[New Paper] Regularized Campaigns as a New Institution for Effective Governance (applied to pollution regulation)
Shiran Victoria Shen
Dear colleagues,
I'm happy to share a new paper that explores the role of regularized campaigns as an institutional innovation to strengthen environmental governance in contexts where formal institutions often struggle to ensure consistent enforcement.
Link to the paper: https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.70052
Preprint on SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4371501
Traditionally, governance tools emphasize either institutions or ad hoc campaigns. While institutions offer continuity, campaigns are mobilized in moments of crisis or reform but tend to be unsustainable. Regularized campaigns combine features of both. The table below outlines key differences.
Table 1. Comparison between (functional, governance-oriented) institutions, ad hoc campaigns, and regularized campaigns
|
Governance Tool |
Continuity of Enforcement
|
Intensity and Visibility
|
Adaptability
|
Signaling Function |
Effect on the Compliance Gap |
|
Institutions
|
Continuous, rule-based, bureaucratized |
Typically, low to moderate |
Low; often rigid |
Weak or diffuse; absorbed into routine bureaucratic processes |
Often persistent due to entrenched discretion |
|
Ad Hoc Campaigns |
Temporary, time-bounded |
High during campaign periods |
High, but reactive |
Strong, but short-lived |
Short-term narrowing, then reversion |
|
Regularized Campaigns |
Periodic and structured, embedded in governance waves |
High during waves; moderate residual impacts |
Medium to high; can be targeted |
Strong and recurring; maintains credible central prioritization |
Sustained reduction |
Drawing on the case of China’s central environmental inspections (CEIs), we theorize and empirically test how institutionalizing high-intensity, periodic enforcement campaigns can reduce compliance disparities, particularly among economically influential firms that have historically evaded regulation under weak oversight. Using an original firm-level dataset that integrates multiple confidential government sources, we find that these compliance gaps narrowed significantly after CEIs became regularized.
This study may be of particular interest to those engaged in research or practice on multi-level governance, regulatory capture, and enforcement asymmetries in both authoritarian and democratic systems.
Best,
Victoria
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Shiran Victoria Shen
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis
Faculty Affiliate, Center on China’s Economy and Institutions
Faculty Affiliate, Center for Human and Planetary Health
Stanford University