Hi Dick,
Well, yes, but, "it depends". What you describe is found, more-or-less. There are some (relatively simple) mechanical processes that generate this. Since they are mechanical, they are meant to be taken as non-judgmental, non-subjective lab instruments for examining syntax collected from nature, in the wild. Like 17th century telescopes, they are blurry, and allow subjective interpretation. You see something, but its not always clear what you see. Different ones give different views. There is a fairly broad selection, each of which gives different details, even as they agree on the overall structure. The good news is that they agree on the overall structure, and that this overall structure agrees with classical symbolic linguistics, at a general level; the game is now to get to the next level of detail. The details are currently too blurry to say "ah ha, this linguist was exactly right, and that one was exactly wrong". It seems likely that everyone was a little-bit right, and a little-bit wrong. So it goes.
Let me give a concrete example, the MST example. This is a one-page recap of Deniz Yuret's PhD thesis, circa 1998. I hope this is not too off-track.
Here, one starts with some reasonably large corpus, say wikipedia, or project gutenberg. (you eventually discover that wikipedia is very very deficient in action verbs, like run, jump, cry, sing, sail, think. But that's for much much later. It does, however, affect the statistics very deeply.)
One then counts the co-occurrence of word-pairs. How often is word w seen to the left of word v, in a window of size 6 or 8 or so? (Window size mostly doesn't matter much). Call this count N(w,v). This is a "real" quantity, based on "facts", its a measurement of "reality". Corpus-dependent, but based on language captured in-the-wild.
Next: compute a magical quantity: the "point-wise mutual information", MI or PMI. I can explain/motivate why it's correct, or "best", just not here, not now. There are other possibilities, too, but the other ones are less coherent, they don't quite make sense. The MI is a simple, explicit formula:
MI(w,v) = log_2 N(w,v) N(*,*) / N(w,*) N(*,v)
where N(w,*) = sum-over-all-v N(w,v) and N(*,*) = sum-total of all word-pairs that were counted. There is a very long history rooted in mathematics and physics and information theory that explains what MI is, and why it is a "good thing", suitable for this task. (That is, MI has nothing do do with language: it works for chemistry, too, and astronomy, etc. It's generic.)
For linguistics, MI is nice because ... when two words co-occur, it has a large value, and when they don't, it has a small (or negative) value. Typical range for MI is from minus 20 to plus 40 or so (depending on corpus size). Examples:
MI(Northern, Ireland) = +25
MI(the, and) = -10
Yuret's Ansatz: we can, we should use MI to tell us which links in a dependency parse are the correct links. The highest-MI links are correct, in some certain objective sense, and the lowest-MI ones are garbage, nonsense.
The algorithm: MST "Maximum Spanning Tree". Take a sentence. Draw an edge that connects every possible word to every other, i.e. a clique, a big tangle, and then remove all links with the lowest MI until a tree is left. (alternately, start with no edges at all, and add the highest-MI edge, then the second highest, etc. until you have a tree, and no unconnected words). Then declare this to be the "correct parse", brush the dust off your overalls, and call it a day. Here's what happens when you do this, and some critiques, and how to do better:
-- Yuret does this, and finds 85% accuracy or thereabouts, vs. a hand-annotated corpus. (Which I think needs to be acknowledged as a huge success! Viz: linguists are not hallucinating; the structure is "actually there", in "true reality".)
-- Prepositions cause problems for MST.
-- During the search for the tree, you can (arbitrarily) choose to reject crossing links. Or not.
-- During the search for the tree, you can arbitrarily choose to connect all words (this might not make sense for interjections, coughs, sneezes, non-verbal hand-motions, etc.)
-- During the search for the tree, you can explicitly exclude loops (but perhaps loops are desirable, so...)
-- The above did not describe a link from "root" to head-word. (there's a way to fix this).
-- The links are unlabeled: the algo does not tell you if they are subj, obj, etc.
The last criticism is perhaps the deepest, most significant. I claim I know exactly how to get past it. Also, I claim I know how to get past the 85% accuracy. I will not explain in this email, though.
The moral of the story:
-- One can objectively measure the existence of dependencies.
-- One has a lot of alternatives to explore (tree or loops allowed? cross or no-cross allowed? Use MI or use something else? (others have explored "something else", were less successful, but more famous. Standard story of fame and prestige in academia))
-- The MST or MST-like approaches are a way-point, not the final end-point. A step on the path.
Oh, I should mention: some of the neural-net stuff, like word2vec, GloVe, can be kind-of understandable as sort-of MST-like things, if you look at them the right way. There's a lot to be said, but it does offer a bridge between the "here" of symbolic linguistics, and the there of the deep-learning crowd, a unification of the two.
So, my ruminations about "shallow" and "deep" are more along these lines: Lets accept what MST does (or some variant of it, according to taste and evidence), and call this "shallow", so that "shallow" is a way-marker on the map, from here to there. So, shallow is giving us some-kind of dependency parse, mostly-ish accurate, with deficiencies, but its "unarguable" because it is based on measured statistics. Variations of the algorithm give somewhat different results, but they are all in the same ballpark.
So what's the "deep structure"? Well, its the structure we want to actually have. Say, your life's work. Or perhaps Melcuk's MTT. Or maybe predicate-argument structure. Or Sowa's concept nets. Or some mashup of these. I don't particularly care: all I know is that it's the general direction for the next way-point on the journey.
How do we get there? Well, there has to be some relatively simple collection of formulas and algorithms that are mechanical in their action. The quality of these mechanisms will be judged on how closely they line up with the more sophisticated theories of syntax+semantics. My laboratory bench has a bunch of these mechanisms laying about. I cannot assemble them and evaluate them fast enough. I am totally certain that they will work: preliminary evidence is very good, and besides, most or all of them are already based on tricks and techniques that many others have described, and have found to be useful and successful.
To get back to your example: it's not so simple, because it includes morphology, which I did not talk about, above. How can one find out that "rain", "rains" "rained" and "raining" are somehow the same word, sharing a stem, but with different suffixes? Well, there is a way to do this, but its another, different mechanism to be bolted on. How can one discover that "it was raining" and "it rained" are vaguely synonymous? They don't even have the same word-count. Well, that is yet another mechanism, that goes elsewhere, attaching a different way. There's no particular graph to rule-them-all. There's a morpho-graph that draws an edge between "rain" and "ing". There's a semantic graph that treats "wasraining" as a single unit. There's a third graph that attaches "it" to it's referent. Except, for this example, "it" refers is a pleonastic-it to an implicit, non-specified imaginary place-time, rather than to some explicit word in a previous sentence. The three graphs are related, but have different functions, they illustrate different relationships.
-- Linas