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I stumbled across a related topic regarding Wigner's friend/Schrodinger's Cat via the observer in QM, in that a traditional cat, not a metaphor would count from physical principle's as an observer itself. This is going way down the observer chain, say, from a Boltzmann Brain of hyper intelligence to a cat. Would a computer system be an observer or a bacteria? Ummmm....? Hey, a BB is indeed a brain sim.
I do not think a quantum observer needs to be any conscious entity at all. All that is required for a system to act as a quantum observer is for the it to couple to a pure quantum state so the quantum phase of that pure state is completely transferred to the large N number of mixed quantum states composing this system. This serves as the collapse. Further this quantum system with frequency ν will enter this state of affairs on a time scale T << 1/ν and so the system never executes its quantum oscillations.
There is no need for a mentally conscious being. A biological system, whether a purring cat or a person is a finite non-zero temperature entity filled with quantum noise due to its thermal properties. As such the Schrödinger cat is not possible. There is no way a cat can be in a superposition of states, or at least not the entire thing.
LC
-----Original Message-----
From: Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com>
To: Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sat, Jun 27, 2020 7:32 pm
Subject: Re: Importance of including environment in brain simulation
This video is set towards the end so I have not seen the whole presentation. At the end he gets into the Wigner's friend problem in QM, and there is the result of Fraschiger and Renner on this that illustrates limits on the idea of objective observership.A brain to function needs an environment. It must be an open system A brain or conscious entity that is a closed system is almost a contradiction. Self-awareness is all within the perspective of a relative basis with an external world.LC
On Saturday, June 27, 2020 at 12:36:57 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:Brent,It looks like you were right about the importance of including environmental data in a brain simulation. Markus Muller uses algorithmic information theory to argue that whether or not a simulated brain is a zombie or not, depends on a large extent to the degree in which environmental information is incorporated into the simulation:(See 51 minutes 40 seconds in)Jason
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Rather consistent with QBism in which QM predicts personal probabilities of observations.
I wonder how much credence I should give to algorithmic probability?
Is this the only possible measure? How much does it depend on the choice of Turing machine?
Usually such questions are answerable only in the limit n->oo; but is that legitimate in deriving physical reality?
Brent--
On 6/27/2020 10:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
Brent,--
It looks like you were right about the importance of including environmental data in a brain simulation. Markus Muller uses algorithmic information theory to argue that whether or not a simulated brain is a zombie or not, depends on a large extent to the degree in which environmental information is incorporated into the simulation:
(See 51 minutes 40 seconds in)
Jason
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Jason--
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On 28 Jun 2020, at 01:32, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:This video is set towards the end so I have not seen the whole presentation. At the end he gets into the Wigner's friend problem in QM, and there is the result of Fraschiger and Renner on this that illustrates limits on the idea of objective observership.
A brain to function needs an environment. It must be an open system
A brain or conscious entity that is a closed system is almost a contradiction.
Self-awareness is all within the perspective of a relative basis with an external world.
LC
On Saturday, June 27, 2020 at 12:36:57 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:Brent,It looks like you were right about the importance of including environmental data in a brain simulation. Markus Muller uses algorithmic information theory to argue that whether or not a simulated brain is a zombie or not, depends on a large extent to the degree in which environmental information is incorporated into the simulation:(See 51 minutes 40 seconds in)Jason
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On 28 Jun 2020, at 20:14, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:On Sat, Jun 27, 2020 at 3:11 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:Rather consistent with QBism in which QM predicts personal probabilities of observations.
I wonder how much credence I should give to algorithmic probability?It does allow one to retrodict several observed and otherwise unexplained properties of the universe (why there are simple, yet probabilistic and computable laws, why the universe has a finite traceable age, why it has time)Is this the only possible measure? How much does it depend on the choice of Turing machine?He mentions earlier in his talk that this is covered in section 12 but that he doesn't have time to cover it in his talk. He says the choice of Turing machine is unimportant to the overall measure but I am unsure of how the argument works so I can't explain it without trying to reread and understand that part of the paper. I think it is similar to how the choice of computer is irrelevant to the UDA or its exact programming implementation.
Usually such questions are answerable only in the limit n->oo; but is that legitimate in deriving physical reality?
I think physics is heading in that direction. Many of the roadblocks in various theories are hitting limits in understanding due to an apparent explosion of infinite possibilities. It happens in trying to go back before the big bang in inflation, in string theory when trying to determine the vacuum state we are in, in accounting for the fine-tuning of the universe, in trying to unify general relativity and QM, in explaining how quantum computers work. I think all of these lend a little credence to the idea that we are observers embedded within an infinite reality containing all possible observer states.
JasonBrent
On 6/27/2020 10:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
Brent,--
It looks like you were right about the importance of including environmental data in a brain simulation. Markus Muller uses algorithmic information theory to argue that whether or not a simulated brain is a zombie or not, depends on a large extent to the degree in which environmental information is incorporated into the simulation:
(See 51 minutes 40 seconds in)
Jason
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On 29 Jun 2020, at 01:12, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:The Schrodinger cat argument is meant to illustrate a sort of reductio-absurdism. A cat is a macroscopic and thermal object that is filled with quantum noise. It is massively decoherent. This means there is no real physical way for it to be in an entangled state so half alive and dead.
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On 27 Jun 2020, at 19:36, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
Brent,
It looks like you were right about the importance of including environmental data in a brain simulation. Markus Muller uses algorithmic information theory to argue that whether or not a simulated brain is a zombie or not, depends on a large extent to the degree in which environmental information is incorporated into the simulation:
(See 51 minutes 40 seconds in)
He does not say much there, and taken literally, this is already what the antic dream argument put in doubt.
If we take the arithmetical first person indeterminacy into account, it is not so much the environment which needs to be taken into account, but the collection of all consistent continuation, structured by the material modes of self-reference.
If not, it means that the substitution level has chosen correctly, or that the “brain” was not well copied… (or that we use a non mechanist theory of mind).
Bruno
Jason--
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On 30 Jun 2020, at 19:54, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 6/30/2020 5:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Jun 2020, at 19:36, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
Brent,
It looks like you were right about the importance of including environmental data in a brain simulation. Markus Muller uses algorithmic information theory to argue that whether or not a simulated brain is a zombie or not, depends on a large extent to the degree in which environmental information is incorporated into the simulation:
(See 51 minutes 40 seconds in)
He does not say much there, and taken literally, this is already what the antic dream argument put in doubt.
If we take the arithmetical first person indeterminacy into account, it is not so much the environment which needs to be taken into account, but the collection of all consistent continuation, structured by the material modes of self-reference.
Consistent continuation of what? That's the question.
Brent
If not, it means that the substitution level has chosen correctly, or that the “brain” was not well copied… (or that we use a non mechanist theory of mind).
Bruno
Jason--
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On 30 Jun 2020, at 19:54, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 6/30/2020 5:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Jun 2020, at 19:36, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
Brent,
It looks like you were right about the importance of including environmental data in a brain simulation. Markus Muller uses algorithmic information theory to argue that whether or not a simulated brain is a zombie or not, depends on a large extent to the degree in which environmental information is incorporated into the simulation:
(See 51 minutes 40 seconds in)
He does not say much there, and taken literally, this is already what the antic dream argument put in doubt.
If we take the arithmetical first person indeterminacy into account, it is not so much the environment which needs to be taken into account, but the collection of all consistent continuation, structured by the material modes of self-reference.
Consistent continuation of what? That's the question.
Consistent continuation of you (the first person knower). It is what is axiomatised completely (at the propositional level) by:[]p & <>t & p (p is provable, consistent and true).
Intutively, that entails many aberrant experience/dream, but the constraints of self-reference leads to a sort of Everett-Griffith-Omnès-Hartle-Gell’man sort of quantum logic: a statistically interfering bunch of histories “making relative sense”.
Bruno
Brent
If not, it means that the substitution level has chosen correctly, or that the “brain” was not well copied… (or that we use a non mechanist theory of mind).
Bruno
Jason--
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On 1 Jul 2020, at 22:30, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 7/1/2020 6:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Jun 2020, at 19:54, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 6/30/2020 5:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Jun 2020, at 19:36, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
Brent,
It looks like you were right about the importance of including environmental data in a brain simulation. Markus Muller uses algorithmic information theory to argue that whether or not a simulated brain is a zombie or not, depends on a large extent to the degree in which environmental information is incorporated into the simulation:
(See 51 minutes 40 seconds in)
He does not say much there, and taken literally, this is already what the antic dream argument put in doubt.
If we take the arithmetical first person indeterminacy into account, it is not so much the environment which needs to be taken into account, but the collection of all consistent continuation, structured by the material modes of self-reference.
Consistent continuation of what? That's the question.
Consistent continuation of you (the first person knower). It is what is axiomatised completely (at the propositional level) by:[]p & <>t & p (p is provable, consistent and true).
How can pick out a person and define the unity of experience of that person?
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On 2 Jul 2020, at 18:11, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 7/2/2020 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 1 Jul 2020, at 22:30, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 7/1/2020 6:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Jun 2020, at 19:54, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 6/30/2020 5:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Jun 2020, at 19:36, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
Brent,
It looks like you were right about the importance of including environmental data in a brain simulation. Markus Muller uses algorithmic information theory to argue that whether or not a simulated brain is a zombie or not, depends on a large extent to the degree in which environmental information is incorporated into the simulation:
(See 51 minutes 40 seconds in)
He does not say much there, and taken literally, this is already what the antic dream argument put in doubt.
If we take the arithmetical first person indeterminacy into account, it is not so much the environment which needs to be taken into account, but the collection of all consistent continuation, structured by the material modes of self-reference.
Consistent continuation of what? That's the question.
Consistent continuation of you (the first person knower). It is what is axiomatised completely (at the propositional level) by:[]p & <>t & p (p is provable, consistent and true).
How can pick out a person and define the unity of experience of that person?
It is like in the Helsinki—>(Washington/Moscow) experience. It illustrates that nobody can do that, except the first person subject itself, who does it by memorising some past history.
What does it mean in this computational model to memorize some history. In the physics model of computation, memory means storing information in a temporarily static form. I don't see a place for this in the "closest continuation of observer moments”.
Brent