No one knows what the stuff is of QM!

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Philip Thrift

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Jul 29, 2019, 3:18:02 PM7/29/19
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But this is interesting:




The Weak Reality That Makes Quantum Phenomena More Natural: Novel Insights and Experiments
Yakir Aharonov, Eliahu Cohen, Mordecai Waegell, and Avshalom C. Elitzur
November 7, 2018
https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/20/11/854/htm

Abstract: While quantum reality can be probed through measurements, the Two-State Vector Formalism (TSVF) reveals a subtler reality prevailing between measurements. Under special pre- and post-selections, odd physical values emerge. This unusual picture calls for a deeper study. Instead of the common, wave-based picture of quantum mechanics, we suggest a new, particle-based perspective: Each particle possesses a definite location throughout its evolution, while some of its physical variables (characterized by deterministic operators, some of which obey nonlocal equations of motion) are carried by “mirage particles” accounting for its unique behavior. Within the time interval between pre- and post-selection, the particle gives rise to a horde of such mirage particles, of which some can be negative. What appears to be “no-particle”, known to give rise to interaction-free measurement, is in fact a self-canceling pair of positive and negative mirage particles, which can be momentarily split and cancel out again. Feasible experiments can give empirical evidence for these fleeting phenomena. In this respect, the Heisenberg ontology is shown to be conceptually advantageous compared to the Schrödinger picture. We review several recent advances, discuss their foundational significance and point out possible directions for future research.

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Bruno Marchal

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Jul 30, 2019, 4:51:26 AM7/30/19
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I have not the time to read the paper, but it seems, from the abstract that this run into a similar problem than with Bohm-Debroglie type of theories. We could in principle build a mirage observer, and with mechanism, it cannot be a zombie. So, it is like introducing “stuff” to select a reality, which is incompatible with digital mechanism.
So this goes outside the frame of my hypothesis, and this move, like Bohm, calls for a non computationalist theory of mind (like actually Bohm advocated).

Bruno




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Philip Thrift

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Jul 30, 2019, 7:05:06 AM7/30/19
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On Tuesday, July 30, 2019 at 3:51:26 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Jul 2019, at 21:18, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:


But this is interesting:




The Weak Reality That Makes Quantum Phenomena More Natural: Novel Insights and Experiments
Yakir Aharonov, Eliahu Cohen, Mordecai Waegell, and Avshalom C. Elitzur
November 7, 2018
https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/20/11/854/htm

Abstract: While quantum reality can be probed through measurements, the Two-State Vector Formalism (TSVF) reveals a subtler reality prevailing between measurements. Under special pre- and post-selections, odd physical values emerge. This unusual picture calls for a deeper study. Instead of the common, wave-based picture of quantum mechanics, we suggest a new, particle-based perspective: Each particle possesses a definite location throughout its evolution, while some of its physical variables (characterized by deterministic operators, some of which obey nonlocal equations of motion) are carried by “mirage particles” accounting for its unique behavior. Within the time interval between pre- and post-selection, the particle gives rise to a horde of such mirage particles, of which some can be negative. What appears to be “no-particle”, known to give rise to interaction-free measurement, is in fact a self-canceling pair of positive and negative mirage particles, which can be momentarily split and cancel out again. Feasible experiments can give empirical evidence for these fleeting phenomena. In this respect, the Heisenberg ontology is shown to be conceptually advantageous compared to the Schrödinger picture. We review several recent advances, discuss their foundational significance and point out possible directions for future research.

I have not the time to read the paper, but it seems, from the abstract that this run into a similar problem than with Bohm-Debroglie type of theories. We could in principle build a mirage observer, and with mechanism, it cannot be a zombie. So, it is like introducing “stuff” to select a reality, which is incompatible with digital mechanism.
So this goes outside the frame of my hypothesis, and this move, like Bohm, calls for a non computationalist theory of mind (like actually Bohm advocated).

Bruno




The formulations of quantum mechanics are as witches' brews.

Here are just 9 (from 2001):
  



Welcome to the renaissance of quantum mechanics. It took more than a hundred years, but physicists finally woke up, looked quantum mechanics into the face – and realized with bewilderment they barely know the theory they’ve been married to for so long. Gone are the days of “shut up and calculate”; the foundations of quantum mechanics are en vogue again. 

It is not a spontaneous acknowledgement of philosophy that sparked physicists’ rediscovered desire; their sudden search for meaning is driven by technological advances.

-- Sabine Hossenfelder


@philipthrift

Bruno Marchal

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Jul 30, 2019, 12:14:41 PM7/30/19
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On 30 Jul 2019, at 13:05, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:



On Tuesday, July 30, 2019 at 3:51:26 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Jul 2019, at 21:18, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:


But this is interesting:




The Weak Reality That Makes Quantum Phenomena More Natural: Novel Insights and Experiments
Yakir Aharonov, Eliahu Cohen, Mordecai Waegell, and Avshalom C. Elitzur
November 7, 2018
https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/20/11/854/htm

Abstract: While quantum reality can be probed through measurements, the Two-State Vector Formalism (TSVF) reveals a subtler reality prevailing between measurements. Under special pre- and post-selections, odd physical values emerge. This unusual picture calls for a deeper study. Instead of the common, wave-based picture of quantum mechanics, we suggest a new, particle-based perspective: Each particle possesses a definite location throughout its evolution, while some of its physical variables (characterized by deterministic operators, some of which obey nonlocal equations of motion) are carried by “mirage particles” accounting for its unique behavior. Within the time interval between pre- and post-selection, the particle gives rise to a horde of such mirage particles, of which some can be negative. What appears to be “no-particle”, known to give rise to interaction-free measurement, is in fact a self-canceling pair of positive and negative mirage particles, which can be momentarily split and cancel out again. Feasible experiments can give empirical evidence for these fleeting phenomena. In this respect, the Heisenberg ontology is shown to be conceptually advantageous compared to the Schrödinger picture. We review several recent advances, discuss their foundational significance and point out possible directions for future research.

I have not the time to read the paper, but it seems, from the abstract that this run into a similar problem than with Bohm-Debroglie type of theories. We could in principle build a mirage observer, and with mechanism, it cannot be a zombie. So, it is like introducing “stuff” to select a reality, which is incompatible with digital mechanism.
So this goes outside the frame of my hypothesis, and this move, like Bohm, calls for a non computationalist theory of mind (like actually Bohm advocated).

Bruno




The formulations of quantum mechanics are as witches' brews.

Here are just 9 (from 2001):
  


That paper is very amusing! Very good also.

What is amusing is that none of the nine formulations assumes the collapse, and when it comes to Everett (with Bryce DeWitt’s naming: the MWI) they argue (correctly) that Everett did only propose a new formulation. And from what they say: it is equivalent with the previous formulations. 

Interesting insight that the transactional interpretation can’t distinguish fermion and boson. 

Some formulation are closer to quantum field theory and, hopefully, to some possible marriage with GR.

Will the physicists converge toward a physical TOE? 

And will it be the same with the one that all (Löbian) universal machine can find in their head, from the mechanist assumption? (That would confirm the machine’s theory of consciousness/first person).

That’s the questions …

Bruno






Welcome to the renaissance of quantum mechanics. It took more than a hundred years, but physicists finally woke up, looked quantum mechanics into the face – and realized with bewilderment they barely know the theory they’ve been married to for so long. Gone are the days of “shut up and calculate”; the foundations of quantum mechanics are en vogue again. 

It is not a spontaneous acknowledgement of philosophy that sparked physicists’ rediscovered desire; their sudden search for meaning is driven by technological advances.

-- Sabine Hossenfelder


@philipthrift


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Lawrence Crowell

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Jul 30, 2019, 4:09:51 PM7/30/19
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There may not be any stuff that is quantum. The paper looks to be a further extension of weak measurements devised by Aharonov.

LC

Philip Thrift

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Jul 31, 2019, 3:25:45 AM7/31/19
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If it isn't stuff (at the bottom of it), it it isn't real.

Otherwise, it is idealism, which physics (as today's "popular" physicists present it to the public) has become today.

In philosophy, idealism is the group of metaphysical philosophies that assert that reality, or reality as humans can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial.

@philipthrift

Bruno Marchal

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Aug 1, 2019, 4:51:45 AM8/1/19
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On 31 Jul 2019, at 09:25, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:


If it isn't stuff (at the bottom of it), it it isn't real.

Otherwise, it is idealism, which physics (as today's "popular" physicists present it to the public) has become today.

In philosophy, idealism is the group of metaphysical philosophies that assert that reality, or reality as humans can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial.


In a first approximation, this can help. But, at some point,  it might be handy to distinguish between

- human idealism (what you describe by “ that assert that reality, or reality as humans can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed”)

-universal idealism (the same with “human” replace by digital machine or (intensional) number (I will lake this notion clear in the glossary that I have promised).

- immaterialism (the belief in a Turing universal system and in no more than that for the ontology).

The last case is more a neutral monism than an idealism, as the ideas are not really primitive, they occur in the mind of numbers, which are taken as the “independent ontology” that we assume.

Metter is not “just” an idea in the mind of some numbers: it is a phenomenological reality that *all* universal number encounter. The physical reality is a deep invariant sharable by all machine/number, and which has for them also a non sharable part (the qualia, the immediate consciousness, …).

Bruno




@philipthrift


On Tuesday, July 30, 2019 at 3:09:51 PM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
There may not be any stuff that is quantum. The paper looks to be a further extension of weak measurements devised by Aharonov.

LC

On Monday, July 29, 2019 at 2:18:02 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:

But this is interesting:




The Weak Reality That Makes Quantum Phenomena More Natural: Novel Insights and Experiments
Yakir Aharonov, Eliahu Cohen, Mordecai Waegell, and Avshalom C. Elitzur
November 7, 2018
https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/20/11/854/htm

Abstract: While quantum reality can be probed through measurements, the Two-State Vector Formalism (TSVF) reveals a subtler reality prevailing between measurements. Under special pre- and post-selections, odd physical values emerge. This unusual picture calls for a deeper study. Instead of the common, wave-based picture of quantum mechanics, we suggest a new, particle-based perspective: Each particle possesses a definite location throughout its evolution, while some of its physical variables (characterized by deterministic operators, some of which obey nonlocal equations of motion) are carried by “mirage particles” accounting for its unique behavior. Within the time interval between pre- and post-selection, the particle gives rise to a horde of such mirage particles, of which some can be negative. What appears to be “no-particle”, known to give rise to interaction-free measurement, is in fact a self-canceling pair of positive and negative mirage particles, which can be momentarily split and cancel out again. Feasible experiments can give empirical evidence for these fleeting phenomena. In this respect, the Heisenberg ontology is shown to be conceptually advantageous compared to the Schrödinger picture. We review several recent advances, discuss their foundational significance and point out possible directions for future research.

@philipthrift

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Philip Thrift

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Aug 1, 2019, 6:42:32 AM8/1/19
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On Thursday, August 1, 2019 at 3:51:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 31 Jul 2019, at 09:25, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:


If it isn't stuff (at the bottom of it), it it isn't real.

Otherwise, it is idealism, which physics (as today's "popular" physicists present it to the public) has become today.

In philosophy, idealism is the group of metaphysical philosophies that assert that reality, or reality as humans can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial.


In a first approximation, this can help. But, at some point,  it might be handy to distinguish between

- human idealism (what you describe by “ that assert that reality, or reality as humans can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed”)

-universal idealism (the same with “human” replace by digital machine or (intensional) number (I will lake this notion clear in the glossary that I have promised).

- immaterialism (the belief in a Turing universal system and in no more than that for the ontology).

The last case is more a neutral monism than an idealism, as the ideas are not really primitive, they occur in the mind of numbers, which are taken as the “independent ontology” that we assume.

Metter is not “just” an idea in the mind of some numbers: it is a phenomenological reality that *all* universal number encounter. The physical reality is a deep invariant sharable by all machine/number, and which has for them also a non sharable part (the qualia, the immediate consciousness, …).

Bruno


To identify qualia themselves with purely numerical entities is the question.

If qualia are nonnumerical, and assuming they are real (which I do), then they must be nonnumerical (or non-"physical") material constituents of nature.

@philipthrift

Bruno Marchal

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Aug 1, 2019, 8:34:26 AM8/1/19
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The machine can define “[]p” numerically, like a “machine’s body” or “machine’s relative code”. 
The machine cannot be sure it is really its own code, but by betting on mechanism and on the doctor choice of substitution level, she can conceive that such a code exists, and reason from this..

BUT...

…the machine can’t define “[]p & p” numerically at all. It is logically impossible. The machine’s soul know that she is not a machine (except perhaps from God’s point of view, but she knows that she can’t have that view, or assess it publicly).

This is the tour de force of the Theaetetus definition when applied in the Mechanist frame: it explains why machines are necessarily confronted with things which are not only not computable, but not representable in any third person way.
The corresponding logic (the modal logic of [1]p, with [1]p defined by []p & p), i.e. S4Grz is a formal logic describing a non formalisable reality accessed by all (sound) machine. Yes, that is a (meta- tour de force, made possible tanks to Gödel completeness and Incompleteness theorem, together with Tarski un-definability of truth theorem  (and Scott-Montague un-definability of knowledge theorem). 

Qualia are non physical and non numerical, yet phenomenologically real and explained or “meta-explained”, like for consciousness.

“We” can meta-define knowledge and qualia, by referring to the “simple” god of mechanism: some notion of arithmetical truth, and the truth of Mechanism which is assumed. We can also understand intuitively that we cannot really define the notion of arithmetical truth, and indeed, that is why logicians have invented “first order logic”, which gives a way to talk and reason on things that we cannot define (but that we can approximate).

Concerning the definability of the self-mode we have, from the machine’s public opinion:

 p undefinable,
 []p definable,
 []p & p undefinable,
 []p & <>t definable,
 []p & <>t & p undefinable


Bruno








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Brent Meeker

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Aug 1, 2019, 6:57:48 PM8/1/19
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On 8/1/2019 5:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> This is the tour de force of the Theaetetus definition when applied in
> the Mechanist frame: it explains why machines are necessarily
> confronted with things which are not only not computable, but not
> representable in any third person way.
> The corresponding logic (the modal logic of [1]p, with [1]p defined by
> []p & p), i.e. S4Grz is a formal logic describing a non formalisable
> reality accessed by all (sound) machine. Yes, that is a (meta- tour de
> force, made possible tanks to Gödel completeness and Incompleteness
> theorem, together with Tarski un-definability of truth theorem  (and
> Scott-Montague un-definability of knowledge theorem).
>
> Qualia are non physical and non numerical, yet phenomenologically real
> and explained or “meta-explained”, like for consciousness.

But this is not at all convincing.  Just because some things (reflective
relations) are not computable by the prefect logic machine does not show
they are models or instances of qualia. Qualia are perceptions for
example, which are partly shareable.

Brent


Bruno Marchal

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Aug 2, 2019, 5:20:58 AM8/2/19
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We share only the number relations. Not the qualia itself. We only projects ours on others, when enough similar to us.

The machine qualia are not just non computable, they are non definable and obey to a logic of qualia known before we found it in the discourse of the machines. They have a conical perceive field associated with them. A good paper is the paper on quantum logic by John Bell (not the physicists, but the logician). There are some mistake in that paper, but not relevant here.

Bell, J. L. (1986). A new approach to quantum logic. Brit. J. Phil. Sci., 37:83-99.

Bruno

>
> Brent
>
>
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Philip Thrift

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Aug 2, 2019, 6:40:34 AM8/2/19
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On Friday, August 2, 2019 at 4:20:58 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

> On 2 Aug 2019, at 00:57, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 8/1/2019 5:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> This is the tour de force of the Theaetetus definition when applied in the Mechanist frame: it explains why machines are necessarily confronted with things which are not only not computable, but not representable in any third person way.
>> The corresponding logic (the modal logic of [1]p, with [1]p defined by []p & p), i.e. S4Grz is a formal logic describing a non formalisable reality accessed by all (sound) machine. Yes, that is a (meta- tour de force, made possible tanks to Gödel completeness and Incompleteness theorem, together with Tarski un-definability of truth theorem  (and Scott-Montague un-definability of knowledge theorem).
>>
>> Qualia are non physical and non numerical, yet phenomenologically real and explained or “meta-explained”, like for consciousness.
>
> But this is not at all convincing.  Just because some things (reflective relations) are not computable by the prefect logic machine does not show they are models or instances of qualia. Qualia are perceptions for example, which are partly shareable.

We share only the number relations. Not the qualia itself. We only projects ours on others, when enough similar to us.

The machine qualia are not just non computable, they are non definable and obey to a logic of qualia known before we found it in the discourse of the machines.  They have a conical perceive field associated with them. A good paper is the paper on quantum logic by John Bell (not the physicists, but the logician). There are some mistake in that paper, but not relevant here.

Bell, J. L. (1986). A new approach to quantum logic. Brit. J. Phil. Sci., 37:83-99.

Bruno



If qualia are not "number relations" then they must be substances on their own.

And what is substance that is (at least partly) non-numerical: matter.

@philipthrift 

Lawrence Crowell

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Aug 2, 2019, 8:40:14 AM8/2/19
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Matter has its origin in either the condensate interaction of Goldstone-Higgs bosons or with strong asymptotic QCD. With the Goldstone bosons the degree of freedom of the scalar fields enters into a longitudinal degree of freedom in weak flavor changing or isospin fields or in fermions. With QCD the interaction is strong so there is no possible escape for a the massless gauge boson or gluon. So one can think of these as a situation where a massless particle is trapped in some small volume so from a large scale it appears to be a massive particle with a timelike direction. There really is not anything else to it.

LC
 

Bruno Marchal

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Aug 2, 2019, 8:49:53 AM8/2/19
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Why should something be either “number relation” or substance?

When a digital machine introspect itself, it is confronted with some truth concerning both numerical (or numericalisable) aspect of itself, and non numerical aspect of itself, which are semantical and related to the arithmetical truth (itself a non numericalisable reality). The arithmetical reality is full of semantical notions which are non numerical, when seen from inside.  The arithmetical truth itself is non numerical. To model it, we use the assertion themselves. Today that “1+1=2” we can say simply that 1+1=2, but we cannot translate “true(“1+1=2”) in any numerical way that the machine concerned would make sense of, unless “true” is a restricted truth predicate, not working for all proposition that the machine can assert.

All the self-modes involving the conjunction “& p”, like []p & p, or []p & <>t & p”, or just “p” itself are not definable in the language of the machine. They are necessarily not numerical for the machine, but the machine can bet that they correspond to complex set of sentences/numbers once she postulates the Mechanist hypothesis. That asks for a big leap of faith fr the machine, as []p & p, for example, describes a non numerical subject. The machine is born “non mechanist”, somehow. It *is* (and has to be) counter-intuitive.

Bruno




And what is substance that is (at least partly) non-numerical: matter.

@philipthrift 

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Philip Thrift

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Aug 2, 2019, 9:07:49 AM8/2/19
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If everything is matter (against the idea that it's an illusion) then matter doesn't have its origin in anything.  

People who say there is matter and something else have to say exactly what that immaterial "something else" is. There seems to be little "substance" to the claim that there is something else that's not matter.

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Lawrence Crowell

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Aug 2, 2019, 10:27:22 AM8/2/19
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There is energy that by E = mc^2 has an equivalence to mass. However, the mass content of a particle or object is derived. The mass-gap of YM gauge fields such as QCD and the role of the Higgs condensate in effect derives the mass of particles at low energy. This is established physics.

LC 

Philip Thrift

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Aug 2, 2019, 1:04:28 PM8/2/19
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There is matter that has mass. There is matter that has no mass: Massless matter.

e.g.  massless matter fermions


cf.
 
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