https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/04/13/999313/kerala-fight-covid-19-india-coronavirus/?fbclid=IwAR0VQcRqqnCSEWrV1NkMi1kOR_N3r-ne2qkDoOCga4QC1GuukZlbVdjb5_0What the world can learn from Kerala about how to fight covid-19
The inside story of how one Indian state is flattening the curve through epic levels of contact tracing and social assistance.
by Sonia Faleiro
April 13, 2020
A government health worker in Kerala checks a boy’s temperature.
GETTY IMAGES
The
sun had already set on March 7 when Nooh Pullichalil Bava received the
call. “I have bad news,” his boss warned. On February 29, a family of
three had arrived in the Indian state of Kerala from Italy, where they
lived. The trio skipped a voluntary screening for covid-19 at the
airport and took a taxi 125 miles (200 kilometers) to their home in the
town of Ranni. When they started developing symptoms soon afterward,
they didn’t alert the hospital. Now, a whole week after taking off from
Venice, all three—a middle-aged man and woman and their adult son—had
tested positive for the virus, and so had two of their elderly
relatives.
PB Nooh, as he is known, is the civil servant in
charge of the district of Pathanamthitta, where Ranni is located; his
boss is the state health secretary. He’d been expecting a call like this
for days. Kerala has a long history of migration and a constant flow of
international travelers, and the new coronavirus was spreading
everywhere. The first Indian to test positive for covid-19 was a medical
student who had arrived in Kerala from Wuhan, China, at the end of
January. At 11:30 that same night, Nooh joined his boss and a team of
government doctors on a video call to map out a strategy.
You can
read our most essential coverage of the coronavirus/covid-19 outbreak
for free, and also sign up for our coronavirus newsletter. But please
consider subscribing to support our nonprofit journalism.
For
some, this wasn’t their first time fighting a deadly epidemic. In 2018,
the state had dealt with an outbreak of Nipah, a brain-damaging virus
that, like the coronavirus, had originated in bats and transferred to
humans. And, as with covid-19, there was no vaccine and no cure.
Seventeen people had died, but the World Health Organization (WHO)
called Kerala’s handling of the outbreak a “success story” since—despite
technical shortfalls—the state’s health system had contained a
potential disaster.
This time, though, they would need to go further and move faster.
By
3 a.m. the team had settled on a WHO-recommended plan of contact
tracing, isolation, and surveillance. It had been used to limit the
spread of Nipah, and on the medical student in January. The plan relied
on consulting patients, mapping their movements to see who they’d
interacted with, and isolating anyone in the chain with symptoms.
There
was, however, one obstacle. The family “weren’t forthcoming,” says
Nooh. They were in isolation at the district hospital but didn’t want to
declare the full extent of their movements. It was as though they were
embarrassed.
At this point, 31 people had tested positive for
covid-19 across the country. It was a small number, but the virus was
fast-moving—on average, one person was thought to infect two to three
others.
This spelled bad news for India. Many of its 1.4 billion
residents live in large families and don’t have running water, making it
difficult to sanitize things and maintain social distancing. Even
countries with advanced health-care systems were being overwhelmed, and
India had just 0.5 hospital beds for every 1,000 people—a long way
behind Italy, with 3.2 beds per 1,000, and China, with 4.3. In addition,
there were only 30,000 to 40,000 ventilators nationwide, while testing
kits, personal protective equipment for health-care workers, and oxygen
flow masks were also in short supply. It was clear to Nooh and his
colleagues: the only way to control transmission was to break the chain.
Detective work
Nooh,
who is 40, with a thick head of hair that he combs dutifully to one
side, is a soft-spoken man who lives with his wife, a medical student,
close to his office. In 2018, when a flood swept through the district
and left more than two dozen people dead and 20,000 houses damaged, he
had led relief efforts, and got no more than two or three hours of sleep
at night. Admirers started a Facebook fan page called Nooh Bro’s Ark.
The
experience taught him not just how to manage people in a crisis, but
also how to read them. He gauged, correctly, that this family from Ranni
would be intractable. So rather than rely on them, he turned to
old-style detective work and technology to piece together where they’d
been and who they’d come in contact with.
District Collector PB Nooh
PB
Nooh, a civil servant in Kerala, saw quickly that the only way to
control transmission was to break the chain. Photo: IndiaSpend
/Shreehari Paliath
He brought in 50 police officers, paramedics, and
volunteers, and split them into teams. Then he sent them out to retrace
the family’s movements over that crucial week. They’d given his district
officers scraps—an address here, a name there—but Nooh’s task force
expanded it dramatically, using GPS data mined from the family’s mobile
phones and surveillance footage taken from the airport, streets, and
stores.
In a matter of hours they had learned a lot more about
the family’s movements than they’d been told—and what they found alarmed
them. In the seven days since arriving in Kerala, the family had gone
from one densely crowded place to another. They’d visited a bank, a post
office, a bakery, a jewelry store, and some hotels. They even went to
the police for help with paperwork.
State support
That
evening, Kerala’s health minister, KK Shailaja, arrived from the state
capital. A former science teacher, she’d already gained a reputation for
her prompt and efficient handling of the unfolding crisis: the media
had nicknamed her the “Coronavirus Slayer.”
While the rest of
India, along with countries such as the UK and the US, wouldn’t take
stringent steps to limit movement for another two months, Shailaja had
ordered Kerala’s four international airports to start screening
passengers in January. All those with symptoms were taken to a
government facility, where they were tested and isolated; their samples
were flown to the National Institute of Virology 700 miles away. By
February, she had a 24-member state response team coordinating with the
police and public officials across Kerala.
In the seven days since arriving in Kerala, the family had gone from
one densely crowded place to another.
This
was unusual—but Kerala often goes a different route from the rest of
India. The small coastal state at the country’s southern tip is steeped
in communist ideas and governed by a coalition of communist and
left-wing parties.
In recent years, as some states have followed
the populist lead of India’s Hindu nationalist prime minister, Narendra
Modi, Kerala has maintained its focus on social welfare. Its health-care
system is ranked the best in India, with world-class nurses who are
headhunted for hospitals in Europe and America; the state’s life
expectancy figures are among the highest in the country.
The
minister’s arrival in the district reassured Nooh. He wasn’t on his own;
the machinery of the entire state was at his disposal. “The seriousness
of the government was amazing,” he says. Each team on his task force
was increased from six people to 15.
KK Shailaja
Kerala’s
health minister, KK Shailaja, a former science teacher, quickly gained a
reputation for her handling of the unfolding crisis: the media
nicknamed her the “Coronavirus Slayer.”
By March 9, around 48 hours
after the family tested positive, Nooh’s teams had a map and a flow
chart listing each place they had been, when, and for how long. The
information was circulated on social media, and people were asked to
dial a hotline if it was possible that they had interacted with the
family. Nooh’s office was flooded with calls: the family had met with
almost 300 people since arriving in town.
Now the teams had to
track down these people, gauge their symptoms, and either send them to
the district hospital for testing or order them to self-isolate at home.
The number of people self-isolating quickly rose to more than 1,200.
Still, Nooh knew that people who agreed to self-isolate wouldn’t
necessarily do it. So he set up a call center in his office, bringing in
more than 60 medical students and staff from the district’s health
department, whose job was to call everyone isolating, every day.
The
callers ran patients through a questionnaire meant to assess their
physical and mental health, but also to catch lies. If anyone was caught
sneaking out, “we had the police, the revenue department, and village
councils ready to act,” Nooh says. But the carrot was as important as
the stick: his office also delivered groceries to those in need.
The
district was placed on high alert. Nooh wore a mask, scattered bottles
of hand sanitizer around the office, and reverted “to the old model of
namaste” rather than shaking hands. This was now ground zero for the
covid-19 crisis in India.
Leadership on display
On March 11,
the who declared the covid-19 outbreak a pandemic. The next day, India
reported its first death. Even so, Modi—perhaps concerned by the impact
on the already lackluster economy—refused to issue public advisories and
didn’t address the media. His biggest concern seemed to be a plan to
redesign the heart of the Indian capital, including parliament, at a
cost equal to $2.6 billion.
In Kerala, a different style of
leadership was on display. With 15 cases now confirmed across the state,
Pinarayi Vijayan, the chief minister, ordered a lockdown, shutting
schools, banning large gatherings, and advising against visiting places
of worship. He held daily media briefings, got internet service
providers to boost capacity to meet the demands of those now working
from home, stepped up production of hand sanitizer and face masks, had
food delivered to schoolchildren reliant on free meals, and set up a
mental health help line. His actions assuaged the public’s fears and
built trust.
“There was so much confidence in the state
government,” says Latha George Pottenkulam, a clothing designer in the
port city of Kochi, “that there was no resistance to modifying one’s
behavior by staying in.”
Related Story
How San Francisco plans to trace every coronavirus case and contact
Assembling a team to identity and isolate infections could be a crucial step in getting the city back to work.
There
were other reasons why Kerala was better equipped to deal with the
crisis than most places. It is small and densely populated, but
relatively well-off. It has a 94% literacy rate, the highest in India,
and a vibrant local media. Elsewhere in the country, people were taking
WhatsApp rumors at face value—for example, spreading messages claiming
that exposure to sunlight could protect against the virus. But in
Kerala, most people realized the seriousness of the situation.
Manju
Sara Rajan, the editor of an online design magazine in the district of
Kottayam, told me she felt safer living in Kerala than anywhere else in
India. “We have been considering the possibilities for far longer,” she
said. Everyone around her knew the number to call if they developed
symptoms, and they weren’t acting heedlessly by rushing to the hospital
at the first sign of a dry cough.
By March 23, the number of
confirmed cases in Nooh’s district had risen from five to nine, but the
containment efforts were judged successful.
That didn’t mean
Kerala was coming through unscathed. It is one of India’s smallest
states but has almost the same population as California: the district of
Pathanamthitta has more than a million
residents alone. Services were under severe pressure, and local doctors were stretched.
Nazlin
A. Salam, a 36-year-old GP at the district general hospital, found
herself working 12-hour days. She christened her turquoise blue Nissan
Micra the “Covid Car”—nobody else in her family would go near it—and
sanitized it every night. After returning from work she would bathe
before approaching her children, and refused to kiss them in case she
unwittingly transmitted the virus.
Her patients were stable, she
said, but there were only three ventilators at the covid-19 isolation
ward and another two for general use, in a hospital with a potential
intake of 400 people. To keep numbers down, the district administration
would have to continue contact tracing and testing. By March 28 it had
more than 134,000 people under surveillance, with 620 in government care
and the rest isolating at home.Every day, Nooh arrived at his office at
8:30 a.m. and didn’t leave until 9:30 p.m. Even when he was in bed,
calls and messages about the situation streamed in.
For most of
March, India’s prime minister still hadn’t announced a plan to combat
the pandemic. He had asked Indians, in a nationally televised speech, to
come out on their balconies one Sunday to clap for health workers.
Another day, he asked them to stay home for a few hours—a “people’s
curfew”—but his messaging was so muddled that large crowds, which
included police officers, took to the streets to blow conches, bang
utensils, and ring bells as though they were celebrating a festival.
Then,
on March 24, without warning, Modi declared that India would go into a
21-day lockdown—and it would start in less than four hours. Keralites
were prepared for this national closure, since they had already been
living in an informal lockdown for weeks. But they also had support:
Vijayan, the state’s chief minister, was the first in the country to
announce a relief package. He declared a community kitchen scheme to
feed the public, and free provisions including rice, oil, and spices. He
even moved up the date of state pension payments.
The rest of
India wasn’t quite as lucky. With the shutdown just hours away, people
rushed out to buy food and supplies: in many areas they quickly dried
up.
The lockdown didn't cover shops selling food, but many people
chose to stay indoors to avoid crossing paths with law enforcement.
At
the same time, hundreds of thousands of migrant workers who were now
out of jobs tried to find their way home, but with state borders sealed
and trucks and buses suspended, they had no option but to walk hundreds
of miles to their families. By March 29 at least 22 of them had died on
the way.
Meanwhile police officers, determined to be seen doing
their job, chased down anyone who was outside, even trucks carrying
essential supplies, couriers from Amazon Pantry, and of course the
desperate migrant workers. In West Bengal, they beat a man buying milk.
He died. The government later confirmed that the lockdown didn’t cover
shops selling food, but many people chose to stay indoors to avoid
crossing paths with law enforcement.
The supply crisis escalated
so quickly that one reporter nosing around the prime minister’s home
constituency in Uttar Pradesh found hungry children chewing on grass.
Equipment shortages left some desperate doctors wearing raincoats and
motorcycle helmets instead of coveralls and protective masks. Although
the government announced a $22.5 billion stimulus package, it was tiny
relative to the needs of India’s population. It wasn’t even clear how
and when it would get food into people’s hands. And yet, Indians had no
choice but to stay indoors.
The country had “missed the boat on
testing,” said Ramanan Laxminarayan, director of the Centre for Disease
Dynamics, Economics, and Policy, in a TV interview. “Containment is not
an option anymore.” The lockdown would slow the spread of the virus,
but, he said, there could be 300 million to 500 million cases by July:
“Eventually everyone in India will get covid.”
What was needed
now was to proactively test anyone over the age of 65 who was showing
symptoms, and for the public sector to start making ventilators “on a
war footing.”
A few days earlier, the prime minister had proposed
an emergency covid-19 fund for the eight member nations of SAARC, the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. In grandiose fashion,
he declared that India would contribute $10 million. “We can respond
best by coming together, not growing apart—collaboration, not confusion;
preparation, not panic,” he said, during a video conference with
regional leaders.
Then, after flashing money at SAARC, he
tweeted to solicit donations from the public for a fund he had set up to
fight covid-19, but with little transparency about the fund’s legal
framework and where the money might actually go.
As the virus
spread across villages, towns, and cities and then lit into India’s—and
Asia’s—largest slum, Dharavi, in Mumbai, the government continued to
ignore calls for more testing and equipment. Then it announced that it
would start broadcasting reruns of the Ramayana, a 1980s TV show based
on the Hindu epic of the same name whose central message is the triumph
of good over evil.
The Modi government’s failure to act left it
to individual states to protect people as best they could. Only states
like Kerala, with the experience and aptitude to take on a crisis of
international proportions, felt able to do so.
'Everyone must contribute'
As
of March 31, the Indian government had announced 1,637 cases of
covid-19. In Kerala, 215 people had tested positive. And if Laxminarayan
is correct, this was only the beginning.
Nooh was still contact
tracing, testing, and isolating, his team chasing down every potential
patient. There were now more than 162,000 people in self-isolation in
his district, as well as more than 60 community kitchens, eight relief
camps to house and feed migrant workers unable to return to their home
states, and a two-member documentation team taking notes in the event
that the situation repeats itself.
One Saturday in March, Nooh
took a long drive to Konni, a town on the edge of a forest that is
famous for elephants. One part of the forest is inhabited by an
indigenous community of 37 families, separated from the town by a river.
There was no bridge, and Nooh had heard that relief supplies hadn’t
gotten there. At the water’s edge, he rolled up his sharp blue trousers
and hoisted a jute sack full of provisions over his shoulder. It weighed
about 35 pounds (16 kilograms). This wasn’t his job, but he wanted to
send a message. “In an unprecedented situation, everyone must
contribute,” he said.
Twenty-three days earlier, Nooh had been
faced with the “biggest ever challenge” of his career. Now, despite
being severely overworked, he saw an opportunity. “As a society, we’ve
never faced such a situation,” he said. “Let’s see what we can do.”
Sonia
Faleiro is the author of Beautiful Thing: Inside the Secret World of
Bombay’s Dance Bars (2010). Her new book The Good Girls will be
published in January 2021.