Local Realism and Bell

[Jason Resch]

From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm

Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world. Our world is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell inequality more than does quantum theory. This serves to debunk the myth that equates local realism with local hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along the way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were right in their questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory, provided one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our journey, we strive to explain our views from first principles, without expecting mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge from the reader.

[Philip Thrift]

"quantum theory is the science of preparing systems in one state and detecting them in another state; everything that happens in between is philosophy"

- https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/philosophy-of-physics-quantum-theory/

Everyone has their own breed of gremlins that operate "in between".

@philipthrift

[Lawrence Crowell]

I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.

LC

On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 10:56:24 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.

I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.

Not convincing.

Bruce

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 7:06:51 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.

I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.

Not convincing.

Bruce

A black hole could do the trick. I have only looked at the first page of this, so I can't judge this deeply yet. I keep getting interrupted by things like phone calls and then my gallomph of a Labrador Retriever wanted attention.

LC

[Brent Meeker]

It postulates there is a change in the global state function which spreads at the speed of light and decoheres superpositions that are measured.

Brent

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[Brent Meeker]

On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.

I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.

I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.

Brent

Not convincing.

Bruce

 

LC

On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 10:56:24 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:

From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm

Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world. Our world is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell inequality more than does quantum theory. This serves to debunk the myth that equates local realism with local hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along the way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were right in their questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory, provided one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our journey, we strive to explain our views from first principles, without expecting mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge from the reader.

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[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 11:27 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.

I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.

I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.

Brent

It is paragraphs like this that seem to me to appeal to magic:

Bruce

 "It is only when Alice and Bob interact that correlations are established. Let us assume for the moment that both Alice and Bob always push their buttons before interacting. The magical rule is that an Alice is allowed to interact with a Bob if and only if they jointly satisfy the conditions of the nonlocal box set out in Table 1.

"For example, if Alice pushes button 1, she splits. Consider the Alice who sees green. Her system can be imagined to carry the following rule: You are allowed to interact with Bob if either he had pushed button 0 on his box and seen green, or pushed button 1 and seen red. Should this Alice ever come in presence of a Bob who had pushed button 1 and seen green, she would simply not become aware of his presence and could walk right through him without either one of them noticing anything. Of course, the other Alice, the one who had seen red after pushing button 1, would be free to shake hands with that Bob."

"When they meet, the correlations they experience are simply due to the matching rule that determines which Alices are allowed to interact with which Bobs,"

Bruce

[Jason Resch]

The scenario described in the paper isn't meant to be an account of reality, it's a contrived scenario stated up front to be an imaginary universe. The paper is meant to show that Bell does not disprove local realism, only local hidden variables with single definite outcomes of measurement.

As for the magic, there is magic as the Non-local boxes in the scenario operate by magic, and the rule that enforces consistency can be viewed as a a form of magic too.  In our world and in QM things are a bit different. Perfect functioning non-local boxes are not possible, at best we can violate Bell's inequality by 10% using entanglement.  If one uses entangled particles to build approximately functioning non-local boxes, then the rule that prevents interacting with incompatible branches is the same consistency rule that ensures if you make the repeated measurements of the same observable you get consistent results.  In the case of the entangled particles, they have both already interacted (they'be both already measured each other), so measuring one and finding it to be spin down, tells you already the other one is spin up.  So when you Alice receives a radio message from Bob, she already knows the result.  You can view meeting the Bob as just another kind of measurement (and for the same observable).

Jason

[Bruce Kellett]

That doesn't work for entangled particles in the singlet state either. Since the measurements by Alice and Bob are independent, both can get either up or down. They both split into two universes, separately and locally. But when Alice-up, say, meets Bob, she splits according to his result. So we get two possibilities: (Alice-up + Bob-up), and (Alice-up + Bob-down). For the case of aligned S-G magnets, the (Alice-up + Bob-up) combination is not possible. The impossibility of such a meeting requires exactly the same magic as the Brassard et al. paper proposes.

Bruce.

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 8:27:23 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.

I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.

I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.

Brent

All of this is well-established physics.

@philipthrift 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.

I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.

I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.

That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed lower than light.

Bruno

Brent

Not convincing.

Bruce

 

LC

On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 10:56:24 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:

From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm

Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world. Our world is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell inequality more than does quantum theory. This serves to debunk the myth that equates local realism with local hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along the way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were right in their questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory, provided one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our journey, we strive to explain our views from first principles, without expecting mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge from the reader.

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[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:23 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.

I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.

I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.

That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed lower than light.

That doesn't explain anything.

Bruce 

[Bruno Marchal]

I know you’ve already try to expand on this, but it seems to me that this was based on some incorrect interpretation of the notion of worlds, like if a measurement made by Alice has to change the possible outcomes available to Bob, but that does not happen in the relative state view. Only a physical collapse would entail some “action at a distance”; without collapse anywhere, I don’t see how could such influence at a distance occurs. We did disagree also on the numbers of histories involved, which I take to be always infinite.

Bruno

Bruce 

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[Brent Meeker]

On 8/16/2019 4:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.

I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.

I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.

That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed lower than light.

But as Bruce says, it's a kind of magic as stated.  To not be magic there must be some physical interactions communicating Alice's result to Bob's system: Photons would the obvious candidate, but how exactly do they interact with Bob and his system to make them orthogonal to one of Alice's results and not the other? 

Brent

[Philip Thrift]

People were asking this question decades ago, and will still be asking it decades in the future.

@philipthrift 

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 12:21 AM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 16 Aug 2019, at 13:30, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:23 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.

I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.

I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.

That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed lower than light.

That doesn't explain anything.

I know you’ve already try to expand on this, but it seems to me that this was based on some incorrect interpretation of the notion of worlds, like if a measurement made by Alice has to change the possible outcomes available to Bob, but that does not happen in the relative state view. Only a physical collapse would entail some “action at a distance”; without collapse anywhere, I don’t see how could such influence at a distance occurs. We did disagree also on the numbers of histories involved, which I take to be always infinite.

Clarify your argument, then, and remove the suggestion of magic.

Bruce

[Bruno Marchal]

Brent, Bruce,

The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.

The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself relatively. And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it means that her accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her photon and d for bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he will meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices seeing u will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will access a world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or slower, and no physical influence exist at all. They both only localise themselves in the multiverse, at different possible cosmic branches.

The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob, which would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than light physical influence.

A quantum state does not describe a world, but is only an indexical map, for a subject, of the histories that he/she can access to.  ud-du means only, to Alice and Bob, that they will always means their corresponding correlated counterpart, whatever they found. Even if we give sense to “they both find u”, each of us will meet they counterparts, which they can interact with when meeting again,  having found d.

Bruno

Brent

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[Brent Meeker]

On 8/17/2019 6:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that
> whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon
> being u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever
> manifest herself relatively. And reciprocally with Bob. It is just
> that when Alice see u, it means that her accessible histories will all
> be consistent with u for her photon and d for bob’s photon. If Bob
> sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he will meet Alice
> having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices seeing u will
> access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will access a
> world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs
> observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or
> slower, and no physical influence exist at all.

If there is no physical influence, then why is it limited to light
speed? and why does it have physical consequences?

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

Because the spreading of the superposition is a local phenomenon. That is why both Alice and Bob “create” their own counterparts.

> and why does it have physical consequences?

Because we belong to all histories, and the formalism entail statistical interference of the histories that we cannot distinguish.

The Aspect experience shows that this lakes sense. It entails (assuming no loophole and all that) the existence of the alternate outcomes or of faster than light (FTL) influence, I would say.

It is up to believer in fhe FTL to devise an experience showing its existence. I think. Aspect experience certainly show this if we add the assumption that the singlet state describe one universe, with one Alice and Bob, but my interpretation of the singlet state involves an infinity (or a great number, that depend on how space-time-gravity is quantised) of Alices and Bobs.

Bruno



>
> Brent
>
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[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Aug 2019, at 17:56, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm

Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world. Our world is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell inequality more than does quantum theory. This serves to debunk the myth that equates local realism with local hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along the way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were right in their questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory, provided one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our journey, we strive to explain our views from first principles, without expecting mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge from the reader.

As farra as I understand, with few ambiguous propositions, it seems coherent with Mechanism and the type of many-histories it implies, and I appreciate it leads to a local physics (although this is still an open problem with mechanism).

Bruno

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[Brent Meeker]

On 8/18/2019 2:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Aug 2019, at 21:49, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:



On 8/17/2019 6:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself relatively. And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it means that her accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her photon and d for bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he will meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices seeing u will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will access a world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or slower, and no physical influence exist at all. 

If there is no physical influence, then why is it limited to light speed?

Because the spreading of the superposition is a local phenomenon.

A local physical phenomenon.  "Local" means interactions only occur  at the same spacetime point...all both interactions and spacetime are physical concepts..  So you've done nothing but say the same thing again while avoiding the word "physical".

Brent

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

Brent, Bruce,

On 16 Aug 2019, at 22:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 8/16/2019 4:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.

I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.

I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.

That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed lower than light.

But as Bruce says, it's a kind of magic as stated.  To not be magic there must be some physical interactions communicating Alice's result to Bob's system: Photons would the obvious candidate, but how exactly do they interact with Bob and his system to make them orthogonal to one of Alice's results and not the other? 

The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.

The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself relatively.

That is exactly the magic that needs to be explained.

 

And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it means that her accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her photon and d for bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he will meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices seeing u will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will access a world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or slower, and no physical influence exist at all. They both only localise themselves in the multiverse, at different possible cosmic branches.

What makes a history "accessible"? You have offered only magic to rule out histories that violate the basic conservation rules.

The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob, which would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than light physical influence.

The argument does not depend on any "one world" assumption. The problem is clearly present even in the Everettian setting, when there are copies of Alice and Bob who see each result. These always exist, since both up and down results are always possible for any measurement on the separated singlet particles.

 

A quantum state does not describe a world, but is only an indexical map, for a subject, of the histories that he/she can access to.  ud-du means only, to Alice and Bob, that they will always means their corresponding correlated counterpart, whatever they found.

Given the miracle that occurs at this step in your account.

 

 Even if we give sense to “they both find u”, each of us will meet they counterparts, which they can interact with when meeting again,  having found d.

You are not convincing anyone other than yourself here, Bruno.

Bruce 

[Bruno Marchal]

I meant that  the spreading of the wave is a local physical local phenomenon, as oppose to a collapse into *one* physical reality, with one couple Alice-Bobn which would require a faster than light physical influence at a distance.

Bruno

Brent

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Aug 2019, at 04:02, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

Brent, Bruce,

On 16 Aug 2019, at 22:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 8/16/2019 4:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.

I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.

I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.

That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed lower than light.

But as Bruce says, it's a kind of magic as stated.  To not be magic there must be some physical interactions communicating Alice's result to Bob's system: Photons would the obvious candidate, but how exactly do they interact with Bob and his system to make them orthogonal to one of Alice's results and not the other? 

The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.

The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself relatively.

That is exactly the magic that needs to be explained.

I don’t see this. ud - du predicts this, by the quantum formalism. 

 

And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it means that her accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her photon and d for bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he will meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices seeing u will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will access a world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or slower, and no physical influence exist at all. They both only localise themselves in the multiverse, at different possible cosmic branches.

What makes a history "accessible"? You have offered only magic to rule out histories that violate the basic conservation rules.

I don’t see this at all. (I assume QM here, not mechanism).

The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob, which would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than light physical influence.

The argument does not depend on any "one world" assumption. The problem is clearly present even in the Everettian setting, when there are copies of Alice and Bob who see each result. These always exist, since both up and down results are always possible for any measurement on the separated singlet particles.

I don’t see this. Alice and Bob have prepared the particle together (or by some entanglement swapping technic), the state ud-du require the correlations, in all base. Once separated, they can only access to their correlate parts, which requires the “creation” of “new” Bob and Alice. 

It is up to you, if you think that some FTL influence occur, to explain why and how.

 

A quantum state does not describe a world, but is only an indexical map, for a subject, of the histories that he/she can access to.  ud-du means only, to Alice and Bob, that they will always means their corresponding correlated counterpart, whatever they found.

Given the miracle that occurs at this step in your account.

Which miracle? I just use the fact that once a superposition is there, it never collapse. It is the collapse which would be magical.

 

 Even if we give sense to “they both find u”, each of us will meet they counterparts, which they can interact with when meeting again,  having found d.

You are not convincing anyone other than yourself here, Bruno.

I don’t think so. I am not sure if you are not the only one, perhaps with one other, who believes that the violation of Bell’s inequality entails physical action at a distance (which have no meaning for me in a relativistic context).

Both EPR and Bell assumes that "Alice and Bob” are well defined and keep their identity throughout the experience, which indeed would require some FTL influence, but I don’t see that FTL when we keep all branch of the superposition into account.

Bruno

Bruce 

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[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 6:41 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 19 Aug 2019, at 04:02, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.

The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself relatively.

That is exactly the magic that needs to be explained.

I don’t see this. ud - du predicts this, by the quantum formalism. 

Yes, and that formalism requires what for you is "the dreaded collapse". Think about it. How else does this work in conventional QM?

The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob, which would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than light physical influence.

The argument does not depend on any "one world" assumption. The problem is clearly present even in the Everettian setting, when there are copies of Alice and Bob who see each result. These always exist, since both up and down results are always possible for any measurement on the separated singlet particles.

I don’t see this. Alice and Bob have prepared the particle together (or by some entanglement swapping technic), the state ud-du require the correlations, in all base. Once separated, they can only access to their correlate parts, which requires the “creation” of “new” Bob and Alice. 

No, this is just an appeal to magic. "They can only have access to their correlate parts"? That is what you have to explain. What prevents them from accessing all the other combinations.

Look, it is actually quite simple for you. All you have to do is provide a local causal explanation for the appearance of the cos^2(theta/2) dependence on the relative angle between Alice's and Bob's separate and independent measurements. If Alice gets 'up', Bob has a probability of sin^2(theta/2) of getting 'up', and cos^2(theta/2) probability of getting 'down'.  Do that, and I might be convinced. So far, you haven't even come close.

It is up to you, if you think that some FTL influence occur, to explain why and how.

It is not up to me to provide a local explanation. I claim that the effect is non-local. You are the one who is required to provide a local explanation. You claim that it is a consequence of many worlds, or the absence of collapse. OK, then convince me.......

 

Both EPR and Bell assumes that "Alice and Bob” are well defined and keep their identity throughout the experience, which indeed would require some FTL influence, but I don’t see that FTL when we keep all branch of the superposition into account.

Bell does not require that assumption. I have given you full accounts of Bell that did not rely on any collapse assumption, accounts in which both Alice and Bob get both up and down results. You just have to show how the (theta/2) dependence between their results arises from purely local interactions in the many worlds situation.

I can offer you considerable odds that you will not be able to do this.

Bruce

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Aug 2019, at 13:59, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 6:41 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 19 Aug 2019, at 04:02, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.

The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself relatively.

That is exactly the magic that needs to be explained.

I don’t see this. ud - du predicts this, by the quantum formalism. 

Yes, and that formalism requires what for you is "the dreaded collapse". Think about it. How else does this work in conventional QM?

The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob, which would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than light physical influence.

The argument does not depend on any "one world" assumption. The problem is clearly present even in the Everettian setting, when there are copies of Alice and Bob who see each result. These always exist, since both up and down results are always possible for any measurement on the separated singlet particles.

I don’t see this. Alice and Bob have prepared the particle together (or by some entanglement swapping technic), the state ud-du require the correlations, in all base. Once separated, they can only access to their correlate parts, which requires the “creation” of “new” Bob and Alice. 

No, this is just an appeal to magic. "They can only have access to their correlate parts"? That is what you have to explain. What prevents them from accessing all the other combinations.

Unitarity.

Look, it is actually quite simple for you. All you have to do is provide a local causal explanation for the appearance of the cos^2(theta/2) dependence on the relative angle between Alice's and Bob's separate and independent measurements. If Alice gets 'up', Bob has a probability of sin^2(theta/2) of getting 'up', and cos^2(theta/2) probability of getting 'down'.  Do that, and I might be convinced. So far, you haven't even come close.

The local causal explanation, here, is the wave equation. The non-locality (the violation of Bell’s inequality, or GHZ’s even more weird happening) is explained by the causal evolution of the wave in a higher dimensional space.

Everett has been criticised for giving the same prediction, but that was the idea: showing that the average relative observer in the relatives state theory gives the same prediction than conventional QM. There is no need to assume an Heisenberg cut or a von Neuman-Wigner ultimate first person reduction of the wave: there is just no collapse, and observation/measurement is self-entanglement. 

It is up to you, if you think that some FTL influence occur, to explain why and how.

It is not up to me to provide a local explanation. I claim that the effect is non-local.

But both Digital mechanism and Quantum mechanics suggests, if not impose some “non-locality”. My point is that with the relative state notion, that you get when you decide to apply QM on the couple observer + observed, the non-locality, the inseparability of D’Espagnat, is a true observable phenomenon, but it does not requires faster than light influence: it is a statistical effect depending on our indetermination on which histories we belong too in the infinities of histoires described by the singlet state.

You are the one who is required to provide a local explanation.

H phi = E phi

If you can show how this implies FTL action at distance, you might try to show me.

You claim that it is a consequence of many worlds, or the absence of collapse. OK, then convince me…….

You are the guy making the extraordinary claim, which in my opinion contradicts already special relativity (or pushing the instrumentalist “shut up and compute” maximally).

The singlet state is independent of the base in which it is written. It is a state where both Alice and Bob could find any result, then you have to take into account that Alice share the world with Bob, but they have different indetermination in between the measurement. Your four worlds interpretation get wrong when you take all the relative state into account. I prove this to myself by a simple induction on the lattice defining a localised object, then all interactions generates a wave of self-entanglement with the environment at each step of the histories. In this way, despite everything is described by a local/causal history, it will look indeterminate and non local from some classes of histories. The astract treatment of this is well done in the book on Quantum Computation by Hirvensalo.

If you see FTL in the quantum non-locality, or in Aspect experience, I would advise you attempt to change your interpretation of the formalism.

 

Both EPR and Bell assumes that "Alice and Bob” are well defined and keep their identity throughout the experience, which indeed would require some FTL influence, but I don’t see that FTL when we keep all branch of the superposition into account.

Bell does not require that assumption. I have given you full accounts of Bell that did not rely on any collapse assumption, accounts in which both Alice and Bob get both up and down results. You just have to show how the (theta/2) dependence between their results arises from purely local interactions in the many worlds situation.

I did, with special different theta, and it is not much different than in some links we gave, but you attribute a constant identity to Alice and Bob which did not make sense. The theta/2 dependence is what requires to interpret the singlet state by a state of infinitely may “universes” in which Alice and Bob have all state possible, but with the correlation. When Alice make a measurement, she knows which Bob she will meet. If Bob makes a measurement he will know which Alice he will meet, but relatively to their states. That makes things highly non-local from the perspective of all persons able to interact, but without any “real physical influence at a distance”.

It is a place where Leonard Susskind is a bit too quick, when he says (on YouTube but also in his book that I have cited) that we cannot simulate the quantum non locality with a computer “in real time”. Of course he is correct, but if you simulate the schroedinger equation of the couple Alice and Bob doing all sorts of experiments, you will be obliged to get all the superposition but in fine, in the majority of histories, the Alices and the Bobs will measure and infer the right cos(theta/2).  The difficulty is that “you” have to sample the answers of many Alices and Bob.

I can offer you considerable odds that you will not be able to do this.

If you can get FTL action at a distance from QM, I will automatically think that you take some aspect of your interpretation too seriously or naively.

I might be wrong, but most argument claiming there exists, by EPR-Bell-Aspect  either use some implicit collapse somewhere, or take the notion of worlds in a sense which eludes me.

I will give more thought on this, some quantum thought experience might perhaps change my mind, but I doubt the singlet state will be enough.  We might discuss the GHZ state, as it does no more involve probability, and is even more strange.

You might try to use it to show the existence of FTL.

Bruno

Bruce

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[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 6:41 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 19 Aug 2019, at 04:02, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

Brent, Bruce,

On 16 Aug 2019, at 22:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.

That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed lower than light.

But as Bruce says, it's a kind of magic as stated.  To not be magic there must be some physical interactions communicating Alice's result to Bob's system: Photons would the obvious candidate, but how exactly do they interact with Bob and his system to make them orthogonal to one of Alice's results and not the other? 

The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.

The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself relatively.

That is exactly the magic that needs to be explained.

I don’t see this. ud - du predicts this, by the quantum formalism.

Yes. And that is the standard non-local argument. Don't forget that, as Maudlin points out, the quantum wave function is, itself, a non-local object.

  

And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it means that her accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her photon and d for bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he will meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices seeing u will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will access a world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or slower, and no physical influence exist at all. They both only localise themselves in the multiverse, at different possible cosmic branches.

What makes a history "accessible"? You have offered only magic to rule out histories that violate the basic conservation rules.

I don’t see this at all. (I assume QM here, not mechanism).

I don't know how I can make you understand that just multiplying the number of "worlds", and appealing to some obscure notion of "histories", does nothing towards providing a coherent local causal account of the observed correlations.

 

The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob, which would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than light physical influence.

The argument does not depend on any "one world" assumption. The problem is clearly present even in the Everettian setting, when there are copies of Alice and Bob who see each result. These always exist, since both up and down results are always possible for any measurement on the separated singlet particles.

I don’t see this. Alice and Bob have prepared the particle together (or by some entanglement swapping technic), the state ud-du require the correlations, in all base. Once separated, they can only access to their correlate parts, which requires the “creation” of “new” Bob and Alice.

Any copies of Alice and Bob that there might be are created at the time they make their measurements and observe (record) their results. This happens at space-like separations, so any correlations are necessarily non-local in origin. All else is magic or mysticism.

 

It is up to you, if you think that some FTL influence occur, to explain why and how.

Don't try and divert attention from your own failings by claiming that it is all my responsibility. This is about you, and your failure to provide the advertised local causal account through many worlds, that is at issue.

A quantum state does not describe a world, but is only an indexical map, for a subject, of the histories that he/she can access to.  ud-du means only, to Alice and Bob, that they will always means their corresponding correlated counterpart, whatever they found.

Given the miracle that occurs at this step in your account.

Which miracle? I just use the fact that once a superposition is there, it never collapse. It is the collapse which would be magical.

Collapse is irrelevant. This is just another of your diversionary tactics. You claim that there is "some collapse" if you have no answer to the points being made. I have not made any collapse assumption; all along I have been working in a many-worlds setting. I maintain that this does not result in a local account. You claim different, so prove it by providing this local account.

 Even if we give sense to “they both find u”, each of us will meet they counterparts, which they can interact with when meeting again,  having found d.

You are not convincing anyone other than yourself here, Bruno.

I don’t think so. I am not sure if you are not the only one, perhaps with one other, who believes that the violation of Bell’s inequality entails physical action at a distance (which have no meaning for me in a relativistic context).

Don't change the subject, and ascribe to me views that I have never held and have never advocated. There is no FTL physical action. The no-signalling theorems guarantee this.

 

Both EPR and Bell assumes that "Alice and Bob” are well defined and keep their identity throughout the experience, which indeed would require some FTL influence, but I don’t see that FTL when we keep all branch of the superposition into account.

Your conclusion does not follow from your premises. I have given a clear account of how Alice and Bob can maintain their identities, even though they split according to the results obtained, and still meet to exchange data and calculate non-local correlations, even though there are no physical FTL effects. This account explicitly keeps all branches of the superposition in play, even though that does not really alter anything.

Bruce

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Aug 2019, at 08:24, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 6:41 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 19 Aug 2019, at 04:02, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

Brent, Bruce,

On 16 Aug 2019, at 22:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.

That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed lower than light.

But as Bruce says, it's a kind of magic as stated.  To not be magic there must be some physical interactions communicating Alice's result to Bob's system: Photons would the obvious candidate, but how exactly do they interact with Bob and his system to make them orthogonal to one of Alice's results and not the other? 

The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.

The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself relatively.

That is exactly the magic that needs to be explained.

I don’t see this. ud - du predicts this, by the quantum formalism.

Yes. And that is the standard non-local argument. Don't forget that, as Maudlin points out, the quantum wave function is, itself, a non-local object.

I can hardly imagine a notion more local than a wave.

But, yes, if a wave describe an amplitude of probability concerning a single particle, then, if that wave collapse, it can only do this in a highly non-local way. That was the reason why Einstein criticise Bohr’s QM, notably in 1927 at the Solvay Congress in Brussels, and which lead to EPR.

I think Maudlin said that the quantum wave is a non-local object in the context of the “one-world” assumption. In my edition of his book on non-separability he explains this is no more true in the non-collapse theory (but you said he changes his mind on this?).

  

And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it means that her accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her photon and d for bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he will meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices seeing u will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will access a world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or slower, and no physical influence exist at all. They both only localise themselves in the multiverse, at different possible cosmic branches.

What makes a history "accessible"? You have offered only magic to rule out histories that violate the basic conservation rules.

I don’t see this at all. (I assume QM here, not mechanism).

I don't know how I can make you understand that just multiplying the number of "worlds", and appealing to some obscure notion of "histories", does nothing towards providing a coherent local causal account of the observed correlations.

It is not the multiplication of worlds per se which solves the problem, it is the fact that the "multiplication of worlds” is itself a local phenomenon. When Alice measures her particle, and Bob measure his particle, they both “multiply” their accessible worlds, in which both will met eventually their correlated counterparts, whatever the results their could be said to have obtained initially (if we could give some sense for this).

 

The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob, which would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than light physical influence.

The argument does not depend on any "one world" assumption. The problem is clearly present even in the Everettian setting, when there are copies of Alice and Bob who see each result. These always exist, since both up and down results are always possible for any measurement on the separated singlet particles.

I don’t see this. Alice and Bob have prepared the particle together (or by some entanglement swapping technic), the state ud-du require the correlations, in all base. Once separated, they can only access to their correlate parts, which requires the “creation” of “new” Bob and Alice.

Any copies of Alice and Bob that there might be are created at the time they make their measurements and observe (record) their results. This happens at space-like separations, so any correlations are necessarily non-local in origin. All else is magic or mysticism.

The splitting or differentiation of the “world” is a local phenomenon. 

FTL action at a distance seems more magic to me than a local differentiation of histories.

 

It is up to you, if you think that some FTL influence occur, to explain why and how.

Don't try and divert attention from your own failings by claiming that it is all my responsibility. This is about you, and your failure to provide the advertised local causal account through many worlds, that is at issue.

The wave propagate locally. Everything is local at all “space-time” situation. You continue to talk like if the wave collapsed when we do measurement, but that does not occur once we abandon the idea that any collapse ever occur.

A quantum state does not describe a world, but is only an indexical map, for a subject, of the histories that he/she can access to.  ud-du means only, to Alice and Bob, that they will always means their corresponding correlated counterpart, whatever they found.

Given the miracle that occurs at this step in your account.

Which miracle? I just use the fact that once a superposition is there, it never collapse. It is the collapse which would be magical.

Collapse is irrelevant.

I don’t see this. If the wave collapse, it has to be non-local. Without collapse, the multiplication of worlds is a local phenomenon spreading at the speed of the possible local interaction with the environment. 

This is just another of your diversionary tactics. You claim that there is "some collapse" if you have no answer to the points being made. I have not made any collapse assumption; all along I have been working in a many-worlds setting. I maintain that this does not result in a local account. You claim different, so prove it by providing this local account.

My feeling is that you interpret the multiplication of worlds like if that was an instantaneous process, but it is a local one: like a front wave made of many single waves. The singlet sate is for personal use only: it says to Bob and to Alice which types of Alice and Bob they can meet in their future. In a sense, once separated, the “original” will never meet again: only their counterparts in the relevant histories with a measure given from the state.

 Even if we give sense to “they both find u”, each of us will meet they counterparts, which they can interact with when meeting again,  having found d.

You are not convincing anyone other than yourself here, Bruno.

I don’t think so. I am not sure if you are not the only one, perhaps with one other, who believes that the violation of Bell’s inequality entails physical action at a distance (which have no meaning for me in a relativistic context).

Don't change the subject, and ascribe to me views that I have never held and have never advocated. There is no FTL physical action. The no-signalling theorems guarantee this.

Existence of FTL is weaker than No-signalling, but with some amount of physical realism, it is about the same.

If you agree that there is no FTL when there is no collapse, then again, I am no more sure we disagree on anything here.

 

Both EPR and Bell assumes that "Alice and Bob” are well defined and keep their identity throughout the experience, which indeed would require some FTL influence, but I don’t see that FTL when we keep all branch of the superposition into account.

Your conclusion does not follow from your premises. I have given a clear account of how Alice and Bob can maintain their identities, even though they split according to the results obtained, and still meet to exchange data and calculate non-local correlations, even though there are no physical FTL effects.

In absence of collapse. 

This account explicitly keeps all branches of the superposition in play, even though that does not really alter anything.

If there is a collapse, it has to be non local, as Einstein understood very early. Only differentiation of worlds at lower speed of light can maintain the localness of the actions together with maintaining the quantum statistics right in the mind of all Alices and Bobs.

Bruno

Bruce

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[Bruce Kellett]

Bruno,

I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.

So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.

As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.

It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical nonsense.

Bruce

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:

Bruno,

I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.

So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.

As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.

It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical nonsense.

Bruce

I started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I will try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of PR box argument.

MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence to QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the problem into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if any interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a "it feels good" sort of argument. 

I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently:

No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding to a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is this idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, the world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer who is in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on that measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic jump.

If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I may work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's theorem. The implication is there is no decidable way to determine whether QM is ψ-epistemic, say in the sense of Bohr and Copenhagen Interpretation and Fuch's QuBism, or if it is ψ-ontic in the sense of MWI and GRW and ... .

All of these have problems. Bohr and CI posit as fundamental quantum and classical domains. However as pointed out by Heisenberg early on there is an ambiguous boundary between these two domains. MWI proposes a splitting of worlds, but there is no definitive meaning to a spatial surface or set of them according to probabilities. Bohm's idea really only has sense in nonrelativistic domain, but that could hold for physics on a holographic screen, so while this has serious weaknesses I will not throw it completely under the bus. There are I read at last count over 50 interpretations. Collapses are not the result of unitary evolution and so appear inconsistent with the evolution of quantum states. I think this is some sort of incompleteness in the axioms or postulate of QM. It might be compared to the fifth axiom of Euclid in geometry. I think in the end, or if I am right, then this is simply a state of affairs that exists, there is no causal process behind it and we are best to just accept this and press on. Maybe this is Mermin's Shut up and calculate and this search for interpretations is a waste of time. 

LC

[Philip Thrift]

I think it is also true of Many Worlds (BTW, Sean Carroll is launching a nationwide tour, as he reports on Twitter, evangelizing the Many Worlds interpretation), but any papers/videos advocating any epistemic or Bayesian quantum interpretations can be ignored, and nothing is missed, and time saved for better things.

@philipthrift

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Aug 2019, at 01:11, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

Bruno,

I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.

I thought we were agreeing. Are you telling me that you believe in FTL after all?

All what I said is that non-locality does not imply any physical action/influence at a distance.(Even “non-signalling one”).

You loss me completely. 

So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality,

Yes, it solve it by showing that non-locality does not require FTL at a distance. But the price to pay is that no outcome is ever unique in the 3p picture (superpositions never die). Uniqueness of outcome  is always a first person view of the experience.

but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to shed some light on the matter.

The real light I give comes from the mechanist hypothesis: the physical reality is explained in a new way, by deriving the QM formalism from the statistics on all computations structure by self-reference.

I don’t assume QM, except in this thread where we discuss if QM’s non local feature, and my point is only that

1) with the one-world hypothesis there is FTL action at a distance (FTLAD)

2) with the many-world hypothesis, there is no such FTLAD, the non-locality remains a real *phenomenon*, Bell’s inequality are violated, but only as a first person plural perception. The local causal explanation is the Wave equation (although this one should become also an appearance when we assume Mechanism (but that is another thread).

If you could have done so, it would have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.

Assuming QM.

(With Mechanism, we get a 0 world theory.). 

As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real existence of the other worlds.

There are reasons to believe in the non existence of any world. With Mechanism, there are only computations, whose existence are proven in RA and PA.

In Everett, the many-worlds should not be taken literally. I told you that the closer (to mechanism) account of QM is the one by Griffith, Hartle, Gell-Man and Omnes (with some nuances not yet decided by Mechanism).

One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics,

Even to mechanism, where we know that there is no physical world at all.

and one can safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.

Yes, they become explicitly phenomenological appearances. Even the whole wave is an appearance with computationalism. 

It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a substitute for non-locality is now dead,

I was the last hope? Well, what an honour!

and we are left with physics as it always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical nonsense.

With only one world, you do have a collapse of the wave, and Bell’s inequality does imply FTLAD. The non-locality becomes physical, which, Imo, is much more nonsensical than the … theorem showing the existence of all computations executed in arithmetic.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Aug 2019, at 03:42, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:

Bruno,

I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.

So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.

As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.

It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical nonsense.

Bruce

I started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I will try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of PR box argument.

MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence to QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the problem into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if any interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a "it feels good" sort of argument. 

My point is that with the MWI (by which I mean the QM axiomatics without the collapse postulate) the violation of Bell’s inequality does not entail Faster than Light action at a distance (FTLAD), it entails only a local appearance of such action.

So Aspect experience proves the disjunction “FTLAD or Many-worlds”. But the term “world” should be taken with some caution (there are mathematical phenomenological constructs).

I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently:

No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding to a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is this idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, the world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer who is in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on that measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic jump.

If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I may work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's theorem.

That is a good insight, and it can be proved when you assume (explicitly) the Mechanist hypothesis. All computations exist in the arithmetical reality, and physics emerges from a statistics on all first person experience related to those computations. Eventually “physical prediction” with “measure one” have to obey to the logic of []p & <>t, with p partially computable (sigma_1). That gives already a quantum logic.

The implication is there is no decidable way to determine whether QM is ψ-epistemic, say in the sense of Bohr and Copenhagen Interpretation and Fuch's QuBism, or if it is ψ-ontic in the sense of MWI and GRW and … .

The only physics become a subbranch of machine/number psychology/theology, once we assume Mechanism. There is no problem with physics, but there is a problem with physicalism, if we make that Mechanist assumption.

All of these have problems. Bohr and CI posit as fundamental quantum and classical domains. However as pointed out by Heisenberg early on there is an ambiguous boundary between these two domains. MWI proposes a splitting of worlds, but there is no definitive meaning to a spatial surface or set of them according to probabilities. Bohm's idea really only has sense in nonrelativistic domain, but that could hold for physics on a holographic screen, so while this has serious weaknesses I will not throw it completely under the bus. There are I read at last count over 50 interpretations. Collapses are not the result of unitary evolution and so appear inconsistent with the evolution of quantum states.

Indeed.

I think this is some sort of incompleteness in the axioms or postulate of QM.

Eventually QM is related to the intrinsic incompleteness of all theories on arithmetic. 

It might be compared to the fifth axiom of Euclid in geometry. I think in the end, or if I am right, then this is simply a state of affairs that exists, there is no causal process behind it and we are best to just accept this and press on. Maybe this is Mermin's Shut up and calculate and this search for interpretations is a waste of time. 

Things are much simpler if we assume mechanism, like Everett. But Everett stil assumes some universal wave, which, when we assume mechanism, must be justify by the mechanist first person indeterminacy in arithmetic. 

To apply physics, “shut up and calculate” is all good, but in Metaphysics, it is pure authoritative argument to prevent finding and testing possible solutions of the problem. That is doubly true in the Mechanist frame, probably because the Mechanist solution is troubling for those who are physicalist, and believe in an ontological physical universe.

The mechanist solution is empirically testable, so let us test it. Up to now, Mechanism is the only theory which explains the appearance without eliminating consciousness and its mechanist explanation (the theology G* and its variants).

With Mechanism, physics is not the fundamental science. Physics is reduced to a sort of arithmetical probability/credibility machine theory.

Bruno

LC

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[Lawrence Crowell]

On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 4:42:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Aug 2019, at 03:42, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:

Bruno,

I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.

So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.

As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.

It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical nonsense.

Bruce

I started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I will try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of PR box argument.

MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence to QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the problem into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if any interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a "it feels good" sort of argument. 

My point is that with the MWI (by which I mean the QM axiomatics without the collapse postulate) the violation of Bell’s inequality does not entail Faster than Light action at a distance (FTLAD), it entails only a local appearance of such action.

So Aspect experience proves the disjunction “FTLAD or Many-worlds”. But the term “world” should be taken with some caution (there are mathematical phenomenological constructs).

 I would agree with that. MWI and this curious quantum frame dragging along a restricted quantum basis is not some causal influence. I doubt any MWI upholder is saying that. 

I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently:

No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding to a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is this idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, the world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer who is in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on that measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic jump.

If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I may work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's theorem.

That is a good insight, and it can be proved when you assume (explicitly) the Mechanist hypothesis. All computations exist in the arithmetical reality, and physics emerges from a statistics on all first person experience related to those computations. Eventually “physical prediction” with “measure one” have to obey to the logic of []p & <>t, with p partially computable (sigma_1). That gives already a quantum logic.

It is of course not clear whether this Gödel self-reference is what nature actually does, or whether this is something we do with our QM theory. Gödel's theorem involves an infinite number of statements or predicates that act on Gödel numbers of such predicates. For physics this is tantamount to the assumption the number of qubits N → ∞, which mirrors in some ways statistical mechanics and how classical thermodynamics is considered to emerge. Nature may do something approximate to this, and we make the assumption this is a Gödel loop of sorts.

 

The implication is there is no decidable way to determine whether QM is ψ-epistemic, say in the sense of Bohr and Copenhagen Interpretation and Fuch's QuBism, or if it is ψ-ontic in the sense of MWI and GRW and … .

The only physics become a subbranch of machine/number psychology/theology, once we assume Mechanism. There is no problem with physics, but there is a problem with physicalism, if we make that Mechanist assumption.

Clearly though caution is advised. There is a long history of comparing nature to our devices, from pumps to clocks and steam engines to now computers.

LC

 

All of these have problems. Bohr and CI posit as fundamental quantum and classical domains. However as pointed out by Heisenberg early on there is an ambiguous boundary between these two domains. MWI proposes a splitting of worlds, but there is no definitive meaning to a spatial surface or set of them according to probabilities. Bohm's idea really only has sense in nonrelativistic domain, but that could hold for physics on a holographic screen, so while this has serious weaknesses I will not throw it completely under the bus. There are I read at last count over 50 interpretations. Collapses are not the result of unitary evolution and so appear inconsistent with the evolution of quantum states.

Indeed.

I think this is some sort of incompleteness in the axioms or postulate of QM.

Eventually QM is related to the intrinsic incompleteness of all theories on arithmetic. 

It might be compared to the fifth axiom of Euclid in geometry. I think in the end, or if I am right, then this is simply a state of affairs that exists, there is no causal process behind it and we are best to just accept this and press on. Maybe this is Mermin's Shut up and calculate and this search for interpretations is a waste of time. 

Things are much simpler if we assume mechanism, like Everett. But Everett stil assumes some universal wave, which, when we assume mechanism, must be justify by the mechanist first person indeterminacy in arithmetic. 

To apply physics, “shut up and calculate” is all good, but in Metaphysics, it is pure authoritative argument to prevent finding and testing possible solutions of the problem. That is doubly true in the Mechanist frame, probably because the Mechanist solution is troubling for those who are physicalist, and believe in an ontological physical universe.

The mechanist solution is empirically testable, so let us test it. Up to now, Mechanism is the only theory which explains the appearance without eliminating consciousness and its mechanist explanation (the theology G* and its variants).

With Mechanism, physics is not the fundamental science. Physics is reduced to a sort of arithmetical probability/credibility machine theory.

Bruno

LC

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[Lawrence Crowell]

On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 4:42:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Things are much simpler if we assume mechanism, like Everett. But Everett stil assumes some universal wave, which, when we assume mechanism, must be justify by the mechanist first person indeterminacy in arithmetic. 

To apply physics, “shut up and calculate” is all good, but in Metaphysics, it is pure authoritative argument to prevent finding and testing possible solutions of the problem. That is doubly true in the Mechanist frame, probably because the Mechanist solution is troubling for those who are physicalist, and believe in an ontological physical universe.

The mechanist solution is empirically testable, so let us test it. Up to now, Mechanism is the only theory which explains the appearance without eliminating consciousness and its mechanist explanation (the theology G* and its variants).

With Mechanism, physics is not the fundamental science. Physics is reduced to a sort of arithmetical probability/credibility machine theory.

Bruno

This distinction between what is physical and what is mechanistic seems somewhat contrived. I suppose in the philosophical world this is what people do, where now there are people into meta-metaphysics. I am not an enemy of philosophy quite in the way Feynman was or his followers as Weinberg, but I do think science is best with a minimum of metaphysics.

LC 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Aug 2019, at 15:47, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 4:42:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Aug 2019, at 03:42, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:

Bruno,

I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.

So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.

As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.

It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical nonsense.

Bruce

I started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I will try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of PR box argument.

MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence to QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the problem into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if any interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a "it feels good" sort of argument. 

My point is that with the MWI (by which I mean the QM axiomatics without the collapse postulate) the violation of Bell’s inequality does not entail Faster than Light action at a distance (FTLAD), it entails only a local appearance of such action.

So Aspect experience proves the disjunction “FTLAD or Many-worlds”. But the term “world” should be taken with some caution (there are mathematical phenomenological constructs).

 I would agree with that. MWI and this curious quantum frame dragging along a restricted quantum basis is not some causal influence. I doubt any MWI upholder is saying that. 

I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently:

No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding to a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is this idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, the world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer who is in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on that measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic jump.

If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I may work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's theorem.

That is a good insight, and it can be proved when you assume (explicitly) the Mechanist hypothesis. All computations exist in the arithmetical reality, and physics emerges from a statistics on all first person experience related to those computations. Eventually “physical prediction” with “measure one” have to obey to the logic of []p & <>t, with p partially computable (sigma_1). That gives already a quantum logic.

It is of course not clear whether this Gödel self-reference is what nature actually does, or whether this is something we do with our QM theory. 

With Mechanism, nature does not exist. The appearance of nature and physical laws must be recovered by the statistics on the (relative) computations (which exists in arithmetic). The logic of the observable becomes the logic of what is invariant in the “sum” of all computations. At first sight, this cannot work, but then the Gödelian limitation just put the right structure (as far as we can judge today) on the consistent computational extensions, so that we an say that … mechanism is not refuted, neither by Gödel (as Penrose or Lucas argued), nor by QM.

Gödel's theorem involves an infinite number of statements or predicates that act on Gödel numbers of such predicates. For physics this is tantamount to the assumption the number of qubits N → ∞, which mirrors in some ways statistical mechanics and how classical thermodynamics is considered to emerge. Nature may do something approximate to this, and we make the assumption this is a Gödel loop of sorts.

With mechanism, we have no choice than recover the wave appearance (“nature” and the collapse) from a “many-world”, or more simply “many computations” in arithmetic. We just cannot assume a nature, made of something. It is all but a statistics on infinitely many computations (all computations which bring us, from under our substitution level).

 

The implication is there is no decidable way to determine whether QM is ψ-epistemic, say in the sense of Bohr and Copenhagen Interpretation and Fuch's QuBism, or if it is ψ-ontic in the sense of MWI and GRW and … .

The only physics become a subbranch of machine/number psychology/theology, once we assume Mechanism. There is no problem with physics, but there is a problem with physicalism, if we make that Mechanist assumption.

Clearly though caution is advised. There is a long history of comparing nature to our devices, from pumps to clocks and steam engines to now computers.

Searle made a similar critics. But the discovery of the universal machine, Imo, changes this completely. For them first time we get a notion of universality which is close for Cantor’s diagonalisation, and which prevents reductionism. It is something entirely new. Normally, it should have been discovered before incompleteness, which is an easy consequence of the Church-Turing thesis, which recognise that universality has being genuine.

After the discovery of the universal machine, and all its computations in arithmetic, it is very natural to doubt about physicalism. The doubt will be more between digital physics (the physical universe result from the execution of a particular programs or set of programs) and Mechanism, which precludes the possibility that the physical universe is Turing computable (as physics emerges from an finite sum on all computations, which is not computable a priori). Digital physics destroys itself, as it entails Mechanism, and Mechanism entails the negation of any entirely computable physics. 

Of course, caution is advised. Mechanism can be false, and that would entail the consistency of the existence of a primitively physical universe. Yet, Mechanism is the simplest (conceptually) theory in cognitive science, so, strong evidences that mechanism is false is needed to make that move, I would say, especially with quantum mechanics which seems to confirm the most “shocking” consequences of Digital Mechanism.

Bruno

LC

 

All of these have problems. Bohr and CI posit as fundamental quantum and classical domains. However as pointed out by Heisenberg early on there is an ambiguous boundary between these two domains. MWI proposes a splitting of worlds, but there is no definitive meaning to a spatial surface or set of them according to probabilities. Bohm's idea really only has sense in nonrelativistic domain, but that could hold for physics on a holographic screen, so while this has serious weaknesses I will not throw it completely under the bus. There are I read at last count over 50 interpretations. Collapses are not the result of unitary evolution and so appear inconsistent with the evolution of quantum states.

Indeed.

I think this is some sort of incompleteness in the axioms or postulate of QM.

Eventually QM is related to the intrinsic incompleteness of all theories on arithmetic. 

It might be compared to the fifth axiom of Euclid in geometry. I think in the end, or if I am right, then this is simply a state of affairs that exists, there is no causal process behind it and we are best to just accept this and press on. Maybe this is Mermin's Shut up and calculate and this search for interpretations is a waste of time. 

Things are much simpler if we assume mechanism, like Everett. But Everett stil assumes some universal wave, which, when we assume mechanism, must be justify by the mechanist first person indeterminacy in arithmetic. 

To apply physics, “shut up and calculate” is all good, but in Metaphysics, it is pure authoritative argument to prevent finding and testing possible solutions of the problem. That is doubly true in the Mechanist frame, probably because the Mechanist solution is troubling for those who are physicalist, and believe in an ontological physical universe.

The mechanist solution is empirically testable, so let us test it. Up to now, Mechanism is the only theory which explains the appearance without eliminating consciousness and its mechanist explanation (the theology G* and its variants).

With Mechanism, physics is not the fundamental science. Physics is reduced to a sort of arithmetical probability/credibility machine theory.

Bruno

LC

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[Bruno Marchal]

That is why I study Digital Mechanism. It makes metaphysics and theology into an experimental science. 

What some people often missed (and it is normal after 1500 years of materialist brainwashing) is that the hypothesis of the existence of a *primaty* physical reality (physicalism) *is* an hypothesis in metaphysics. With mechanism, that hypothesis has been shown inconsistent, and the mind)body problem is shown to be reduced in deriving the belief in the physical reality from a theory of consciousness, which is offered by the G* logic of Gödel-Löb-Solovay, so we can test it (and indeed, QM (without collapse) favours it, by far, I would argue).

It is just a bad habit we have since 529 (symbolic date, closure of Plato academy) to abandon rigorous in the fundamental domain, and in the human domain (which explains Shoah, Rwanda, etc., plausibly enough). The truth is that we can keep the scientific attitude in all domains, just by adding enough interrogation mark after clear assumption, and never claim to have obtained the truth.

Bruno

LC 

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[Lawrence Crowell]

On Thursday, August 22, 2019 at 8:41:40 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Aug 2019, at 15:47, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 4:42:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Aug 2019, at 03:42, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:

Bruno,

I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.

So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.

As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.

It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical nonsense.

Bruce

I started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I will try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of PR box argument.

MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence to QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the problem into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if any interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a "it feels good" sort of argument. 

My point is that with the MWI (by which I mean the QM axiomatics without the collapse postulate) the violation of Bell’s inequality does not entail Faster than Light action at a distance (FTLAD), it entails only a local appearance of such action.

So Aspect experience proves the disjunction “FTLAD or Many-worlds”. But the term “world” should be taken with some caution (there are mathematical phenomenological constructs).

 I would agree with that. MWI and this curious quantum frame dragging along a restricted quantum basis is not some causal influence. I doubt any MWI upholder is saying that. 

I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently:

No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding to a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is this idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, the world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer who is in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on that measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic jump.

If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I may work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's theorem.

That is a good insight, and it can be proved when you assume (explicitly) the Mechanist hypothesis. All computations exist in the arithmetical reality, and physics emerges from a statistics on all first person experience related to those computations. Eventually “physical prediction” with “measure one” have to obey to the logic of []p & <>t, with p partially computable (sigma_1). That gives already a quantum logic.

It is of course not clear whether this Gödel self-reference is what nature actually does, or whether this is something we do with our QM theory. 

With Mechanism, nature does not exist. The appearance of nature and physical laws must be recovered by the statistics on the (relative) computations (which exists in arithmetic). The logic of the observable becomes the logic of what is invariant in the “sum” of all computations. At first sight, this cannot work, but then the Gödelian limitation just put the right structure (as far as we can judge today) on the consistent computational extensions, so that we an say that … mechanism is not refuted, neither by Gödel (as Penrose or Lucas argued), nor by QM.

I tend to see nature as primary and mechanism as something we impose. I guess there is a little bit in me that is sympathetic to the 19th century Romantics in this way. As I see it nature bats last, and we humans can only try to emulate nature, but that our mechanisms will probably never be able to capture nature.

 

Gödel's theorem involves an infinite number of statements or predicates that act on Gödel numbers of such predicates. For physics this is tantamount to the assumption the number of qubits N → ∞, which mirrors in some ways statistical mechanics and how classical thermodynamics is considered to emerge. Nature may do something approximate to this, and we make the assumption this is a Gödel loop of sorts.

With mechanism, we have no choice than recover the wave appearance (“nature” and the collapse) from a “many-world”, or more simply “many computations” in arithmetic. We just cannot assume a nature, made of something. It is all but a statistics on infinitely many computations (all computations which bring us, from under our substitution level).

Nature exhibit various symmetries that from a Lie algebraic level are a set of transformation that have some analogue to computing systems. These symmetries may be inexact, say a physical vacuum of broken symmetry, and our modeling of these as cybernetic systems are ways of drawing analogies. These are things we impose and not things which we can say with much certainty are absolutely intrinsic.

 

 

The implication is there is no decidable way to determine whether QM is ψ-epistemic, say in the sense of Bohr and Copenhagen Interpretation and Fuch's QuBism, or if it is ψ-ontic in the sense of MWI and GRW and … .

The only physics become a subbranch of machine/number psychology/theology, once we assume Mechanism. There is no problem with physics, but there is a problem with physicalism, if we make that Mechanist assumption.

Clearly though caution is advised. There is a long history of comparing nature to our devices, from pumps to clocks and steam engines to now computers.

Searle made a similar critics. But the discovery of the universal machine, Imo, changes this completely. For them first time we get a notion of universality which is close for Cantor’s diagonalisation, and which prevents reductionism. It is something entirely new. Normally, it should have been discovered before incompleteness, which is an easy consequence of the Church-Turing thesis, which recognise that universality has being genuine.

After the discovery of the universal machine, and all its computations in arithmetic, it is very natural to doubt about physicalism. The doubt will be more between digital physics (the physical universe result from the execution of a particular programs or set of programs) and Mechanism, which precludes the possibility that the physical universe is Turing computable (as physics emerges from an finite sum on all computations, which is not computable a priori). Digital physics destroys itself, as it entails Mechanism, and Mechanism entails the negation of any entirely computable physics. 

Of course, caution is advised. Mechanism can be false, and that would entail the consistency of the existence of a primitively physical universe. Yet, Mechanism is the simplest (conceptually) theory in cognitive science, so, strong evidences that mechanism is false is needed to make that move, I would say, especially with quantum mechanics which seems to confirm the most “shocking” consequences of Digital Mechanism.

Bruno

I honestly see this as all a sort of model system, which may have some pattern or parallel to nature, but which I doubt absolutely captures nature. After all there could be things beyond Gödel, and they are themselves not Gödel. It has a sort of Zen quality to it.

LC

 

LC

 

All of these have problems. Bohr and CI posit as fundamental quantum and classical domains. However as pointed out by Heisenberg early on there is an ambiguous boundary between these two domains. MWI proposes a splitting of worlds, but there is no definitive meaning to a spatial surface or set of them according to probabilities. Bohm's idea really only has sense in nonrelativistic domain, but that could hold for physics on a holographic screen, so while this has serious weaknesses I will not throw it completely under the bus. There are I read at last count over 50 interpretations. Collapses are not the result of unitary evolution and so appear inconsistent with the evolution of quantum states.

Indeed.

I think this is some sort of incompleteness in the axioms or postulate of QM.

Eventually QM is related to the intrinsic incompleteness of all theories on arithmetic. 

It might be compared to the fifth axiom of Euclid in geometry. I think in the end, or if I am right, then this is simply a state of affairs that exists, there is no causal process behind it and we are best to just accept this and press on. Maybe this is Mermin's Shut up and calculate and this search for interpretations is a waste of time. 

Things are much simpler if we assume mechanism, like Everett. But Everett stil assumes some universal wave, which, when we assume mechanism, must be justify by the mechanist first person indeterminacy in arithmetic. 

To apply physics, “shut up and calculate” is all good, but in Metaphysics, it is pure authoritative argument to prevent finding and testing possible solutions of the problem. That is doubly true in the Mechanist frame, probably because the Mechanist solution is troubling for those who are physicalist, and believe in an ontological physical universe.

The mechanist solution is empirically testable, so let us test it. Up to now, Mechanism is the only theory which explains the appearance without eliminating consciousness and its mechanist explanation (the theology G* and its variants).

With Mechanism, physics is not the fundamental science. Physics is reduced to a sort of arithmetical probability/credibility machine theory.

Bruno

LC

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Aug 2019, at 03:34, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Thursday, August 22, 2019 at 8:41:40 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Aug 2019, at 15:47, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 4:42:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Aug 2019, at 03:42, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:

Bruno,

I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.

So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.

As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.

It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical nonsense.

Bruce

I started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I will try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of PR box argument.

MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence to QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the problem into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if any interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a "it feels good" sort of argument. 

My point is that with the MWI (by which I mean the QM axiomatics without the collapse postulate) the violation of Bell’s inequality does not entail Faster than Light action at a distance (FTLAD), it entails only a local appearance of such action.

So Aspect experience proves the disjunction “FTLAD or Many-worlds”. But the term “world” should be taken with some caution (there are mathematical phenomenological constructs).

 I would agree with that. MWI and this curious quantum frame dragging along a restricted quantum basis is not some causal influence. I doubt any MWI upholder is saying that. 

I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently:

No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding to a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is this idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, the world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer who is in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on that measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic jump.

If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I may work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's theorem.

That is a good insight, and it can be proved when you assume (explicitly) the Mechanist hypothesis. All computations exist in the arithmetical reality, and physics emerges from a statistics on all first person experience related to those computations. Eventually “physical prediction” with “measure one” have to obey to the logic of []p & <>t, with p partially computable (sigma_1). That gives already a quantum logic.

It is of course not clear whether this Gödel self-reference is what nature actually does, or whether this is something we do with our QM theory. 

With Mechanism, nature does not exist. The appearance of nature and physical laws must be recovered by the statistics on the (relative) computations (which exists in arithmetic). The logic of the observable becomes the logic of what is invariant in the “sum” of all computations. At first sight, this cannot work, but then the Gödelian limitation just put the right structure (as far as we can judge today) on the consistent computational extensions, so that we an say that … mechanism is not refuted, neither by Gödel (as Penrose or Lucas argued), nor by QM.

I tend to see nature as primary and mechanism as something we impose.

But you said above that you prefer not do metaphysics.

My point si double, I show that IF we assume Mechanism (that there is no Non Turing emulable action playing a role in consciousness, mind, or in the first person perception, except for the indeterminacy on which computations support us) then nature is not primary, but emerges from a statistics on all (relative) computation “seen from the perspective of the person associated to the (infinitely many) machines’ relative state in arithmetic.

I don’t know if Digital Mechanism is true. The advantage of that hypothesis is that the problem can be translated into mathematical problem, and with Indexical Digital Mechanism (roughly speaking “yes doctor” + The Church-Turing Thesis), the Mind-Body Problem reduce into the problem of deriving the appearance of the physical laws from a “theory of consciousness” which in this case is “simply” the intensional modes of self-reference. Thanks to a theorem by Solovay, that “theology” is axiomatised by two modal logics G and G*, and from them you get quickly the mathematics of the intensional variants.

I guess there is a little bit in me that is sympathetic to the 19th century Romantics in this way. As I see it nature bats last, and we humans can only try to emulate nature, but that our mechanisms will probably never be able to capture nature.

That is a good insight, Nature is given by a sort of limit of all experiences. It is the invariant in the global indeterminacy on all computations. It is above all universal machine, but what Gödel, Church, Post, Kleene, … Löb, Solovay show is that this universal machine ignorance is mathematically structured. With mechanism, somehow, the physical reality is the border of that ignorance. With Mechanism, the whole physical reality inherit a large part of that ignorance.

Maybe Mechanism is false, but it does give an account of reality which does not eliminate consciousness (it gives it an important role) and explain (perhaps wrongly, but explain, in a precise sense) where the laws of physics comes from.

It provides a new perspective on quantum mechanism. With Mechanism, a priori we have more “worlds/computations", given that we take them all (that includes the quantum computations, by a result by David Deutsch).

Then the sel-ferential constraints imposed by incompleteness suggest a quantum structure, and a quantum quantisation, on the set of accessible relative computational states.

The Universal wave might be an invariant of the universal machine observable defined in the arithmetical reality (standard model).

 

Gödel's theorem involves an infinite number of statements or predicates that act on Gödel numbers of such predicates. For physics this is tantamount to the assumption the number of qubits N → ∞, which mirrors in some ways statistical mechanics and how classical thermodynamics is considered to emerge. Nature may do something approximate to this, and we make the assumption this is a Gödel loop of sorts.

With mechanism, we have no choice than recover the wave appearance (“nature” and the collapse) from a “many-world”, or more simply “many computations” in arithmetic. We just cannot assume a nature, made of something. It is all but a statistics on infinitely many computations (all computations which bring us, from under our substitution level).

Nature exhibit various symmetries that from a Lie algebraic level are a set of transformation that have some analogue to computing systems. These symmetries may be inexact, say a physical vacuum of broken symmetry, and our modeling of these as cybernetic systems are ways of drawing analogies. These are things we impose and not things which we can say with much certainty are absolutely intrinsic.

It always depend on the hypotheses. I have to be agnostic in my domain. The god of Plato is the truth we search, and with mechanism (and Socrates) we already know that such truth is never the one we could claim as such. So, when doing “metaphysics” or “theology” seriously, it is preferable to recognise that we don’t know, and try theories (as precise as possible). 

The advantage of Indexical Digital Mechanism (IDM) is that it is conceptually simple, has a long history, with in the West and the East, and that recently it made a giant leap: the discovery of the universal machine/number/system/language/word. 

It was discovered by mathematical logicians, and it gives rise to many branches (Recursion theory (computability theory), Proof Theory, theoretical computer science, with many subbranch like learning theory, Provability logics, etc.).

Up to now, the physical reality does not disprove IDM. Note that a Newtonian World would have disproved IDM, but the quantum seems quite an ally, up to now. If something in physics could disprove IDM, I would expected it more from GR than QM. But now that is speculative!

 

 

The implication is there is no decidable way to determine whether QM is ψ-epistemic, say in the sense of Bohr and Copenhagen Interpretation and Fuch's QuBism, or if it is ψ-ontic in the sense of MWI and GRW and … .

The only physics become a subbranch of machine/number psychology/theology, once we assume Mechanism. There is no problem with physics, but there is a problem with physicalism, if we make that Mechanist assumption.

Clearly though caution is advised. There is a long history of comparing nature to our devices, from pumps to clocks and steam engines to now computers.

Searle made a similar critics. But the discovery of the universal machine, Imo, changes this completely. For them first time we get a notion of universality which is close for Cantor’s diagonalisation, and which prevents reductionism. It is something entirely new. Normally, it should have been discovered before incompleteness, which is an easy consequence of the Church-Turing thesis, which recognise that universality has being genuine.

After the discovery of the universal machine, and all its computations in arithmetic, it is very natural to doubt about physicalism. The doubt will be more between digital physics (the physical universe result from the execution of a particular programs or set of programs) and Mechanism, which precludes the possibility that the physical universe is Turing computable (as physics emerges from an finite sum on all computations, which is not computable a priori). Digital physics destroys itself, as it entails Mechanism, and Mechanism entails the negation of any entirely computable physics. 

Of course, caution is advised. Mechanism can be false, and that would entail the consistency of the existence of a primitively physical universe. Yet, Mechanism is the simplest (conceptually) theory in cognitive science, so, strong evidences that mechanism is false is needed to make that move, I would say, especially with quantum mechanics which seems to confirm the most “shocking” consequences of Digital Mechanism.

Bruno

I honestly see this as all a sort of model system, which may have some pattern or parallel to nature,

Keep in mind that with computationalism, in the IDM sense, after the reasoning is completed, we cannot assume more than elementary arithmetic. That is enough to determine the universal dovetailing and the space on which a “consciousness flux”, initiating the consciousness of any universal number which then differentiate in the first person way, 

Nature is not an illusion, but a stable emerging pattern, obeying to the laws of the arithmetical observable. Below our substitution level, we differentiate on a continuum (in some topological sense) of consistent extensions.

Things are like that:

Number ==> Consciousness ==> physical reality ==> Human consciousness.

but which I doubt absolutely captures nature.

Good. Doubting is the main virtue of the serious researcher.

After all there could be things beyond Gödel, and they are themselves not Gödel. It has a sort of Zen quality to it.

Gödel missed Mechanism, despite getting a good part of it. He missed even Church’s thesis, as he acknowledges quite frankly. 

But he is the one showing that about numbers and digital machines, we know about nothing.

The singularity belongs to the past. It is the discovery of the universal machine. It is initially *very* intelligent, now, we can make it only less intelligent or with luck to preserve its intelligence (the Löbian case). The universal machine is, right at the start, confronted to an hesitation between security (a recursively enumerable subset of the total computable functions) and liberty/universaility (all total and partial computable functions). I guess I will come back on this.

I think we can recognise ourself in those machines. 

Worse, if we don’t, those of those baby gods could become terrible children.

But today, the humans don’t even recognise themselves in the humans, so I guess that history will take time ...

Bruno

LC

 

LC

 

All of these have problems. Bohr and CI posit as fundamental quantum and classical domains. However as pointed out by Heisenberg early on there is an ambiguous boundary between these two domains. MWI proposes a splitting of worlds, but there is no definitive meaning to a spatial surface or set of them according to probabilities. Bohm's idea really only has sense in nonrelativistic domain, but that could hold for physics on a holographic screen, so while this has serious weaknesses I will not throw it completely under the bus. There are I read at last count over 50 interpretations. Collapses are not the result of unitary evolution and so appear inconsistent with the evolution of quantum states.

Indeed.

I think this is some sort of incompleteness in the axioms or postulate of QM.

Eventually QM is related to the intrinsic incompleteness of all theories on arithmetic. 

It might be compared to the fifth axiom of Euclid in geometry. I think in the end, or if I am right, then this is simply a state of affairs that exists, there is no causal process behind it and we are best to just accept this and press on. Maybe this is Mermin's Shut up and calculate and this search for interpretations is a waste of time. 

Things are much simpler if we assume mechanism, like Everett. But Everett stil assumes some universal wave, which, when we assume mechanism, must be justify by the mechanist first person indeterminacy in arithmetic. 

To apply physics, “shut up and calculate” is all good, but in Metaphysics, it is pure authoritative argument to prevent finding and testing possible solutions of the problem. That is doubly true in the Mechanist frame, probably because the Mechanist solution is troubling for those who are physicalist, and believe in an ontological physical universe.

The mechanist solution is empirically testable, so let us test it. Up to now, Mechanism is the only theory which explains the appearance without eliminating consciousness and its mechanist explanation (the theology G* and its variants).

With Mechanism, physics is not the fundamental science. Physics is reduced to a sort of arithmetical probability/credibility machine theory.

Bruno

LC

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