and the 2 ignore options.
Do you have those messages saved somewhere? That would be really useful
to track down the issue...
> Removing them with cli, all a bit tedious ;(
>
> Finally, If someone knows how to create a VM for iso booting from CLI I would greatly appreciate a short info here.
This is a missing part...
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2951
> Looking forward to some docs/explanation on the changed qvm* tools since we are now supposed to do it from the command line.
There will be separate post about it, but see below.
> E.g. How to make net/proxy/app VM (qvm-create has some classes now...?)
This one is possible also from GUI - in main menu you have "Create Qubes
VM" option and there you have "provides network" option which allow you
to create net/proxy VM.
> qvm-prefs options (kernel boot extern/intern and netvm settings),
There is qvm-prefs --help-properties, which shows details about each
property.
> changes with LVM pools(? there was a option --boot-root-from-file?) , booting VM from iso file etc.
See above...
- --
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab
A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text.
Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing?
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This aint the 90s anymore. low level actors have become equal to state level. Its probably partly why nsa built prism, only way they could one up them. 90% of ddos sites are run by 15 year olds. 2005 saw a dramatic increase, but 2012 was a real turning point, we are in an epidemic now.
I was complaining about bios exploits 10 years ago and people were lying to themselves then, nothing has changed.
And if you are worried about the gov't spying on you. Don't do anything online, period. Why are you even using a computer? Even worse, a cellphone. Just assume most things are not private.
Listen, you're not reading what I'm saying, especially across multiple of posts in this thread. Also there is a very, very thin line between fear and anxiety. I'm not planning to live a life of concerns through anxiety, I live a life with concerns through real fear from real threats. Fear is rationalized and real, while anxiety is based on baseless emotions which swallow you up. I'm pragmatic, I do what can be done now, I do not want to live in anxiety, or bash words around aimlessly. Things has to be done, and not just talking about it.
Security and privacy has always been a concern of real fear for me, especially with democracy rotting away slowly, year by year, which is made worse by technology that is increasingly, and slowly ever more so, being used against people. The fall of democracy, is what worries me, especially with the technology that can be used to either protect it, or destroy it.
I worry about the future. I do not worry much about the past, like the 90s repeating itself, rather new threats have the risk of emerging. They too must be handled with concerns of rationalized fear, and not through baseless anxiety. Even if there is just 5% risk, it must be taken seriously, and approached logically.
I do not see it as being good or constructive to continue discussing this in this thread, if you want, make a new thread and throw a link here, then I'll follow and keep discussing with you for as long as I have free time to do so. We're getting vastly off-topic here, in a thread which is about Qubes 4 release, we shouldn't talk more about this in this thread.
this is probbaly a good time to try the unofficial qubes irc chat on freenode.
I've installed 4.0-rc1 on Intel i5-7200u Asus UX410UA laptop. System was rebooting after grub menu in loop until I removed 'iommu=no-igfx' option, then it boots successfully. System does not have discrete GPU, VT-i is on, booting in CMS (BIOS Legacy mode), because in EFI mode system reboots immediately after selection of any option in installation image's boot menu.
I have problems with touchpad, though: it works with 0.1-1 sec lags, pointer jumps here and there. Sometimes it freezes for minutes. Several tens of i2c_hid errors added to dmesg per second:
i2c_hid i2c-ELAN1200:00: i2c_hid_get_input: incomplete report (16/16466).
I believe it's Fedora 25 problem: https://bbs.archlinux.org/viewtopic.php?id=226194
My mistake, it's Arch forum, but the problem is the same. I've booted from KDE Neon Live USB (Ubuntu-based with 4.8.0 kernel) and the touchpad works flawlessly.
for me fresh install on x230 using legacy boot and there is no grub, so
how make the iommu=no-igfx edit?
install again using EFI boot but installer stuck at beginning "Xen 4.8.1
(c/s) EFI loader" screen.
I don't know what this fear vs anxiety things is, but neither is automatically rational.
If you are not using secure boot, you are not even reasonably secure. This needs to be discussed here. Worry about the future of Qubes if you care about those things.
Wallpapers (and first impressions...) are really important, even more so with less GUI snacks.On 08/04/2017 07:19 AM, Zrubi wrote:But still feels like a bare naked login screen. IMHO this should be just as important as the Qubes boot (splash) screen.Which also have similar aesthetic. Do you think about just some better background there, or some bigger change?A would say it's needs a bigger change. But of course this is really subjective, and currently do not have time to design a qubes related skin for the login manager :( So this is just my (and my surroundings) opinion. Handle with sustenance ;)On a related note, I would love to see some better Qubes graphics design. Especially, in my opinion, better built-in choices for the desktop wallpaper. Good default wallpaper makes a big difference in first impression of an OS. (And until #215 is implemented, users who aren't comfortable with Linux will have a hard time figuring out how to set a custom dom0 wallpaper themselves, and will probably expose dom0 to an untrusted image in any case.) Maybe there are some graphics designers or professional photographers in the Qubes community. I wonder if a call for wallpaper submissions or something similar could help?