What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

[Alan Grayson]

I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. AG

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 5:02:09 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:

I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. AG

I was just taking "Mechanism" as a (computability) term meaning "not able to perform Turing jumps".

     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_jump

But then there is an "Extended" Mechanism:

      Turing jumps through provability

       https://arxiv.org/abs/1501.05327

@philipthrift

 

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, 18 Sep 2019 at 20:02, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. AG

The complaint that we can’t define, explain or test for consciousness can be used for “awakening from unremarkable surgery” as well: people who go through it seem to be the same, but how could you know?

--

Stathis Papaioannou

[John Clark]

On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 6:02 AM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person,

On some days the meaning of "Mechanism" may mean that in Brunospeak but on other days it does not, such as the day Bruno said "it is not relevant to say “yes” or “no” in a practical implementation of Mechanism". The only thing that remains constant is that the Brunospeak meaning never has any relationship to the English meaning of the word. And the same thing is true for words like "God" and "theology".

  John K Clark

[Alan Grayson]

Haven't you ever awoken from surgery? AG 

[Brent Meeker]

Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help
to define it in words?

Brent

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Yes, and I think I was just the same as before and so does everyone else. But maybe I am fundamentally different. How would I know?

--

Stathis Papaioannou

[Alan Grayson]

Ostensively? What do you mean? You know, there are things we call 

"dictionaries" where words are defined. If we have no way to define 

"consciousness", we have no chance of understanding it. AG

[John Clark]

On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 2:55 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

> You know, there are things we call "dictionaries" where words are defined.

And all those dictionary definitions are made of words, and all those words have there own definitions also in the dictionary, and all those words have there own definitions also in the dictionary, and all those words have there own definitions also in the dictionary.... and round and round we go. Another definition is never going to break is out of that meaningless circle, to do that you're going to need an example. After all, where do you think the people who wrote the dictionary got the knowledge to write their book?

> If we have no way to define "consciousness", we have no chance of understanding it.

That's not true for consciousness and its not true for anything else either. Fundamentally our understanding of the world does not come from definitions, it comes from examples.

 John K Clark

 

[Alan Grayson]

Where would science be without its definitions? They are decisive in knowing what we are talking about! And there's more, much more to dictionaries, than you claim. AG 

 

[John Clark]

On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 3:30 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

 

> there's more, much more to dictionaries, than you claim.

There is more, much more in a dictionary than definitions made of words that are also made of words?! Please give me an EXAMPLE of that.

John K Clark

[Brent Meeker]

You'd ask people who knew you well.

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

Like this.  Imagine an elephant. 

Ok, that was you being conscious of an elephant.

Brent

[Philip Thrift]

Actually I first "imaged" Dumbo, the Disney cartoon character. :)

@philipthrift 

[John Clark]

On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 4:25 PM 'Brent Meeker'  <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> Haven't you ever awoken from surgery? AG 

>> Yes, and I think I was just the same as before and so does everyone else. But maybe I am fundamentally different. How would I know?

>>> You'd ask people who knew you well.

And if you did that you would hear them make noises with their mouth, but whatever consciousness is it certainly isn't those mouth noises. If your lucky you may be able to detect a pattern in those noises that would indicate intelligence, but you would have to make an additional assumption to conclude that also indicated consciousness, namely that consciousness is an inevitable byproduct of intelligence. In the real world everybody makes that assumption a thousand times a day because the alternative is solipsism. 

 John K Clark    

[Brent Meeker]

They question was whether you could find out you were fundamentally different after an operation.  Not whether or not your friends were conscious.  Saibal said "No." apparently based only on the fact that he couldn't trust introspection.  But in that would equally imply he couldn't tell whether he fundamentally changed from day to day, or minute to minute. Of course nothing can provide certainty, but your friends saying you act differently or you don't would be good evidence.  It's the same level of evidence for thinking one another consciousness, but it's broader since you might be different in some way you were not conscious of.

Brent

[Stathis Papaioannou]

And if you were different in some way you were  not conscious of, it wouldn’t matter.

--

Stathis Papaioannou

[Brent Meeker]

How do you figure that?  Suppose you're a murderous psychopath after the operation.   Just because YOU don't remember not being a murderous psychopath before, it may still matter.

Brent

[Stathis Papaioannou]

I 

In that case there would be objective evidence of a change and you would be conscious of this evidence. But if neither you nor anyone else noticed a change, it wouldn’t matter. For example, if my colour qualia changed every day, but there was no objective difference and I didn’t notice any difference, it wouldn’t matter. It could be argued that such a change is not really a change at all.

--

Stathis Papaioannou

[Alan Grayson]

Do you use a dictionary? AG 

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/18/2019 5:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

I 

On Thu, 19 Sep 2019 at 10:17, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 9/18/2019 3:22 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Thu, 19 Sep 2019 at 08:16, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 9/18/2019 2:58 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 4:25 PM 'Brent Meeker'  <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> Haven't you ever awoken from surgery? AG 

>> Yes, and I think I was just the same as before and so does everyone else. But maybe I am fundamentally different. How would I know?

>>> You'd ask people who knew you well.

And if you did that you would hear them make noises with their mouth, but whatever consciousness is it certainly isn't those mouth noises. If your lucky you may be able to detect a pattern in those noises that would indicate intelligence, but you would have to make an additional assumption to conclude that also indicated consciousness, namely that consciousness is an inevitable byproduct of intelligence. In the real world everybody makes that assumption a thousand times a day because the alternative is solipsism.

They question was whether you could find out you were fundamentally different after an operation.  Not whether or not your friends were conscious.  Saibal said "No." apparently based only on the fact that he couldn't trust introspection.  But in that would equally imply he couldn't tell whether he fundamentally changed from day to day, or minute to minute. Of course nothing can provide certainty, but your friends saying you act differently or you don't would be good evidence.  It's the same level of evidence for thinking one another consciousness, but it's broader since you might be different in some way you were not conscious of.

And if you were different in some way you were  not conscious of, it wouldn’t matter.

How do you figure that?  Suppose you're a murderous psychopath after the operation.   Just because YOU don't remember not being a murderous psychopath before, it may still matter.

In that case there would be objective evidence of a change and you would be conscious of this evidence.

You would be conscious of the fact that your friends and other physical evidence told you that you had changed.  You would not need to have any feeling (gualia) of difference.  Which is why we believe that the shared physical world is more real/stable/fundamental than our qualia.

Brent

But if neither you nor anyone else noticed a change, it wouldn’t matter. For example, if my colour qualia changed every day, but there was no objective difference and I didn’t notice any difference, it wouldn’t matter. It could be argued that such a change is not really a change at all.

--

Stathis Papaioannou

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[Alan Grayson]

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:02:09 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. AG

The really interesting thing about this thread, and it's hugely telling, is that Bruno refuses (yes, refuses) to say whether my comment is correct, and if not, what needs to be corrected. AG 

[John Clark]

On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 9:40 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> There is more, much more in a dictionary than definitions made of words that are also made of words?! Please give me an EXAMPLE of that.

> Do you use a dictionary? AG 

The last time I used a dictionary was when I was trying to decide if I should use the word "effect" or "affect" and concluded that most people don't know the difference either so it just didn't effect (or affect) communication a great deal one way or the other. And I certainly find a dictionary is never of any help in trying to figure out fundamental questions about reality. Most people don't have a dictionary in their house and haven't used one since they were nine when their fourth grade teacher made them, and yet they somehow manage to communicate just fine. 

And you never answered my question, if it wasn't from EXAMPLES of language use where do you think the people who wrote the dictionary got the knowledge to write their book? I suggest you read the book "The Professor and the Madman" by Simon Winchester, it tells the story of how the ultimate dictionary, The Oxford English Dictionary got made:

The Professor and the Madman: A Tale of Murder, Insanity, and the Making of the Oxford English Dictionary

John K Clark

 

[Philip Thrift]

This is a nice online dictionary I found recently:

       https://www.lexico.com/en

 (Try our your favorite word.)

@philpthrift

[Alan Grayson]

Don't you use definitions in physics, such as mass, energy, velocity, acceleration, space, time, entropy? Without them, we simply couldn't do physics. Here, as in your MW obsession, you seem opaque to reality. AG

 

[John Clark]

On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 5:45 AM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

 

> Don't you use definitions in physics, such as mass, energy, velocity, acceleration, space, time, entropy?

Sure, and every one of those definitions came from EXAMPLES observed in the physical world. The definitions didn't create the physical world, the physical world created the definitions. 

John K Clark

[Alan Grayson]

I am not saying that examples are not suggestive of laws of physics. All I am saying, which you irrationally deny, is that definitions are part of an overall process for knowing reality, that is, for actually doing physics. Without them we can't speak meaningfully with each other. And most people still use dictionaries, which are now online, and often are implicit in our discussions. As I recall quite clearly, it was YOU who have been vigorously critical of Bruno for his alleged sloppy and varying DEFINITIONS!. Looks like your achieving troll status with foolish argments. So where is Bruno? AG 

[John Clark]

On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 6:12 AM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

 

> I am not saying that examples are not suggestive of laws of physics. All I am saying, which you irrationally deny, is that definitions are part of an overall process for knowing reality,

Definitions have nothing to do with knowing reality, sometimes they can help in communicating with fellow human beings but even then they are usually not needed, the meaning of the word is obvious from the usage. That is after all how children learn language, by observing its use in the physical world. 

 > And most people still use dictionaries

Dictionaries are only a few hundred years old and even today most humans on this planet have never used a dictionary even once in their entire life.

 

> As I recall quite clearly, it was YOU who have been vigorously critical of Bruno for his alleged sloppy and varying DEFINITIONS!.

Definitions are arbitrary human conventions not signposts to ultimate reality, but for communication to be effective they need to be consistent, at least from one paragraph to the next in the same post. 

 John K Clark

[Alan Grayson]

On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 4:33:41 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 6:12 AM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

 

> I am not saying that examples are not suggestive of laws of physics. All I am saying, which you irrationally deny, is that definitions are part of an overall process for knowing reality,

Definitions have nothing to do with knowing reality, sometimes they can help in communicating with fellow human beings but even then they are usually not needed, the meaning of the word is obvious from the usage. That is after all how children learn language, by observing its use in the physical world. 

How would you know what a LT is unless it was well defined? I think this discussion is worthless and I won't reply to any nonsense put forth to continue it. AG 

[John Clark]

On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 6:43 AM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

> How would you know what a LT is unless it was well defined?

By seeing it used in relation to something in the physical world, but I never have so I have no idea what a "LT" is, but I do know IHA.

John K Clark

[Alan Grayson]

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

I think you've nailed the problem. We don't know how to define "consciousness". In terms of what? Presumably it's properties, as we define other entities in physics, such as the electron. Who was the SC justice who said you know pornography when you see it, but you can't define it prior to the observation?  So far, the most we can say about consciousness, that is, its properties, is that it's self-referential. AG

[Philip Thrift]

On defining 'electron', of course some say

https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1984qtg..book...66D/abstract

Particles do not Exist

• Davies, P. C. W.

Abstract

The concept of a particle is purely an idealized model of some utility in flat space quantum field theory. Away from that limited context, however, the concept becomes much less useful and has been the source of much confusion. The study of DeWitt-style particle detectors has exposed the nebulousness of the particle concept and suggests that it should be abandoned completely.

@philipthrift 

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/19/2019 2:45 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> Don't you use definitions in physics, such as mass, energy, velocity,
> acceleration, space, time, entropy? Without them, we simply couldn't
> do physics. Here, as in your MW obsession, you seem opaque to reality. AG

Sure. But ultimately they are all grounded in ostensive definitions.

Brent

[Alan Grayson]

Obstensively, like imagining anything like an elephant exists? But what and 

how is this imagining helpful in knowing what consciousness us, as compared 

to specific definitions used in physics as previously indicated? AG

[Alan Grayson]

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:02:09 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. AG

The fact that Bruno, a prolific poster, won't comment if the above is correct, is evidence for me, that at his core, he's is a BS artist. AG 

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/19/2019 11:04 AM, AG wrote:
> I think you've nailed the problem. We don't know how to define
> "consciousness". In terms of what? Presumably it's properties, as we
> define other entities in physics, such as the electron. Who was the SC
> justice who said you know pornography when you see it, but you can't
> define it prior to the observation?  So far, the most we can say about
> consciousness, that is, its properties, is that it's self-referential. AG

Actually, I think this is questionable.  I'm not sure that I can
directly refer to my own consciousness.  Whenever I think about by
consciousness I'm thinking of what it just was, a moment ago.  Of course
I think the phrase "I'm conscious."  But that's the words. I'm not sure
there's a qualia of consciousness per se.  Conscious is always
consciousness OF something...but I don't think that thing can be
consciousness.

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

Whether it's helpful or not, it's the basis we have to go on.  Bruno wants to define consciousness as whatever is self-referential, because he can prove arithmetic is self-referential (given the right coding).  But I've seen billboards that are self-referential, so I don't think that's a good definition.   And even if it's true that consciousness if self-referential (I have my doubts), so what?  It's doesn't see that essential to consciousness, since I very rarely refer to my consciousness.

Brent

[Alan Grayson]

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:02:09 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. AG

Bruno; does "Yes doctor" mean that a patient accepts as fact that removing his/her brain and/or nervous system and replacing it with microcircuits preserving the same functions, yields a surgical result such that the patient upon awakening seems to him or herself, and others, as the same "person" who previously approved the surgery? Is this the essence of mechanism?  If not, please elaborate. TIA, AG
 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Sep 2019, at 12:02, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable surgery.

Yes, that is basically correct. A bit imprecise. To be sure, I do not claim that Mechanism is true. It is just my working hypothesis, and my point is that:

1) mechanism is incompatible with physicalism: physics becomes a branch of machine’s biology/psychology/theology/computer-science/elementary arithmetic. 

And indeed, I git very early that mechanism entails a physical reality which has a many “words/histories/alternate-relative-states, with a weird statistics, but it took me 30 years to see that the math confirms quantum mechanics (without collapse).

From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. AG

I guess you meant “”...since we can even define what consciousness IS”.

We cannot even define what is a physical universe. There are very few things that we can define about “reality” (not even “reality”), but that does not prevent us to know or to have a good idea about those thing. I agree with you that consciousness is not definable, nor knowledge, nor truth, but consciousness is what we know the best, and is the only indubitable thing we are confronted with. 

Actually I define, or “meta-define” consciousness by something

1) true

2) knowable

3) indubitable 

Yet,

4) not provable, and, importantly, as you say

5) not definable in the language available by the entity concerned, unless through adherence to a notion of truth (mathematical logic explains how to give sense to this).

In that sense, not only the machine is conscious, but do find that theory of consciousness, including the fact that physics has to be retrieved from that theory of consciousness, making it refutable. I predicted most quantum weirdness from this, and was not far from believing I was refuting Mechanism, until I realise (thanks to Everett) that the physicists were already there. Before that I have used quantum mechanics + collapse just a tool in molecular biochemistry.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Sep 2019, at 12:33, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 5:02:09 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:

I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. AG

I was just taking "Mechanism" as a (computability) term meaning "not able to perform Turing jumps".

     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_jump

But then there is an "Extended" Mechanism:

      Turing jumps through provability

       https://arxiv.org/abs/1501.05327

Yes, that is what Turing machine can do. They can compute (and are universal with resect to computation), but they can many other things, were they are no more ever universal, and so can improved themselves infinitely. And yes there are many jumps, and the machine do that all the time, including when you pull out he electrical source …

But it is not extended mechanism. It is simple digital mechanism, where we distinguish provability and computability, and that distinction is a key in my work. Despite provability is not universal, once the machine is “rich enough” (I use the term Löbian) then not only the (sound) machine is not universal for provability (Gödel’s theorem), but it knows that very well, and get a little bit “mystical” for pure logical reason (like Plato and others humans have understood).

Bruno

@philipthrift

 

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Sep 2019, at 13:11, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 6:02 AM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person,

On some days the meaning of "Mechanism" may mean that in Brunospeak but on other days it does not, such as the day Bruno said "it is not relevant to say “yes” or “no” in a practical implementation of Mechanism”.

That does not change the definition of mechanism, that Grayson explained in the right way, although he does not mention that mechanism is a believe/assumption of the existence of level of substitution. Later I show that no machine can find its own level of substitution, but they can still make a bet, or an act of faith, if and when the doctor suggest they *migt* survive some disease through this, but of course, not in any provable way. That is why Mechanism is a theological axiom/hypothesis. It is the belief in some form of technical (then arithmetical) (re)-incarnation.

What you say is true for all theories, and is akin to say that the logical consequence of a theory does not depend on your or me believing or assuming the theory.

Now, in the thought experience, is it easier to fake we believe in the theory to get the consequences, but you could use “robots” instead of human, as the first person notion is defined in a third person way (the content of the 1p-personal diary, and “1p-personal diary” 

The only thing that remains constant is that the Brunospeak meaning never has any relationship to the English meaning of the word. And the same thing is true for words like "God" and "theology”.

No. My use of the term is English. It is even the Christian use in the period where the christian were neoplatonist. It is a common use, often precise by “the god of the philosopher”, on which the literature is extremely abundant. 

Like many atheists, you talk like if only the christians got the right vocabulary, and like them, you do everything to make us forget that theology has been a science for a millenium, and a very fertile one, as mathematics and physics are born from the neoplatonist doubt that physics was the fundamental science.

Bruno

  John K Clark

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Sep 2019, at 20:55, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system
> with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or
> perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake

> from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening
> from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge
> stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS.

Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help
to define it in words?

Brent

Ostensively? What do you mean? You know, there are things we call 

"dictionaries" where words are defined. If we have no way to define 

"consciousness", we have no chance of understanding it. AG

Like with truth, which is undefinable, we can use the notion all the time, without being able to define it. Enough examples can give the intuition, even if we can’t get to the certainty (which in science is just a form of madness).

And the, as I show, we can meta-define such concept, and there is a science which provides all the needed tools; it is mathematical logic (alas, very badly taught when taught at all).

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Sep 2019, at 21:30, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 1:14:36 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 2:55 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

> You know, there are things we call "dictionaries" where words are defined.

And all those dictionary definitions are made of words, and all those words have there own definitions also in the dictionary, and all those words have there own definitions also in the dictionary, and all those words have there own definitions also in the dictionary.... and round and round we go. Another definition is never going to break is out of that meaningless circle, to do that you're going to need an example. After all, where do you think the people who wrote the dictionary got the knowledge to write their book?

> If we have no way to define "consciousness", we have no chance of understanding it.

That's not true for consciousness and its not true for anything else either. Fundamentally our understanding of the world does not come from definitions, it comes from examples.

 John K Clark

Where would science be without its definitions? They are decisive in knowing what we are talking about! And there's more, much more to dictionaries, than you claim. AG 

In science, we never know. A scientist who say “we know that …” is either doing an abuse of language for being short, or is a con artist.

Bruno

 

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Sep 2019, at 23:01, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 3:27:55 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 9/18/2019 11:55 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system
> with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or
> perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake
> from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening
> from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge
> stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS.

Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help
to define it in words?

Brent

Ostensively? What do you mean? You know, there are things we call 

"dictionaries" where words are defined. If we have no way to define 

"consciousness", we have no chance of understanding it. AG

Like this.  Imagine an elephant. 

Ok, that was you being conscious of an elephant.

Brent

Actually I first "imaged" Dumbo, the Disney cartoon character. :)

That happen often to fictionalist :)

Bruno

@philipthrift 

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Sep 2019, at 00:16, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 9/18/2019 2:58 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 4:25 PM 'Brent Meeker'  <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> Haven't you ever awoken from surgery? AG 

>> Yes, and I think I was just the same as before and so does everyone else. But maybe I am fundamentally different. How would I know?

>>> You'd ask people who knew you well.

And if you did that you would hear them make noises with their mouth, but whatever consciousness is it certainly isn't those mouth noises. If your lucky you may be able to detect a pattern in those noises that would indicate intelligence, but you would have to make an additional assumption to conclude that also indicated consciousness, namely that consciousness is an inevitable byproduct of intelligence. In the real world everybody makes that assumption a thousand times a day because the alternative is solipsism.

They question was whether you could find out you were fundamentally different after an operation.  Not whether or not your friends were conscious.  Saibal said "No." apparently based only on the fact that he couldn't trust introspection.  But in that would equally imply he couldn't tell whether he fundamentally changed from day to day, or minute to minute. Of course nothing can provide certainty, but your friends saying you act differently or you don't would be good evidence.  It's the same level of evidence for thinking one another consciousness, but it's broader since you might be different in some way you were not conscious of.

That’s right, and the definitions of the “first person” used either in the thought experiment (content of the diary taken by the candidate with him, in the annihilation/copy box) or used in the math (beweisbar(‘p’) & p, []p & p) makes the reasoning on consciousness rigorous and transparent, despite not being able to define it, as long as we agree that we can survive for more than one second in our everyday life. 

Bruno

Brent

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[Bruno Marchal]

And so your inference was wrong.

Your definition was correct, albeit imprecise.Indexical Digital Mechanism (aka computationalism) is the assumption that there is a level of description of my brain/body (actually in a very general sense, it could the whole physical universe) such that my consciousness is maintained in a digital emulation of my brain when digitally correct at that level.

Non mechanism is basically the idea that no magic events occurs in the brain, nor that a brain, which can be considered as an analog Mechanism,  needs all decimal of some non computable reals. Mechanism is used explicitly by Everett, but also arguably by Darwin, molecular genetics, and is a consequence of most known physical laws.

The problem is that atheism are used to exploit mechanism to put the mind-body problem under the rug. There would be a physical ontological universe, and we are just material machine. The problem is that a digital machine cannot feel any difference in between being emulated in arithmetic and in a physical reality, and eventually physics has to be come a statistics on all (relative) computations. When the math is done, we recover the quantum formalism, until now, so we can say that the idea that there is a “real” (ontological, primitive,irreductibel,  in-ned-to be assumed) physical universe has become speculative, if not superstitious or pseudo-religious.

Materialism will be abandonned, probably, just like the “élan vitale” of 18th century. It makes just no sense, besides having zero evidence for it.

We must not confuse the physical reality, and the physicalist idea that the physical reality is the fundamental reality from which all the others (biology, psychology, …) would emerge.

Assuming Mechanism, it is a theorem in metaphysics/theology that the physical reality has to be explained by machine’s mathematical psycho-theology, and nature confirms this (unless you believe in the magical “physical collapse”).

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

Assuming a physical world, but that assumption is the one incompatible with Mechanism.

That results annoy only philosopher who are dogmatic on both Matter and Mechanism. Scientist usually are not, thanks god!

Bruno

John K Clark

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Sep 2019, at 12:12, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 3:56:43 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 5:45 AM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

 

> Don't you use definitions in physics, such as mass, energy, velocity, acceleration, space, time, entropy?

Sure, and every one of those definitions came from EXAMPLES observed in the physical world. The definitions didn't create the physical world, the physical world created the definitions. 

John K Clark

I am not saying that examples are not suggestive of laws of physics. All I am saying, which you irrationally deny, is that definitions are part of an overall process for knowing reality, that is, for actually doing physics.

Hmm … if you are patient and honest, I can explain that physics does not study the fundamental reality, but only one aspect of it.

Without them we can't speak meaningfully with each other. And most people still use dictionaries, which are now online, and often are implicit in our discussions. As I recall quite clearly, it was YOU who have been vigorously critical of Bruno for his alleged sloppy and varying DEFINITIONS!.

Clark seems to have a personal agenda, and will systematically try to confuse people on the issue of the consequence of mechanism. 

Now, in mathematical logic there is a huge chapter of definability theory, and we can prove that machine’s introspecting themselves will be confronted to “obvious but undeniable truth”, like “I am conscious” will belong. Also, “knowledge” by a machine cannot be defined by that machine, but the machine can define “knowledge” for a simpler machine than itself, and the, by assuming Mechanism, can lift that theory on itself, but she has to be very cautious, as the math shows that when done in some manner, the machine will become inconsistent. This is related to what I call the theological trap. Some truth becomes false when asserted or prove. The logical equation []x -> ~x has many non trivial solutions (x = f; x = <>t, x = <><>t, etc. “<> is the dual of [] (provable) and can be read consistent. Dual means that <>p is the same as ~[]~p.

Looks like your achieving troll status with foolish argments. So where is Bruno? AG 

I am here AG. Sorry for being late, but it is the academical “entry” (we say in French) and there is a lot of work.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Sep 2019, at 17:00, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system
> with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or
> perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake
> from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening
> from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge
> stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS.

Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help
to define it in words?

Brent

I think you've nailed the problem. We don't know how to define "consciousness”.

Not we don”t have a definition of consciousness, but for those who claim to not know, I suggest to ask their dentist to not use anesthetiser, and they will have a pretty good idea of what is it to be like having consciousness. Consciousness is what gives sense to pain, pleasure, knowledge, etc.

In terms of what?

With mechanism, we can define knowledge by the conjunction-onjction of belief and truth. For belief, we can use Gödel’s definition in elementary arithmetic (where you assume x + 0 = x, & Co.), fortieth you can study Tarski theory of truth, it quite enough, and yes, tarski is the one showing that the arithmetical truth cannot be defined by machines, or actually, even by most non-mechanical entities too, with some exception.

Presumably it's properties, as we define other entities in physics, such as the electron.

You cannot use 3p notions to define consciousness which is a pure 1p notion.

(Eventually the physical will appear as a 1p-plural notion, but that’s for later).

Who was the SC justice who said you know pornography when you see it, but you can't define it prior to the observation?  So far, the most we can say about consciousness, that is, its properties, is that it's self-referential. AG

Indeed, but it has two main level: the simple non reflexive consciousness, which is implicitly self-referential, and the consciousness of the Löbian machine (which are not just universal, they know that they are universal) where the self-reference is made explicit by the machine. It has about the difference between the consciousness of low animals compared to higher vertebrate, although I suspect the cuttlefish and some others invertebrate to have it too.

Bruno

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[Alan Grayson]

On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 9:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Sep 2019, at 17:00, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system
> with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or
> perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake
> from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening
> from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge
> stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS.

Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help
to define it in words?

Brent

I think you've nailed the problem. We don't know how to define "consciousness”.

Not we don”t have a definition of consciousness, but for those who claim to not know, I suggest to ask their dentist to not use anesthetiser, and they will have a pretty good idea of what is it to be like having consciousness. Consciousness is what gives sense to pain, pleasure, knowledge, etc.

I know I have consciousness. That's not the issue. What I don't know is how it can exist or the conditions for its existence. I also know that some chemicals can dramatically alter consciousness, and in some cases destroy it absolutely. So its material basis seems pretty firm.  Also, more fundamentally, I find your Platonic theory of numbers on dubious grounds. Numbers can easily be inferred from observations of the physical world, whereas the reverse Platonic claim is hugely difficult if not impossible. I see a single object, from which I conceive "1". I see another indentical object and I conceive "2". And so forth. I also dispute your claim that the successor function or principle is derivable independent of the physical world, which you see as illusional. The successor principle as codified in Peano's postulates seems a simply inference from observations, that is, an extension of them. It's not sometime inherently mysterious dependent on what Godel proved. Can you say exactly, in a few words, why Godel is relevant to any of this? AG

In terms of what?

With mechanism, we can define knowledge by the conjunction-onjction of belief and truth. For belief, we can use Gödel’s definition in elementary arithmetic (where you assume x + 0 = x, & Co.), fortieth you can study Tarski theory of truth, it quite enough, and yes, tarski is the one showing that the arithmetical truth cannot be defined by machines, or actually, even by most non-mechanical entities too, with some exception.

Presumably it's properties, as we define other entities in physics, such as the electron.

You cannot use 3p notions to define consciousness which is a pure 1p notion.

(Eventually the physical will appear as a 1p-plural notion, but that’s for later).

I am merely stating that an electron is defined by its measured properties which anyone, with sufficient

effort, can confirm. I don't see that 1p or 3p has anything to do with this, other than to obfuscate. AG 

[Alan Grayson]

On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 10:12:12 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 9:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Sep 2019, at 17:00, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system
> with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or
> perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake
> from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening
> from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge
> stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS.

Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help
to define it in words?

Brent

I think you've nailed the problem. We don't know how to define "consciousness”.

Not we don”t have a definition of consciousness, but for those who claim to not know, I suggest to ask their dentist to not use anesthetiser, and they will have a pretty good idea of what is it to be like having consciousness. Consciousness is what gives sense to pain, pleasure, knowledge, etc.

I know I have consciousness. That's not the issue. What I don't know is how it can exist or the conditions for its existence. I also know that some chemicals can dramatically alter consciousness, and in some cases destroy it absolutely. So its material basis seems pretty firm.  Also, more fundamentally, I find your Platonic theory of numbers on dubious grounds. Numbers can easily be inferred from observations of the physical world, whereas the reverse Platonic claim is hugely difficult if not impossible. I see a single object, from which I conceive "1". I see another indentical object and I conceive "2". And so forth. I also dispute your claim that the successor function or principle is derivable independent of the physical world, which you see as illusional. The successor principle as codified in Peano's postulates seems a simply inference from observations, that is, an extension of them. It's not sometime inherently mysterious dependent on what Godel proved. Can you say exactly, in a few words, why Godel is relevant to any of this? AG

In terms of what?

With mechanism, we can define knowledge by the conjunction-onjction of belief and truth. For belief, we can use Gödel’s definition in elementary arithmetic (where you assume x + 0 = x, & Co.), fortieth you can study Tarski theory of truth, it quite enough, and yes, tarski is the one showing that the arithmetical truth cannot be defined by machines, or actually, even by most non-mechanical entities too, with some exception.

"conjunction-onjction"? What the heck is that? I contend that all the postulates of arithmetic, including x + 0 = x, can be inferred from observations of the external, physical universe. AG 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Sep 2019, at 05:29, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 9/19/2019 4:42 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 12:52:03 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 9/19/2019 2:45 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> Don't you use definitions in physics, such as mass, energy, velocity,
> acceleration, space, time, entropy? Without them, we simply couldn't
> do physics. Here, as in your MW obsession, you seem opaque to reality. AG

Sure. But ultimately they are all grounded in ostensive definitions.

Brent

Obstensively, like imagining anything like an elephant exists? But what and 

how is this imagining helpful in knowing what consciousness us, as compared 

to specific definitions used in physics as previously indicated? AG

Whether it's helpful or not, it's the basis we have to go on.  Bruno wants to define consciousness as whatever is self-referential,

Not 3p self-referential (that is []p), but very importantly it is 1p-self-referential. Consciousness is first person knowledge, with not definable self, but still existing. My theory of consciousness is basically the standard one found by Theaetetus. Incompleteness literally imposed it once we bet on mechanism.

because he can prove arithmetic is self-referential (given the right coding).  But I've seen billboards that are self-referential, so I don't think that's a good definition.

If the billboard is Turing universal, it will work. And the main point is that this theory of consciousness implies the laws of physics, and implies already the quantum formalism and its many-histories structuration. 

   And even if it's true that consciousness if self-referential (I have my doubts),

Here there is a difficulty. The consciousness of the universal machine lack full self-reference power, and is not subjectively self-referential. Only the Löbian machine get aware of the self-reference,ntial aspect of consciousness, but it makes sense to say that this is already a delusion. The induction axioms belongs already in the phenomenology, somehow.

so what?  It's doesn't see that essential to consciousness, since I very rarely refer to my consciousness.

It is normal. It has to be like that. When the worm is suffering, he is not aware of the self-reference, but we, from outside can bet that the worm’s suffering is the worms’ one, like you say “my consciousness” (a symptom that you are a Löbian machine).

Consciousness can be meta-defined in many ways. It is what we know the best, and the only thing we can be sure of, yet it is not definable with any words, and not identifiable with anything describable in the third person way. That is something that consciousness has in common with god (and that’w why the idealist sometimes want to assume consciousness as the primitive thing, but with mechanism, consciousness is just a relative property of numbers with respect to their infinitely many computational histories.

Unfortunately, most people (especially since the closure of Plato’s academy) confuse first person notion and third person notion, like Penrose and Lucas who use Gödel against mechanism, but confuse []p and ([]p & p).

Bruno

Brent

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[Bruno Marchal]

The patient cannot accept this as a fact. It is something he can hope only. Then, if mechanism is true, by definition he was correct, but even after the operation, he cannot claim that as a fact, despite its personal impression. He might have lose a faculty and not be aware of it, like people can become blind and be unaware of the change, in some special brain disease (anosognosia).

Is this the essence of mechanism?  If not, please elaborate. TIA, AG

Yes, it is mechanism, but it requires an act of faith.

Now, to be sure, taking a plane, or even a bike, requires some faith too, but here, that play an important role in the sequel, and so that nuance has to be taken into account.

Rational machine have a surrational corona extending what they can justify. That corona has a precise mathematical structure, and is used to derive the laws of physics from arithmetic. 

Bruno

 

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Sep 2019, at 06:12, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 9:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Sep 2019, at 17:00, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system
> with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or
> perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake
> from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening
> from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge
> stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS.

Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help
to define it in words?

Brent

I think you've nailed the problem. We don't know how to define "consciousness”.

Not we don”t have a definition of consciousness, but for those who claim to not know, I suggest to ask their dentist to not use anesthetiser, and they will have a pretty good idea of what is it to be like having consciousness. Consciousness is what gives sense to pain, pleasure, knowledge, etc.

I know I have consciousness. That's not the issue.

OK.

What I don't know is how it can exist or the conditions for its existence.

Assuming that the brain works “digitally-mechanically” at some level of description will eventually answer this, but the price is that physics will have to be reduced to machine theology (which is itself reducible to arithmetic).

I also know that some chemicals can dramatically alter consciousness,

Which is easy to explain in the mechanist theory, as the chemical will perturb the *functioning* of the brain.

and in some cases destroy it absolutely.

This will never happens, but that is highly not obvious, so I will not try to explain here. It necessitates to understand that mechanism makes the physical universe having no ontological status at all (which contradicts 1500 years of enforced materialist theology, so people will take time to swallow this, no doubt).

So its material basis seems pretty firm. 

Yes. But eventually, that material basis emerges from the statistic on all computations. Matter exists, and indeed the physical laws describe a reality, but it is no more fundamental or ontological.

Also, more fundamentally, I find your Platonic theory of numbers on dubious grounds.

I do not assume platonism. I assume only what I have to assume to define what is a machine, mathematically.

If you agree with proposition like “2+2=4”, and that we can deduce from it that the equation x + 2 = 4 has a solution, that is enough. That is assumed by most theory in physics. 

So Platonism and neoplatonism are not assumed, but derived from Mechanism.

Numbers can easily be inferred from observations of the physical world,

That is correct. But that does not imply that the physical world is primary.

What you miss is perhaps, like some other, the fact (and here that *is* a fact) that the notion of computation have been shown being purely arithmetical. Turing’s original definition is purely mathematical already (set of quadruples verifying some conditions) and later it has been shown to be arithmetical (although the proof is already in Gödel 1931, but Gödel did not see this as he did not believe the Church-Turing thesis at that time, only later).

whereas the reverse Platonic claim is hugely difficult if not impossible. I see a single object, from which I conceive "1". I see another indentical object and I conceive "2”.

The idea of defining “real” by what we see IS Aristotle theology. It is what Plato warns us to not taken for granted.

To be honest with you, I confess that I have less doubt that 2 divides 24, than any extrapolation in some reality or in any laws inferred from it. I doubt less “2 divide 24” than F = GmM/r^2. I can conceive waking up in the morning and discovering that F = GmM/r^2. Is false, but it is harder to conceive that I can wake up in the morning and believe that 2 does not divide 24. In fact, to accept F = GmM/r^2, I already needs the believe in elementary arithmetic. 

And so forth. I also dispute your claim that the successor function or principle is derivable independent of the physical world, which you see as illusional.

I am a logician. I don’t know the truth. I just explain the consequence of Mechanism, and show that Nature confirms them up to now, at a place where the materialist ignores consciousness or dismiss it entirely.

The successor principle as codified in Peano's postulates seems a simply inference from observations,

Yes, the successor can be inferred from physical experience and life, like with birthday and the idea of death, but most results obtained have been got through logical reflection. Euclid might have got the intuition of natural number from observation and life, but he got the fundamental theorems of arithmetic through reflexion. Same for the infinity of primes, which is not something observable in any strict sense of observation.

that is, an extension of them. It's not sometime inherently mysterious dependent on what Godel proved. Can you say exactly, in a few words, why Godel is relevant to any of this? AG

Gödel’s theorem is important, but there is something more important: the discovery of the universal machineries and of the universal machine, made by Emil Post, Alan Turing, Alonzo Church and  very well understood by Stephen Kleene, who with Emil Post, will create the field of theoretical computer science (aka Recursion Theory, or now, Computability theory).

Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem is an easy theorem when you accept the Church-turing thesis (stating that we get all computable functions through their respective formalism, and it is provable that they are equivalent, like all formalism found since, including the quantum computer.

So, Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, found independently of Church thesis confirms it, and will add some important precision.

More important is Gödel’s second theorem, and the generalisation which will follow, like Löb’s theorem, and Solovay’s theorem. It shows that a class of machine are not only universal, but that they can know that they are universal (without knowing defined technically/mathematically), and such machine know their limitation and do postulate a reality which they are aware not being able to prove its existence (they mystical, somehow). Eventually they do understand that there is a physical reality which is observable, and that the physical reality emerges from the computation. The finding is basically what Plato and the neoplatonist already found. In a nutshell, the physical reality is an illusion by numbers. But with Turing, Gödel and Co, we have the math to derive that physics, and thus we can test if the physics that we infer from observation fit with the physics in the head of the machine (and deducible from “1+1=2 & Co.).

And, thanks to QM without collapse, it fits, up to now.

What is a universal machinery? It is an enumeration (with repetition) of all (partial and total) computable functions. Choose your favorite universal programming language, and order the one argument programs (by length and alphabetically for those having the same length), and you get a universal machinery: phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, … (noted phi_i).

Then we can define a universal “machine” or “number” by a number u such that phi_u(x, y) = phi_x(y). U is called a computer, x is called a programme, and y is called “data”.

I can explain why this entails a very strong form of incompleteness. Since Gödel, we know not only that elementary arithmetic is Turing universal (and thus explains the existence of all universal machineries), but we know that some universal knows that they are universal, and here the theorem of Löb and Solovay add much more precision. 

To be continue, if you are interested. Ask any question, but be patient ...

Bruno

In terms of what?

With mechanism, we can define knowledge by the conjunction-onjction of belief and truth. For belief, we can use Gödel’s definition in elementary arithmetic (where you assume x + 0 = x, & Co.), fortieth you can study Tarski theory of truth, it quite enough, and yes, tarski is the one showing that the arithmetical truth cannot be defined by machines, or actually, even by most non-mechanical entities too, with some exception.

Presumably it's properties, as we define other entities in physics, such as the electron.

You cannot use 3p notions to define consciousness which is a pure 1p notion.

(Eventually the physical will appear as a 1p-plural notion, but that’s for later).

I am merely stating that an electron is defined by its measured properties which anyone, with sufficient

effort, can confirm. I don't see that 1p or 3p has anything to do with this, other than to obfuscate. AG 

Who was the SC justice who said you know pornography when you see it, but you can't define it prior to the observation?  So far, the most we can say about consciousness, that is, its properties, is that it's self-referential. AG

Indeed, but it has two main level: the simple non reflexive consciousness, which is implicitly self-referential, and the consciousness of the Löbian machine (which are not just universal, they know that they are universal) where the self-reference is made explicit by the machine. It has about the difference between the consciousness of low animals compared to higher vertebrate, although I suspect the cuttlefish and some others invertebrate to have it too.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Sep 2019, at 09:49, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 10:12:12 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 9:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Sep 2019, at 17:00, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system
> with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or
> perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake
> from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening
> from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge
> stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS.

Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help
to define it in words?

Brent

I think you've nailed the problem. We don't know how to define "consciousness”.

Not we don”t have a definition of consciousness, but for those who claim to not know, I suggest to ask their dentist to not use anesthetiser, and they will have a pretty good idea of what is it to be like having consciousness. Consciousness is what gives sense to pain, pleasure, knowledge, etc.

I know I have consciousness. That's not the issue. What I don't know is how it can exist or the conditions for its existence. I also know that some chemicals can dramatically alter consciousness, and in some cases destroy it absolutely. So its material basis seems pretty firm.  Also, more fundamentally, I find your Platonic theory of numbers on dubious grounds. Numbers can easily be inferred from observations of the physical world, whereas the reverse Platonic claim is hugely difficult if not impossible. I see a single object, from which I conceive "1". I see another indentical object and I conceive "2". And so forth. I also dispute your claim that the successor function or principle is derivable independent of the physical world, which you see as illusional. The successor principle as codified in Peano's postulates seems a simply inference from observations, that is, an extension of them. It's not sometime inherently mysterious dependent on what Godel proved. Can you say exactly, in a few words, why Godel is relevant to any of this? AG

In terms of what?

With mechanism, we can define knowledge by the conjunction-onjction of belief and truth. For belief, we can use Gödel’s definition in elementary arithmetic (where you assume x + 0 = x, & Co.), fortieth you can study Tarski theory of truth, it quite enough, and yes, tarski is the one showing that the arithmetical truth cannot be defined by machines, or actually, even by most non-mechanical entities too, with some exception.

"conjunction-onjction"? What the heck is that?

A new type of typo error, due to the progress in applied computer science. Sorry. Read simply “conjunction”.

I contend that all the postulates of arithmetic, including x + 0 = x, can be inferred from observations of the external, physical universe. AG 

No problem with this, all universal machine in arithmetic get their ignition of number through a physical reality, that they cannot avoid, even if it is not a primitive reality in the big picture.

Bruno

Presumably it's properties, as we define other entities in physics, such as the electron.

You cannot use 3p notions to define consciousness which is a pure 1p notion.

(Eventually the physical will appear as a 1p-plural notion, but that’s for later).

I am merely stating that an electron is defined by its measured properties which anyone, with sufficient

effort, can confirm. I don't see that 1p or 3p has anything to do with this, other than to obfuscate. AG 

Who was the SC justice who said you know pornography when you see it, but you can't define it prior to the observation?  So far, the most we can say about consciousness, that is, its properties, is that it's self-referential. AG

Indeed, but it has two main level: the simple non reflexive consciousness, which is implicitly self-referential, and the consciousness of the Löbian machine (which are not just universal, they know that they are universal) where the self-reference is made explicit by the machine. It has about the difference between the consciousness of low animals compared to higher vertebrate, although I suspect the cuttlefish and some others invertebrate to have it too.

Bruno

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[Alan Grayson]

On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 2:44:05 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Sep 2019, at 17:00, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:02:09 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. AG

Bruno; does "Yes doctor" mean that a patient accepts as fact that removing his/her brain and/or nervous system and replacing it with microcircuits preserving the same functions, yields a surgical result such that the patient upon awakening seems to him or herself, and others, as the same "person" who previously approved the surgery?

The patient cannot accept this as a fact. It is something he can hope only. Then, if mechanism is true, by definition he was correct, but even after the operation, he cannot claim that as a fact, despite its personal impression. He might have lose a faculty and not be aware of it, like people can become blind and be unaware of the change, in some special brain disease (anosognosia).

Is this the essence of mechanism?  If not, please elaborate. TIA, AG

Yes, it is mechanism, but it requires an act of faith.

Now, to be sure, taking a plane, or even a bike, requires some faith too, but here, that play an important role in the sequel, and so that nuance has to be taken into account.

Rational machine have a surrational corona extending what they can justify. That corona has a precise mathematical structure, and is used to derive the laws of physics from arithmetic. 

Bruno

Can you name one law you have established or proved using your theory? AG 

 

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[Alan Grayson]

On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 5:21:38 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 2:44:05 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Sep 2019, at 17:00, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:02:09 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. AG

Bruno; does "Yes doctor" mean that a patient accepts as fact that removing his/her brain and/or nervous system and replacing it with microcircuits preserving the same functions, yields a surgical result such that the patient upon awakening seems to him or herself, and others, as the same "person" who previously approved the surgery?

The patient cannot accept this as a fact. It is something he can hope only. Then, if mechanism is true, by definition he was correct, but even after the operation, he cannot claim that as a fact, despite its personal impression. He might have lose a faculty and not be aware of it, like people can become blind and be unaware of the change, in some special brain disease (anosognosia).

Is this the essence of mechanism?  If not, please elaborate. TIA, AG

Yes, it is mechanism, but it requires an act of faith.

Now, to be sure, taking a plane, or even a bike, requires some faith too, but here, that play an important role in the sequel, and so that nuance has to be taken into account.

Rational machine have a surrational corona extending what they can justify. That corona has a precise mathematical structure, and is used to derive the laws of physics from arithmetic. 

Bruno

Can you name one law you have established or proved using your theory? AG 

Calculating everything, even if that were possible, doesn't mean you know anything! How would you know our universe uses inverse square for gravity (to a good approximation) and not inverses of higher order? Also, since no computer can calculate a single irrational number, they can only calculate to a measure zero (the rationals) of what exists; not to mention the finite time constraint for any of these calculations. AG 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Sep 2019, at 15:18, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 5:21:38 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 2:44:05 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Sep 2019, at 17:00, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:02:09 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. AG

Bruno; does "Yes doctor" mean that a patient accepts as fact that removing his/her brain and/or nervous system and replacing it with microcircuits preserving the same functions, yields a surgical result such that the patient upon awakening seems to him or herself, and others, as the same "person" who previously approved the surgery?

The patient cannot accept this as a fact. It is something he can hope only. Then, if mechanism is true, by definition he was correct, but even after the operation, he cannot claim that as a fact, despite its personal impression. He might have lose a faculty and not be aware of it, like people can become blind and be unaware of the change, in some special brain disease (anosognosia).

Is this the essence of mechanism?  If not, please elaborate. TIA, AG

Yes, it is mechanism, but it requires an act of faith.

Now, to be sure, taking a plane, or even a bike, requires some faith too, but here, that play an important role in the sequel, and so that nuance has to be taken into account.

Rational machine have a surrational corona extending what they can justify. That corona has a precise mathematical structure, and is used to derive the laws of physics from arithmetic. 

Bruno

Can you name one law you have established or proved using your theory? AG 

I have written a theorem prover generating the propositional physical laws.

 It predicts many laws including the very existence of non trivial physical laws, and the quantum nature of the observable. It predicts general statements, like the bottom of the physical reality is highly symmetrical (and plausibly necessarily reversible).

Then it predicts the qualia and consciousness, at a place where physics is either wrong or dismiss its existence and makes it into an illusion.

Keep in mind that Mechanism is not an hypothesis in physics, but in cognitive science. This predicted the possibility of AI (the reason what I have mocked 40 years ago).

I am not so much proposing a new theory than showing that all physicalist theory of everything are wrong if we assume Mechanism (like Descartes, Darwin, and many others more or less explicitly).

Calculating everything, even if that were possible,

The possibility of this is a theorem in arithmetic + Church’s thesis.

doesn't mean you know anything!

We agree on that. You know the main axiom from which I derive everything is named “the Modesty axiom” by Rohit Parikh and Raymond Smullyan.

Not only I don’t know everything, but I know-for-sure only my consciousness, and only god knows if I know more than that. But I have theories/beliefs, and I show how to test them.

How would you know our universe uses inverse square for gravity (to a good approximation) and not inverses of higher order?

That kind of thing is explained by many theorems in mathematics already. A beautiful illustration is given in the following very nice video which computes the sum of the inverse of saure numbers 1 + 1/4 + 1/9 + 1/16 + 1/25 + … using (and explaining) the inverse square laws.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-o3eB9sfls

I can’t use this with Mechanism though, because we have not yet extracted any notion of physical space (although I do have ideas how to get them, but the math get very complex. A recent progress has been made as it is related to possible deep relation between the theory of brads and knots and very large cardinal in set theory (the cardinal of Laver).

Also, since no computer can calculate a single irrational number,

That is false. A computer can calculate PI, e, sqrt(2), sqrt(3), sqrt(5) etc.. all irrational.

they can only calculate to a measure zero (the rationals) of what exists; not to mention the finite time constraint for any of these calculations. AG 

If you study my papers, you will see that the physical laws are not computable: they emerge from the first person indeterminacy (step 3) and the delay invariance (step 2 and 4). The universal machine is partially computable only, which means that she is partially not computable, also, and that plays a key role, for both consciousness and matter.

Bruno

 

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[Alan Grayson]

No. A computer cannot calculate any irrational exactly. It can only approximate them, such as PI. AG 

they can only calculate to a measure zero (the rationals) of what exists; not to mention the finite time constraint for any of these calculations. AG 

If you study my papers, you will see that the physical laws are not computable: they emerge from the first person indeterminacy (step 3) and the delay invariance (step 2 and 4). The universal machine is partially computable only, which means that she is partially not computable, also, and that plays a key role, for both consciousness and matter.

Bruno

 

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[Alan Grayson]

With PI, you at least have a series representation and can approximate it to any degree desirable, but with most of the others you don't even know how to represent them mathematically and thus haven't a prayer for calculating them. AG 

[Bruno Marchal]

Nor could a human.

It can only approximate them, such as PI. AG 

With PI, you at least have a series representation and can approximate it to any degree desirable,

OK. And that is how we define what is a computable real number. We can compute the approximations. Actually we need also to be able to compute a modulus of convergence, to assure that addition of the computable real numbers is a computable operation. Turing get this wrong in his paper, but corrected this in a footnote in most re-publication of his paper.

but with most of the others you don't even know how to represent them mathematically and thus haven't a prayer for calculating them. AG 

Yes, in classical logic/theories, most real numbers are not computable. Note that in intuitionistic mathematics, Brouwer has introduce the axioms that all real numbers are computable, but as I use classical logic, that does not concern us. Yet that play a role in the logic of the subject ([]p & p, S4Grz, …).

Bruno

they can only calculate to a measure zero (the rationals) of what exists; not to mention the finite time constraint for any of these calculations. AG 

If you study my papers, you will see that the physical laws are not computable: they emerge from the first person indeterminacy (step 3) and the delay invariance (step 2 and 4). The universal machine is partially computable only, which means that she is partially not computable, also, and that plays a key role, for both consciousness and matter.

Bruno

 

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[Alan Grayson]

Listen; you can't compute, even approximately, a real number you have no way of defining. In fact, the act of defining it, would be tantamount to computing it! So this is all nonsense. But let's suppose the monkey at the keyboard produces a text defining the axioms of QM, along with a multitude of other theories. Without a physical universe to test these theories, there's no way to determine which one is "true". Frankly, I don't see what's been discovered by "computability". AG 

[Bruno Marchal]

No problem with this. I cannot compute a non computable real. OK.

In fact, the act of defining it, would be tantamount to computing it!

Hmm… OK (with a large sense of tantamount). 

But what I can still do, is generating it, even if I will generate many other real numbers, and be unable to recognise where is the one which is uncomputable. 

So this is all nonsense.

You confuse generating the decimal of a real number, and just that one (computable real number), and generating a real number, among many one. That are different procedures.

But let's suppose the monkey at the keyboard produces a text defining the axioms of QM, along with a multitude of other theories. Without a physical universe to test these theories, there's no way to determine which one is "true”.

With mechanism, no universe, nor god, could do that. But the relative state of the machine have just the math showing that the physical reality will look like a quantum multiverse, so no need to add a universe when actually, it cannot do the work we would expect it to do, without violating Mechanism.

Frankly, I don't see what's been discovered by "computability". AG 

A precise mathematical notion of universality.

Bruno

Bruno

they can only calculate to a measure zero (the rationals) of what exists; not to mention the finite time constraint for any of these calculations. AG 

If you study my papers, you will see that the physical laws are not computable: they emerge from the first person indeterminacy (step 3) and the delay invariance (step 2 and 4). The universal machine is partially computable only, which means that she is partially not computable, also, and that plays a key role, for both consciousness and matter.

Bruno

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[Alan Grayson]

Your machine can generate other theories, such as one corresponding to universes which don't obey QM. Presumably, all of these are assumed to produce physically appearing universes. I don't see that anything has been proven, or even that any of these universes must exist just because some axioms are typed by the monkey. And regardless of how you parse words, you cannot compute most irrational numbers; only a few that have known mathematical expressions like PI and e.  AG

Frankly, I don't see what's been discovered by "computability". AG 

A precise mathematical notion of universality.

Bruno

Bruno

they can only calculate to a measure zero (the rationals) of what exists; not to mention the finite time constraint for any of these calculations. AG 

If you study my papers, you will see that the physical laws are not computable: they emerge from the first person indeterminacy (step 3) and the delay invariance (step 2 and 4). The universal machine is partially computable only, which means that she is partially not computable, also, and that plays a key role, for both consciousness and matter.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

The universal dovetailer does not generate theories. It generates all computations, and the physical universe is the unique structure emerging from the statistics on all computation. Physics is theory-independent, or universal-machine-independent. That is why the “TOE” is anything Turing equivalent to Arithmetic (without induction). Physics is independent of the phi_i. It is the same for all universal machine. There is only one physics (with Mechanism). That’s the beauty of it.

Presumably, all of these are assumed to produce physically appearing universes.

No. 

I don't see that anything has been proven, or even that any of these universes must exist just because some axioms are typed by the monkey.

You are right. Monkey's typing does not produce any universe. Study my papers, perhaps, you would have seen that your monkey does not generate any universe. A physical universe becomes a first person plural appearance associated to a unique statistics on all relative computations. A monkey can only type a texte, and no texte ever produced anything y itself. Don’t confuse a computation emulated in a reality, and a description of a computation (in any reality).

In fact, with Mechanism, it is proven that the physical universe is not described by *any* computation. Mechanism is at the antipodes of “digital physics” which is simply inconsistent (Digital physics implies Mechanism, but Mechanism negates digital Physics, so Digital physics, as a fundamental theory is self-contradictory).

And regardless of how you parse words, you cannot compute most irrational numbers; only a few that have known mathematical expressions like PI and e.  AG

On the contrary. I cannot compute a few non computable real numbers, but I can generate them all, and that explains why the universal dovetailer executes all computations with all Turing’s Oracles.

Bruno

Frankly, I don't see what's been discovered by "computability". AG 

A precise mathematical notion of universality.

Bruno

Bruno

they can only calculate to a measure zero (the rationals) of what exists; not to mention the finite time constraint for any of these calculations. AG 

If you study my papers, you will see that the physical laws are not computable: they emerge from the first person indeterminacy (step 3) and the delay invariance (step 2 and 4). The universal machine is partially computable only, which means that she is partially not computable, also, and that plays a key role, for both consciousness and matter.

Bruno

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[Alan Grayson]

You must have a special definition of "computable number". As I see it, other than PI, e, and possibly a few other irrational numbers, no computer can fully compute any of them, which have the cardinality of the continuum.  You can't even define those numbers so how the heck can you compute them? You could take a string representing some rational number, and then insert digits randomly, to produce an approximation of some irrational number. It will always be an approximation since your program will never halt. And how will you define that random string you're inserting without referencing some quantum measurements, say of spin? AG

Bruno

Frankly, I don't see what's been discovered by "computability". AG 

A precise mathematical notion of universality.

Bruno

Bruno

they can only calculate to a measure zero (the rationals) of what exists; not to mention the finite time constraint for any of these calculations. AG 

If you study my papers, you will see that the physical laws are not computable: they emerge from the first person indeterminacy (step 3) and the delay invariance (step 2 and 4). The universal machine is partially computable only, which means that she is partially not computable, also, and that plays a key role, for both consciousness and matter.

Bruno

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[Alan Grayson]

Does this mean you have given up, or have never endorsed the MW theory? AG 

Presumably, all of these are assumed to produce physically appearing universes.

No. 

I don't see that anything has been proven, or even that any of these universes must exist just because some axioms are typed by the monkey.

You are right. Monkey's typing does not produce any universe. Study my papers, perhaps, you would have seen that your monkey does not generate any universe. A physical universe becomes a first person plural appearance associated to a unique statistics on all relative computations. A monkey can only type a texte, and no texte ever produced anything y itself. Don’t confuse a computation emulated in a reality, and a description of a computation (in any reality).

In fact, with Mechanism, it is proven that the physical universe is not described by *any* computation. Mechanism is at the antipodes of “digital physics” which is simply inconsistent (Digital physics implies Mechanism, but Mechanism negates digital Physics, so Digital physics, as a fundamental theory is self-contradictory).

And regardless of how you parse words, you cannot compute most irrational numbers; only a few that have known mathematical expressions like PI and e.  AG

On the contrary. I cannot compute a few non computable real numbers, but I can generate them all, and that explains why the universal dovetailer executes all computations with all Turing’s Oracles.

Bruno

Frankly, I don't see what's been discovered by "computability". AG 

A precise mathematical notion of universality.

Bruno

Bruno

they can only calculate to a measure zero (the rationals) of what exists; not to mention the finite time constraint for any of these calculations. AG 

If you study my papers, you will see that the physical laws are not computable: they emerge from the first person indeterminacy (step 3) and the delay invariance (step 2 and 4). The universal machine is partially computable only, which means that she is partially not computable, also, and that plays a key role, for both consciousness and matter.

Bruno

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[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, September 28, 2019 at 4:18:58 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:

You must have a special definition of "computable number". As I see it, other than PI, e, and possibly a few other irrational numbers, no computer can fully compute any of them, which have the cardinality of the continuum.  You can't even define those numbers so how the heck can you compute them? You could take a string representing some rational number, and then insert digits randomly, to produce an approximation of some irrational number. It will always be an approximation since your program will never halt. And how will you define that random string you're inserting without referencing some quantum measurements, say of spin? AG

Books on computability theory are all wrong: They are based on Platonism.

In contrast, real computability takes the world as it really is,

https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/

 

Real computing is computing voided of Platonism.

 

@philipthrift 

[Bruno Marchal]

I use the standard one. What is slightly less standard is my definition all generable real numbers. Computable implies generable, but generable does not imply computable. 

As I see it, other than PI, e, and possibly a few other irrational numbers, no computer can fully compute any of them,

The set of computable real numbers is (obviously) countable. The set of non computable real numbers is not countable, so yes, much more are not computable.

which have the cardinality of the continuum. 

Indeed.

You can't even define those numbers so how the heck can you compute them?

I can write a procedure which generate them all, without computing any. A real number is generable if there is an algorithm which generate them, and the dovetailing on the initial segment of the reals do generate them all. What I cannot do is generate them individually, or namely. I have given the procedure for doing so.

You could take a string representing some rational number, and then insert digits randomly, to produce an approximation of some irrational number. It will always be an approximation since your program will never halt.

That would all irrational real number not computable, but of course all sqrt(x) when x is not a square are computable.

A real number is computable when you can write a program generating the decimals of it, and generating only the decimals of it. That is also an infinite task.

And how will you define that random string you're inserting without referencing some quantum measurements, say of spin?

I generate them all by dovetailing, so I get all their approximations, and they all converge in the limit. That works for their role as oracle.

Most of the real numbers generated in that way are not nameable (there is only a countable set of nameable numbers). 

At the start, I have:

0...

And

1...

Those initial segment denote already an non countable set of numbers or infinite binary sequence, the non countable set of those beginning by 0, and the non countable set of those beginning with 1.

Then I get four uncountable sets:

00...

01...

 and,

10...

11…

Etc.

All real number are generated in that way, although at no moment did I name or describe any one of them individually. That is why we cannot use Cantor argument to claim that one real number will be missing.

That can be related to Brouwer’s fan in intuitionist mathematics, or Kleene-Brouwer trees, or to descriptive set theory, which study the set of reals, or the subset of N, with different topologies. It makes sense in measure theory.

Bruno

AG

Bruno

Frankly, I don't see what's been discovered by "computability". AG 

A precise mathematical notion of universality.

Bruno

Bruno

they can only calculate to a measure zero (the rationals) of what exists; not to mention the finite time constraint for any of these calculations. AG 

If you study my papers, you will see that the physical laws are not computable: they emerge from the first person indeterminacy (step 3) and the delay invariance (step 2 and 4). The universal machine is partially computable only, which means that she is partially not computable, also, and that plays a key role, for both consciousness and matter.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

… given up what?

or have never endorsed the MW theory? AG 

I have endorse the MW just by looking at bacteria and amoeba, studying how they reproduce themselves at the molecular level, and then discovering, in a book on Gödel’s proof, that arithmetic already emulate all possible digital machines. That was a long time before I heard about conceptual problem in QM, and even then, it will take time (and my reading of Everett) to see that the physicist were already there (I mean, conceiving that the physical reality is a statistics on many histories.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Sep 2019, at 14:55, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Saturday, September 28, 2019 at 4:18:58 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:

You must have a special definition of "computable number". As I see it, other than PI, e, and possibly a few other irrational numbers, no computer can fully compute any of them, which have the cardinality of the continuum.  You can't even define those numbers so how the heck can you compute them? You could take a string representing some rational number, and then insert digits randomly, to produce an approximation of some irrational number. It will always be an approximation since your program will never halt. And how will you define that random string you're inserting without referencing some quantum measurements, say of spin? AG

Books on computability theory are all wrong: They are based on Platonism.

Only in the formal sense of platonism. We need to give sense to “this machine does not stop”, or to “this Diophantine equation does not admit any solution”.

We just accept the belief that either A is true, or A is false, if A is a closed sentence of arithmetic.

In contrast, real computability takes the world as it really is,

Using the adjective “real” is crackpot, (even blasphemy in the theology of the machine). “Real” is a good meta-term, in some colloquial context, but it should be use with extreme moderation. Like “fictionalism” it assumes that some theory is unreal, and is equivalent with “my religion is the true one”. That is an argument per authority in disguise. 

https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/

 

Real computing is computing voided of Platonism.

OK. It is a naturalist or materialist assumption, and so, by the UD Argument necessitate to abandon the Indexical Digital Mechanist hypothesis in cognitive science. 

Bruno

 

@philipthrift 

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