Why Does the Universe Exist? Some Perspectives from Our Physics Project—Stephen Wolfram Writings

[Jason Resch]

https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2021/04/why-does-the-universe-exist-some-perspectives-from-our-physics-project/ 

I found this fascinating. It appears to have many similarities with the type of physical reality that emerges from then universal dovetailer, with new ways of explaining it and some new insights.

Jason

[Telmo Menezes]

Hi Jason,

This is really interesting, thanks for sharing. Since Wolfram started going in this direction, something that occurs to me is this: hypergraphs are perhaps one of the most general mathematical constructs that can be conceived of. Almost everything else can be seen as a special case of hypergraphs. Like you say, with the update rules, we shouldn't be surprised if they are equivalent to the UD. My scepticism is this: is anything being gained in terms of explanatory power? Should we be surprised that such a powerful representation can contain the rules of our reality? I do admit that I have to study these ideas in more detail, and there is something really compelling about hypergraphs + update rules.

"As soon as one starts talking about “running programs” some people will immediately ask “On what computer?” But a key intellectual point is that computational processes can ultimately be defined completely abstractly, without reference to anything like a physical computer. "

Oh boy, John Clark is not going to like this :)

Telmo.

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[John Clark]

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 3:04 AM Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote:

> Oh boy, John Clark is not going to like this :)

Well, I like Stephen Wolfram and I agree 100% with the ASCII sequence that Stephen Wolfram's physical brain produced:

"As soon as one starts talking about “running programs” some people will immediately ask “On what computer?" But a key intellectual point is that computational processes can ultimately be defined completely abstractly, without reference to anything like a physical computer. "

All completely true, however you can't make a computation with a definition, not even if the definition is what a computation is. For a definition to make any sense you need a mind, and to have a mind you need a brain, and a brain needs to process information, and if a Turing Machine cannot process a given amount of information then nothing can. And nobody, I repeat absolutely nobody, has been able to make a Turing machine without using the laws of physics or has even propose a theory about how such a thing could be possible because, as I said in the above, you can't make a computation with nothing but a definition, in fact you can't do anything at all if all you have is a definition.

 > My scepticism is this: is anything being gained in terms of explanatory power? 

Although quite interesting so far Stephen Wolfram cellular automation ideas have been no help whatsoever to physicists, but perhaps someday they may be, maybe someday we'll find that quarks behave the way they do because of some simple cellular automation at work inside them, but even if that day comes to pass you're still not going to be able to make a Turing machine, or anything else, with just a definition.

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

ewg

   

 

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[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 2:04 AM Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote:

Hi Jason,

This is really interesting, thanks for sharing. Since Wolfram started going in this direction, something that occurs to me is this: hypergraphs are perhaps one of the most general mathematical constructs that can be conceived of. Almost everything else can be seen as a special case of hypergraphs. Like you say, with the update rules, we shouldn't be surprised if they are equivalent to the UD. My scepticism is this: is anything being gained in terms of explanatory power? Should we be surprised that such a powerful representation can contain the rules of our reality? I do admit that I have to study these ideas in more detail, and there is something really compelling about hypergraphs + update rules.

That is a good question. I am not familiar with them myself, but my understanding is they do not provide for any form of computation beyond what is turing computable, so in that sense, I don't know that they provide any additional explanatory power beyond the simple statement that all computations exist.

A commenter on my site recently asked, what can we say about the "computer" that computes all these computations. My reply was:

"There is no single one. There are infinite varieties of different TMs, and all can exist Platonically/Arithmetically. Gregory Chaitin discovered an equation whose structure models LISP computers. There are likewise other equations corresponding to the Java Virtual Machine, and the Commodore 64. All these Turing machines, and their execution traces of every computer program they can run, exist in math in the same sense that the Mandelbrot set or the decimal expansion of Pi exist in math. Despite the infinite variety of architectures for different Turing machines, their equivalence (in the Turing computability sense) makes the question of “Which Turing machine is running this universe?” impossible to answer, beyond saying, “all of them are.”"

I think hypergraphs, then, would be just one more mathematical object we could add to the heap of Turing universal mathematical objects which could (and would, if Platonism is correct) underlie the computations of our universe/experiences.

 

"As soon as one starts talking about “running programs” some people will immediately ask “On what computer?” But a key intellectual point is that computational processes can ultimately be defined completely abstractly, without reference to anything like a physical computer. "

My same reply also provided an explanation/argument, which is applicable to anyone who accepts simple truths concerning abstract objects have definite and objective true/false values, paired with a rejection of philosophical zombies. I think John rejects zombies, so he would have to reject objective truth to believe a physical computer is necessary to produce observers. Below is what I wrote:

The way I like to think about it is this: If one is willing to believe that truth values for mathematical relations like “2 + 2 = 4” can exist and be true independently of the universe or someone writing it down, or a mathematician thinking about it, that is all you need.

For if the truth values of certain simple relations have an independent existence, then so to do the truth values of far more complex equations. Let’s call the Diophantine equation that computes the Wave Function of the Hubble Volume of our universe “Equation X”. Now then, it becomes a question of pure arithmetic, whether it is true or false that:

“In Equation X, does the universal state variable U, at time step T contain a pattern of electrons that encode to the string:

‘why does the existence of Universal Equations imply the existence of iterative search processes for solutions?'”

If that question has a definitive objective truth, then it is the case that in the universe U, at time step T, in equation X, there is some person in that universe who had a conscious thought, and wrote it down and it got organized into a pattern of electrons which anyone who inspects this vast equation with its huge variables could see.

Once you get to this point, the last and final step is to reject the possibility that the patterns found in these equations, which behave and act like they are conscious, and claim to be conscious, are philosophical zombies. In other words, to accept that they are conscious beings, just like those who exist in “physical” universes (assuming there is any possible distinction between a physical universe, and a physical universe computed by a Platonic or Arithmetic Turing Machine).

Jason

 

Oh boy, John Clark is not going to like this :)

Telmo.

Am Do, 11. Aug 2022, um 20:35, schrieb Jason Resch:

https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2021/04/why-does-the-universe-exist-some-perspectives-from-our-physics-project/ 

I found this fascinating. It appears to have many similarities with the type of physical reality that emerges from then universal dovetailer, with new ways of explaining it and some new insights.

Jason

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[Brent Meeker]

On 8/12/2022 10:56 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Below is what I wrote:

The way I like to think about it is this: If one is willing to believe that truth values for mathematical relations like “2 + 2 = 4” can exist and be true independently of the universe or someone writing it down, or a mathematician thinking about it, that is all you need.

But it's truth value does depend on someone assigning the value "t" to some axioms and all mathematical truth values are nothing but "t" arbitrarily assigned to some axioms plus some rules of inference that preserve "t".  "t" has little to do with what it true in the world.

Brent

[John Clark]

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 1:56 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I think John rejects zombies,

Yes and I have a very good reason for doing so. I know for a fact I am conscious and the evidence is overwhelming that Darwinian evolution is correct, but if you could have intelligent behavior without consciousness then natural selection could never have invented it, yet it did. Therefore the only logical conclusion is that consciousness is the inevitable byproduct of intelligence.

 >so he would have to reject objective truth to believe a physical computer is necessary to produce observers. Below is what I wrote:

 The way I like to think about it is this: If one is willing to believe that truth values for mathematical relations like “2 + 2 = 4” can exist and be true independently of the universe

But I don't believe that. If there were zero or even just one thing in the entire universe then the very concept of "2" would be meaningless, as would the concept of additon. In fact if there was just one thing then there would be nothing because the best definition of "nothing" that I know of is infinite unbounded homogeneity.

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

idb

[Jason Resch]

If there were zero objects in the universe then the concept of zero would necessarily exist to preserve the property of the number of physical objects in that nothing.

If the concept of zero exists then at least 'one' abstract entity must exist, the one number zero.

Now 'two' abstract numbers exist, 'one' and 'zero'. Et cetera.

Jason

"The Tao begets one; one begets two; two begets three; three begets the myriad things."

-- Lao Tzu

[Jason Resch]

The physical world chugs along with anyone having to assign to assign values, or apply rules of inference.

Why can't the same be true for other platonic objects?

Jason

[Brent Meeker]

Because "Platonic" means "exists only in imagination".

Brent

[John Clark]

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 3:09 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

> If there were zero objects in the universe then the concept of zero would necessarily exist to preserve the property of the number of physical objects in that nothing. If the concept of zero exists then at least 'one' abstract entity must exist, the one number zero. Now 'two' abstract numbers exist, 'one' and 'zero'. Et cetera.

You're making the argument that there must be more than just one thing in the universe and therefore it can not consist of infinite unbounded homogeneity, and therefore the universe is not nothing, and therefore the universe is something, and therefore it exists. And that's all very fine but it's irrelevant because your claim was that 2+2=4 would exist even if the universe did not. I maintain it would not. I'm certainly not saying  2+2 =4 has no meaning, I'm saying it has a meaning precisely because the universe exists. I'm saying that physics is more fundamental than mathematics.  

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis 

mta

[Jason Resch]

You defined nothing as a universe of zero physical objects. And have said a number N is meaningless without at least N things in that universe to count.

Is zero meaningless in a universe with zero physical things?

You might argue that it is, but I would say zero is necessary for the operation and preservation of such a universe of zero objects. Otherwise without some rule saying "the number of physical objects is and shall always be 0" what is to stop the nothing from becoming a universe having a non zero number of objects?

I don't see any way from escaping the necessity of rules and the number zero, for a nothing of the kind you describe.

Not do I see a way for zero to exist apart from all the other numbers. Zero has properties, including factors. The factors of zero include all integers.

Jason

[Jason Resch]

Perhaps conventionally.

But perhaps physical existence is platonic existence (i.e. all self-consistent structures exist, all rule based formal systems, etc.). 

This would account for fine-tuning, and plausibly yield an answer to "why quantum mechanics?"

Jason

Brent

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[John Clark]

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 3:41 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

> You defined nothing as a universe of zero physical objects.

I also said the universe could not exist if it only had one physical object because I defined "nothing" as infinite unbounded homogeneity. If you have a better definition of "nothing" I'd like to hear it.   

> Is zero meaningless in a universe with zero physical things?

If the universe had zero (or only one) physical things then even "meaning" would be meaningless, and so would "meaningless". But those things do have meaning therefore I can deduce that the universe does not consist of infinite unbounded homogeneity, and therefore the universe must contain more than just one thing;  

> I don't see any way from escaping the necessity of rules and the number zero,

I don't either if you want to describe how the universe works because mathematics is the best language to do that. English is a useful language too but the word "cow" cannot give milk and the definition of a computation cannot perform a computation.  

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis 

apl

 

[Mindey]

The way I like to think about it is this: If one is willing to believe that truth values for mathematical relations like “2 + 2 = 4” can exist and be true independently of the universe

Definition is not nothing. Definition is an implicit program.

I defined "nothing" as infinite unbounded homogeneity. If you have a better definition of "nothing" I'd like to hear it. 

I define "nothing" as absence of information about any aspect (projection axis, defining semantic dimension) whatsoever.

If the concept of zero exists then at least 'one' abstract entity must exist, the one number zero.

By this definition of "nothing", all possible projection axes (aspects, or points of view to which the projection ought to be zero by definition of "nothing") must therefore exist to define it. Thus, an assumption of nothingness explodes not just into "one abstract entity", but all possible imaginary entities with respect to which information amount can be measured, and said to be zero.

This definition of "nothing", as a kind of inverse of "everything", implies, or invites us to imagine all possible things.

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[Joel Dietz]

 > My scepticism is this: is anything being gained in terms of explanatory power? 

Although quite interesting so far Stephen Wolfram cellular automation ideas have been no help whatsoever to physicists, but perhaps someday they may be, maybe someday we'll find that quarks behave the way they do because of some simple cellular automation at work inside them, but even if that day comes to pass you're still not going to be able to make a Turing machine, or anything else, with just a definition.

I just gave a TedX talk on this topic (https://youtu.be/HhNnnKV-h_Q) but, in short, Wolfram's ideas about the ruliad are extremely helpful for formalizing physics as a set of transformations and, as such, you can begin to create a ruleset and test various variations. We are doing this starting with a physics engine (i.e. a procedurally generated game worlds with variables physics playable in various game engines including UE5), but the implication is you can potentially test various rulesets and see what coheres into a meaningful and observable phenomena. 

In that sense, this is like a testing kit to see what other dimensions are possible. 

 

ewg

   

 

Hi Jason,

This is really interesting, thanks for sharing. Since Wolfram started going in this direction, something that occurs to me is this: hypergraphs are perhaps one of the most general mathematical constructs that can be conceived of. Almost everything else can be seen as a special case of hypergraphs. Like you say, with the update rules, we shouldn't be surprised if they are equivalent to the UD. My scepticism is this: is anything being gained in terms of explanatory power? Should we be surprised that such a powerful representation can contain the rules of our reality? I do admit that I have to study these ideas in more detail, and there is something really compelling about hypergraphs + update rules.

"As soon as one starts talking about “running programs” some people will immediately ask “On what computer?” But a key intellectual point is that computational processes can ultimately be defined completely abstractly, without reference to anything like a physical computer. "

Oh boy, John Clark is not going to like this :)

Telmo.

Am Do, 11. Aug 2022, um 20:35, schrieb Jason Resch:

https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2021/04/why-does-the-universe-exist-some-perspectives-from-our-physics-project/ 

I found this fascinating. It appears to have many similarities with the type of physical reality that emerges from then universal dovetailer, with new ways of explaining it and some new insights.

Jason

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[John Clark]

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 4:49 PM Mindey <min...@mindey.com> wrote:

> I defined "nothing" as infinite unbounded homogeneity. If you have a better definition of "nothing" I'd like to hear it. 

> I define "nothing" as absence of information about any aspect (projection axis, defining semantic dimension) whatsoever.

 

I think my definition is more fundamental because Information is physical, it takes physical energy to erase information, and there is a limit to how much of it a given volume can contain and it is proportional to the area of the surface of that volume. Purely abstract things don't have that property, it would be silly to ask how much something abstract like love a sphere with a radius of 1 meter could contain, but it would not be silly to ask how much information it could contain.  And you can't have information without a discontinuity of some sort, and you can't have a discontinuity if everything is just one thing because the smallest bit of information there is involves a change from on to off.   

Also, your definition is somewhat circular because "absence" already implies the thing you're trying to define.

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis 

ggf

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/12/2022 12:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022, 3:33 PM John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 3:09 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

> If there were zero objects in the universe then the concept of zero would necessarily exist to preserve the property of the number of physical objects in that nothing. If the concept of zero exists then at least 'one' abstract entity must exist, the one number zero. Now 'two' abstract numbers exist, 'one' and 'zero'. Et cetera.

You're making the argument that there must be more than just one thing in the universe and therefore it can not consist of infinite unbounded homogeneity, and therefore the universe is not nothing, and therefore the universe is something, and therefore it exists. And that's all very fine but it's irrelevant because your claim was that 2+2=4 would exist even if the universe did not. I maintain it would not. I'm certainly not saying  2+2 =4 has no meaning, I'm saying it has a meaning precisely because the universe exists. I'm saying that physics is more fundamental than mathematics.  

You defined nothing as a universe of zero physical objects. And have said a number N is meaningless without at least N things in that universe to count.

Is zero meaningless in a universe with zero physical things?

Meaning is a relation between a sentence and a fact or other sentence.  "Zero" is meaningless except for the relations we attribute to it in sentences.  It is interesting that in Peano's axioms zero is defined negatively as "The integer that is not the successor of n for all n."

You might argue that it is, but I would say zero is necessary for the operation and preservation of such a universe of zero objects.

So why don't you conclude there can be no universe of zero objects.  And what exactly is an object?  It's not a term that appears in quantum field theory?

Otherwise without some rule saying "the number of physical objects is and shall always be 0" what is to stop the nothing from becoming a universe having a non zero number of objects?

That's actually a well worked out theory, c.f. Hartle-Hawking, that nothing became a universe.  Lawrence Krauss wrote a book about it.

I don't see any way from escaping the necessity of rules and the number zero, for a nothing of the kind you describe.

Not do I see a way for zero to exist apart from all the other numbers.

That's "t" under Peano's axioms.

Zero has properties, including factors. The factors of zero include all integers.

Oh, well that proves it's real.

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/12/2022 12:56 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022, 3:29 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 8/12/2022 12:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022, 2:18 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 8/12/2022 10:56 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Below is what I wrote:

The way I like to think about it is this: If one is willing to believe that truth values for mathematical relations like “2 + 2 = 4” can exist and be true independently of the universe or someone writing it down, or a mathematician thinking about it, that is all you need.

But it's truth value does depend on someone assigning the value "t" to some axioms and all mathematical truth values are nothing but "t" arbitrarily assigned to some axioms plus some rules of inference that preserve "t".  "t" has little to do with what it true in the world.

The physical world chugs along with anyone having to assign to assign values, or apply rules of inference.

Why can't the same be true for other platonic objects?

Because "Platonic" means "exists only in imagination".

Perhaps conventionally.

But perhaps physical existence is platonic existence (i.e. all self-consistent structures exist, all rule based formal systems, etc.).

Given a sufficiently broad definition of "exists".   Just like 2+2=5 for sufficiently large values of 2.

This would account for fine-tuning, and plausibly yield an answer to "why quantum mechanics?"

One can "account" for anything in words.

Brent

[Jason Resch]

Not exactly. The existence of a plentitude implies observers should find themselves entwines with an environment having many-histories.

If there was no QM, that would rule out the existence of a plentitude.

Jason

Brent

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[Brent Meeker]

On 8/12/2022 2:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022, 5:25 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 8/12/2022 12:56 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022, 3:29 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 8/12/2022 12:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022, 2:18 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 8/12/2022 10:56 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Below is what I wrote:

The way I like to think about it is this: If one is willing to believe that truth values for mathematical relations like “2 + 2 = 4” can exist and be true independently of the universe or someone writing it down, or a mathematician thinking about it, that is all you need.

But it's truth value does depend on someone assigning the value "t" to some axioms and all mathematical truth values are nothing but "t" arbitrarily assigned to some axioms plus some rules of inference that preserve "t".  "t" has little to do with what it true in the world.

The physical world chugs along with anyone having to assign to assign values, or apply rules of inference.

Why can't the same be true for other platonic objects?

Because "Platonic" means "exists only in imagination".

Perhaps conventionally.

But perhaps physical existence is platonic existence (i.e. all self-consistent structures exist, all rule based formal systems, etc.).

Given a sufficiently broad definition of "exists".   Just like 2+2=5 for sufficiently large values of 2.

This would account for fine-tuning, and plausibly yield an answer to "why quantum mechanics?"

One can "account" for anything in words.

Not exactly. The existence of a plentitude implies observers should find themselves entwines with an environment having many-histories.

You don't know that the environment has more than one history.

If there was no QM, that would rule out the existence of a plentitude.

You think God couldn't have created other Newtonian worlds?

Brent

[Jason Resch]

If there is an infinite plenitude of individually distinct Newtonian worlds, observers within that reality will experience indeterminnace in their observations due to the fact that each observer's mind has an infinity of incarnations across different Newtonian universes in the plentitude. Even God could perhaps not eliminate that indeterminnace as experienced by most observers in such a reality. The feat might be like making a square circle.

Jason

[Brent Meeker]

In a Newtonian multitude even observer would be distinct and would have only one instance.  There would be no indeterminance.

Brent

Even God could perhaps not eliminate that indeterminnace as experienced by most observers in such a reality. The feat might be like making a square circle.

Jason

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[Jason Resch]

Why do you say they would be distinct?

Say four different Newtonian universes all contain Alice's brain in state S. Can Alice predict what she will see next, or which universe she happens to be in?

(See attached brain states image)

"It is impossible for any observer to deduce with certainty on the basis of her observations and memory which world she is a part of. That is, there are always many different worlds for which being contained in them is compatible with everything she knows, but which imply different predictions for future observations."

-- Markus Müller in “Could the physical world be emergent instead of fundamental, and why should we ask?” (2017)

Jason

Brent

Even God could perhaps not eliminate that indeterminnace as experienced by most observers in such a reality. The feat might be like making a square circle.

Jason

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[Brent Meeker]

They're either distinct or identical and identical universes are the same universe, c.f. Laplace and the identity of indiscernibles.

Brent

[Jason Resch]

The universes can be different while the same brain state of a particular observer is found between two or more universes.

Jason

Brent

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[Brent Meeker]

In that case they are distinct universes.  Universes include brains.

Brent

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Identical physical states in a deterministic world would evolve identically, as would any supervening mental states. However, a supervenient relationship is such that multiple different physical states can give rise to the same mental state. The different physical states may then evolve differently giving different subsequent mental states. Subjectively, this would mean that your next mental state is undetermined. This idea has been used by the philosopher Christian List to propose a mechanism for libertarian free will in a determined world. I don’t think that works because indeterminacy is not a good basis for free will (the main problem with libertarian free will), but it is an interesting idea nonetheless.

--

Stathis Papaioannou

[ronaldheld]

Is this vaguely related to Tegmark's mathematical structures? 

[John Clark]

On Sat, Aug 13, 2022 at 12:49 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Identical physical states in a deterministic world would evolve identically, as would any supervening mental states.

Yes. 

 > However, a supervenient relationship is such that multiple different physical states can give rise to the same mental state.

True, and in that situation things would not be reversible; a cellular automation like Conway's LIFE is not reversible and for the same reason. Something can be 100% deterministic in the forward time dimension but not in the backward time dimension, but so far at least nobody has any experimental evidence that fundamental physics has that property, fundamental physics can't explain why you can't unscramble an egg, you need more than the laws of physics to explain that you need to invoke initial conditions. That situation could change if some of Stephen Wolfram's ideas turn out to be correct, but so far there is no evidence that they are.  

 > The different physical states may then evolve differently giving different subsequent mental states. Subjectively, this would mean that your next mental state is undetermined. 

You never know for sure what you're going to do next until you actually do it because sometimes you change your mind at the last second, but there is nothing profound or mystical in that, a two dollar calculator doesn't know what it's gonna put up on its screen when you type in 2+2 until it has finish the calculation.  

> This idea has been used by the philosopher Christian List to propose a mechanism for libertarian free will in a determined world. I don’t think that works because indeterminacy is not a good basis for free will (the main problem with libertarian free will), but it is an interesting idea nonetheless.

I've never heard of him but if he's like most philosophers he will have gone on and on about why we have free will without once asking himself what the term "free will" is even supposed to mean; I've never heard a philosopher give a definition of it that wasn't either circular or just pure gibberish. I feel it might be helpful if before philosophers start talking about whether human beings have a certain property they first make clear what that property is, and only after that would it be appropriate to discuss if humans happen to have that property or not.  I don't demand that the definition be perfect but I don't think it's too much to ask that they give me at least a general idea of approximately what the hell they're talking about when they say "free will".

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

fws

 

[Jason Resch]

I think we're talking past each other. Perhaps this passage will help clarify things:

And it’s very much the same story with the ruliad—and with the laws of physics. If we constrain the kind of way that we observe—or “parse”—the ruliad, then it becomes inevitable that the effective laws we’ll see will have certain features, which turns out apparently to be exactly what’s needed to reproduce known laws of physics. The full ruliad is in a sense very wild; but as observers with certain characteristics, we see a much tamer version of it, and in fact what we see is capable of being described in terms of laws that we can largely write just in terms of existing mathematical constructs.

At the outset, we might have imagined that the ruliad would basically just serve as a kind of dictionary of possible universes—a “universe of all possible universes” in which each possible universe has different laws. But the ruliad is in a sense a much more complicated object. Rather than being a “dictionary” of possible separate universes, it is something that entangles together all possible universes. The Principle of Computational Equivalence implies a certain homogeneity to this entangled structure. But the crucial point is that we don’t “look at this structure from the outside”: we are instead observers embedded within the structure. And what we observe then depends on our characteristics. And it turns out that even very basic features of our consciousness and sensory apparatus in a sense inevitably lead to known laws of physics—and in a sense do so generically, independent of details of just where in rulial space we are, or exactly what slice of the ruliad we take.

From: "The Concept of the Ruliad" Steven Wolfram

Jason

 

Brent

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[Jason Resch]

It is similar, but I think it is more concretely defined.

Wolfram describes the collection of all formally describable rule based systems, leading to a complex structure he calls the Ruliad: https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2021/11/the-concept-of-the-ruliad/

Unlike Tegmark's idea, Wolfram explains how this structure is vastly interconnected and observers within this structure observer certain regularities which are necessarily tied to the own nature of the observer (their mind and sense organs, etc.), which ultimately defines a set of regularities (the laws of physics) for that observer (or observers of that same class).

I think there is more similarity between Wolfram's ideas, and those of Bruno Marchal and Markus P. Müller, which framed things algorithmically and showed how laws of physics can be extracted from the structure of all computations.

Jason

[Joel Dietz]

I think there is more similarity between Wolfram's ideas, and those of Bruno Marchal and Markus P. Müller, which framed things algorithmically and showed how laws of physics can be extracted from the structure of all computations.

Can you give some citations? I don't obviously see how their work overlaps with the ruliad. 

 

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[Jason Resch]

On Sat, Aug 13, 2022, 2:08 PM Joel Dietz <jdi...@gmail.com> wrote:

I think there is more similarity between Wolfram's ideas, and those of Bruno Marchal and Markus P. Müller, which framed things algorithmically and showed how laws of physics can be extracted from the structure of all computations.

Can you give some citations? I don't obviously see how their work overlaps with the ruliad. 

I have included relevant quotes and links to sources throughout my page here:

https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/

You can Ctrl+F and search on that page for Marchal and Müller to find all the relevant references and passages I have for them.

Both of their theories are based on assuming an ontology of all computations, and then seeing the what conclusions we could derive about the character of experience or physical laws from that assumption.

Jason

[spudb...@aol.com]

"The structure of all computations". Lets go physicalist even on this one. Where does such a mechanism exist? Is it dark matter? the area beyond the Hubble Volume, the unborn minds of humans and AI yet to come? Phase space???? Hilbert Space, Anti-De Sitter space??? A future Omega Point, a current or future multiverse?? Mar-a-largo in a secret safer? 

I like Wolframs concepts, and have no horse in these discussions, save what my be construed as the existential, because, that as a meta goal is seemingly, practical ultimately. 

 
Much thanks, Jason. 

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Most modern philosophers are compatibilists, so called because they think free will and determinism are compatible. Compatibilists say that you act freely if you do so according to your preferences rather than being coerced or under abnormal influence such as psychotic illness. This is the layperson’s definition of freedom and the definition used to establish legal responsibility in court. Incompatibilists, on the other hand, worry that even if you are doing what you want, it isn’t really free if your actions are determined by prior events. Compatibilists think this is absurd, because if your actions aren’t determined, they are random, and why would anyone equate freedom with their actions being random?

--

Stathis Papaioannou

[Brent Meeker]

Daniel Dennett says it is making choices based on who you are: your education, experience, genetics, perspective,...  And that's all the "free will" worth having.

Brent

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

fws

 

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[John Clark]

On Sat, Aug 13, 2022 at 5:09 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Most modern philosophers are compatibilists, so called because they think free will and determinism are compatible. 

I think before philosophers start saying what free will is and is not compatible with they should first explain what the hell they mean by "free will, but they never do, when asked they just start waving their hands around speaking gibberish. 

> Compatibilists say that you act freely if you do so according to your preferences 

There are only 2 possibilities, there is either a reason for my preference in which case it is mechanical, or there is no reason for my preference in which case it is by definition un-reasonable and random. 

> or under abnormal influence such as psychotic illness. 

There are only 2 possibilities,  there is a reason for that "abnormal" influence in which case it is mechanical or there is no reason for the "abnormal"  influence in which case it is by definition un-reasonable and random.

> This is the layperson’s definition of freedom and the definition used to establish legal responsibility in court. 

Yes, and that is why the legal system is such a ridiculous incoherent mess. There could be no other outcome if something is based on pure nonsense. 

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis 

hgh

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, 14 Aug 2022 at 18:52, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sat, Aug 13, 2022 at 5:09 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Most modern philosophers are compatibilists, so called because they think free will and determinism are compatible. 

I think before philosophers start saying what free will is and is not compatible with they should first explain what the hell they mean by "free will, but they never do, when asked they just start waving their hands around speaking gibberish. 

That's what I was trying to explain: you act of your own free will if you do what you want to do, you don't act of your own free will if you do something accidentally, or you are forced, or you don't know what you're doing due to a mental illness. There is nothing clever about this, it's the layperson's definition, and most philosophers think it's the only definition that makes sense. Daniel Dennett is an example of a compatibilist philosopher.

> Compatibilists say that you act freely if you do so according to your preferences 

There are only 2 possibilities, there is either a reason for my preference in which case it is mechanical, or there is no reason for my preference in which case it is by definition un-reasonable and random. 

> or under abnormal influence such as psychotic illness. 

There are only 2 possibilities,  there is a reason for that "abnormal" influence in which case it is mechanical or there is no reason for the "abnormal"  influence in which case it is by definition un-reasonable and random.

Yes, so you can only act freely if your actions are determined. A little bit of randomness might be OK but if everything you did was random you would die.

 

> This is the layperson’s definition of freedom and the definition used to establish legal responsibility in court. 

Yes, and that is why the legal system is such a ridiculous incoherent mess. There could be no other outcome if something is based on pure nonsense.

The legal system might be a mess, but at least in principle it's a good idea not to punish people who didn't do it, did it under coercion, or didn't know what they were doing because they were dementing, for example.

--

Stathis Papaioannou

Virus-free.www.avast.com

[John Clark]

On Sun, Aug 14, 2022 at 5:52 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

> you don't act of your own free will if you do something accidentally, or you are forced,

Everybody is always subjected to force, sometimes, as when an electromagnetic force enters your eye and prevents you from walking into a brick wall it's a good thing because you don't want to walk into a brick wall, and sometimes, such as when the gravitational force prevents you from jumping over a mountain, it's a bad thing because you want to jump over that mountain.

> There is nothing clever about this, it's the layperson's definition,

Yeah, it's just saying sometimes you can will what you want to do and sometimes you can't. I don't see why lawyers need to get involved in that but under our legal system they certainly are.

>>Yes, and that is why the legal system is such a ridiculous incoherent mess. There could be no other outcome if something is based on pure nonsense.

>> The legal system might be a mess, but at least in principle it's a good idea not to punish people who didn't do it, did it under coercion, or didn't know what they were doing because they were dementing, for example.

The first question you have to ask is what is the purpose of punishing a murderer? I think the only legitimate answer to that is to prevent a similar murder in the future, anything more than that is not justice, it's just vengeance; I'm no different from anybody else and sometimes I'd like a little vengeance, but I am not proud of that reptilian part of my brain and so I will not defend it. Therefore from a legal point of view it shouldn't matter if somebody is a murderer because he had bad genes, or bad upbringing, or a random cosmic ray distroyed the crucial part of his brain that generates empathy for his fellow creatures, the important point is regardless of the cause he remains a murderer spreading misery wherever he goes and needs to be dealt with accordingly. The only legitimate mitigating circumstance would be if it could be proven that the murder occurred because of extremely unlikely circumstances that were very unlikely to be repeated. We should assume he is likely to murder again unless proven otherwise, and that would not be easy to prove.

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis 

8vv

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, 14 Aug 2022 at 21:20, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sun, Aug 14, 2022 at 5:52 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

> you don't act of your own free will if you do something accidentally, or you are forced,

Everybody is always subjected to force, sometimes, as when an electromagnetic force enters your eye and prevents you from walking into a brick wall it's a good thing because you don't want to walk into a brick wall, and sometimes, such as when the gravitational force prevents you from jumping over a mountain, it's a bad thing because you want to jump over that mountain.

It's different if you say "I was forced by someone holding a gun to my head" or "I was forced by the laws of physics".

 

> There is nothing clever about this, it's the layperson's definition,

Yeah, it's just saying sometimes you can will what you want to do and sometimes you can't. I don't see why lawyers need to get involved in that but under our legal system they certainly are.

>>Yes, and that is why the legal system is such a ridiculous incoherent mess. There could be no other outcome if something is based on pure nonsense.

>> The legal system might be a mess, but at least in principle it's a good idea not to punish people who didn't do it, did it under coercion, or didn't know what they were doing because they were dementing, for example.

The first question you have to ask is what is the purpose of punishing a murderer? I think the only legitimate answer to that is to prevent a similar murder in the future, anything more than that is not justice, it's just vengeance; I'm no different from anybody else and sometimes I'd like a little vengeance, but I am not proud of that reptilian part of my brain and so I will not defend it. Therefore from a legal point of view it shouldn't matter if somebody is a murderer because he had bad genes, or bad upbringing, or a random cosmic ray distroyed the crucial part of his brain that generates empathy for his fellow creatures, the important point is regardless of the cause he remains a murderer spreading misery wherever he goes and needs to be dealt with accordingly. The only legitimate mitigating circumstance would be if it could be proven that the murder occurred because of extremely unlikely circumstances that were very unlikely to be repeated. We should assume he is likely to murder again unless proven otherwise, and that would not be easy to prove.

 

Whether punishment could act as a deterrent corresponds with whether the action was done "of his own free will" as per the above definition. That is the main utility of the idea. For example, there is no point in punishing a sleepwalker who kills someone because it won't deter other sleepwalkers from doing the same thing.

--

Stathis Papaioannou

[John Clark]

On Sun, Aug 14, 2022 at 7:39 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> Everybody is always subjected to force, sometimes, as when an electromagnetic force enters your eye and prevents you from walking into a brick wall it's a good thing because you don't want to walk into a brick wall, and sometimes, such as when the gravitational force prevents you from jumping over a mountain, it's a bad thing because you want to jump over that mountain.

>It's different if you say "I was forced by someone holding a gun to my head" or "I was forced by the laws of physics".

If it could be proven that I murdered because somebody put a gun to my head that would be a legitimate mitigating circumstance because it would be unlikely that in the future somebody would hold a gun to my head again and thus I would be unlikely to murder again. But if I did it because of the law of electromagnetism that would not be a mitigating circumstance because I am likely to encounter electromagnetism again and thus likely to murder again.

> there is no point in punishing a sleepwalker who kills someone because it won't deter other sleepwalkers from doing the same thing.

But a few amps flowing through his body for just a few seconds would improve him immeasurably and prevent the sleepwalker from ever murdering again. And because he is likely to sleep again, he would be an extremely dangerous man that needs to be dealt with. Imprisonment won't solve the problem, in 2019 in the USA 143 prisoners were murdered by other prisoners who had already been convicted of murder, and the man who murdered Martin Luther King was an escaped prisoner.

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis 

com

wcom

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, 14 Aug 2022 at 22:07, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sun, Aug 14, 2022 at 7:39 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> Everybody is always subjected to force, sometimes, as when an electromagnetic force enters your eye and prevents you from walking into a brick wall it's a good thing because you don't want to walk into a brick wall, and sometimes, such as when the gravitational force prevents you from jumping over a mountain, it's a bad thing because you want to jump over that mountain.

>It's different if you say "I was forced by someone holding a gun to my head" or "I was forced by the laws of physics".

If it could be proven that I murdered because somebody put a gun to my head that would be a legitimate mitigating circumstance because it would be unlikely that in the future somebody would hold a gun to my head again and thus I would be unlikely to murder again. But if I did it because of the law of electromagnetism that would not be a mitigating circumstance because I am likely to encounter electromagnetism again and thus likely to murder again.

There would be no point in punishing you if you murdered because someone held a gun to your head, because it wouldn’t change your future behaviour or the behaviour of others on a similar situation. On the other hand, punishing someone who kills in order to steal the victim’s money may deter him and others like him from doing it again, even though his brain was just following the laws of physics.

> there is no point in punishing a sleepwalker who kills someone because it won't deter other sleepwalkers from doing the same thing.

But a few amps flowing through his body for just a few seconds would improve him immeasurably and prevent the sleepwalker from ever murdering again. And because he is likely to sleep again, he would be an extremely dangerous man that needs to be dealt with. Imprisonment won't solve the problem, in 2019 in the USA 143 prisoners were murdered by other prisoners who had already been convicted of murder, and the man who murdered Martin Luther King was an escaped prisoner.

The idea of acting of your own free will only applies to punishment as deterrent. You have to have control over your behaviour and to understand what you are doing in order for that to work, and that doesn’t apply to sleepwalkers.

--

Stathis Papaioannou

[Joel Dietz]

There are two completely incompatible models of free will and thus, the term is overloaded and subject to misinterpretation.

1. "free will" in the sense of a necessary description of the way in which a particular self-identified subject choses an action without coercion. In that sense, one can say "I freely chose to turn right at the intersection" or "I chose to eat this burger." The English language requires such a usage because we need a way to describe actions that exist without coercion. 

2. "free will" in the sense that some elements of our universe may be non-deterministic and in which the idea of the "self" (and particularly, the idea of our own self) may have an ability to change some outcomes based on some concept of agency. This is an extremely illusive concept because it is basically unprovable by definition. 

For example, imagine a construct of 10,000 neurons in which you know exactly what each neuron does, precisely how it receives its stimulus and its exact programming. You can then say "I know how this construct works and reliably discern what inputs will lead to what outputs." However, it is *impossible* to prove that there is not another as of yet invisible or unmeasurable mechanism within the construct that can alter or override the standard system of inputs and outputs.  

This is an extremely hairy problem that extends into paranomal phenomena, UFOlogy, religion, etc. in that one cannot can not, by stating any system of laws or deterministic systems, rule out the possibility of some override function or, for that matter, exceptions where one law simply ceases to function.  

The concept of "God" bridges over both of these concepts and makes it more complex, because it supposes an external agency that may even have a motive in keeping up trapped inside some presumably maximally deterministic system, or tricking us into thinking that we have agency when we do not, or for that matter, some tricky scenario where some master planners battle for agency. George R. R. Martin's Sandkings is remarkably like 1st Enoch in this regard. 

I personally suspect agency is non-binary and instead has multiple scalar elements a genetic override function and is rather complex than anyone has modeled to date. 

 

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[John Clark]

On Sun, Aug 14, 2022 at 11:21 AM Joel Dietz <jdi...@gmail.com> wrote:

There are two completely incompatible models of free will and thus, the term is overloaded and subject to misinterpretation.

1. "free will" in the sense of a necessary description of the way in which a particular self-identified subject choses an action without coercion.

And either there was a reason you chose that action rather than another in which case you're a cuckoo clock, or there was no reason you chose that action rather than another in which case you're a roulette wheel.  Where does this thing called "free will" enter the picture? Forget figuring out if we have it or not, just tell me what it is supposed to mean.  I don't think it means anything, I think it's an idea so bad it's not even wrong.

> 2. "free will" in the sense that some elements of our universe may be non-deterministic and in which the idea of the "self" (and particularly, the idea of our own self) may have an ability to change some outcomes based on some concept of agency.

That doesn't make any sense,  if it was non-deterministic then there was no reason for that change and your actions were unreasonable,  but if "agency" (whatever that means) was the reason for the change then the change was deterministic not non-deterministic. 

> This is an extremely illusive concept because it is basically unprovable by definition. 

Then it's not a useful concept and thinking about it is not worth the wear and tear inflicted on our neurons.

> For example, imagine a construct of 10,000 neurons in which you know exactly what each neuron does, precisely how it receives its stimulus and its exact programming. You can then say "I know how this construct works and reliably discern what inputs will lead to what outputs." However, it is *impossible* to prove that there is not another as of yet invisible or unmeasurable mechanism within the construct that can alter or override the standard system of inputs and outputs.  

I can't prove there is not a teapot in orbit around the planet Uranus either, but there's no reason to think there is one and there are plenty of reasons to suspect there is not.  

> The concept of "God" bridges over both of these concepts and makes it more complex,

Even in the unlikely event that God exists I don't see how that alters things one iota. It is as true for God as it is for me, God either does what He does for a reason in which case His actions are reasonable, or He does what he does for no reason in which case His actions are unreasonable.  

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

lnb

[John Clark]

On Sun, Aug 14, 2022 at 8:47 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

> The idea of acting of your own free will only applies to punishment as deterrent.

Before you start worrying about deterrence the first order of business is to make sure that a convicted murderer doesn't murder again because I think such a thing would be as great a miscarriage of justice as executing an innocent man.  

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

jhgq

[Joel Dietz]

And either there was a reason you chose that action rather than another in which case you're a cuckoo clock, or there was no reason you chose that action rather than another in which case you're a roulette wheel.  Where does this thing called "free will" enter the picture? Forget figuring out if we have it or not, just tell me what it is supposed to mean.  I don't think it means anything, I think it's an idea so bad it's not even wrong.

Everything in common usage in the vernacular means something (i.e. it has semantic utility). I already gave one common and useful definition and you are welcome to check the OED for more. If you don't like it then you don't like the English language which I can do nothing about.  

I can't prove there is not a teapot in orbit around the planet Uranus either, but there's no reason to think there is one and there are plenty of reasons to suspect there is not.  

This is exactly the difference between a reasonable assumption and proof. Unfortunately we find people not properly trained in philosophy stating things as proofs when they are anything but. 

 

lnb

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[John Clark]

On Sun, Aug 14, 2022 at 12:04 PM Joel Dietz <jdi...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> And either there was a reason you chose that action rather than another in which case you're a cuckoo clock, or there was no reason you chose that action rather than another in which case you're a roulette wheel.  Where does this thing called "free will" enter the picture? Forget figuring out if we have it or not, just tell me what it is supposed to mean.  I don't think it means anything, I think it's an idea so bad it's not even wrong.

> Everything in common usage in the vernacular means something (i.e. it has semantic utility). I already gave one common and useful definition

Somehow I missed that, please repeat it.  

> and you are welcome to check the OED for more.

You're never going to find philosophical insight in the OED or any other dictionary because all the definitions in them are ultimately circular, they're all made up of words that have their own definitions that are also made up of words, and round and round we go.

>> I can't prove there is not a teapot in orbit around the planet Uranus either, but there's no reason to think there is one and there are plenty of reasons to suspect there is not.  

> This is exactly the difference between a reasonable assumption and proof.

Yep, and in science you can never prove an idea is correct but you can sometimes prove an idea is incorrect. And if it "is basically unprovable by definition" so you can't prove or disprove it then it's silly and is an idea so bad it's not even wrong. You only get a proof of truth in pure mathematics, not in science.

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

wet

 

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Mon, 15 Aug 2022 at 01:21, Joel Dietz <jdi...@gmail.com> wrote:

There are two completely incompatible models of free will and thus, the term is overloaded and subject to misinterpretation.

1. "free will" in the sense of a necessary description of the way in which a particular self-identified subject choses an action without coercion. In that sense, one can say "I freely chose to turn right at the intersection" or "I chose to eat this burger." The English language requires such a usage because we need a way to describe actions that exist without coercion. 

2. "free will" in the sense that some elements of our universe may be non-deterministic and in which the idea of the "self" (and particularly, the idea of our own self) may have an ability to change some outcomes based on some concept of agency. This is an extremely illusive concept because it is basically unprovable by definition. 

For example, imagine a construct of 10,000 neurons in which you know exactly what each neuron does, precisely how it receives its stimulus and its exact programming. You can then say "I know how this construct works and reliably discern what inputs will lead to what outputs." However, it is *impossible* to prove that there is not another as of yet invisible or unmeasurable mechanism within the construct that can alter or override the standard system of inputs and outputs.  

This is an extremely hairy problem that extends into paranomal phenomena, UFOlogy, religion, etc. in that one cannot can not, by stating any system of laws or deterministic systems, rule out the possibility of some override function or, for that matter, exceptions where one law simply ceases to function.  

The concept of "God" bridges over both of these concepts and makes it more complex, because it supposes an external agency that may even have a motive in keeping up trapped inside some presumably maximally deterministic system, or tricking us into thinking that we have agency when we do not, or for that matter, some tricky scenario where some master planners battle for agency. George R. R. Martin's Sandkings is remarkably like 1st Enoch in this regard. 

I personally suspect agency is non-binary and instead has multiple scalar elements a genetic override function and is rather complex than anyone has modeled to date. 

Most philosophers say that the first definition is all that free will is, all that is required for agency and moral responsibility, and the second definition is nonsense.  The second definition comes from a fallacious overextension of the first definition: you aren’t free if you are forced, if your brain follows the laws of physics it is forced by the laws of physics, so you aren’t free. Laypeople who know nothing about philosophy use the first definition all the time. Laypeople who know a little about philosophy often seem unaware that the first definition is philosophically legitimate.

On Sun, 14 Aug 2022 at 14:47, Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sun, 14 Aug 2022 at 22:07, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sun, Aug 14, 2022 at 7:39 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> Everybody is always subjected to force, sometimes, as when an electromagnetic force enters your eye and prevents you from walking into a brick wall it's a good thing because you don't want to walk into a brick wall, and sometimes, such as when the gravitational force prevents you from jumping over a mountain, it's a bad thing because you want to jump over that mountain.

>It's different if you say "I was forced by someone holding a gun to my head" or "I was forced by the laws of physics".

If it could be proven that I murdered because somebody put a gun to my head that would be a legitimate mitigating circumstance because it would be unlikely that in the future somebody would hold a gun to my head again and thus I would be unlikely to murder again. But if I did it because of the law of electromagnetism that would not be a mitigating circumstance because I am likely to encounter electromagnetism again and thus likely to murder again.

There would be no point in punishing you if you murdered because someone held a gun to your head, because it wouldn’t change your future behaviour or the behaviour of others on a similar situation. On the other hand, punishing someone who kills in order to steal the victim’s money may deter him and others like him from doing it again, even though his brain was just following the laws of physics.

> there is no point in punishing a sleepwalker who kills someone because it won't deter other sleepwalkers from doing the same thing.

But a few amps flowing through his body for just a few seconds would improve him immeasurably and prevent the sleepwalker from ever murdering again. And because he is likely to sleep again, he would be an extremely dangerous man that needs to be dealt with. Imprisonment won't solve the problem, in 2019 in the USA 143 prisoners were murdered by other prisoners who had already been convicted of murder, and the man who murdered Martin Luther King was an escaped prisoner.

The idea of acting of your own free will only applies to punishment as deterrent. You have to have control over your behaviour and to understand what you are doing in order for that to work, and that doesn’t apply to sleepwalkers.

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Stathis Papaioannou

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[Brent Meeker]

On 8/14/2022 2:51 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> This is the layperson’s definition of freedom and the definition used to establish legal responsibility in court. 

Yes, and that is why the legal system is such a ridiculous incoherent mess. There could be no other outcome if something is based on pure nonsense.

The legal system might be a mess, but at least in principle it's a good idea not to punish people who didn't do it, did it under coercion, or didn't know what they were doing because they were dementing, for example.

The legal standard makes sense in compatibilist terms.  One's decisions are due one's physical makeup that encodes experience and education.  Observing and learning that people are punished for illegal actions counts as experience and education and so may influence one's decisions.

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/14/2022 4:19 AM, John Clark wrote:

Therefore from a legal point of view it shouldn't matter if somebody is a murderer because he had bad genes, or bad upbringing, or a random cosmic ray distroyed the crucial part of his brain that generates empathy for his fellow creatures, the important point is regardless of the cause he remains a murderer spreading misery wherever he goes and needs to be dealt with accordingly.

That's overlooking the fact that if he had known or estimated that he would be punished he might not have chosen to commit the murder.  So in calculating the gains and loses from a murder what society does to punish murder.  If it's a matter of bad genes or cosmic rays that's not something that can enter into informing the calculation to commit murder so there's no point in making an example of those murderers.

Brent

[Joel Dietz]

>> I can't prove there is not a teapot in orbit around the planet Uranus either, but there's no reason to think there is one and there are plenty of reasons to suspect there is not.  

> This is exactly the difference between a reasonable assumption and proof.

. And if it "is basically unprovable by definition" so you can't prove or disprove it then it's silly and is an idea so bad it's not even wrong.

Then by your definition your idea that 'there is not a teapot in orbit around the planet Uranus' is 'an idea so bad it's not even wrong' and by definition you are circulating ' 'so bad' ideas, including probably the entirety of all your statements since virtually none of them are provable. QED.  

The rest of us live in a world of reasonable assumptions including the OED which is mostly reliable in how to built semantic webs of meaning and not at all concerning the ultimate truth of anything. 

 

[Telmo Menezes]

Am Fr, 12. Aug 2022, um 19:56, schrieb Jason Resch:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 2:04 AM Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote:

Hi Jason,

This is really interesting, thanks for sharing. Since Wolfram started going in this direction, something that occurs to me is this: hypergraphs are perhaps one of the most general mathematical constructs that can be conceived of. Almost everything else can be seen as a special case of hypergraphs. Like you say, with the update rules, we shouldn't be surprised if they are equivalent to the UD. My scepticism is this: is anything being gained in terms of explanatory power? Should we be surprised that such a powerful representation can contain the rules of our reality? I do admit that I have to study these ideas in more detail, and there is something really compelling about hypergraphs + update rules.

That is a good question. I am not familiar with them myself, but my understanding is they do not provide for any form of computation beyond what is turing computable, so in that sense, I don't know that they provide any additional explanatory power beyond the simple statement that all computations exist.

A commenter on my site recently asked, what can we say about the "computer" that computes all these computations. My reply was:

"There is no single one. There are infinite varieties of different TMs, and all can exist Platonically/Arithmetically. Gregory Chaitin discovered an equation whose structure models LISP computers. There are likewise other equations corresponding to the Java Virtual Machine, and the Commodore 64.

This is really interesting, I didn't know about that! Can you provide some references?

All these Turing machines, and their execution traces of every computer program they can run, exist in math in the same sense that the Mandelbrot set or the decimal expansion of Pi exist in math. Despite the infinite variety of architectures for different Turing machines, their equivalence (in the Turing computability sense) makes the question of “Which Turing machine is running this universe?” impossible to answer, beyond saying, “all of them are.”"

I agree.

I think hypergraphs, then, would be just one more mathematical object we could add to the heap of Turing universal mathematical objects which could (and would, if Platonism is correct) underlie the computations of our universe/experiences.

 

"As soon as one starts talking about “running programs” some people will immediately ask “On what computer?” But a key intellectual point is that computational processes can ultimately be defined completely abstractly, without reference to anything like a physical computer. "

My same reply also provided an explanation/argument, which is applicable to anyone who accepts simple truths concerning abstract objects have definite and objective true/false values, paired with a rejection of philosophical zombies. I think John rejects zombies, so he would have to reject objective truth to believe a physical computer is necessary to produce observers. Below is what I wrote:

The way I like to think about it is this: If one is willing to believe that truth values for mathematical relations like “2 + 2 = 4” can exist and be true independently of the universe or someone writing it down, or a mathematician thinking about it, that is all you need.

For if the truth values of certain simple relations have an independent existence, then so to do the truth values of far more complex equations. Let’s call the Diophantine equation that computes the Wave Function of the Hubble Volume of our universe “Equation X”. Now then, it becomes a question of pure arithmetic, whether it is true or false that:

“In Equation X, does the universal state variable U, at time step T contain a pattern of electrons that encode to the string:

‘why does the existence of Universal Equations imply the existence of iterative search processes for solutions?'”

If that question has a definitive objective truth, then it is the case that in the universe U, at time step T, in equation X, there is some person in that universe who had a conscious thought, and wrote it down and it got organized into a pattern of electrons which anyone who inspects this vast equation with its huge variables could see.

Once you get to this point, the last and final step is to reject the possibility that the patterns found in these equations, which behave and act like they are conscious, and claim to be conscious, are philosophical zombies. In other words, to accept that they are conscious beings, just like those who exist in “physical” universes (assuming there is any possible distinction between a physical universe, and a physical universe computed by a Platonic or Arithmetic Turing Machine).

I tend to agree with you, because this is the most parsimonious explanation of reality than assuming some mysterious process/mechanism/entity that makes it so that this particular Universe and this particular state of affairs and this particular moment in time is real and others are not.

Telmo

Jason

 

Oh boy, John Clark is not going to like this :)

Telmo.

Am Do, 11. Aug 2022, um 20:35, schrieb Jason Resch:

https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2021/04/why-does-the-universe-exist-some-perspectives-from-our-physics-project/ 

I found this fascinating. It appears to have many similarities with the type of physical reality that emerges from then universal dovetailer, with new ways of explaining it and some new insights.

Jason

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[Telmo Menezes]

Am Fr, 12. Aug 2022, um 14:55, schrieb John Clark:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 3:04 AM Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote:

> Oh boy, John Clark is not going to like this :)

Well, I like Stephen Wolfram

I like him too. Mathematica is a beautiful piece of software and I bought his book "A New Kind of Science" when it came out, which is also beautiful and inspiring.

and I agree 100% with the ASCII sequence that Stephen Wolfram's physical brain produced:

"As soon as one starts talking about “running programs” some people will immediately ask “On what computer?" But a key intellectual point is that computational processes can ultimately be defined completely abstractly, without reference to anything like a physical computer. "

All completely true, however you can't make a computation with a definition, not even if the definition is what a computation is. For a definition to make any sense you need a mind, and to have a mind you need a brain, and a brain needs to process information, and if a Turing Machine cannot process a given amount of information then nothing can. And nobody, I repeat absolutely nobody, has been able to make a Turing machine without using the laws of physics

We are physical beings existing within the laws of physics. It could be that there is a larger computational reality, and that our universe and the laws of physics are "local" to the "sector" of the computation that we inhabit. We are experiencing this computational reality from the inside.

or has even propose a theory about how such a thing could be possible because, as I said in the above, you can't make a computation with nothing but a definition, in fact you can't do anything at all if all you have is a definition.

The tricky thing, that Jason expanded on better than me, is that the outcomes of computations preexist, in the sense that the outcome will be the same independently of how, when or where the computation is performed. We might need a physical computer to find out that 12345 * 67890 = 838102050, but it was already and it always has been and will be the case that 12345 * 67890 = 838102050 (by definition of the natural numbers and multiplication).

 > My scepticism is this: is anything being gained in terms of explanatory power? 

Although quite interesting so far Stephen Wolfram cellular automation ideas have been no help whatsoever to physicists, but perhaps someday they may be,

They are however already quite interesting from computer science, I would say. I am still to this day fascinated by the fact that some elementary cellular automata rules such as rule 110 are Turing complete and display chaotic behavior, while most others are stable. The connections with phenotypical expression in nature are also quite fascinating. It is hard to not suspect that there is something fundamental going on here.

Telmo

maybe someday we'll find that quarks behave the way they do because of some simple cellular automation at work inside them, but even if that day comes to pass you're still not going to be able to make a Turing machine, or anything else, with just a definition.

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

ewg

   

 

Hi Jason,

This is really interesting, thanks for sharing. Since Wolfram started going in this direction, something that occurs to me is this: hypergraphs are perhaps one of the most general mathematical constructs that can be conceived of. Almost everything else can be seen as a special case of hypergraphs. Like you say, with the update rules, we shouldn't be surprised if they are equivalent to the UD. My scepticism is this: is anything being gained in terms of explanatory power? Should we be surprised that such a powerful representation can contain the rules of our reality? I do admit that I have to study these ideas in more detail, and there is something really compelling about hypergraphs + update rules.

"As soon as one starts talking about “running programs” some people will immediately ask “On what computer?” But a key intellectual point is that computational processes can ultimately be defined completely abstractly, without reference to anything like a physical computer. "

Oh boy, John Clark is not going to like this :)

Telmo.

Am Do, 11. Aug 2022, um 20:35, schrieb Jason Resch:

https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2021/04/why-does-the-universe-exist-some-perspectives-from-our-physics-project/ 

I found this fascinating. It appears to have many similarities with the type of physical reality that emerges from then universal dovetailer, with new ways of explaining it and some new insights.

Jason

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[Telmo Menezes]

Am Fr, 12. Aug 2022, um 20:47, schrieb John Clark:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 1:56 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I think John rejects zombies,

Yes and I have a very good reason for doing so. I know for a fact I am conscious and the evidence is overwhelming that Darwinian evolution is correct, but if you could have intelligent behavior without consciousness then natural selection could never have invented it, yet it did.

I agree with your premises but not with your conclusions. I agree that:

- I am conscious.

- There is overwhelming evidence in favor of Darwinian evolution.

I disagree that:

- Natural selection "invented" consciousness.

Maybe stars are conscious. Why not? How do you know?

- If you could have intelligent behavior without consciousness then natural selection could never have invented it.

Why? Some people are born without legs. Does that means that natural selection could not have invented legs?

Telmo

Therefore the only logical conclusion is that consciousness is the inevitable byproduct of intelligence.

 >so he would have to reject objective truth to believe a physical computer is necessary to produce observers. Below is what I wrote:

 The way I like to think about it is this: If one is willing to believe that truth values for mathematical relations like “2 + 2 = 4” can exist and be true independently of the universe

But I don't believe that. If there were zero or even just one thing in the entire universe then the very concept of "2" would be meaningless, as would the concept of additon. In fact if there was just one thing then there would be nothing because the best definition of "nothing" that I know of is infinite unbounded homogeneity.

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

idb

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[John Clark]

On Sun, Aug 14, 2022 at 3:02 PM Joel Dietz <jdi...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> And if it "is basically unprovable by definition" so you can't prove or disprove it then it's silly and is an idea so bad it's not even wrong.

 

 

> Then by your definition your idea that 'there is not a teapot in orbit around the planet Uranus' is 'an idea so bad it's not even wrong'

Yes, such a theory would be not necessarily wrong but certainly silly.  It would be as silly as your theory that "it is *impossible* to prove that there is not another as of yet invisible or unmeasurable mechanism within the construct that can alter or override the standard system of inputs and outputs [of the brain]."

And by the way, even if that theory turned out to be true it wouldn't alter the fact that you either did what you did for a reason and thus are a cuckoo clock or you did what you did for no reason and thus are a roulette wheel. And "free will", whatever the hell it's supposed to mean, would still not be entering the picture.  

 

> The rest of us live in a world of reasonable assumptions

And you think a teapot in orbit around the planet Uranus is a reasonable assumption? You think it wise to take time to consider it when we could've used that time to think about something else, something a bit less silly?

 

> including the OED

The lexicographers who wrote the OEC are experts in words but they probably have less philosophical insight into the fundamental nature of reality than you do.

> which is mostly reliable in how to built semantic webs of meaning

A dictionary can't even do that with nothing but definitions, you need real world examples to obtain meaning. Somebody points to the squiggle "tree" and then to a tall thing with green stuff at the top in the real world and a child gets the connection. Without examples from the real world the OED would just be a web of squiggles and not a web of meaning.

> and not at all concerning the ultimate truth of anything. 

But wasn't that what we were talking about?

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

25v

 

[John Clark]

On Sun, Aug 14, 2022 at 2:40 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:

> If it's a matter of bad genes or cosmic rays that's not something that can enter into informing the calculation to commit murder so there's no point in making an example of those murderers.

But as I said, before you start worrying about deterrence you should make sure that the man you have just convicted of murder does not murder again. Take for example the case of Kenneth McDuff, he was convicted of the rape torture and murder of 3 children in 1966 and sentenced to death, but it was later commuted to life in prison. Despite the life sentence he was released from prison in 1989 due to overcrowding. As a free man over the next 3 years McDuff tortured at least 5 more children to death before he was caught. In 1998 he was finally executed, he never killed anybody after that and I think we can be pretty sure he never will.

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

kmd

 

 

[John Clark]

On Mon, Aug 15, 2022 at 7:07 AM Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote:

>> Well, I like Stephen Wolfram

 

> I like him too. Mathematica is a beautiful piece of software and I bought his book "A New Kind of Science" when it came out, which is also beautiful and inspiring.

Me too, that book is on my bookshelf only about 10 feet away from me right now.  

> We are physical beings existing within the laws of physics. It could be that there is a larger computational reality, and that our universe and the laws of physics are "local" to the "sector" of the computation that we inhabit. We are experiencing this computational reality from the inside.

Yes we could be part of a computer simulation, but the computer simulating us must be operating according to physical law, unless it is also a simulation. But unless it's turtles all the way down eventually you're going to hit the bedrock of physical reality.  

> The tricky thing, that Jason expanded on better than me, is that the outcomes of computations preexist,

The trouble is if all correct computations exist in some sort of platonic heaven then all incorrect computations exist there too, you need physics to tell the difference. If you have 2 rocks and then find 3 more you can make a one to one correspondence between the rocks and the fingers of your hand, but if you have 2 rocks and only find 2 more you cannot.

> in the sense that the outcome will be the same independently of how, when or where the computation is performed. We might need a physical computer to find out that 12345 * 67890 = 838102050, but it was already and it always has been and will be the case that 12345 * 67890 = 838102050 (by definition of the natural numbers and multiplication).

But you needed a physical computer or a physical brain to figure that out. If platonic heaven contains everything that is true it also contains everything that is false, and there are many more false things than true things (that's why science is so difficult) so platonic Heaven is a pretty uninteresting place because it is so dense with things that are untrue.

Meaning needs contrast. Michelangelo's David was carved from a single huge block of marble that was a 100 million years old, but it would be silly to say David was 100 million years old and Michelangelo did nothing but unpack it from the marble that was not part of David. And to make a real calculation rather than a pretend toy one you have to differentiate the correct from the incorrect, you not only have to mention the correct answer you have to make it clear that all the other answers, and there are an infinite number of them, are wrong. And for that you need a physical machine.

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

wpr

[John Clark]

On Mon, Aug 15, 2022 at 7:11 AM Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote:

> I agree with your premises but not with your conclusions. I agree that:

- I am conscious.

- There is overwhelming evidence in favor of Darwinian evolution.

OK.

> I disagree that:

- Natural selection "invented" consciousness.

Maybe stars are conscious. Why not? How do you know?

I "know" that stars, rocks and rotting corpses are not conscious in the same way that I "know" that I'm not the only conscious being in the universe, some things behave intelligently and some things do not,  stars, rocks and rotting corpses do not. Like me, Evolution is interested in intelligent behavior, not so much with consciousness. 

>> If you could have intelligent behavior without consciousness then natural selection could never have invented it.

> Why? Some people are born without legs. Does that means that natural selection could not have invented legs?

Some people are born with a mutation that causes them to have no legs because, although the genetic code is very good, it is not perfect, and sometimes it makes a mistake; but such a mutation would not confer a survival advantage in the current environment and therefore would be unlikely to be passed onto the next generation. If the Turing Test, which is basically just a test for intelligent behavior, did not work for consciousness and there was no connection between the two things then even if a person accidentally acquired consciousness because of a mutation that consciousness gene would soon go extinct in the genepool because it would confer no survival advantage; that's why species of animals that have lived in pitch dark caves for thousands or millions of years have no eyes, eyes would convey no survival advantage and would even be a disadvantage because it would waste valuable resources on something useless, an animal that had a mutation for no eyes would have an advantage over its fellow creatures in the cave environment and the gene for no eyes would become dominant in the genepool.  

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

2ct
i

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Removing a hazard, if that’s how you want to look at the legal system, does not require any consideration of the criteria for free will, but deterring people from breaking legal or moral rules does.

--

Stathis Papaioannou

[John Clark]

On Mon, Aug 15, 2022 at 9:48 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> before you start worrying about deterrence you should make sure that the man you have just convicted of murder does not murder again. Take for example the case of Kenneth McDuff, he was convicted of the rape torture and murder of 3 children in 1966 and sentenced to death, but it was later commuted to life in prison. Despite the life sentence he was released from prison in 1989 due to overcrowding. As a free man over the next 3 years McDuff tortured at least 5 more children to death before he was caught. In 1998 he was finally executed, he never killed anybody after that and I think we can be pretty sure he never will.

> Removing a hazard, if that’s how you want to look at the legal system, does not require any consideration of the criteria for free will, but deterring people from breaking legal or moral rules does.

Punishment is a factor in the environment and the fear of that is often sufficient to stop somebody from murdering.  

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

mzy

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Aug 15, 2022 at 5:51 AM Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote:

Am Fr, 12. Aug 2022, um 19:56, schrieb Jason Resch:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 2:04 AM Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote:

Hi Jason,

This is really interesting, thanks for sharing. Since Wolfram started going in this direction, something that occurs to me is this: hypergraphs are perhaps one of the most general mathematical constructs that can be conceived of. Almost everything else can be seen as a special case of hypergraphs. Like you say, with the update rules, we shouldn't be surprised if they are equivalent to the UD. My scepticism is this: is anything being gained in terms of explanatory power? Should we be surprised that such a powerful representation can contain the rules of our reality? I do admit that I have to study these ideas in more detail, and there is something really compelling about hypergraphs + update rules.

That is a good question. I am not familiar with them myself, but my understanding is they do not provide for any form of computation beyond what is turing computable, so in that sense, I don't know that they provide any additional explanatory power beyond the simple statement that all computations exist.

A commenter on my site recently asked, what can we say about the "computer" that computes all these computations. My reply was:

"There is no single one. There are infinite varieties of different TMs, and all can exist Platonically/Arithmetically. Gregory Chaitin discovered an equation whose structure models LISP computers. There are likewise other equations corresponding to the Java Virtual Machine, and the Commodore 64.

This is really interesting, I didn't know about that! Can you provide some references?

 

Sure.

In his 1987 book Algorithmic Information Theory, Gregory Chaitin describes one such equation: the “Exponential Diophantine Equation Computer.” It has 20,000 variables and is two hundred pages long.

This equation perfectly replicates the behavior of the LISP programming language. He describes the equation as follows:

If the LISP expression k has no value, then this equation will have no solution. If the LISP expression k has a value, then this equation will have exactly one solution. In this unique solution, n = the value of the expression k.

Gregory Chaitin in “META MATH! The Quest for Omega” (2004)

 

All these Turing machines, and their execution traces of every computer program they can run, exist in math in the same sense that the Mandelbrot set or the decimal expansion of Pi exist in math. Despite the infinite variety of architectures for different Turing machines, their equivalence (in the Turing computability sense) makes the question of “Which Turing machine is running this universe?” impossible to answer, beyond saying, “all of them are.”"

I agree.

Nice.

 

I think hypergraphs, then, would be just one more mathematical object we could add to the heap of Turing universal mathematical objects which could (and would, if Platonism is correct) underlie the computations of our universe/experiences.

 

"As soon as one starts talking about “running programs” some people will immediately ask “On what computer?” But a key intellectual point is that computational processes can ultimately be defined completely abstractly, without reference to anything like a physical computer. "

My same reply also provided an explanation/argument, which is applicable to anyone who accepts simple truths concerning abstract objects have definite and objective true/false values, paired with a rejection of philosophical zombies. I think John rejects zombies, so he would have to reject objective truth to believe a physical computer is necessary to produce observers. Below is what I wrote:

The way I like to think about it is this: If one is willing to believe that truth values for mathematical relations like “2 + 2 = 4” can exist and be true independently of the universe or someone writing it down, or a mathematician thinking about it, that is all you need.

For if the truth values of certain simple relations have an independent existence, then so to do the truth values of far more complex equations. Let’s call the Diophantine equation that computes the Wave Function of the Hubble Volume of our universe “Equation X”. Now then, it becomes a question of pure arithmetic, whether it is true or false that:

“In Equation X, does the universal state variable U, at time step T contain a pattern of electrons that encode to the string:

‘why does the existence of Universal Equations imply the existence of iterative search processes for solutions?'”

If that question has a definitive objective truth, then it is the case that in the universe U, at time step T, in equation X, there is some person in that universe who had a conscious thought, and wrote it down and it got organized into a pattern of electrons which anyone who inspects this vast equation with its huge variables could see.

Once you get to this point, the last and final step is to reject the possibility that the patterns found in these equations, which behave and act like they are conscious, and claim to be conscious, are philosophical zombies. In other words, to accept that they are conscious beings, just like those who exist in “physical” universes (assuming there is any possible distinction between a physical universe, and a physical universe computed by a Platonic or Arithmetic Turing Machine).

I tend to agree with you, because this is the most parsimonious explanation of reality than assuming some mysterious process/mechanism/entity that makes it so that this particular Universe and this particular state of affairs and this particular moment in time is real and others are not.

Thank you for that. I have yet to find an idea that can explain more while assuming less (in this case only assuming that 2+2=4, and the rest can be shown constructively).

Jason

 

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Aug 15, 2022 at 6:47 AM John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sun, Aug 14, 2022 at 3:02 PM Joel Dietz <jdi...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> And if it "is basically unprovable by definition" so you can't prove or disprove it then it's silly and is an idea so bad it's not even wrong.

 

 

> Then by your definition your idea that 'there is not a teapot in orbit around the planet Uranus' is 'an idea so bad it's not even wrong'

There are many dwarf galaxies orbiting the Milkyway, and hence also orbiting Uranus. Perhaps there is intelligent life in one of these dwarf galaxies which makes teapots.

What makes any idea seem silly or not is a matter of its compatibility with one's unstated, but working theories and assumptions about reality. We assume (generally) teapots only exist on Earth (no where else in the universe), we assume there are no naturally forming teapots (or anything meeting such a definition), we assume our history of space launches is accurate and complete and no secret missions by NASA, Russia, China, or Space-X have put a teapot in orbit of any other plant besides Earth, we assume humanity is the first and only intelligent civilization to arise on Earth, we assume no alien intelligences have visited our solar system who consume tea from pots, and never in history has any colony or ship with teapots landed on any moon of any planet besides Earth, that in no branch of the wave function atoms spontaneously arrange to form a teapot in orbit of another planet, and so on.

Are all of these assumptions and theories valid? I think all could be questioned by an appropriately inquisitive mind.

If you want to make progress in science, state what your theories and assumptions are, and try to disprove them. As time goes on the theories and assumptions which fail to be disproven you can put more confidence in. Arguing about which ideas are silly or not without first stating and agreeing on the operating assumptions is itself silly.

Jason

 

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Aug 15, 2022 at 7:45 AM John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Mon, Aug 15, 2022 at 7:07 AM Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote:

>> Well, I like Stephen Wolfram

 

> I like him too. Mathematica is a beautiful piece of software and I bought his book "A New Kind of Science" when it came out, which is also beautiful and inspiring.

Me too, that book is on my bookshelf only about 10 feet away from me right now.  

> We are physical beings existing within the laws of physics. It could be that there is a larger computational reality, and that our universe and the laws of physics are "local" to the "sector" of the computation that we inhabit. We are experiencing this computational reality from the inside.

Yes we could be part of a computer simulation, but the computer simulating us must be operating according to physical law, unless it is also a simulation. But unless it's turtles all the way down eventually you're going to hit the bedrock of physical reality.  

> The tricky thing, that Jason expanded on better than me, is that the outcomes of computations preexist,

The trouble is if all correct computations exist in some sort of platonic heaven then all incorrect computations exist there too, you need physics to tell the difference. If you have 2 rocks and then find 3 more you can make a one to one correspondence between the rocks and the fingers of your hand, but if you have 2 rocks and only find 2 more you cannot.

> in the sense that the outcome will be the same independently of how, when or where the computation is performed. We might need a physical computer to find out that 12345 * 67890 = 838102050, but it was already and it always has been and will be the case that 12345 * 67890 = 838102050 (by definition of the natural numbers and multiplication).

But you needed a physical computer or a physical brain to figure that out. If platonic heaven contains everything that is true it also contains everything that is false, and there are many more false things than true things (that's why science is so difficult) so platonic Heaven is a pretty uninteresting place because it is so dense with things that are untrue.

If you read the recent wirings by Wolfram on the Ruliad which I have linked at the start of this thread, he explains how rather than break down into complete nonsense from all the possible computations, we can expect observers to see regularities which leads to a unique system of "laws of physics" as seen by each observer in the Ruliad.

Jason

[John Clark]

On Mon, Aug 15, 2022 at 11:42 AM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

> There are many dwarf galaxies orbiting the Milkyway, and hence also orbiting Uranus. Perhaps there is intelligent life in one of these dwarf galaxies which makes teapots.

What the hell?!

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis 

tjs

[Jason Resch]

Read the rest and maybe it will make sense.

Jason

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[Stathis Papaioannou]

But only if they have control over their actions, which is where the compatibilist definition of free will comes into it.

--

Stathis Papaioannou

[Philip Benjamin]

[Philip Benjamin]

       Very rarely I will again any response!!

       If there nothing never existed, never ever anything will exist anywhere. This is the ‘rational’ question of aseity and the inevitable necessity of  infinite regress. What is more rational ? Aseity of ‘dead matter’ that create life? Or aseity of LIFE with creating both dead matter and life forms?

      Patriarchs, Prophets and the Apostles expounded the aseity of Adonai (plural) YHWH (singular) Elohim (plural). A corollary from Genesis is the Sabbath—the seventh day and the seven days of the week which has no rhyme or reason in any astronomy or solar, lunar, planetary equations. The Western academia (WAMP-the-Ingrate) arbitrarily accepted the Scriptural  

 Sabbath and Sabbatical. The compelling addition of the first day also was because of the 100% Jewish earliest Church (“multitudes”) on Acts 17: 17-24, that witnessed the earth rending Resurrection on the First Day.

     Empiricism counts!

Philip Benjamin

 

From: everyth...@googlegroups.com everyth...@googlegroups.com On Behalf Of Stathis Papaioannou
Sent: Saturday, August 13, 2022 4:09 PM
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Why Does the Universe Exist? Some Perspectives from Our Physics Project—Stephen Wolfram Writings

 

On Sat, 13 Aug 2022 at 21:53, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sat, Aug 13, 2022 at 12:49 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

 

> Identical physical states in a deterministic world would evolve identically, as would any supervening mental states.

 

Yes. 

 

 > However, a supervenient relationship is such that multiple different physical states can give rise to the same mental state.

 

True, and in that situation things would not be reversible; a cellular automation like Conway's LIFE is not reversible and for the same reason. Something can be 100% deterministic in the forward time dimension but not in the backward time dimension, but so far at least nobody has any experimental evidence that fundamental physics has that property, fundamental physics can't explain why you can't unscramble an egg, you need more than the laws of physics to explain that you need to invoke initial conditions. That situation could change if some of Stephen Wolfram's ideas turn out to be correct, but so far there is no evidence that they are.  

 

 > The different physical states may then evolve differently giving different subsequent mental states. Subjectively, this would mean that your next mental state is undetermined. 

[Brent Meeker]

By an exercise of their will.

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

That which can explain anything fails to explain at all.

Brent

[Lawrence Crowell]

I never entirely saw why one would embrace the Wolfram paradigm of physics. 

The universe exists for much the same reason it is not possible to define nothingness without paradox. Nothingness cannot exist, otherwise by its existential nature it would be something. If nothingness does not exist. then something must exist, which annuls nothing. The quantum vacuum shares this property, where complete vacuum is unstable.

LC

[John Clark]

On Tue, Aug 16, 2022 at 6:33 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

> The universe exists for much the same reason it is not possible to define nothingness without paradox. Nothingness cannot exist, otherwise by its existential nature it would be something. If nothingness does not exist. then something must exist, which annuls nothing. The quantum vacuum shares this property, where complete vacuum is unstable.

Well said! 

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

oui

 

[Telmo Menezes]

Am Mo, 15. Aug 2022, um 17:27, schrieb Jason Resch:

On Mon, Aug 15, 2022 at 5:51 AM Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote:

Am Fr, 12. Aug 2022, um 19:56, schrieb Jason Resch:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 2:04 AM Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote:

Hi Jason,

This is really interesting, thanks for sharing. Since Wolfram started going in this direction, something that occurs to me is this: hypergraphs are perhaps one of the most general mathematical constructs that can be conceived of. Almost everything else can be seen as a special case of hypergraphs. Like you say, with the update rules, we shouldn't be surprised if they are equivalent to the UD. My scepticism is this: is anything being gained in terms of explanatory power? Should we be surprised that such a powerful representation can contain the rules of our reality? I do admit that I have to study these ideas in more detail, and there is something really compelling about hypergraphs + update rules.

That is a good question. I am not familiar with them myself, but my understanding is they do not provide for any form of computation beyond what is turing computable, so in that sense, I don't know that they provide any additional explanatory power beyond the simple statement that all computations exist.

A commenter on my site recently asked, what can we say about the "computer" that computes all these computations. My reply was:

"There is no single one. There are infinite varieties of different TMs, and all can exist Platonically/Arithmetically. Gregory Chaitin discovered an equation whose structure models LISP computers. There are likewise other equations corresponding to the Java Virtual Machine, and the Commodore 64.

This is really interesting, I didn't know about that! Can you provide some references?

 

Sure.

In his 1987 book Algorithmic Information Theory, Gregory Chaitin describes one such equation: the “Exponential Diophantine Equation Computer.” It has 20,000 variables and is two hundred pages long.

This equation perfectly replicates the behavior of the LISP programming language. He describes the equation as follows:

If the LISP expression k has no value, then this equation will have no solution. If the LISP expression k has a value, then this equation will have exactly one solution. In this unique solution, n = the value of the expression k.

Gregory Chaitin in “META MATH! The Quest for Omega” (2004)

Thanks Jason!

 

All these Turing machines, and their execution traces of every computer program they can run, exist in math in the same sense that the Mandelbrot set or the decimal expansion of Pi exist in math. Despite the infinite variety of architectures for different Turing machines, their equivalence (in the Turing computability sense) makes the question of “Which Turing machine is running this universe?” impossible to answer, beyond saying, “all of them are.”"

I agree.

Nice.

 

I think hypergraphs, then, would be just one more mathematical object we could add to the heap of Turing universal mathematical objects which could (and would, if Platonism is correct) underlie the computations of our universe/experiences.

 

"As soon as one starts talking about “running programs” some people will immediately ask “On what computer?” But a key intellectual point is that computational processes can ultimately be defined completely abstractly, without reference to anything like a physical computer. "

My same reply also provided an explanation/argument, which is applicable to anyone who accepts simple truths concerning abstract objects have definite and objective true/false values, paired with a rejection of philosophical zombies. I think John rejects zombies, so he would have to reject objective truth to believe a physical computer is necessary to produce observers. Below is what I wrote:

The way I like to think about it is this: If one is willing to believe that truth values for mathematical relations like “2 + 2 = 4” can exist and be true independently of the universe or someone writing it down, or a mathematician thinking about it, that is all you need.

For if the truth values of certain simple relations have an independent existence, then so to do the truth values of far more complex equations. Let’s call the Diophantine equation that computes the Wave Function of the Hubble Volume of our universe “Equation X”. Now then, it becomes a question of pure arithmetic, whether it is true or false that:

“In Equation X, does the universal state variable U, at time step T contain a pattern of electrons that encode to the string:

‘why does the existence of Universal Equations imply the existence of iterative search processes for solutions?'”

If that question has a definitive objective truth, then it is the case that in the universe U, at time step T, in equation X, there is some person in that universe who had a conscious thought, and wrote it down and it got organized into a pattern of electrons which anyone who inspects this vast equation with its huge variables could see.

Once you get to this point, the last and final step is to reject the possibility that the patterns found in these equations, which behave and act like they are conscious, and claim to be conscious, are philosophical zombies. In other words, to accept that they are conscious beings, just like those who exist in “physical” universes (assuming there is any possible distinction between a physical universe, and a physical universe computed by a Platonic or Arithmetic Turing Machine).

I tend to agree with you, because this is the most parsimonious explanation of reality than assuming some mysterious process/mechanism/entity that makes it so that this particular Universe and this particular state of affairs and this particular moment in time is real and others are not.

Thank you for that. I have yet to find an idea that can explain more while assuming less (in this case only assuming that 2+2=4, and the rest can be shown constructively).

Jason

 

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[Telmo Menezes]

Am Mo, 15. Aug 2022, um 14:45, schrieb John Clark:

On Mon, Aug 15, 2022 at 7:07 AM Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote:

>> Well, I like Stephen Wolfram

 

> I like him too. Mathematica is a beautiful piece of software and I bought his book "A New Kind of Science" when it came out, which is also beautiful and inspiring.

Me too, that book is on my bookshelf only about 10 feet away from me right now.  

> We are physical beings existing within the laws of physics. It could be that there is a larger computational reality, and that our universe and the laws of physics are "local" to the "sector" of the computation that we inhabit. We are experiencing this computational reality from the inside.

Yes we could be part of a computer simulation, but the computer simulating us must be operating according to physical law, unless it is also a simulation. But unless it's turtles all the way down eventually you're going to hit the bedrock of physical reality.

This is the case if the physical laws that we observe are universal across all possible universes, but it could also be that the laws of physics that we observe are a local feature of a much wider reality / computation. If some form of Platonism is correct, it could be that what we call "the laws of physics" are just a structural feature of a set of mathematical forms that we are "observing from the inside".

In this sort of metaphysics, being "inside of a simulation" loses its meaning. It could be true and not true at the same time. What I mean is:  this exact same state of affairs that you/I are observing from the first person could be instantiated in a supercomputer in planet Zobolox one trillion years from now, and also in a simulation inside a simulation in another distant galaxy in the distant past. It would just be an atemporal thing, like a number. In which simulation is the number 1243234?

 

> The tricky thing, that Jason expanded on better than me, is that the outcomes of computations preexist,

The trouble is if all correct computations exist in some sort of platonic heaven then all incorrect computations exist there too, you need physics to tell the difference. If you have 2 rocks and then find 3 more you can make a one to one correspondence between the rocks and the fingers of your hand, but if you have 2 rocks and only find 2 more you cannot.

Or physics could be an emergent property of consistency between computations.

> in the sense that the outcome will be the same independently of how, when or where the computation is performed. We might need a physical computer to find out that 12345 * 67890 = 838102050, but it was already and it always has been and will be the case that 12345 * 67890 = 838102050 (by definition of the natural numbers and multiplication).

But you needed a physical computer or a physical brain to figure that out. If platonic heaven contains everything that is true it also contains everything that is false, and there are many more false things than true things (that's why science is so difficult) so platonic Heaven is a pretty uninteresting place because it is so dense with things that are untrue.

It might be that the sort of conscious state and perceptual activity that we experience correspond to the part of the platonic Heaven that is self-consistent.

I am not saying that these things are true. I am only trying to point out to you that you are assuming a very specific metaphysics. You assume that the sort of reality defined by our observable physical laws is the ultimate reality.

And since you, like me, are a strong believer in Darwinism, we don't even have to go into the metaphysical. You might also want to consider that there is no reason for evolution to provide us with direct access to reality. It might also be the case that some illusion is a better adaptation. Donald Hoffman goes as far as claiming that the most likely situation is that we evolved to perceive such an illusion. Are you familiar with his ideas?

Meaning needs contrast. Michelangelo's David was carved from a single huge block of marble that was a 100 million years old, but it would be silly to say David was 100 million years old and Michelangelo did nothing but unpack it from the marble that was not part of David.

I agree, and I would add that meaning is observer-dependent. Meaning is a property of human minds, not of external reality. I do agree that I am able to construct meaning because of all the things that I am not. If I was everything, I would be nothing and no meaning would be possible for me.

Telmo

And to make a real calculation rather than a pretend toy one you have to differentiate the correct from the incorrect, you not only have to mention the correct answer you have to make it clear that all the other answers, and there are an infinite number of them, are wrong. And for that you need a physical machine.

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

wpr

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[John Clark]

On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 11:29 AM Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote:

>> Yes we could be part of a computer simulation, but the computer simulating us must be operating according to physical law, unless it is also a simulation. But unless it's turtles all the way down eventually you're going to hit the bedrock of physical reality.

> This is the case if the physical laws that we observe are universal across all possible universes,

Not necessarily, in a simulated universe we could make fundamental physical laws be anything we like, we could even make a Harry Potter universe if we wanted to. But eventually you're going to come to a universe that is not simulated and obeys fundamental natural laws of physics unless, as I said, the chain is infinitely long and it's turtles all the way down.

> Or physics could be an emergent property of consistency between computations.

That's basically what I've been saying, physics can tell the difference between a correct computation and an incorrect one; if you assume that true paradoxes cannot exist then you're gonna need something like that to resolve them. You might even say resolving paradoxes is the very definition of physics.

> And since you, like me, are a strong believer in Darwinism, we don't even have to go into the metaphysical. You might also want to consider that there is no reason for evolution to provide us with direct access to reality.

True. Evolution only required us to be good at surviving on the African savanna, but doing that required quite a bit of intellectual firepower. That's why we find that hand eye coordination is easy but solving partial differential equations is hard even though our recent work on computers has taught us that from a fundamental viewpoint catching a baseball requires more intellectual activity than solving Maxwell's  Equations, computers have been able to do that for years but a robot can't match the dexterity of even a mediocre baseball player.  At least not yet. 

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

mbp

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/17/2022 8:29 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
> And since you, like me, are a strong believer in Darwinism, we don't
> even have to go into the metaphysical. You might also want to consider
> that there is no reason for evolution to provide us with direct access
> to reality. It might also be the case that some illusion is a better
> adaptation. Donald Hoffman goes as far as claiming that the most
> likely situation is that we evolved to perceive such an illusion. Are
> you familiar with his ideas?

The "illusion" must have some relation to reality in order to provide
better adaptation.  But in that case why call it "illusion"?  Is it an
illusion that we don't perceive RF or gamma rays?  Are dogs
hallucinating when they smell things we don't?

Brent

[Telmo Menezes]

It could be that actively preventing us from perceiving some aspect of reality increases our biological fitness, but at the same time ultimately prevents us from fully understanding reality. It could be some fundamental cognitive distortion.

A long time ago I was programming an artificial life simulation. It was this typical thing, a simulated environment with agents foraging for food. The agents underwent an evolutionary process. To test the evolutionary process, I decided to make the view range of the agents a genetic parameter without constraints. I was fully expecting this value to quickly go to infinity. To my surprise, when I checked the simulation the next morning, the view range had stabilized at a relatively short value. The reason was this: agents with infinite vision range went for big piles of food that were far away. They all chose the same pile, and when they converged there was not enough food for everyone, and they had spent too much energy going the distance. Of course they could have evolved some more sophisticated strategies, but since the vision range was a genetic parameter, it was simply easier for evolution to provide global coordination by limiting the vision range, and then it got stuck at this local optimum. I still think about this to this day, and wonder if such a phenomenon has biological plausibility.

Telmo

> Brent

>
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[John Clark]

On Thu, Aug 18, 2022 at 6:46 AM Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote:

> Of course they could have evolved some more sophisticated strategies, 

Yes but the other agents could've evolved more sophisticated strategies too, and the behavior of the other agents must be considered because they are a very important part of the environment, if not the most important part.

> but since the vision range was a genetic parameter, it was simply easier for evolution to provide global coordination by limiting the vision range, and then it got stuck at this local optimum. 

Your agents could've gotten stuck in an ESS, a Evolutionarily Stable Strategy. Once the majority of a population are using a ESS a mutant who follows a different strategy will soon die out even though if everybody followed that strategy everybody would be better off. It is one of the many flaws in Darwinian Evolution and why it took over 3 billion years for it to invent brains. Just a century ago humans had no idea how to make a brain but today we're very close.

> I still think about this to this day, and wonder if such a phenomenon has biological plausibility.

It certainly does!  Richard Dawkins talks about this extensively in his wonderful books "The Selfish Gene" and "The Extended Phenotype", two of the best books I've ever read and I read a lot. 

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

sse

 

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Aug 18, 2022, 6:46 AM Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote:

Am Mi, 17. Aug 2022, um 21:52, schrieb Brent Meeker:
> On 8/17/2022 8:29 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>> And since you, like me, are a strong believer in Darwinism, we don't
>> even have to go into the metaphysical. You might also want to consider
>> that there is no reason for evolution to provide us with direct access
>> to reality. It might also be the case that some illusion is a better
>> adaptation. Donald Hoffman goes as far as claiming that the most
>> likely situation is that we evolved to perceive such an illusion. Are
>> you familiar with his ideas?
>
> The "illusion" must have some relation to reality in order to provide
> better adaptation.  But in that case why call it "illusion"?  Is it an
> illusion that we don't perceive RF or gamma rays?  Are dogs
> hallucinating when they smell things we don't?

It could be that actively preventing us from perceiving some aspect of reality increases our biological fitness, but at the same time ultimately prevents us from fully understanding reality. It could be some fundamental cognitive distortion.

A long time ago I was programming an artificial life simulation. It was this typical thing, a simulated environment with agents foraging for food. The agents underwent an evolutionary process. To test the evolutionary process, I decided to make the view range of the agents a genetic parameter without constraints. I was fully expecting this value to quickly go to infinity. To my surprise, when I checked the simulation the next morning, the view range had stabilized at a relatively short value. The reason was this: agents with infinite vision range went for big piles of food that were far away. They all chose the same pile, and when they converged there was not enough food for everyone, and they had spent too much energy going the distance. Of course they could have evolved some more sophisticated strategies, but since the vision range was a genetic parameter, it was simply easier for evolution to provide global coordination by limiting the vision range, and then it got stuck at this local optimum. I still think about this to this day, and wonder if such a phenomenon has biological plausibility.

That is truly fascinating.

It brings to mind a situation where I was experimenting with alife, and after many generations they evolved swarming/social behavior, despite their inability to detect each other, all had converged to only travel in the same direction and never turn around to get food behind or too far to the side of them.

Individually this strategy seemed bad, but it benefitted the group overall. Since everytime any piece of food was eaten another would appear randomly. So by sweeping across the screen in the same direction, efficiency was maximized for the individual, and all ended up eating more as a result. Or maybe there was some other reason for it. It fascinated me nonetheless.

Jason

[Telmo Menezes]

Am Do, 18. Aug 2022, um 13:38, schrieb John Clark:

On Thu, Aug 18, 2022 at 6:46 AM Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote:

> Of course they could have evolved some more sophisticated strategies, 

Yes but the other agents could've evolved more sophisticated strategies too, and the behavior of the other agents must be considered because they are a very important part of the environment, if not the most important part.

I completely agree, and to be clear the simulation that I created at that time was precisely aimed at exploring what you described. I was attempting to simulate speciation, and the agents could indeed develop diverse and independent strategies.

> but since the vision range was a genetic parameter, it was simply easier for evolution to provide global coordination by limiting the vision range, and then it got stuck at this local optimum. 

Your agents could've gotten stuck in an ESS, a Evolutionarily Stable Strategy. Once the majority of a population are using a ESS a mutant who follows a different strategy will soon die out even though if everybody followed that strategy everybody would be better off. It is one of the many flaws in Darwinian Evolution and why it took over 3 billion years for it to invent brains. Just a century ago humans had no idea how to make a brain but today we're very close.

Agreed.

> I still think about this to this day, and wonder if such a phenomenon has biological plausibility.

It certainly does!  Richard Dawkins talks about this extensively in his wonderful books "The Selfish Gene" and "The Extended Phenotype", two of the best books I've ever read and I read a lot. 

I have read "The Selfish Gene" a long time ago and it was also quite influential for me. I will take a look at "The Extended Phenotype".

Speaking of biology books, this one is not about evolutionary theory but it is one of the most beautiful scientific books that I own, and in case you don't know about it, I suspect you might like it:

"The Machinery of Life" by David S. Goodsell

Telmo

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

sse

 

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[Telmo Menezes]

That is very nice, and I think that it matches the conventional explanations for swarming behavior in nature (also protection against predators).

I guess we need some sort of everything list Alife hacakthon :) Russell is very quiet, but I know that he also likes this stuff. In fact, I believe that I found this list in the 2000s because of some alife-related reference. How would have thought that I would still be here in 2022, reading all about paganism and Trump-stuff :)

Telmo

Jason

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[Russell Standish]

On Sun, Aug 21, 2022 at 03:14:50PM +0200, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>

> I guess we need some sort of everything list Alife hacakthon :) Russell is very
> quiet, but I know that he also likes this stuff.

Indeed. But I need to retire first to be able to have the time to do
some real work! I tried last year, but got sucked back into my old contract
due to labour shortages.

Hopefully next year.


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