by judges’ abusive 100% self-exoneration
from complaints against them,
whereby they make their abuse of power riskless
and
how you can benefit from
the professional law research and arguments below
in your own complaint
and
by bringing judges’ abuse to the attention of
the more than 20 presidential candidates,
each of whom desperately needs to gain
national attention, campaign volunteers, and donations
by breaking a story that makes him or her
We the People’s Champion of Justice
Petition for review of the dismissal of a complaint
against U.S. District of Columbia Circuit (DCC)
Chief Judge Merrick Garland, Then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh,
and their peers and colleagues
for their self-interested abusive
dismissal of 100% of the 478 complaints against them and
denial of 100% of petitions to review those dismissals
filed during 11 years,
which complaint DCC referred to
Supreme Court Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.,
and he referred for disposition to the 11th Circuit,
whose chief judge likewise dismissed it
in his personal and judicial class interest
By
Dr. Richard
Cordero, Esq.
Ph.D., University of
Cambridge, England
M.B.A., University of Michigan Business School
D.E.A., La Sorbonne, Paris
The judicial complaint, the dismissal
order, this petition for review, and
all intervening documents are found in the file at:
Re: Misconduct
Petition 19-90053 & 11-19-90054
From referred
complaint DC-18-90089
Dear Mr. Gerstenlauer,
I, Dr. Richard Cordero, Esq., (hereinafter Dr. Cordero), hereby petition
the Judicial Council of the 11th Circuit for review of the dismissal
by Chief Judge Ed
Carnes (C. J. Carnes) of the above-captioned judicial misconduct complaints, which originated
in a referral from Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.
I declare
under penalty of perjury that the statements that I have made in this review petition
are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
A. The original complaint and the judges’ Abuse of
Complaint Procedure through Abusive Orchestrated reciprocal exoneration
1. Dr. Cordero publicly filed the original complaint
under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (the Act), 28 U.S.C.
§§351-364(*>jur:24fn18a) against Chief Judge Merrick Garland, Judge Brett
Kavanaugh, and their circuit peers and district colleagues in the U.S. District
of Columbia Circuit (DCC) for dismissing 100% of the 478 complaints about them
filed under the Act in DCC, and denying 100% of the petitions for review of
such dismissals during at least the 1oct06-30sep17 11-year period(†>OL2:748).
The materials
corresponding to the(* †>prefix:page number references) are found in Dr.
Cordero’s two-volume study of judges and their judiciaries, titled and
downloadable thus:
Exposing Judges'
Unaccountability and
Consequent Riskless Wrongdoing:
Pioneering the news and publishing field of
judicial unaccountability reporting* †
*
Volume 1: http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL/DrRCordero-Honest_Jud_Advocates.pdf >all
prefixes:page# up to prefix OL:page393
† Volume 2: http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Honest_Jud_Advocates.pdf >from page
OL2:394
a. Download the volume files using MS
Edge, Firefox, or Chrome; it may happen that Internet Explorer only downloads a
blank page.
c. In each downloaded file, go to the
Menu bar >View >Navigation Panels >Bookmarks panel and use its
bookmarks, which make navigating to the contents’ numerous(* †>blue
references)
very easy.
2. The factual basis for the above statement is provided
by the statistics(complaint, †>OL2:795§C) that judges were required
under 28 U.S.C. §604(h)(2)
(*>jur:26fn23a), to submit and did
submit to Congress and the public.
Through their 100% complaint dismissal and petition denial, the
DCC judges committed “Abuse of Complaint Procedure” through “Abusive Orchestrated” self-interested reciprocal exoneration (cf.
Rule 10 of the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings (the
Rules)).
B. The granting of impunity
to Then-Judge Kavanaugh
3. At the outset, 11th Circuit Chief
Judge Ed Carnes (C.J. Carnes) excluded Judge Kavanaugh from the complaint by
alleging that he was no longer a member of the DCC, but rather a justice of the
Supreme Court, whose members are not covered by the Act. With the stroke of a
pen, C.J. Carnes granted impunity to a member of the class of judges. He did so
by disregarding the secular principle “the offense travels with the offender”.
4. That principle provides that a person is not
absolved from responsibility for his acts simply because at the time of reviewing
a complaint against him he no longer holds the same office that he did at the
time of committing the alleged offense. The jurisdiction of the court that
could have determined the complaint if it had been filed while the person was
holding an office covered under the law or rule that he allegedly violated is
predicated on his having committed the alleged offense, not on his continued holding
of the same office.
5. By disregarding this principle, C.J. Carnes
pretended that the new office conferred impunity on Now-Justice Kavanaugh. Thereby,
the Chief Judge also deprived Dr. Cordero and every other person harmed by
Then-Judge Kavanaugh of any remedy.
6. C.J. Carnes’ gross violation of that secular
principle can be illustrated by arguing the extreme:
a. Hitler’s officers argued that the International Tribunal
at Nuremburg did not have jurisdiction to judge them for the crimes that they
had allegedly committed as officers of the Third Reich because that Reich had
ceased to exist, and consequently, they were no longer officers of it, but
rather simple citizens. The Nuremburg Tribunal rejected that defense because
“the offense travels with the offender”.
b. To rule otherwise would have been an outrage. It
would have deprived the rules of war and conventions against war crimes of any
sense. It would have made a mockery of the principle that ‘murder –and all the
more so crimes against humanity- never prescribes’. This explains why after well
half a century since the end of the Third Reich the U.S. and the rest of the
international community still chase after Hitler’s officers, bring them to
justice, and convict them…and even if delayed, not all justice is denied to
their victims and their relatives.
c. Mutatis mutandis, C.J. Carnes got Now-Justice
Kavanaugh scot-free and made the harm to his victims irreparable.
7. Arguing
comparables, “the offense travels with the offender” has been applied by
federal and state judges in cases involving pedophilic priests and the Catholic
Church:
a. Most charges against them concern offenses that
they committed while the priests served at dioceses other than the current ones
to which the Church transferred them while they were priests, which they may
not be anymore. Neither the priests’ current service elsewhere nor non-priest
status exempts the priests or the Church
from liability regardless of whether the Church, the principal, was ignorant of
the reason for the transfer of the priests, its agents, or carried it
out to effect an institutional cover-up of their crimes.
b. Cf. A company does not escape its debt by being
bought by another, for ‘a debt travels with the debtor’.
8. But Judges Above the Law do not apply to
themselves the principles that they apply to others. So, C.J. Carnes pretends
that the transfer of J. Kavanaugh from DCC to the Supreme Court immunizes him
from responsibility for his abusive exoneration of himself and his DCC peers
and colleagues from 100% of complaints(*>jur:88§§a-c)
and 100% of review petitions, no matter how much such exoneration imputes his
fairness, impartiality, and commitment “to
maintain[ing] public confidence in the judiciary’s ability to redress
misconduct or disability”(Rule 23(b)(1)).
9. Dr. Cordero could have engaged in expensive
and time-consuming law research to provide citations to cases supporting the
above statements. But it would have been a waste of his resources:
a. Neither C.J. Carnes nor his peers and colleagues everywhere
in the Federal Judiciary(*>jur:10-14; †>OL2:548, 748) ever considered subjecting
themselves to the requirements of the Act, in particular, or any other legal
principle or precedent, in general, when they “Orchestrated”
(cf. Rule 10(b)) their reciprocal complaint exoneration.
b. In fact, it would have been naïve and presumptuous
of Dr. Cordero to wishfully think that if he only argued the law competently
with an abundance of citations, the judges who held a 100% self-interested
exoneration record would have had no choice but to rescind their complicit
institutionalized agreement through which they ensured the risklessness of
their misconduct in order to start incriminating themselves and holding each
other accountable and even liable to compensate their victims.
C. The exoneration of “peers and colleagues” nominally and not nominally identified
was contrary to the facts and the Rules
1. The identification of complained-against
judges whose names appeared in official lists
10. Dr. Cordero filed his complaint against DCC C.J.
Garland, Judge Kavanaugh, and their “peers
and colleagues” who participated in the dismissal of 100% of the 478
complaints against them and the denial of 100% of review petition filed during
the 1oct06-30sep17 11-year period.
11. It is counterfactual for C.J. Carnes to state that Dr.
Cordero did not identify those “peers
and colleagues”. In his letter of April 19, 2019, which C.J. Carnes
admitted as “a second supplement”,
Dr. Cordero identified the current judges of DCC as well as the current members
of its Judicial Council as among those “peers
and colleagues”. He even provided the official list of their names that
DCC itself had posted on its website and that he downloaded, printed, and
attached to his April 19 letter.
12. Chief Judge Carnes knew the names of those “peers and colleagues”.
13. There was as a matter of fact no justification for
dismissing Dr. Cordero’s complaint against them on the pretense that he had not
identified them by name. Dr. Cordero did identify them by name.
2. Judges not complained against by name can be
identified through a “limited inquiry”
14. As to the “peers
and colleagues” not nominally identified, e.g., those who had been DCC
chief judges and previous members of the DCC judicial council, C.J. Carnes could
have identified them had he conducted in good faith, impartially, and with due
diligence a Rule 11(b) “limited
inquiry [to] communicate orally or in writing with the complainant, the subject
judge [nominally identified, such as C.J. Garland], and any others who may have
knowledge of the matter [such as Justice Kavanaugh], and may obtain and review
transcripts and other relevant documents” in the possession or under the
control of, for instance, those two judges, any other current or former DCC
judge or council member, the DCC Circuit Executive, the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts(>jur:21fn10), or the Federal
Judicial Center(>jur:22fn11).
15. Rule 11(c) does not authorize a chief judge to exonerate
a subject judge if the latter is not identified by name. A subject judge may be
identified by any other reasonable means, such as the time and place of their
service, and acts, e.g., ‘the
judges serving on the DCC during at least the 1oct06-30sep17 period and
participating in such 100% dismissal and denial’.
16. Do judges reject a complaint against John and Jane Doe?
Of course not, unless the judges are the putative defendants. Judges Above the
Law.
17. C.J. Carnes exonerated his “peers and colleagues” in the DCC from Dr.
Cordero’s Rule 6 complaint as well as himself and those in the 11th
Circuit from the complaint that he identified under Rule 5(a) based on Dr.
Cordero’s.
18. To do so he arrogated to himself the power to insert in
the Rules an exclusionary provision: If a complainant does not state the name
of a subject judge, that judge is exonerated even if his name can be
ascertained through “a limited
inquiry”.
19. By so doing, C.J. Carnes offended against Rule 5(b), which
provides as follows:
5(b) Submission Not Fully Complying with Rule 6. A legible submission in substantial but not
full compliance with Rule 6 must be considered as possible grounds for the
identification of a complaint under Rule 5(a). (emphasis added)
20. Rule 6 does not require that a subject judge be
identified nominally. For its part, Dr. Cordero’s complaint provides ‘grounds for the identification of a complainant’. This statement is supported
by:
Commentary on Rule 5…when a chief judge becomes aware of
information constituting reasonable grounds to inquire into possible misconduct
or disability on the part of a covered judge, and no formal complaint has been
filed, the chief judge has the power in his or her discretion to begin an
appropriate inquiry.
21. All C.J. Carnes needed was “information”, not names…not even a complainant
with a complaint! Once he had such “information”,
he could “inquire”,
whether by himself, a designee, or by appointing a special committee to investigate
not “misconduct”, but
merely “possible misconduct”.
22. Just as he need not be sure that any misconduct had been
committed in order to set in motion an inquiry, he need not be sure of the identity,
never mind the name, of the possibly misconducting judge. But all he wanted to
do was go through the motions of processing yet another complaint in order to
conjure up any pretext to exonerate himself and his “peers and colleagues” everywhere and dismiss it,
just as the DCC judges had dismissed a 100% of 478 complaints against
themselves and denied 100% of review petitions. They all run the processing of
complaints as a sham.
D. 100% self-exoneration is ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’
inherently suspicious and should have led to the appointment of a Rule 11(f) “special committee"
1. Two or three chief judges could not have had
the same views of the law and the facts on 478 complaints for 11 years
23. C.J. Carnes offended against Rule 11(b), which provides
in pertinent part thus:
Rule 11(b). …In conducting the inquiry, the chief judge must
not determine any reasonably disputed issue. Any such determination must be
left to a special committee…and to the judicial council that considers the
committee’s report.
24. Disregarding that injunction, C.J. Carnes did “determine the reasonably disputed
issue” that the judges’ 100% complaint dismissal and 100% petition
denial constituted misconduct through “orchestrated”
abuse of their self-disciplining power in the self-interest of securing 100% exoneration.
25. Self-endowed with impunity, unaccountable judges will escape
any adverse consequence for their past misconduct and be emboldened to continue
and expand their current and future misconduct, harming “the effective and expeditious
administration of justice”, Dr. Cordero, similarly situated
complainants, and the rest of the public left exposed to the same and new forms
of their riskless misconduct.
26. To determine the reasonableness of that issue, this petition
applies the highest standard of proof, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt. Applicable
only in criminal cases, that standard is applied by the trier of facts to
sentence a man or woman to capital punishment or to life imprisonment or to
spend 10, 20, 30 years in prison.
27. To that end, ‘circumstantial
evidence from which reasonable inferences can be raised may be sufficient’(Rule
11(c)(1)(D)). If that standard can be satisfied by the instant complaint, then
its result is reasonable in light of the legal maxim “he who can do the most can do the lesser”.
28. It is beyond a reasonable doubt that 100% of the 478
complaints filed against DCC judges during an 11-year period could not have
been so undoubtedly defective that they warranted dismissal and denial of 100%
of review petitions without even the appointment of a special committee to
investigate them. This could not happen but for the judges-cum-accused
interpreting the Act self-servingly to frustrate its intent of providing for “effective justice” by means of
disciplining judges.
29. It is beyond a reasonable doubt that the two or more DCC
chief judges during that 11-year period could not have held exactly the same views
of the law and the facts so that upon applying them to the different sets of
complaints that they handled during their respective tenure they reached the
same conclusion in 100% of complaints: dismissal. By contrast, their views of
the law and the facts of all non-complaint filings at times coincided and at
times diverged to the point of their writing a dissent.
2. Tens of Judicial Council members could much
less have had the same views but for their abusive orchestrated reciprocal
exoneration agreement
30. The above analysis is only more patently beyond a
reasonable doubt as to the 100% of the review petitions that the DCC Judicial
Council denied during those 11 years: It is composed of 9 members at any point
in time to whom must be added the number of their replacements during that time.
Their unanimous denial of 100% of petitions did not come from shared views of
the law and the merits of the petitions:
31. In any judicial council, there are members with
different backgrounds, attitudes, and loyalties. Some were nominated and
confirmed by one party while others by the other party. Some were circuit judges
while others were district judges.
32. Actually, some were never district judges, who are in
much closer contact with the parties, witnesses, experts, police officers,
prosecutors, jurors, etc., than the circuit judges, who sit in the ivory tower
of a court of appeal and are not exposed to the same set of human contact and
circumstances that generate real or imagined misconduct opportunities.
33. Some circuit judges even overturned the decisions of
district judges or their friends. Yet, none of the 478 complaints gave rise to
“Payday!” vengeful gloating.
34. Despite their substantial differences, the tens of DCC
Judicial Council members agreed unanimously and without exception during those
11 years: 100% of the dismissals by whoever was the chief judge at the time
were right and 100% of the petitions for review were so meritless that not even
one member dissented, whereby no appointment of a special committee was
triggered.
35. When have you seen even only two married people, brought
together by love rather than assignment, agree on everything for 11 years?
36. It is beyond a reasonable doubt that those judges could
not have reached those 100% records by shared views; they did it by self-interest
‘orchestration’.
37. They were confronted with a conflict of interests
between dealing with the complaints and petitions fairly and impartially, and exonerating
without even appointing any committee their “peers
and colleagues”, who might have become their friends after working
together for years or decades; with whom they were ‘stuck’ for their rest of
their life-appointment; and from whom they could fear retaliation if not
exonerated.
38. So they resolved the conflict in their personal and
class interest. They committed “Abuse
of Complaint Procedure” through “Abusive
orchestrated” exoneration of each other (cf. Rule 10 and ¶(a)).
3. The inherently suspicious 100% orchestrated
self-exoneration
39. It is beyond a reasonable doubt that their 100% self-interested
exoneration from 478 complaints and 100% of review petitions filed during 11
years is inherently suspicious.
40. Res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself): “the complaint and review procedure in
the D.C. Circuit must be flawed because if it were not, the results would be
different”; cf. C.J. Carnes’ order of
dismissal, p.8.
41. Those results would not have obtained but for a complicit reciprocal complaint dismissal
agreement that replaced the fair and impartial determination of each
complaint and each petition with a rubberstamp: ‘Today I exonerate you and
tomorrow you exonerate me or my friends’. The judges “orchestrated”(Rule 10(b)) their predetermined exoneration.
42. While “Res ipsa loquitur” is a legal maxim, the concept
of ‘inherently suspicious’ derives from the common sense that “a reasonable
person” and lay people are supposed to have and apply as jurors. To something
‘inherently suspicious’, their common sense reaction would be to look into it.
43. A fortiori, C.J. Carnes, duty-bound to ensure “the effective and expeditious
administration of justice” based on facts and the law, was required to
appoint a Rule 11(f) special committee. Its duty is to investigate “reasonably disputed issues”
thus:
Commentary on Rule 14. ...The special-committee’s duty — and
that of their staff — is at all times to be impartial seekers of the truth. Rule 14(b) contemplates that
material evidence will be obtained by the committee…Staff or others who are [obtaining
it] should regard it as their role to present evidence representing the entire
picture…subpoena powers are available.
44. Instead, C.J. Carnes protected his personal and class
interests. Neither he nor his DCC peers and colleagues appointed any special
committee. After all, he would have appointed his own peers and colleagues in the
11th Circuit and even himself. All of them would have ended up doing
exactly the same: protecting their personal and class interests by exonerating
their DCC “peers and colleagues”.
45. C.J. Carnes spared himself and them that farce and
reached the predetermined result required to maintain a record of 100%
complaint dismissal and 100% review petition denial: C.J. Carnes dismissed Dr.
Cordero’s complaint.
46. By disregarding the inherent suspiciousness of 100%
orchestrated self-exoneration by those with the greatest interest therein, the
accused themselves, C.J. Carnes offended against a tenet of justice:
a. “Justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and
undoubtedly be seen to be done”; Ex parte McCarthy, [1924] 1 K. B. 256,
259 (1923).
b. “Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice”; Aetna Life Ins. v. Lavoie et al., 475
U.S. 813; 106 S. Ct. 1580; 89 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1986).
E. C.J. Carnes’s disingenuous allegation that Dr.
Cordero’s complaint is dismissible as merit-related
47. J.C. Carnes has allowed the appearance of his disregard
for the inherent suspiciousness of the complained-against judges’ 100%
self-exoneration from complaints and review petitions in order to cover up its
abusive and orchestrated nature.
48. This inherent suspiciousness constitutes a “reasonably disputed issue”
involving ‘a genuine issue of material fact’. Under Rule 11(b) (supra ¶23) and its Commentary, C.J.
Carnes was prohibited from determining the issue and dismissing the complaint:
Commentary on Rule 11: …Essentially, the standard
articulated in subsection (b) is that used to decide motions for summary
judgment pursuant to FRCP 56. Genuine issues of material fact are not resolved
at the summary judgment stage. A material fact is one that “might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute is “genuine” if
“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.”…Similarly, the chief judge may not resolve a genuine issue
concerning a material fact or the existence of misconduct or a disability when
conducting a limited inquiry pursuant to subsection (b).
49. To disregard those injunctions and run his cover-up,
C.J. Carnes disingenuously states on page 7 of his Order: “the allegations of the Complaint
challenge the merits of judicial decisions…which is an independently adequate
alternative reason for dismissing the Complaint in its entirety”.
50. That statement is factually wrong because Dr. Cordero
never challenged the merits of any of the 478 complaints dismissed or any of
the petitions denied. He could not have done so because all complaints and
petitions are kept secret.
51. On the contrary, he requested that they be disclosed so
that the merits of the dismissals and denials may be determined fairly,
impartially, and publicly. “Sunlight
is the best disinfectant”, as Justice Brandeis put it. Their examination
can detect misconduct patterns, trends, and schemes. Thereby they can expose
the DCC judges’ institutionalized policy of misconduct as their orchestrated
modus operandi.
52. Dr. Cordero’s complaint is predicated, not on the merits
of any complaint, but on it being beyond a reasonable doubt inherently
suspicious for 100% of complaints and petitions to be dismissed and denied by
the very ones complained against.
53. That inherent suspiciousness presents the “reasonably disputed issue” that
prevents dismissal.
F. A call on judges to become Deep Throats and
Champions of Justice
54. The disposition of this complaint and petition by the
judges of the 11th Circuit and, for that matter, of DCC or any other
circuit or court, has nothing to do with what the Act or the Rules provide.
55. It has to do only with safeguarding crass personal and
judicial class interests:
a. the
avoidance of retaliation by the judges that one fails to exonerate and their friends;
b. insurance
of reciprocal exoneration when one becomes the complained-against judge; and
c. the
preservation of the pretense that the judicial class is composed of people who
command respect for their superior integrity and are immune to the insidious effect
of their unaccountable, ‘absolute power, which corrupts absolutely’(jur:27fn28).
56. But you, the reading Judge, you can advance a noble
interest that can make you “Honorable”: You can courageously buck the class,
whether discreetly, as Deep Throat of Watergate fame did(*>jur:106§c), or openly, as did the
Silence Breakers on the cover of Time magazine’s Person of the Year issue for 2017. They spoke up and significantly
contributed to transforming society by launching the MeToo! movement....
57. You can denounce judicial abuse at a press conference or
in an Emile Zola’s I accuse!-like(*>jur:98§2) article, or help me publish mine(†>OL2:760, 781, 901) -just as Ronan Farrow exposed Harvey
Weinstein’s sexual abuse in The New
Yorker- and have a transformative impact on justice here and abroad.
58. By so doing, you can reasonably expect to set in motion
for the first time in history a movement for We the People, the masters, to hold our judicial public servants
accountable for their performance and liable to their victims.
59. Unlike all other whistleblowers, you have life-tenure
and your “Compensation shall not
be diminished”(Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1; *>jur:22fn12)
....
60. For your “good
Behaviour”(id.) to ensure “the effective and expeditious administration
of the business of” justice (the Act, §351(a)), you will step out of your
anonymity as one of 2,255 federal judicial officers (as of 30sep18) and become nominally
recognized nationwide by a grateful People
as their Champion of Justice.
61. This is the most opportune time to share your inside
information with each and all of the 25 presidential candidates, each of whom
is desperate to become the standard-bearer of an issue that causes public
outrage and earns him or her national media and public attention, campaign
volunteers, and indispensable donations:
a. At least 65,000 donors from at least 20 states are required
to qualify to appear on the nationally televised presidential debates that
begin on June 26. Failure to qualify will toll the death knell for the
non-appearing candidates.
62. Hence, the candidates want to hear from you. The winning
one may reward you with a nomination to a new Supreme Court of justices who
honor their oath of office under 28 U.S.C. §453:
“[We] solemnly swear (or affirm) that [we] will administer
justice without respect to persons [like
our peers and colleagues, as opposed to other parties to complaints],
and do equal right to the poor [in
connections to us] and to the rich [in
IOUs on us that we gave the peers and colleagues who dismissed complaints
against us]”
G. Action requested
63. Dr. Cordero respectfully requests that the 11th
Circuit Judicial Council:
a. vacate the dismissal order;
b. appoint a special committee to work through Rule
13(a) “experts and professionals” who are neither
judges nor lawyers and are top journalists to investigate whether the judges
have committed misconduct, e.g., abusive orchestrated self-exoneration from
complaints to ensure the risklessness of their misconduct; and
c. take the other requested actions(OL2:794§B; 884§D).
Sincerely,
..
Dr.
Richard Cordero, Esq.
Judicial Discipline Reform
New York City
..
or + New or Users
>Add New
64. If you want to retain Dr. Cordero to render you any
legal service, read his model letter of engagement(*>OL:383).
No
meaningful cause can be advanced without money.
Support
the professional law research and writing, and strategic thinking of
Judicial Discipline Reform
Put your money
where your outrage at abuse and
passion for justice are.
DONATE
to the professional law research and writing, and
strategic thinking of
Judicial Discipline Reform
here
*************************