The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, named after pioneering linguists Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf, explores the connection between language and thought. It is commonly divided into two components: linguistic relativity and linguistic determinism.
Linguistic relativity says that the structure of a language shapes how its speakers perceive and interpret the world. In contrast, linguistic determinism is much more rigid and claims that language entirely governs thought, confining cognition within the limits of linguistic expression. Linguistic determinism has been largely dismissed due to insufficient empirical evidence.
The milder form, linguistic relativity, is widely accepted. Research indicates that language structure influences cognitive functions, including how we perceive colors, navigate spatial relationships, and conceptualize time.
Research has shown that speakers of different languages may perceive the same external sensory information differently, due to how their language categorizes those stimuli.
A classic example is the way languages divide the color spectrum. English, for instance, uses basic color terms like “red,” “blue,” and “green,” where other languages, such as Russian, distinguish between lighter and darker shades of blue with separate terms. Studies have shown that Russian speakers are faster at distinguishing between these two types of blue compared to English speakers.
Similarly, languages with different ways of conceptualizing spatial relationships can lead to differences in how speakers think about space. For example, some indigenous languages, such as Guugu Yimithirr of Australia, use cardinal directions (north, south, east, west) instead of relative terms (left, right, in front, behind) to describe spatial relationships. Research has found that speakers of such languages are better at keeping track of direction and orientation due to the linguistic emphasis on geographical awareness.
Research suggests that our language influences how we encode, store, and retrieve memories.
One of the most famous studies in this area is the work of University of California Irvine psychology and law professor Elizabeth Loftus. She demonstrated how the language used in eyewitness testimony shape people’s recollections of events.
In her study, participants who were asked to describe a car accident using different verbs—such as “smashed” or “contacted”—reported different estimates of the speed of the vehicles and even recalled seeing broken glass when there was none. This finding underscores how language shapes the way we reconstruct our memories, making them susceptible to suggestion and other manipulation.
Language also aids in the organization of memory. For instance, we use language to label and categorize experiences, helping us to recall them more easily. Without language, our ability to structure and make sense of the world around us would be significantly impaired.
Cognitive science also shows that language plays a role in problem-solving. When confronted with a challenge, people often verbalize the problem or “talk through” possible solutions, either out loud or internally. This process helps to structure thoughts, clarify the problem, and organize potential strategies. For example, research has shown that people tend to think more clearly and effectively when they use language to break down complex tasks into manageable steps.
In some cases, however, language slows problem-solving. For example, the well-known verbal overshadowing effect refers to when verbalizing a solution interferes with nonverbal tasks, such as remembering the details of an image or solving a spatial puzzle. This shows that, while language is an important tool for organizing thought, it is not always the most efficient medium for certain kinds of cognitive tasks.
Another fascinating aspect of the relationship between language and thought is bilingualism.
Research has shown that bilingual people often exhibit greater cognitive flexibility and enhanced executive functions compared to monolingual people. The constant switching between languages provides mental exercise, improving the brain’s ability to control attention, inhibit distractions, and solve problems. Bilingual people also tend to have an increased ability to take on different perspectives, as they are accustomed to navigating multiple linguistic and cultural frameworks.
Interestingly, the influence of language on cognition may vary depending on the context. Bilingual people often switch languages based on the social context, and this ability to move back and forth between linguistic systems has broader cognitive benefits, leading to enhanced problem-solving abilities and greater adaptability in novel situations.
John,
Great topics, interesting sources.
Let me propose to change "Thought" to "Matter" in your subject line. To keep it nearer to applied ontologies.
Alex
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John,
So many thoughts are crowding my head!
You've touched on at least two crucial topics.
vision and video processing
Starting at about three months, when a human infant realizes that if they focus both eyes on the same spot, a wonderful three-dimensional image appears, they begin to process vision and video images. This gradually refines their mind. What language do they use?
Look around you at the surfaces glowing in different colors. Is it possible to describe them in any human language so precisely that someone else can reproduce them even in their imagination?
There is a hypothesis—a postulate, I think, by R. Hubbard—that a person remembers everything they have seen, specifically the full 3D picture. However, many have blocked or partial access to this primary knowledge.
A thought is always a thought about something that is not usually a thought. If we have a thought about a thought, it is already a second-order or higher-order thought.
In our minds, we often work with various images—snapshots from reality. For example, one person tells another how they were awarded the Nobel Prize.
When reading fiction, many people imagine both people and circumstances.
the structure of knowledge, including in formal ontology
Formal ontology consists of theoretical propositions and facts. Advanced formal ontology also contains proofs and other types of reasoning.
Theory, in turn, consists of axioms, definitions, theorems, proofs, and refutations.
And it's true that we usually encounter one or another stream of thoughts. The rest are images: pictures, sounds, and, less often, warmth and touch.
But before a theory can emerge, we need an accurate description of the phenomena that typically repeat themselves.
This is usually a description of luminous surfaces in their movement and change. Less often, we turn to luminous points, for example, when looking at the stars.
And last but not least: 7 is not a thought, it's a math object - the gem of math.
When Weierstrass gave the definition of a continuous real function that is not differentiable at any point, Poincaré is said to have said: we don’t need such objects.
Alex
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Dear and respected colleagues,
Measuring is disturbing. Alden’s remarks make sense only in the perspective of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty principle.
Data is definitely embodied in matter. Meaning, ie.e data referenced to what ir represents, is not. Landauer describes heat dissipation as related to erasing data. But meaning is not embodied.
There is no mass-energy equivalence. Let us be a bit more precise in calling up theories when we argue in favor of one viewpoint or another. Is consciousness reducible to matter?
Thought, never mind language, deserve a more nuanced understanding than the matter reductionism.
Mihai Nadin
John,
I agree with the need to distinguish phenomena from their representations.
From an anthropological perspective, I would only add one point: the representations are not neutral.
Once we move into FOL, OWL, CL or any formal system, we also inherit the historical segmentation of alphabetic, numeric, and graphic chains that makes those systems possible. Computers reason over logic, but the logic itself carries the organization produced by those symbolic forms.
So maybe the key issue is not brain processes, but how each representational choice shapes what can be expressed and what can be reasoned about.
Thank you, John, for the feedback.
Also, all the other members for sending me your related work to me.
Rogerio
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So part of the confusion in this thread may simply come from assuming that the syntactic shape of the representation determines its conceptual scope
—when in fact the operational semantics may already be quietly doing something closer to second- or higher-order logic.
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Doug
Our approaches are close. As for
"A problem with ontology is that to be formal, an ontological term needs
to have a firm definition, specifying whether a specific newly
considered thing is or is not an instance of the concept the term
encodes. All boundary conditions are not known when the term is
defined. When a newly considered object/event/concept is considered, a
change in definition may be desired to include or exclude the new thing
from the class of things represented by the term."
Here we're talking about the construction and application of theory. This is a large and subtle topic that has a simple impact on formal ontologistics:
Theories need to be formalized.
True, one can also formalize descriptions of phenomena. And that's where a treatise on the phenomenology of matter comes in.
Alex
John,
You wrote "There are various subsets of FOL, such as OWL…"
But OWL isn't a subset of a first-order language. It's a subset of a higher-order language in which, as you point out,
"...do any reasoning about the predicates, relations, and functions that are represented by symbols in FOL. For that, it's necessary to go beyond FOL to second-order (SOL) or higher-order (HOL) logics."
This is easily seen in the OWL2 Primer:
"ClassAssertion( :Person :Mary )"
where Person is a unary predicate.
And here shows in detail what part of HOL OWL2 is.
And the beauty is that OWL2 knowledge processing algorithms, i.e., reasoners, operate without FOL.
We could say that OWL2-reasoners demonstrate how to work with texts written in HOL.
It's important to distinguish between First Order language (FOl) and any First Order Logic (FOL) written in FOl.
Alex
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