Why the EU Needs a Comprehensive Climate Security Strategy
Renaud de RICHTER
Why the EU Needs a Comprehensive Climate Security Strategy
This issue brief examines how the impacts of climate change and climate interventions could affect the EU’s security, and explores how timely governance and prudent research by the European Union can improve potential outcomes. To this end, the International Center for Future Generations (ICFG) recommends the EU develop and implement a comprehensive Climate Security Strategy, one that includes an analysis of solar radiation modification and its potential effects on the EU’s security profile.
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Annex 1: Key References to Security Implications of Climate Change and Interventions
The following provides an overview of key statements by institutions in the US, EU, and UN pertinent to security implications of climate change and climate interventions; in order of recency. Highlights are ours.
United States Department of Defense, Climate change and global security, 2024:
“Since
weather extremes may alter the defence posture of both Allies and
potential adversaries, weather manipulation could be weaponized. The
threat of state-sponsored large-scale weather manipulation using
geoengineering techniques warrants an Allied ability to detect such
actions.
While
large-scale deployment of SAI is observable, many have called for
research to be conducted into SAI to facilitate informed policy debates.
In particular, The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP) states, “Outdoor experiments would be valuable in combination
with model and laboratory studies for understanding processes involved
with potential SRM (Solar Radiation Modification) deployment.” A report
by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
proposes a small-scale research, typically smaller than 100X, that would
result in an observable impact on climate and be conducted under an
international regime of governance founded on transparency. While
international collaboration in SAI research could be beneficial in
creating sound policy decisions regarding issues associated with climate
intervention, one must also address the concern of state actors who may
conduct this type of research without transparency and then may
leverage knowledge gained to produce a unilateral breakout capability.
[…]
A program to measure stratospheric aerosols and particulates is also needed to improve atmospheric modelling and prevent strategic surprise.
This program should provide a capability for the widespread measurement
of atmospheric aerosols and particulates to ensure that an adversary
cannot be positioned for strategic surprise in executing unilateral climate interaction (sic)
action. Further, possessing the capability to deny that stratospheric
tampering occurred is a valuable message to counteract potential
histrionics used in psychological operations. […]
Finally,
there is a need to leverage remote sensing for large-scale monitoring,
given the global implications of climate intervention technologies. A
partnership between the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI) and the DoD could address the challenge of collecting all
available information, including the measurement data recommended above,
to provide an assessment of adversary plans for large-scale climate
intervention activities. […]
For
the DoD, the implications of climate intervention include not only the
effect of such approaches on its military operations but also the possibility that it will have to respond to state sponsored climate intervention activities. The DoD will have to develop the capability to monitor
such activities, which includes deploying the appropriate sensing
capability. Measuring stratospheric aerosols and particulates to avoid
strategic surprise will be key. The DoD must also partner with other government agencies developing these modeling and sensor capabilities.”
European Environment Agency, European Climate Risk Assessment, 2024:
“The
first European Climate Risk Assessment (EUCRA) is a comprehensive
assessment of the major climate risks facing Europe today and in the
future. It identifies 36 climate risks that threaten our energy and food
security, ecosystems, infrastructure, water resources, financial
systems, and people’s health. Many of these risks have already reached
critical levels and can become catastrophic without urgent and decisive
action.
(Extreme)
events, combined with environmental and social risk drivers, pose major
challenges throughout Europe. Specifically, they compromise food and
water security, energy security and financial stability, and the health
of the general population and of outdoor workers; in turn, this affects
social cohesion and stability.”
UN Security Council 9547th meeting, Press Release, 2024:
“The
Security Council today concluded its open debate on climate change and
food insecurity, with speakers calling for urgent action to address the
profound impact of these escalating crises particularly on vulnerable
and conflict-affected nations.”
US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Slowdown of the Motion of the Ocean, 2023:
“…the
movement of water north and south throughout the Atlantic might be
weakening due to climate change,” with potentially severe consequences
for weather patterns in Europe.”
European
Commission and High Representative on Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, Joint Communication on the Climate-Security Nexus, 2023:
“In
the context of accelerated global warming, deliberate large-scale
intervention in the Earth’s natural systems (referred to as
“geoengineering”), such as solar radiation modification, is attracting
more attention. However, the risks, impacts and unintended
consequences that these technologies pose are poorly understood, and
necessary rules, procedures and institutions have not been developed.
These technologies introduce new risks to people and ecosystems, while
they could also increase power imbalances between nations, spark
conflicts and raise a myriad of ethical, legal, governance and political
issues. Guided by the precautionary principle, the EU will support
international efforts to assess comprehensively the risks and
uncertainties of climate interventions, including solar radiation
modification and promote discussions on a potential international
framework for its governance, including research related aspects. …
Climate
change and environmental degradation pose increasing risks to
international peace and security. Extreme weather events, rising
temperatures and sea levels, desertification, water scarcity, threats to
biodiversity, environmental pollution and contamination and loss of
livelihoods threaten the health and well-being of humanity, and can
create the potential for greater migratory movements and displacement,
pandemics, social unrest, instability and insecurity.”
European Commission, Communication on Managing climate risks – protecting people and prosperity, 2023:
“Climate
resilience is a matter of maintaining societal functions, but also of
competitiveness for economies and companies, and thus jobs. Managing
climate risks is a necessary condition for improving living standards,
fighting inequality and protecting people. It is a matter of economic
survival for rural and coastal areas, farmers, foresters and fishers.
For businesses, climate risks are already well recognised and are seen
as the top four risks in a decade.”
Council of the EU, Council conclusions on Climate and Energy Diplomacy, 2023:
“EU climate and energy diplomacy is a core component of the EU’s foreign policy.”
UN Environment Program, One Atmosphere, 2023:
“SRM
could create societal risks including the potential for international
conflicts (because of transboundary effects), unilateral SRM (‘rogue’
parties may opt for SRM deployment) and counter and countervailing SRM
deployments. SRM deployment would therefore raise ethical, moral, legal,
equity and justice questions.
The
lower cost estimate of an SRM deployment (about 20 billion USD per year
per 1°C of cooling) puts the cost of an SRM deployment within the reach
of many states and perhaps non-state actors, raising concern over how a
‘rogue deployment’ might be avoided or responded to. […] There are also
concerns that differences of opinion over whether, what kind or how
much SRM to deploy could generate political and possibly even military
conflict.
Critically,
integrated assessments of many impacts, both positive and negative,
remain limited in scientific literature; for example, mortality and
morbidity from heat stress, water resources, flood risk, storm damage,
vector-borne diseases, biodiversity, food security, ocean ecosystems and
fisheries.”
UN Security Council, Climate Crisis Generating Growing Threats to Global Peace, 2023:
“With
the climate crisis generating an increasing threat to global peace and
security, the Security Council must ramp up its efforts to protect the
Organization’s peace operations around the world and lessen the risk of
conflicts emanating from rising sea levels, droughts, floods and other
climate-related events, briefers, ministers and delegates told the
15-nation organ.”
European Parliament Research Services, Briefing: Climate change considerations for EU security and defence policy, 2022:
“Among
the sectors affected, security and defence is not spared: climate
change not only acts as a threat multiplier, but also impacts
capabilities and operational considerations.”
UN Environment Program, Addressing Climate-Related Security Risks, 2019 and revised in 2022:
“Residents
of urban and peri-urban areas in climate-exposed regions face growing
risks of displacement (and possibly secondary displacement), especially
in vulnerable coastal regions. The effect of environmental and climatic
changes on migration is best understood within the context of existing
migration patterns. Conflicts can force people in high-risk areas to
flee to less dangerous places within their own country or across
borders. In cases where environmental risks and violent conflicts occur
at the same time, this pressure can even be intensified, and in
receiving areas, an influx of migrants can put pressure on local
resources or public services, exacerbating the likelihood of political
tensions or outbreaks of violence. However, migration can also be an
effective adaptation strategy. Migration can improve living conditions
and provide economic perspectives. Temporary or seasonal migration from
severely affected regions to less affected areas, such as during
seasonal rainfalls or heat waves, can help cope with a crisis.”
UN Development Program, A typology and analysis of climate-related security risks, 2022:
“The
analysis shows that climate change is recognized by many countries as a
matter of national security, but also as a factor that exacerbates the
drivers of different types of conflict and security risks. Conflict and
insecurity are also described in the NDCs as increasing vulnerability to
climate change and/or as being potentially disruptive to climate action
and to the achievement of NDC targets, including in post-conflict
situations.”
United
States National Intelligence Council, Climate Change and International
Responses Increasing Challenges to US National Security Through 2040,
2021:
“Risk
of Unilateral Geoengineering Increasing: We assess there is a growing
risk that a country would unilaterally test and possibly deploy
large-scale solar geoengineering technologies as a way to counter
intensifying climate effects if it perceived other efforts to limit
warming to 1.5˚C had failed. Without an international agreement on these
technologies, we assess that such a unilateral effort probably would
cause blowback.” And, “We assess that the lack of any country level
dialogue or governance body to set regulations and enforce transparency
over research increases the possibility that state or nonstate actors
will independently develop or deploy the technology— possibly
covertly—in a manner that risks conflict if other nations blame them for
a weather disaster they believe was caused by geoengineering.
Large-scale
geoengineering could be internationally disruptive because of its
potential to substantially affect the Earth’s biosphere, which would
change global weather patterns and provide climate benefits to some
regions at the expense of others. Depending on the scale and location of
deployment, it could change weather systems in the United States.
Researchers
in several countries, including Australia, China, India, Russia, the
United Kingdom and the United States, as well as several EU members, are
exploring geoengineering techniques. We assess that the lack of any
country level dialogue or governance body to set regulations and enforce
transparency over research increases the possibility that state or
nonstate actors will independently develop or deploy the technology—
possibly covertly—in a manner that risks conflict if other nations blame
them for a weather disaster they believe was caused by geoengineering.”
EU Commission, Communication on Forging a climate-resilient Europe – the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change, 2021:
“The
impacts of climate change have knock-on effects across borders and
continents. Even local climate impacts have regional or global
repercussions, and such transboundary climate risk can reach Europe. For
instance, the disruption of port infrastructure could hamper or even
close down trade routes, both for commodities and goods, with potential
cascading effects across international supply chains.”
UN Climate Security Mechanism, Progress report, 2021:
“The
Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) is a joint initiative by the United
Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP). It was established in 2018 with the
objective of strengthening the capacity of the United Nations system to
analyze and more systematically address the adverse impacts of climate
change on peace and security. The CSM works with partners around the
world to enhance a gender-sensitive understanding of the issue and to
support capacity building efforts in United Nations entities and
regional and subregional organizations for the prevention and management
of climate-related security risks.”
Council of the EU, Council conclusions on Climate Diplomacy, 2020:
“The
European Union is acutely aware that climate change multiplies threats
to international stability and security in particular affecting those in
most fragile and vulnerable situations, reinforcing environmental
pressures and disaster risk, contributing to the loss of livelihoods and
forcing the displacement of people. … The
Council continues to encourage the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the
United Nations system to create a comprehensive information basis for
the UNSC on climate-related security risks, to fully integrate short and
long-term climate and environmental risk factors in the assessment and
management of threats to peace and security, at country, regional and
international levels, and to draw on the expertise of the whole UN
system in order to find operational responses to these risks and
strengthen UN missions on the ground.”
EU External Action Service, Climate Change and Defence Roadmap, 2020:
“Climate
change increases global instability. This will likely increase the
number of crisis situations to which the EU might need to respond while
at the same time the armed forces will be asked more frequently to
assist civilian authorities in response to flooding or forest fires,
both at home and abroad. Future
capabilities will need to adapt to this changing operational
environment (e.g. extreme heat or higher sea levels). At the same time,
the armed forces need to invest in greener technologies throughout their
capability inventory and infrastructure.”
International Military Council on Climate and Security, The World climate and security report, 2020:
“Integrate
climate into armed forces risk assessment, early warning, surveillance,
and operational preparations to include adaptation measures to
climate-proof military infrastructure.Early warning and surveillance
framework should also have the capacity to anticipate risks from
emergent climate-manipulating technologies such as geoengineering.”
UN Development Program, Climate Security Nexus and Prevention of Violent Extremism, 2020:
“Climate
change can contribute to food and water insecurity, but also increase
competition for essential resources, impair livelihoods and coping
strategies to have disruptive effects on the life opportunities of young
people. It can drive forced displacement and rural-urban migration as
well as alter transhumance patterns, potentially fuelling social
tensions between different communities and exacerbating the drivers of
conflict and fragility. Investment in adaptation and resilience can
offset some of these impacts, but not all. These
indirect impacts on governance and social systems are an important
consideration when examining the intersectional risks posed by climate
change and violent extremism.”
Council of the EU, Conclusions on Security and Defence in the context of the EU Global Strategy, 2019:
“Underlines
the importance environmental issues and climate change have for
security and defence, as outlined in the Council conclusions on Climate
Diplomacy of February 2019. The Council also welcomes the increased
climate sensitivity of EU actions on conflict prevention and sustainable
security and emphasises the need for adequate risk assessment and risk
management strategies. […] considering the impact of climate change
within the assessment of global threats and challenges.”
EU
External Action Service, EU Statement before the United Nations
Security Council, “Addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters
on international peace and security” 2019:
“Climate
change acts as a threat multiplier for conflicts over access to
increasingly scarce resources and for instability and international and
internal displacement. […] Assessing climate and environmental risks and
their potential impact on socio-economic stability should be done in
all countries but has to become a priority especially in the most
fragile situations.”
EU External Action Service, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, 2016:
“Yet
today terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change
and energy insecurity endanger our people and territory. … Climate
change and environmental degradation exacerbate potential conflict, in
light of their impact on desertification, land degradation, and water
and food scarcity. We will therefore redouble our efforts on prevention,
monitoring root causes such as human rights violations, inequality,
resource stress, and climate change – which is a threat multiplier that
catalyses water and food scarcity, pandemics and displacement.”
European Union Institute for Security Studies EUISS, Report on Space security for Europe, 2016:
“This
can include reinforcing the use of space assets for addressing global
challenges (such as environment protection, climate change, sustainable
development, and disaster response) while at the same time building
space economic diplomacy to promote the European industrial base.
International space cooperation can thus become a diplomatic tool that
serves both as a market opener for the promotion of European solutions
abroad and as a door opener to deeper cooperation on space security
issues.”
UN Environment Program, Livelihood Security Climate Change, Migration and Conflict in the Sahel, 2011:
“Changes
in the [Sahel’s] regional climate are impacting issues linked to the
availability of natural resources essential to livelihoods in the
region, as well as food insecurity. Along with important social,
economic and political factors, this can lead to migration, conflict or a
combination of the two.”
UN
General Assembly, “Invites Major United Nations Organs to Intensify
Efforts in Addressing Security Implications of Climate Change”, 2009:
“Deeply
concerned about the possible security implications of climate change,
the General Assembly today invited the major organs of the United
Nations, including the Security Council, to intensify their efforts to
address the challenge, as appropriate and within their respective
mandates.”
UN Security Council, “Security councils hols first-ever debate on impact of climate change on peace, security”, 2007:
“Security
council holds first-ever debate on impact of climate change on peace,
security, hearing over 50 speakers. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said
that projected climate changes could not only have serious
environmental, social and economic implications, but implications for
peace and security (…) outlined several “alarming, though not alarmist”
scenarios, including limited or threatened access to energy increasing
the risk of conflict, a scarcity of food and water transforming peaceful
competition into violence and floods and droughts sparking massive
human migrations, polarizing societies and weakening the ability of
countries to resolve conflicts peacefully.”
Annex 2: Existing international treaties and UN Resolutions relevant to SRM
This section provides an overview of international treaties and resolutions relevant to SEM. It is based on UNEP, 2023.
Conventions and Protocols
| Convention / Treaty | Year | Potential relevance |
|---|---|---|
| Liability Convention (of the Outer Space Treaty) | 1972 | The Liability Convention of the outer space treaty provides that a launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft, and liable for damage due to its faults in space. The Convention also provides for procedures for the settlement of claims for damages. |
| ENMOD Convention | 1977 | The ENMOD convention prohibits hostile action to modify the environment as a means of warfare. And it encourages the exchange of scientific and technological information on the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes. “States Parties in a position to do so shall contribute, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to international economic and scientific co-operation in the preservation, improvement and peaceful utilization of the environment, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.” |
| Vienna Convention / Montreal Protocol | 1985 | Parties to the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol agree
to adopt measures to reduce or prevent human activities that have or
are likely to have adverse effects resulting from modification of the
ozone layer. The governance model may offer insight into regulating SAI deployment, though the applicability is limited insofar that many of the substances that could be used for SAI are naturally occurring or otherwise commonly used and only when injected in the stratosphere would they hold adverse effects. |
| Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (UNECE) | 1991 | The UN Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (under the UN Economic Commission for Europe 1991) calls for parties to undertake environmental impact assessment, potentially including for SRM activities. |
| UNFCCC Article 3.3 | 1992 | The
Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. |
UN Resolutions, draft resolutions, multilateral agreements, and COP decisions
| Convention / Treaty | Year | Potential relevance |
|---|---|---|
| CBD – Decision X/33 | 2010 | Ensure … in the absence of science-based, global, transparent and effective control and regulatory mechanisms for geo-engineering … that no climate- related geoengineering activities that may affect biodiversity take place, until there is an adequate scientific basis on which to justify such activities and appropriate consideration of the associated risks for the environment and biodiversity and associated social, economic and cultural impacts, except for small scale scientific research studies that would be conducted in a controlled setting… |
| UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/16/INF/28 | 2012 | Impact of Climate-related Geoengineering on Biological Diversity. Note by the Executive Secretary – Chapter 4: Potential impacts on biodiversity of generic SRM that causes uniform dimming. |
| London Protocol Amendment on Marine Geoengineering | The
London Protocol amendment on marine geoengineering seeks to establish a
stable, legally-binding framework for the regulation of marine
geoengineering, while also allowing for regulatory flexibility and
adaptability to respond to new scientific and technological proposals
that may adversely affect the marine environment in the future based on a
precautionary approach. ‘Marine geoengineering’ is defined in the
amendment as a deliberate intervention in the marine environment to
manipulate natural processes, including to counteract anthropogenic
climate change and its impacts, and that have the potential to result in
deleterious effects, especially where those effects may be widespread,
long-lasting or severe.
The governance model regarding permitting of research is seen by some as a possible model for regulating SAI research (under a suitable convention), though it is unclear if it is effective at ensuring the pursuit of research of high value as permitting agencies may be incentivized to err excessively on the side of prevention. |
|
| Draft resolutions on “Geoengineering” at UNEA-4 and on Solar Radiation Modification at UNEA-6 | 2019, 2024 | UNEA-4
considered a proposal for a UNEP-led report on the risks and potential
of climate engineering, which did not find consensus.
UNEA-6 considered a proposal, which initially suggested that UNEP would convene a group of experts to produce a detailed assessment report and a later revised version suggested asking UNEP to facilitate information sharing, neither of which found consensus though Parties seemed to agree that having a range of options for information sharing would be desirable heading into UNEA-7 in 2025. |
| The Montreal Protocol Decision XXXI/2: Area of focus for 2022 Scientific Assessment Panel | 2021 | Potential areas of focus for the 2022 quadrennial reports of the Scientific Assessment Panel, the Environmental Effects Assessment Panel and the Technology and Economic Assessment Panel: “…An assessment of information and research related to solar radiation management and its potential effect on the stratospheric ozone layer”. |
| Security Council SC/14732 (Draft resolution) | 2021 | Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution Integrating Climate-Related Security Risk into Conflict-Prevention Strategies. The Security Council in a contentious meeting, rejected a draft resolution that would have integrated climate-related security risk as a central component of United Nations conflict prevention strategies aiming to help counter the risk of conflict relapse. |
| General Assembly Resolution A/76/473, para. 12 | 2021 | 76/112. Protection of the atmosphere – Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 2021 [on the report of the Sixth Committee (A/76/473, para. 12)]. Guideline 7 – Intentional large-scale modification of the atmosphere Activities aimed at intentional large-scale modification of the atmosphere should only be conducted with prudence and caution, and subject to any applicable rules of international law, including those relating to environmental impact assessment. |
| Human Rights Council A/HRC/RES/48/14, para. | 2022 | 48/14. Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change [Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 8 October 2021] Paragraph 6 – Requests the Advisory Committee of the Human Rights Council to conduct a study and to prepare a report, in close cooperation with the Special Rapporteur, on the impact of new technologies for climate protection on the enjoyment of human rights, and to submit the report to the Council at its fifty-fourth session. |
Matthias Honegger
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