| I've just found this issue after a "real-world lesson" in why console access should be more strongly secured than mere "general read access"... While I agree with Daniel Beck that a plugin exposing a password would be a bug in the plugin, bugs do happen and Jenkins' core security model should help mitigate this.
More importantly, these days a lot of jobs will be using pipelines, and pipelines don't necessarily use plugins the way the plugin author intended, thus allowing mere "user error" to expose passwords in plain text by accident that a plugin cannot reasonably prevent. As a Jenkins administrator, I can't bugfix my users, so I need to be able to configure my Jenkins server so that such errors can't cause a big security issue. TL;DR: Jenkins allows us to secure access to the workspace as a separate permission - IMO console access should be similarly controllable and the lack of such control is a security weakness. |
