This is exactly why it is important to see how well it is protected. We want it to be as secure as possible.
The experiment could not happen at all with the Windows kernel since it's not open source. Some people claim open source has the advantage of many eyes. Is that true? That's the question.
When you want to really test your company's security you hire some pen testers. They may find security holes. Don't get triggered if they find some problems.
The security of the Linux kernel, the high code churn, the volatility of kernel API changes, kernel CI and automated testing system, the shenanigans around dissing CVE numbers - these are all concerns and topics raised by many security minded people in various konferences. Some knuckleheads get really butt hurt when such questions arise.
I follow the GRSecurity and the PaX team's work for decades now. Just take a look at some of the blog posts at
https://grsecurity.net/blog - not too rarely it turns out that bug Y which is recently fixed in the kernel (and were present for X years where sometimes X is big number) is already fixed in GRSecurity for many years. With that I don't want to advocate for GRSecurity per se, I'm just always appalled to see how the kernel has serious problems around security and a huge space to improve.
So newbies are not welcome, then how would those three patches from the publication would actually land in the kernel? They would have had the researchers not warned the maintainers after the OK signal was already given. Quote from the publication:
"At the same time, we point out
the correct fixing of the bug and provide our correct patch.
In all the three cases, maintainers explicitly acknowledged
and confirmed to not move forward with the incorrect patches"
It's all of our interest to make the kernel more secure. Yes, sometimes that means a stealth pen test.
Maybe UMN made some mistakes but to ban them is too harsh. The takeaway should be that the patches would have gone through and how that process can be fortified.