Emerson AI, [27.08.21 12:20]
A materialist would say that what you know, is that certain neurons in your brain are activated in a certain pattern when you see red. That is all you can know.
Brent Allsop, [27.08.21 12:23]
I am a materialist, and I agree with your first statement.
But your second statement can be falsified. Once we discover which of all our descriptions of stuff in my brain is a description of my redness, this will falsify your last claim, since we will then know more than you claim we can know.
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> So you are saying redness, and all the other colors in this world come from data, being represented by ones and zeros (requires specific transducing mechanisms to interpret whatever physics is representing them, correctly) being "felt" when it is "processed intelligently". What the heck does any of those words even mean?
--On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 10:38 AM John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:--On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 12:05 AM Brent Allsop <brent....@gmail.com> wrote:
Emerson AI, [27.08.21 12:20]
A materialist would say that what you know, is that certain neurons in your brain are activated in a certain pattern when you see red. That is all you can know.Brent Allsop, [27.08.21 12:23]
I am a materialist, and I agree with your first statement.
But your second statement can be falsified. Once we discover which of all our descriptions of stuff in my brain is a description of my redness, this will falsify your last claim, since we will then know more than you claim we can know.I'm a materialist too, but I would NOT say an objective description of the pattern of neurons in a brain that produces redness is a description of the feeling of redness that the owner of that brain experiences. So can the scientific method prove that there are some similarities between my experience of redness and yours? Certainly, we both agree that the redness qualia is different from the blueness qualia, although the two quaila we subjectively experience could be inverted, and for all I know you may not have any subjective experience at all. Can the scientific method ever prove that the subjective experience that we both communicate with the English word "red" are absolutely identical? Certainly not, you experiencing "red" can't be the same as me experiencing red unless we are the same person, and we're not.I just don't see any way, even in theory, the scientific method could ever make the jump between objective and subjective, therefore, because I am a scientific man but could not function if I really thought I was the only conscious being in the universe, I must conclude that a brute fact is involved, namely that consciousness is the way data feels when it is processed intelligently. That's the only reason I think if somebody is taking a calculus exam then they are conscious, but if somebody is sleeping or under anesthesia or dead then they are not.John K Clark
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> So how did my 'in other words" of you saying: "I must conclude that a brute fact is involved, namely that consciousness is the way data feels when it is processed intelligently." differ, or are you claiming you didn't say that?
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Hi Stathis,We've gone over this many times, but your model seems to be missing representations of redness and greenness, as different than red and green. So it appears that all I say get's mapped into your model, leaving it absent of what I'm trying to say. Here you are talking about only the 3: Strongest form of effing the effable, where you directly computationally bind another's phenomenal qualities into your own consciousness.Both the 3rd, strongest, and the 2nd stronger forms, where you computationally bind something you have never experienced before, into you consciousness, require brain hacking.The 1st, weakest form of effing the ineffable, I was using with Emerson, is different. It does not require brain hacking. All it requires is objective observation and communication in way that distinguishes between red and redness, and can model differences in specific intrinsic qualities. If one is using only one abstract word "red" for all things representing red knowledge, you can't model differences in different intrinsic qualities which may be representing red. For the weakest form of effing the ineffable, all you need is a phenomenal definition for subjective terms like "redness", enabling you to communicate things with well defined terms like this example effing statement: "My redness is like your greenness, both of which we call red."Also, thanks to all your endless help, I think I have a better understanding of our differences. I would like to get these differences between your "Functional Property Dualist" camp, and the "Qualia are Material Qualities" camp canonized. Let me see if you agree that this is a good way to concisely describe our differences?Functionalists, like James Carroll and yourself, using the neuro-substitution argument make the assumption that a neuron functions similarly to the discrete logic gates in an abstract CPU.You also assume ALL computation operates this way, which is why you think you can make the claim that the neuro-substitution argument can be applied to all possible computational cases, justifying your belief that your neuro substation argument is a "proof" that qualia must be functional in all possible computational instances.Where as Materialists, like Steven Lehar and I, think this way of thinking about consciousness, or making this assumption is WRONG.We believe that within any such abstract discrete logic only functional system, there can be nothing that is the intrinsic qualities that represent information like redness or greenness.ANDThere is no way to perform the necessary "computational binding" of such intrinsic qualities. As you so adequately point out, discrete logic gates can't do this kind of computational binding.Both of these are required so one can be aware of 2 or more intrinsic qualities at the same time, the very definition of consciousness for me.Even if there was some "function" from which redness emerged, you could use the same neuro-substitution argument to "prove", redness can't be functional Either.Since you completely leave intrinsic qualities like redness out of your way of thinking, you don't seem to be able to model this all important difference, which is so critical for me.
> Functionalists, like James Carroll and yourself, using the neuro-substitution argument make the assumption that a neuron functions similarly to the discrete logic gates in an abstract CPU.
> You also assume ALL computation operates this way,
> justifying your belief that your neuro substation argument is a "proof" that qualia must be functional in all possible computational instances.
>within any such abstract discrete logic only functional system, there can be nothing that is the intrinsic qualities that represent information like redness or greenness.