The Science of Consciousness, Interlaken 2019

[Cosmin Visan]

Next week I will be at The Science of Consciousness in Interlaken, where I will present the ideas from my paper "The Self-Referential Aspect of Consciousness": https://philpeople.org/profiles/cosmin-visan

If anyone will be around too, I will enjoy debating issues about consciousness.

https://www.tsc2019-interlaken.ch/

[Philip Thrift]

Congratulations!

If I had done more, and had any opportunity of being able to go there, I would have submitted something on "Experience Processing".

- https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/

@philipthrift

[Cosmin Visan]

My poster for TSC.

[Cosmin Visan]

Right-click -> Copy image location, to see the full picture in a new tab.

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, June 23, 2019 at 4:52:02 PM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:

My poster for TSC.

"Emergence" seems similar to "fusion" (of [proto]experiences) of https://heddahasselmorch.com/ .

@philipthrift

[Cosmin Visan]

What is a "proto"experience ?

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, June 23, 2019 at 6:19:34 PM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:

What is a "proto"experience ?

Panprotoexperientialism basically combines panexperientialism and panprotopsychism.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism#Panexperientialism

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/#PanpVersPanp 

At the Interlaken TSC conference, there is a workshop

• Panpsychism and Dual Aspect Monism – organized by Philip Goff, Durham University  [details]

I haven't looked at the papers, but there are probably several in the "pan-" area.

@philipthrift

[Philip Thrift]

Here is one (from the abstracts of the TSC2019 conference), though I would still take a "particles [particle-histories] vs. fields" approach

A Field Response to the Combination Problem for Panpsychism

Laura Weed

The combination problem has been identified by William James, David Chalmers, and many others as a significant problem for panpsychism, because it is not apparent how small psychons, however conceived, could combine to form larger selves, while retaining the qualia values and quiddities of the psychons. I will argue in this paper that the problem arises from taking an excessively entitative view of the nature of both physical things, as they are ordinarily conceived, and mental things, as they are ordinarily conceived. I will argue that conceiving of physical and mental things rather as fields will alleviate some of the puzzles that have traditionally arisen in the literature concerning the physical and the mental. First, I will outline a metaphysics of fields, then I will address the details of David Chalmers’ analysis of the combination problem, to show how a metaphysics of fields mutes the force of many of his worries about that problem for panpsychism.

A Metaphysics of Fields

Most metaphysicians in Western Philosophy have followed the lead of Aristotle or Plato and discussed metaphysics in terms of either Aristotelian entities or Platonic properties. Indeed, the psychons rejected by James and Chalmers, are usually thought of as either very small metal entities or very small mental properties. A metaphysics of fields, in contrast, will think of mental activity as a dynamic relationship among attractors, within energy fields, which may or may not also contain entities and properties. The model

for mental activity will have more in common with electromagnetism or gravity, than with quarks and atoms, and will be composed of processes, forces and activities rather than things or properties. Also, fields are not quite Russellian structures, or the entities of structural realism of the type espoused by Ladyman and Ross, although they might contain or generate such structures at times.

@philipthrift