MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Alan Grayson]

Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible. I don't understand his argument, no doubt my failing. ISTM that whether we affirm one world or many worlds, all we can ever measure is what observe in this world, and it is from this world that we generate an ensemble after many trials from which to observe and affirm Born's rule. What am I missing, if anything? TIA, AG

[Brent Meeker]

On 2/13/2020 1:17 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible. I don't understand his argument, no doubt my failing.

I don't think they are incompatible; it's just that the Born rule has to stuck in somehow.  It's not implicit in the SWE and can't be derived from the linear evolution.  Somehow a probability has to be introduced.  Once there is a probability measure, then it can be argued via Gleason's theorem that the only consistent measure is the Born rule.

Brent

ISTM that whether we affirm one world or many worlds, all we can ever measure is what observe in this world, and it is from this world that we generate an ensemble after many trials from which to observe and affirm Born's rule. What am I missing, if anything? TIA, AG

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[Alan Grayson]

On Thursday, February 13, 2020 at 4:33:52 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:

On 2/13/2020 1:17 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible. I don't understand his argument, no doubt my failing.

I don't think they are incompatible; it's just that the Born rule has to stuck in somehow.  It's not implicit in the SWE and can't be derived from the linear evolution.  Somehow a probability has to be introduced.  Once there is a probability measure, then it can be argued via Gleason's theorem that the only consistent measure is the Born rule.

Brent

I think what Bruce is trying to show, is that using the MWI, one CANNOT derive Born's rule as claimed by its advocates. But whether one affirms MWI or not, the only thing one has to work with is an ensemble generated by measurements in THIS world. So if you cannot derive Born's rule using a one-world theory, it would seem impossible to do so with many-worlds, since in operational terms -- what is observed -- the two interpretations are indistinguishable.  AG 

ISTM that whether we affirm one world or many worlds, all we can ever measure is what observe in this world, and it is from this world that we generate an ensemble after many trials from which to observe and affirm Born's rule. What am I missing, if anything? TIA, AG

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[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 7:56 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Thursday, February 13, 2020 at 4:33:52 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:

On 2/13/2020 1:17 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible. I don't understand his argument, no doubt my failing.

I don't think they are incompatible; it's just that the Born rule has to stuck in somehow.  It's not implicit in the SWE and can't be derived from the linear evolution.  Somehow a probability has to be introduced.  Once there is a probability measure, then it can be argued via Gleason's theorem that the only consistent measure is the Born rule.

Brent

I think what Bruce is trying to show, is that using the MWI, one CANNOT derive Born's rule as claimed by its advocates. But whether one affirms MWI or not, the only thing one has to work with is an ensemble generated by measurements in THIS world. So if you cannot derive Born's rule using a one-world theory, it would seem impossible to do so with many-worlds, since in operational terms -- what is observed -- the two interpretations are indistinguishable.  AG 

That's quite an astute observation, Alan. The thing is, we can move on from there. If Many-worlds is true, all possible sets of measurements are generated, and most will give different values for the probabilities. For the observers getting the alternative data, there is nothing to tell them that they are getting the wrong answer. MWI is incoherent.

Bruce

[Alan Grayson]

On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 2:34:59 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:

On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 7:56 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Thursday, February 13, 2020 at 4:33:52 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:

On 2/13/2020 1:17 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible. I don't understand his argument, no doubt my failing.

I don't think they are incompatible; it's just that the Born rule has to stuck in somehow.  It's not implicit in the SWE and can't be derived from the linear evolution.  Somehow a probability has to be introduced.  Once there is a probability measure, then it can be argued via Gleason's theorem that the only consistent measure is the Born rule.

Brent

I think what Bruce is trying to show, is that using the MWI, one CANNOT derive Born's rule as claimed by its advocates. But whether one affirms MWI or not, the only thing one has to work with is an ensemble generated by measurements in THIS world. So if you cannot derive Born's rule using a one-world theory, it would seem impossible to do so with many-worlds, since in operational terms -- what is observed -- the two interpretations are indistinguishable.  AG 

That's quite an astute observation, Alan. The thing is, we can move on from there. If Many-worlds is true, all possible sets of measurements are generated, and most will give different values for the probabilities. For the observers getting the alternative data, there is nothing to tell them that they are getting the wrong answer. MWI is incoherent.

Bruce

But won't the hypothetical observers in OTHER worlds get the same ensembles and thus the same distributions? AG 

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 8:45 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 2:34:59 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:

On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 7:56 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Thursday, February 13, 2020 at 4:33:52 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:

On 2/13/2020 1:17 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible. I don't understand his argument, no doubt my failing.

I don't think they are incompatible; it's just that the Born rule has to stuck in somehow.  It's not implicit in the SWE and can't be derived from the linear evolution.  Somehow a probability has to be introduced.  Once there is a probability measure, then it can be argued via Gleason's theorem that the only consistent measure is the Born rule.

Brent

I think what Bruce is trying to show, is that using the MWI, one CANNOT derive Born's rule as claimed by its advocates. But whether one affirms MWI or not, the only thing one has to work with is an ensemble generated by measurements in THIS world. So if you cannot derive Born's rule using a one-world theory, it would seem impossible to do so with many-worlds, since in operational terms -- what is observed -- the two interpretations are indistinguishable.  AG 

That's quite an astute observation, Alan. The thing is, we can move on from there. If Many-worlds is true, all possible sets of measurements are generated, and most will give different values for the probabilities. For the observers getting the alternative data, there is nothing to tell them that they are getting the wrong answer. MWI is incoherent.

Bruce

But won't the hypothetical observers in OTHER worlds get the same ensembles and thus the same distributions? AG 

No, The point of MWI is that other worlds get different data.

Bruce

[Alan Grayson]

On each individual trial of course, with the exception that some outcomes have the identical probability.  But since the ensembles are generated by the same wf, I think they're identical.  AG

[Bruce Kellett]

Think again. If there are N repetitions of the measurement with two possible outcomes, there are 2^N different sets of results. some sets have the same or similar frequencies, but others have very different frequencies. So many different ideas about the probabilities are obtained in different branches. The wave function does not affect this result.

Bruce

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 3:34:59 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 7:56 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Thursday, February 13, 2020 at 4:33:52 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:

On 2/13/2020 1:17 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible. I don't understand his argument, no doubt my failing.

I don't think they are incompatible; it's just that the Born rule has to stuck in somehow.  It's not implicit in the SWE and can't be derived from the linear evolution.  Somehow a probability has to be introduced.  Once there is a probability measure, then it can be argued via Gleason's theorem that the only consistent measure is the Born rule.

Brent

I think what Bruce is trying to show, is that using the MWI, one CANNOT derive Born's rule as claimed by its advocates. But whether one affirms MWI or not, the only thing one has to work with is an ensemble generated by measurements in THIS world. So if you cannot derive Born's rule using a one-world theory, it would seem impossible to do so with many-worlds, since in operational terms -- what is observed -- the two interpretations are indistinguishable.  AG 

That's quite an astute observation, Alan. The thing is, we can move on from there. If Many-worlds is true, all possible sets of measurements are generated, and most will give different values for the probabilities. For the observers getting the alternative data, there is nothing to tell them that they are getting the wrong answer. MWI is incoherent.

Bruce

All quantum interpretations have a level of incoherence.

LC

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 5:37:06 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

All quantum interpretations have a level of incoherence.

LC

 

That's science in general.

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-pragmatic/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism

@philipthrift

[Brent Meeker]

On 2/14/2020 1:34 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 7:56 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Thursday, February 13, 2020 at 4:33:52 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:

On 2/13/2020 1:17 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible. I don't understand his argument, no doubt my failing.

I don't think they are incompatible; it's just that the Born rule has to stuck in somehow.  It's not implicit in the SWE and can't be derived from the linear evolution.  Somehow a probability has to be introduced.  Once there is a probability measure, then it can be argued via Gleason's theorem that the only consistent measure is the Born rule.

Brent

I think what Bruce is trying to show, is that using the MWI, one CANNOT derive Born's rule as claimed by its advocates. But whether one affirms MWI or not, the only thing one has to work with is an ensemble generated by measurements in THIS world. So if you cannot derive Born's rule using a one-world theory, it would seem impossible to do so with many-worlds, since in operational terms -- what is observed -- the two interpretations are indistinguishable.  AG 

That's quite an astute observation, Alan. The thing is, we can move on from there. If Many-worlds is true, all possible sets of measurements are generated, and most will give different values for the probabilities. For the observers getting the alternative data, there is nothing to tell them that they are getting the wrong answer. MWI is incoherent.

Since it's an interpretation, not a theory, then there's nothing to tell us we're getting the wrong answer either.  We only think "answers" are wrong if they aren't replicated.

Brent

Bruce

ISTM that whether we affirm one world or many worlds, all we can ever measure is what observe in this world, and it is from this world that we generate an ensemble after many trials from which to observe and affirm Born's rule. What am I missing, if anything? TIA, AG

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[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Feb 15, 2020 at 6:14 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 2/14/2020 1:34 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

That's quite an astute observation, Alan. The thing is, we can move on from there. If Many-worlds is true, all possible sets of measurements are generated, and most will give different values for the probabilities. For the observers getting the alternative data, there is nothing to tell them that they are getting the wrong answer. MWI is incoherent.

Since it's an interpretation, not a theory, then there's nothing to tell us we're getting the wrong answer either.  We only think "answers" are wrong if they aren't replicated.

Probably true... But that is exactly what happens in MWI with one branch per outcome -- the data obtained are independent of the amplitudes/coefficients in the original state. So only a miracle could ensure that repeats of an experiment gave the same results. Hence, by the "no miracles" argument, MWI is incoherent.

Bruce

[Alan Grayson]

If there are only two possible outcomes in this world, won't the ensemble in the unobserved world, be the complement of the ensemble in this world? AG 

[Philip Thrift]

More like clones than complements.

If there is a quantum coin flip (QCF) in world w, then there are two copies (branches) w-0 and w-1 with w-0 and w-1 being clones of w with the difference being the two possible outcomes. w no longer exists.

This proceeds with N QCFs via branching to 2^N worlds w-x[1]...x[N], x[i] in {0,1}

So with just 10000 QCFs there are now 

#python

print(2**10000)

19950631168807583848837421626835850838234968318861924548520089498529438830221946631919961684036194597899331129423209124271556491349413781117593785932096323957855730046793794526765246551266059895520550086918193311542508608460618104685509074866089624888090489894838009253941633257850621568309473902556912388065225096643874441046759871626985453222868538161694315775629640762836880760732228535091641476183956381458969463899410840960536267821064621427333394036525565649530603142680234969400335934316651459297773279665775606172582031407994198179607378245683762280037302885487251900834464581454650557929601414833921615734588139257095379769119277800826957735674444123062018757836325502728323789270710373802866393031428133241401624195671690574061419654342324638801248856147305207431992259611796250130992860241708340807605932320161268492288496255841312844061536738951487114256315111089745514203313820202931640957596464756010405845841566072044962867016515061920631004186422275908670900574606417856951911456055068251250406007519842261898059237118054444788072906395242548339221982707404473162376760846613033778706039803413197133493654622700563169937455508241780972810983291314403571877524768509857276937926433221599399876886660808368837838027643282775172273657572744784112294389733810861607423253291974813120197604178281965697475898164531258434135959862784130128185406283476649088690521047580882615823961985770122407044330583075869039319604603404973156583208672105913300903752823415539745394397715257455290510212310947321610753474825740775273986348298498340756937955646638621874569499279016572103701364433135817214311791398222983845847334440270964182851005072927748364550578634501100852987812389473928699540834346158807043959118985815145779177143619698728131459483783202081474982171858011389071228250905826817436220577475921417653715687725614904582904992461028630081535583308130101987675856234343538955409175623400844887526162643568648833519463720377293240094456246923254350400678027273837755376406726898636241037491410966718557050759098100246789880178271925953381282421954028302759408448955014676668389697996886241636313376393903373455801407636741877711055384225739499110186468219696581651485130494222369947714763069155468217682876200362777257723781365331611196811280792669481887201298643660768551639860534602297871557517947385246369446923087894265948217008051120322365496288169035739121368338393591756418733850510970271613915439590991598154654417336311656936031122249937969999226781732358023111862644575299135758175008199839236284615249881088960232244362173771618086357015468484058622329792853875623486556440536962622018963571028812361567512543338303270029097668650568557157505516727518899194129711337690149916181315171544007728650573189557450920330185304847113818315407324053319038462084036421763703911550639789000742853672196280903477974533320468368795868580237952218629120080742819551317948157624448298518461509704888027274721574688131594750409732115080498190455803416826949787141316063210686391511681774304792596709376

worlds.

@philipthrift

[Alan Grayson]

I interpret MW differently. If an observer gets a Head in this world on his first trial, another world is created where his clone get a Tail (since all possibilities are realized)  On the second trial in this world, whatever is measured will be reversed in some another world (for the same reason as just stated), maybe the same world as the one created on the first trial; and so forth. AG 

[Philip Thrift]

There is no "this world". "You"  is in a world w (out of the infinity of worlds already existing), runs the quantum coin flipper - https://www.nature.com/articles/nphys4342 - and two worlds w-0 and w-1 of equal reality replace w. And there are now "You"-0 and "You"-1 and no more "You".

@philipthrift

 

[Alan Grayson]

BS. 

[Philip Thrift]

[Philip Thrift]

You (not me) want a many-worlds reality. That's what you(s) get.

@philipthrift

[Alan Grayson]

BS2. 

[Philip Thrift]

What's incorrect?

If you are not a Many Worlds believer (Mad-Dog Everettian to use Sean Carroll's term) already, ignore any papers or articles on Many Worlds. They are a waste of time (to spend in this - the only - world there is).

@philipthrift 

[Alan Grayson]

I was having a discussion about the MWI, lately with Bruce, to clarify some issues. Doesn't mean I endorse the interpretation. Isn't that totally OBVIOUS? AG 

[Philip Thrift]

I was specifying exactly what MWI entails.

One starts with MWI (like with any axioms) and then sees what follows from the MWI premise.

         MWI implies .... .

Where did I go wrong in what I wrote in what MWI entails?

@philipthrift

[Alan Grayson]

I posted what MWI means. No need to repeat it. It doesn't mean THIS world doesn't exist, or somehow disappears in the process of measurement. AG 

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 4:29:11 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

 

I posted what MWI means. No need to repeat it. It doesn't mean THIS world doesn't exist, or somehow disappears in the process of measurement. AG 

That's nice.

@philipthrift 

[Alan Grayson]

Nice how? Bruce seems to think when a binary measurement is done in this world, it splits into two worlds, each with one of the possible measurements. I see only one world being created, with this world remaining intact, and then comes the second measurement, with its opposite occurring in another world, or perhaps in the same world created by the first measurement. So for N trials, the number of worlds created is N, or less. Isn't this what the MWI means? AG 

[Philip Thrift]

There is one measurement M in world w, with two possible outcomes: O1 and O2.

There are not two measurements M1 and M2.

Of the two worlds w-O1 and w-O2 post world w, one is not assigned "this" and the other assigned "that", They have equal status in MWI reality. One is not privileged over the other in any way.

@philipthrift

[Alan Grayson]

This is hopeless. It's like you don't understand what I wrote, which is pretty simple. AG

[Philip Thrift]

What you wrote has nothing to do with MWI. You created something different from MWI (in the Carroll sense).

But's OK to have your own interpretation. 

It's your own "interpretation", not MWI.  Publish it and call it something else.

@philipthrift 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2020, at 09:56, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Thursday, February 13, 2020 at 4:33:52 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:

On 2/13/2020 1:17 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible. I don't understand his argument, no doubt my failing.

I don't think they are incompatible; it's just that the Born rule has to stuck in somehow.  It's not implicit in the SWE and can't be derived from the linear evolution.  Somehow a probability has to be introduced.  Once there is a probability measure, then it can be argued via Gleason's theorem that the only consistent measure is the Born rule.

Brent

I think what Bruce is trying to show, is that using the MWI, one CANNOT derive Born's rule as claimed by its advocates. But whether one affirms MWI or not, the only thing one has to work with is an ensemble generated by measurements in THIS world. So if you cannot derive Born's rule using a one-world theory, it would seem impossible to do so with many-worlds, since in operational terms -- what is observed -- the two interpretations are indistinguishable.  AG 

We are in many worlds simultaneously. The reason that the particles seems to go in two holes at once, is that we are in two similar worlds, with the only difference being that that particle path. The statistics come from the fact that there are infinitely many computations (in arithmetic) going through or mental state (as described as the relevant level of description: indeed a universal machine cannot distinguish them.

“Many-world” is a misleading label. There are no possible evidence for “worlds”, but it is easy (albeit tedious) to prove that all computations are realised, or emulated, in virtue of the true relations between numbers.

Are mechanism does put light on Everett QM, and that is why Everett used mechanism, but he failed to see where the compilations originate from.

Those advocating the existence of a (one) physical world have to abandon Mechanism (but then also Drawin, and most contemporary discoveries).

Bruno

ISTM that whether we affirm one world or many worlds, all we can ever measure is what observe in this world, and it is from this world that we generate an ensemble after many trials from which to observe and affirm Born's rule. What am I missing, if anything? TIA, AG

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Feb 2020, at 22:31, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sat, Feb 15, 2020 at 6:14 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 2/14/2020 1:34 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

That's quite an astute observation, Alan. The thing is, we can move on from there. If Many-worlds is true, all possible sets of measurements are generated, and most will give different values for the probabilities. For the observers getting the alternative data, there is nothing to tell them that they are getting the wrong answer. MWI is incoherent.

Since it's an interpretation, not a theory, then there's nothing to tell us we're getting the wrong answer either.  We only think "answers" are wrong if they aren't replicated.

Probably true... But that is exactly what happens in MWI with one branch per outcome —

That never happens. It is always 2^aleph_0, at the least.

the data obtained are independent of the amplitudes/coefficients in the original state.

Yes, but the relative probabilities, knowing the present states, is dependent of those coefficients.

So only a miracle could ensure that repeats of an experiment gave the same results. Hence, by the "no miracles" argument, MWI is incoherent.

Your interpretation of the MW seems incoherent, to me. It is more like a many-histories, which are only the computations (run in the arithmetical reality) seen from inside, which can be defined using the tools of computer science (which belongs to arithmetic, but not necessarily in its computable part, due to the first person indeterminacy on all (relative) computational continuations.

Bruno

Bruce

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[Bruno Marchal]

OK.

runs the quantum coin flipper - https://www.nature.com/articles/nphys4342 - and two worlds

Two infinities of worlds, with the same relative measure.

w-0 and w-1 of equal reality replace w. And there are now "You"-0 and "You"-1 and no more "You”.

With the usual personal identity criterion, I would say that there is still many “you”, with a measure 1/2 of you-0 (who remember well being you) and the same for you-1.

Bruno

@philipthrift

 

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[Bruno Marchal]

You might be correct, but then Mechanism is wrong, making wrong not only Darwin, but also basically all known physical theories, which implies mechanism, and then nature confirms also the startling consequence of mechanism.

If you are duplicated (at the right mechanist substitution level), in virtual environment (to make sense of numerical identity), in two different rooms, you can understand that the notion of “this room” does not make sense for you anymore.

Similarly, the idea that in this world the particle has gone to one slit is meaningless, as the interferences are obtained only because you belong to both histories (well, too infinitely many one, but divided in two subset with the same measure, to be precise.

Bruno

 

"You"  is in a world w (out of the infinity of worlds already existing), runs the quantum coin flipper - https://www.nature.com/articles/nphys4342 - and two worlds w-0 and w-1 of equal reality replace w. And there are now "You"-0 and "You"-1 and no more "You".

@philipthrift

 

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[Bruno Marchal]

In both Mechanism and Everett: “this world”, or "this body” is meaningless, or, at best, very ambiguous. When doing metaphysics seriously, it is better to assume as less as possible, and no theories at all can assume, or even define, its own interpretation. Here logic + mechanism is far in advance compared to physics, as it handles the problem of interpretation in the precise and testable way. But mathematical logic is not well taught, if taught at all.

Bruno

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[Alan Grayson]

I suppose I'm just following Tegmark; everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.  So, when an observer measures UP (or DN) in THIS world, another world comes into existence wherein an observer MUST measure DN (or UP). From this I get N or less worlds for N trials where the results of measurements are binary, such as spin. Maybe not precisely MWI, but definitely less stupid -- but still egregiously stupid. How could MWI be remotely correctly if it alleges THIS world splits when it's never observed? But now you say that for Everett there's no such thing as THIS world. All this stuff, including Bruno's BS, is so profoundly dumb, I can't believe we're even discussing it! Was it Brent on another thread who claimed many physicists have become cultists? Whoever made that claim qualifies for sanity. AG

[Brent Meeker]

On 2/16/2020 5:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Feb 2020, at 09:56, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Thursday, February 13, 2020 at 4:33:52 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:

On 2/13/2020 1:17 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible. I don't understand his argument, no doubt my failing.

I don't think they are incompatible; it's just that the Born rule has to stuck in somehow.  It's not implicit in the SWE and can't be derived from the linear evolution.  Somehow a probability has to be introduced.  Once there is a probability measure, then it can be argued via Gleason's theorem that the only consistent measure is the Born rule.

Brent

I think what Bruce is trying to show, is that using the MWI, one CANNOT derive Born's rule as claimed by its advocates. But whether one affirms MWI or not, the only thing one has to work with is an ensemble generated by measurements in THIS world. So if you cannot derive Born's rule using a one-world theory, it would seem impossible to do so with many-worlds, since in operational terms -- what is observed -- the two interpretations are indistinguishable.  AG 

We are in many worlds simultaneously. The reason that the particles seems to go in two holes at once, is that we are in two similar worlds, with the only difference being that that particle path.

They have to be in the same world.  Otherwise they wouldn't interfere.

Brent

The statistics come from the fact that there are infinitely many computations (in arithmetic) going through or mental state (as described as the relevant level of description: indeed a universal machine cannot distinguish them.

“Many-world” is a misleading label. There are no possible evidence for “worlds”, but it is easy (albeit tedious) to prove that all computations are realised, or emulated, in virtue of the true relations between numbers.

Are mechanism does put light on Everett QM, and that is why Everett used mechanism, but he failed to see where the compilations originate from.

Those advocating the existence of a (one) physical world have to abandon Mechanism (but then also Drawin, and most contemporary discoveries).

Bruno

ISTM that whether we affirm one world or many worlds, all we can ever measure is what observe in this world, and it is from this world that we generate an ensemble after many trials from which to observe and affirm Born's rule. What am I missing, if anything? TIA, AG

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[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 12:03:00 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 2/16/2020 5:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Feb 2020, at 09:56, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Thursday, February 13, 2020 at 4:33:52 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:

On 2/13/2020 1:17 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible. I don't understand his argument, no doubt my failing.

I don't think they are incompatible; it's just that the Born rule has to stuck in somehow.  It's not implicit in the SWE and can't be derived from the linear evolution.  Somehow a probability has to be introduced.  Once there is a probability measure, then it can be argued via Gleason's theorem that the only consistent measure is the Born rule.

Brent

I think what Bruce is trying to show, is that using the MWI, one CANNOT derive Born's rule as claimed by its advocates. But whether one affirms MWI or not, the only thing one has to work with is an ensemble generated by measurements in THIS world. So if you cannot derive Born's rule using a one-world theory, it would seem impossible to do so with many-worlds, since in operational terms -- what is observed -- the two interpretations are indistinguishable.  AG 

We are in many worlds simultaneously. The reason that the particles seems to go in two holes at once, is that we are in two similar worlds, with the only difference being that that particle path.

They have to be in the same world.  Otherwise they wouldn't interfere.

Brent

The statistics come from the fact that there are infinitely many computations (in arithmetic) going through or mental state (as described as the relevant level of description: indeed a universal machine cannot distinguish them.

“Many-world” is a misleading label. There are no possible evidence for “worlds”, but it is easy (albeit tedious) to prove that all computations are realised, or emulated, in virtue of the true relations between numbers.

Are mechanism does put light on Everett QM, and that is why Everett used mechanism, but he failed to see where the compilations originate from.

Those advocating the existence of a (one) physical world have to abandon Mechanism (but then also Drawin, and most contemporary discoveries).

Bruno

You remember that Sean Carroll has in the past posted on a "variation" of MWI - the MIWI.

Guest Post: Chip Sebens on the Many-Interacting-Worlds Approach to Quantum Mechanics

http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/12/16/guest-post-chip-sebens-on-the-many-interacting-worlds-approach-to-quantum-mechanics/ 

"Worlds" are called "branches" in

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.08132.pdf

(where here branches apparently don't interact).

@philipthrift

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Feb 2020, at 17:54, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 5:49:38 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 6:19:36 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 4:58:33 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 2:51:53 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 1:45:50 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 4:29:11 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

 

I posted what MWI means. No need to repeat it. It doesn't mean THIS world doesn't exist, or somehow disappears in the process of measurement. AG 

That's nice.

@philipthrift 

Nice how? Bruce seems to think when a binary measurement is done in this world, it splits into two worlds, each with one of the possible measurements. I see only one world being created, with this world remaining intact, and then comes the second measurement, with its opposite occurring in another world, or perhaps in the same world created by the first measurement. So for N trials, the number of worlds created is N, or less. Isn't this what the MWI means? AG 

There is one measurement M in world w, with two possible outcomes: O1 and O2.

There are not two measurements M1 and M2.

Of the two worlds w-O1 and w-O2 post world w, one is not assigned "this" and the other assigned "that", They have equal status in MWI reality. One is not privileged over the other in any way.

@philipthrift

This is hopeless. It's like you don't understand what I wrote, which is pretty simple. AG

What you wrote has nothing to do with MWI. You created something different from MWI (in the Carroll sense).

But's OK to have your own interpretation. 

It's your own "interpretation", not MWI.  Publish it and call it something else.

@philipthrift 

I suppose I'm just following Tegmark; everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.  So, when an observer measures UP (or DN) in THIS world, another world comes into existence wherein an observer MUST measure DN (or UP). From this I get N or less worlds for N trials where the results of measurements are binary, such as spin. Maybe not precisely MWI, but definitely less stupid -- but still egregiously stupid. How could MWI be remotely correctly if it alleges THIS world splits when it's never observed?

Everett explains this entirely in his long text. The observer cannot feel the split, nor observe it directly. But if QM (without collapse) is correct, it is up to the Uni-World to provide explanation of how “nature” makes some terms in the superposition disappear.

Also, the MW is also a consequence of Descartes (mechanism) + Turing-Church-Post-Kleene (i.e. the discovery of the computer … in the elementary arithmetical reality). 

But now you say that for Everett there's no such thing as THIS world. All this stuff, including Bruno's BS, is so profoundly dumb, I can't believe we're even discussing it! Was it Brent on another thread who claimed many physicists have become cultists? Whoever made that claim qualifies for sanity. AG

Are you saying that the brain is not Turing emulable? Or what? All what I say follows from this “intuitively”, but is also recovered by the Platonician’s definition used in epistemology, when modelling  “rational belief” by “provability”, which is suggested by incompleteness. I do know philosophers who are not convinced, by I don’t do philosophy, I prefer to show a theory and its testability, and indeed I show exactly how to test experimentally between Mechanism and (Weak) Materialism (physicalism), and I show that quantum mechanics confirms Mechanism.

I am not the guy who comes with a new theory. I am just showing that the old and venerable Mechanist theory (in biology, psychology) is experimentally testable, and that QM without-collapse confirms it, like I show also that quantum logic confirms it.

What is your take on the WM-duplication? 

Bruno

PS if you could avoid the insults, and reason instead, that would be nice. Leave the insults to those who have no arguments.

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Feb 2020, at 19:02, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 2/16/2020 5:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Feb 2020, at 09:56, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Thursday, February 13, 2020 at 4:33:52 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:

On 2/13/2020 1:17 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible. I don't understand his argument, no doubt my failing.

I don't think they are incompatible; it's just that the Born rule has to stuck in somehow.  It's not implicit in the SWE and can't be derived from the linear evolution.  Somehow a probability has to be introduced.  Once there is a probability measure, then it can be argued via Gleason's theorem that the only consistent measure is the Born rule.

Brent

I think what Bruce is trying to show, is that using the MWI, one CANNOT derive Born's rule as claimed by its advocates. But whether one affirms MWI or not, the only thing one has to work with is an ensemble generated by measurements in THIS world. So if you cannot derive Born's rule using a one-world theory, it would seem impossible to do so with many-worlds, since in operational terms -- what is observed -- the two interpretations are indistinguishable.  AG 

We are in many worlds simultaneously. The reason that the particles seems to go in two holes at once, is that we are in two similar worlds, with the only difference being that that particle path.

They have to be in the same world.  Otherwise they wouldn't interfere.

If they are in the same world, they can no more interfere statistically, and, also, you would be able to get two particles from one, which makes not much sense to me. 

Bruno

Brent

The statistics come from the fact that there are infinitely many computations (in arithmetic) going through or mental state (as described as the relevant level of description: indeed a universal machine cannot distinguish them.

“Many-world” is a misleading label. There are no possible evidence for “worlds”, but it is easy (albeit tedious) to prove that all computations are realised, or emulated, in virtue of the true relations between numbers.

Are mechanism does put light on Everett QM, and that is why Everett used mechanism, but he failed to see where the compilations originate from.

Those advocating the existence of a (one) physical world have to abandon Mechanism (but then also Drawin, and most contemporary discoveries).

Bruno

ISTM that whether we affirm one world or many worlds, all we can ever measure is what observe in this world, and it is from this world that we generate an ensemble after many trials from which to observe and affirm Born's rule. What am I missing, if anything? TIA, AG

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[Alan Grayson]

As I see it, you have no arguments for MW except hand-waving. Do unicorns exist because they can exist? If there are genetic codes which create unicorns, do they exist, somewhere? Well maybe, given enough time. I'll grant you that. But the horse which loses a race in this world, doesn't imply another world in which it wins. Why should it? This is the basic flaw in this nonsense. There is absolutely no basis for believing in another world in which the horse wins; or if I get spin UP in this world, there must be another world in which another copy of me measures spin DN. You justify this by appeals to words and processes I don't fully understand, but they cannot lead to such nonsense. You're just making some critical errors in judgment which I could possibly locate if I wanted to get into your system. But since I know your conclusions are wrong, I am not motivated to do so. I can't explain collapse. But I'd rather to just say I don't know, than to embrace the nonsense of MW. Have you considered forgetting about wf's and just use Dirac's Matrix Mechanics instead of the SWE? In MM there are no waves so no collapse to worry about. Why focus on collapse of the wf when you can use MM? AG

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[Alan Grayson]

LOL. I won't publish! There's more than enough confusion as is. No point in increasing it! You're probably correct; it's my interpretation of MW, probably not exactly what Everett had in mind.  But in the final analysis I don't think it matters. MW is nonsense, however you define it. There's no reason to believe that a horse which loses a race in this world, implies another world in which it wins. AG

[Alan Grayson]

Heisenberg created Matrix Mechanics. AG 

[Philip Thrift]

What you said above

"Have you considered forgetting about wf's and just use Dirac's Matrix Mechanics instead of the SWE? In MM there are no waves so no collapse to worry about. Why focus on collapse of the wf when you can use MM? AG"

is correct of course. This is well known - that there are several "interpretations" that are not in terms of Hilbert Space or wave function.

Quantum Dynamics without the Wave Function

https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0610204

The Form and Interpretation of the Decoherence Functional

A realist quantum theory based on the decoherence functional using the co-event interpretation of Quantum Measure Theory. The Sum-Over-Histories theory of quantum mechanics will provide the bedding for a Hilbert-space-free stochastic-like theory.

https://spiral.imperial.ac.uk/bitstream/10044/1/70797/1/Wilkes-H-2019-PhD-Thesis.pdf

@philipthrift

[Bruno Marchal]

Exists in which sense? They certainly are fictive object. Unicorn does not exist, because by definition they belong to fairy tales. I am not sure what you try to convey, or perhaps to insinuate. “Hand waning” is a bit of an insult. Please quote the sentences that you disagree with, or that you don’t understand.

Or are you assimilating the true number relation with fiction? Then stop doing science, because those number relations are assumed in all theories that I know of.

If there are genetic codes which create unicorns, do they exist, somewhere?

No. Unicorn does not exist by definition. Some horse have one corn, due to congenital malformation, but we don’t use them to suddenly claim that unicorn exist. It would be playing with word.

Well maybe, given enough time. I'll grant you that.

That seems wiser, I mean to understand that the computation exists, once you agree with simple rules like x + 0 = x, x + s(y) = s(x + y), etc.

But the horse which loses a race in this world, doesn't imply another world in which it wins.

I agree. Horses are quasi-classical, so if they lose in “my” branche, they most certainly lose in almost all branches, except perhaps for a negligible subset.

Why should it? This is the basic flaw in this nonsense. There is absolutely no basis for believing in another world in which the horse wins;

I agree. But there are reason to believe, when I send a particle on a plate with two holes, that there are as much histories where it passes through one hole than histories where it passes through the other.

To be sure reality” is more complex, and those histories are relative indexical projection sequences.

I prefer to avoid the term world, which is a technical term in logic, and a very general one. 

or if I get spin UP in this world, there must be another world in which another copy of me measures spin DN.

Then you need to *add* the collapse postulate, which means you have to use different physics for the physicists and the particle. Also, you need to abandon Mechanism (and thus Darwin, biology, etc.). 

You justify this by appeals to words and processes I don't fully understand, but they cannot lead to such nonsense.

I can understand that all this is shocking, but science is not wishful thinking, and we cannot make a simple theory (arithmetic) more complicated just to be OK with our metaphysical prejudices.

You're just making some critical errors in judgment which I could possibly locate

You are welcome.

if I wanted to get into your system. But since I know your conclusions are wrong,

You cannot be serious and say “I know that your conclusion are wrong”. You can say “I suspect your conclusion are wrong”, but even this, when said between scientist, is rare. You should better say “I suspect your conclusion are wrong for this or that reason”.

I am not motivated to do so. I can't explain collapse. But I'd rather to just say I don't know, than to embrace the nonsense of MW.

Concerning Reality, the antic metaphysician knew already that nobody can say “we know …”. In science we give theories and means of verification. If the theory is refuted, we learn something. If not, doubt remains.

Have you considered forgetting about wf's and just use Dirac's Matrix Mechanics

I guess you mean Heisenberg matrix Mechanics. Yes, that does not change anything. Deutsch even prefer the Heisenberg matrices to illustrate the MWI.  I use the SWE just to fix the things. The best formulation of QM is the one by Feynman.

instead of the SWE? In MM there are no waves so no collapse to worry about.

I agree, and in Feynman there is no collapse either, but that’s is what explains the success of the MWI, notably in cosmology and quantum computations. The collapse has been invented to suppress the many worlds, which admittedly look even more weird if we take the SWE literally. The truth is closer to Feynman, which is truly more general, and clearly coherent with relativity (which contradict the SWE). That is even why some people, like Finkelstein, but also Einstein+Bohr, have been close to deduce relativity from quantum mechanics, something that I am studying (no personal opinion on that matter yet).

Why focus on collapse of the wf when you can use MM? AG

If you accept MM, no problem. The many worlds comes there in the form of non nul diagonal term in the density matrixes. See the paper of Deutsch and Heyden to see the “many-world” interpretation of Heisenberg matrix mechanics. Non relativistic MM is completely equivalent with the SWE. Then Dirac and Feynman are just more exact formulation, taking into account the invariance for the Lorentz transformation.

Bruno

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[Alan Grayson]

This is where the proverbial rubber hits the road. I can assume a primary physical world where observations yield those arithmetic rules. As a rudimentary result, there is only one world, this world. Also, you speak of computations, but where is the computer doing the computations? MW is like what Nietzsche said of Christianity; Rococo of the Mind. AG 

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[Quentin Anciaux]

So you accept a physical reality emerging from nothing, located nowhere (as if it has any meaning)... but not a computation... strange how one can be blinded by his own prejudice. 

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[Alan Grayson]

Speaking of prejudices, tell me where and what is the computer doing the computation?  AG

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[Quentin Anciaux]

The same place and thing that magically support the physical reality.

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[Alan Grayson]

You made the claim that computations exist. So please tell me what is doing the computations and where it is located. Hand-waving not acceptable. AG 

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[Alan Grayson]

Alternatively, if computations "support the physical reality", what supports that which supports the physical reality? Another model of turtles within turtles within turtles, infinitely regressing? AG 

[Quentin Anciaux]

You made the claim that physical reality exists ontologically... Can you back it up ? Hand-waving not acceptable

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[Alan Grayson]

I never used the word or concept "ontological".  We observe the world. You claim Many Worlds based on "computations". It's YOUR claim! What is doing the computations and where is it located? If you can't answer this question, your model should not be taken seriously. OTOH, I leave the answer open. I'm willing to acknowledge that I don't know how our universe is "supported", or if it needs to be supported. You claim to have the answer.  But you're like the King who has no clothes. AG

[Quentin Anciaux]

Why should they be located anywhere or done by anything ? It's your claim they should. Stop hand waving !

f you can't answer this question, your model should not be taken seriously. OTOH, I leave the answer open. I'm willing to acknowledge that I don't know how our universe is "supported", or if it needs to be supported. You claim to have the answer.  But you're like the King who has no clothes. AG

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[Alan Grayson]

Face it. You have a vacuous claim. It's not located anywhere and doesn't do anything? And you implicitly claim this is an application of the scientific method? AG 

If you can't answer this question, your model should not be taken seriously. OTOH, I leave the answer open. I'm willing to acknowledge that I don't know how our universe is "supported", or if it needs to be supported. You claim to have the answer.  But you're like the King who has no clothes. AG

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[Quentin Anciaux]

Face it you have a serious claim, stop dodging and hand waving. Why should an ontological computation be located somewhere and done by something, and not an ontological physical reality ? It's the same thing, so when you'll answer without hand waving, I'll do the same.

If you can't answer this question, your model should not be taken seriously. OTOH, I leave the answer open. I'm willing to acknowledge that I don't know how our universe is "supported", or if it needs to be supported. You claim to have the answer.  But you're like the King who has no clothes. AG

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[Alan Grayson]

What is doing the computation? Why is it necessary. You can't explain its necessity or remotely identify it. Dream on, and go FY. AG 

If you can't answer this question, your model should not be taken seriously. OTOH, I leave the answer open. I'm willing to acknowledge that I don't know how our universe is "supported", or if it needs to be supported. You claim to have the answer.  But you're like the King who has no clothes. AG

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[Alan Grayson]

We know the world, THIS world, exists. When we kick it, it kicks back. Why does it need anything in addition to exist? I am listening but you refuse to explain. What is being computed? What, or who wrote the program? Or is there no program? If no program, your claim makes no sense in being an analogy with computers we have.  You insist on the existence of computation to allow the existence of this world.  But what specific function does this computation satisfy to allow for existence? What you have is just a load of BS which makes you happy, presumably. AG 

[Quentin Anciaux]

Why should *something* be doing an ontological computation and an ontological physical reality wouldn't have the same requirement ?  You can't explain its necessity or remotely identify it. Dream on, and go.

If you can't answer this question, your model should not be taken seriously. OTOH, I leave the answer open. I'm willing to acknowledge that I don't know how our universe is "supported", or if it needs to be supported. You claim to have the answer.  But you're like the King who has no clothes. AG

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[Quentin Anciaux]

It's asking where is the ontological physical reality substrate of the ontological computations which are the base of the reality, don't you see the absurdity of the question when the hypotheses is that the physical reality is not ontologically real but an appearance from an ontological mathematical reality ? The mathematical reality is located nowhere ex hypothesi, it's the base of the real, computation are process existing statically in the mathematical reality ex hypothesi.

If you can't answer this question, your model should not be taken seriously. OTOH, I leave the answer open. I'm willing to acknowledge that I don't know how our universe is "supported", or if it needs to be supported. You claim to have the answer.  But you're like the King who has no clothes. AG

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[Alan Grayson]

Your hypothesis is that there must exist mathematical computations to sustain the universe. Unless and until you can justify this hypothesis, it's nothing more than hot air.  But even if I accepted your hypothesis, I'd like to know what is being computed. Here too, you fail to offer anything at all, let alone plausible. AG

If you can't answer this question, your model should not be taken seriously. OTOH, I leave the answer open. I'm willing to acknowledge that I don't know how our universe is "supported", or if it needs to be supported. You claim to have the answer.  But you're like the King who has no clothes. AG

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[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, February 19, 2020 at 12:54:21 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

What is being computed? What, or who wrote the program? Or is there no program? If no program, your claim makes no sense in being an analogy with computers we have.  AG 

 Matter is

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programmable_matter

but naturally, not synthetically.

@philipthrift

[Quentin Anciaux]

What is being computed is our consciousness. Physical reality is an appearance inside our consciousness. The ontologically real physical reality is also no more than an hypothesis, nothing more than hot air... but contrary to you I do not attach myself to any hypothesis, I entertain them and see where it could lead... I'm not an advocate of this or that contrary to you, I'm not here to defend anything except the right to discuss it. Stop being a old rat by adding violence to every post you make on this list... be an adult and try to discuss instead of fighting like your live depends on it.

Quentin

If you can't answer this question, your model should not be taken seriously. OTOH, I leave the answer open. I'm willing to acknowledge that I don't know how our universe is "supported", or if it needs to be supported. You claim to have the answer.  But you're like the King who has no clothes. AG

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[Alan Grayson]

Matter computes when it has specific structures and inputs. It doesn't create or sustain reality in an ontological sense, which is what the argument is about. That is, matter and computations in the link you offer, is preexisting and assumed. AG 

[Alan Grayson]

You surely have a claim which you defend with gusto. All I have done is ask for the basis of your claim -- such as that our consciousness is being computed -- but I haven't seen it. I am not necessarily saying your wrong. I am just asking why you seem so certain you are right. I'm not even clear what it means to compute consciousness. AG 

[Quentin Anciaux]

No I don't defend anything, you do. You defend an ontologically real physical universe, and you don't back your claim. I entertain all idea.

 

All I have done is ask for the basis of your claim -- such as that our consciousness is being computed -- but I haven't seen it.

It's an hypothesis not a claim, it has the same base as an ontologically real physical universe, it's ex hipothesi, both are not compatible hypothesisn so you can't frame one into the other, and that's precisely what you're asking.

 

I am not necessarily saying your wrong. I am just asking why you seem so certain you are right.

I don't know where and when you've seen me asserting I'm certain of anything, I'm just discussing hypothesis and see where that lead

 

I'm not even clear what it means to compute consciousness. AG 

Well if we create one day a full AGI, then that's what it will mean... it will be a consciousness and computed... And for any computation, there are an infinity of possible implementations, we are then in the idea of Bruno. But that only work if computations have an ontological status (meaning they're all *existing* timelessly)... 

But instead of insulting, you should read, we're in a discussion group after all, and if you're not interrested in some hypothesis, don't read them... You can have all the beliefs you want, here we're discussing, not asserting one's belief is better and the other stupid...

At least being able to create a full AGI would give credence to the computational hypothesis, but much more would need to be done, I'm not even sure that can be settled, because it can easily lead to everything is geography.

Quentin

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[Alan Grayson]

AGI = artificial general intelligence? I see a world. It seems real. Your hypothesis is that it's an illusion generated by computations, which are somehow "real". Why should anyone entertain that hypothesis? How could consciousness be generated by computations, and what is doing the computations? A person's brain, or some super brain existing in hyperspace, or beyond the space-time continuum? I get annoyed because I don't see anything to hang my hat on, so to speak. It seems like fantasy talk. AG 

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[Philip Thrift]

That's exactly right.

And also all human-made computers we've ever made - from abacus to laptop - perform computations by moving stuff - beads or electrons - from one place to another. There is no external, abstract computation outside matter that has ever existed.

@philipthrift 

[Bruno Marchal]

The idea is to derive the complex things, like a physical reality and consciousness, from the simple one on which everyone agree. Every one agree on RA, PA’s axioms, which are used in most theories, including in physics.

As a rudimentary result, there is only one world, this world.

Really? You might gives a link to the paper. One world is as much a metaphysical/theological hypothesis than one worlds, a countable number of worlds, an uncountable collection of worlds, etc. 

0 worlds is a good default hypothesis until we get some evidence for some world or worlds. 

There has  never been an evidence for a world. Science is arguably born from that constatation. 

The whole God/Non-God debate is like a trick in between materialist to make us forget that the original theological question of the greeks was concerning the existence of a ontologically primary universe. The question was is physics, music, or mathematics, or something else, the fundamental science. They use “god” as a nickname for the fundamental reality that we search, with the insight that it is more than “my personal consciousness” (the only indubitable belief).

Also, you speak of computations, but where is the computer doing the computations?

Once you agree with elementary arithmetical axiom, like 

1) 0 ≠ s(x)
2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
4) x+0 = x
5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
6) x*0=0
7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

It is not so difficult to define and prove the existence of all halting computations from only those axioms, (together with classical logic), and if you add the induction axioms (PA), you can already prove much more about them including the existence of non halting one, and even of the limitation of machine (and us, with mechanism) about what they can prove about them. 

I can do it if you are interested. It is already in Gödel 1931, although he did not realise this at that time, because he missed the Church’s thesis, and will only  accept it after reading Turing seminal paper (in 1936).

It is just a matter of fact that there is an infinity of computations executed in (each model of) arithmetic going through you actual state, and physics HAS to be explained by their relative statistic if we assume mechanism (which is basically the assumption that there is no magic occurring in the brain/body).

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

That makes sense, but there is an important difference though. 

The notion of computations admit a clear mathematical definition. (Unlike any ontological commitment).

Ask any mathematician if the 10th problem of Hilbert has been solved. They will all answer that it has been indeed solved, and negatively (there is no algorithmic method to solve a diophantine polynomial equation). But such a negative result would not be possible without a clear definition of computation (which what is provided by Church’s and Turing’s thesis (also found by Post and Kleene, perhaps Markov).

Gödel did not believe, for awhile, that such a definition could be possible. He did just proved that there is no universal definition of provability, or of admissible inference rules, etc. and this by diagonalisation. But then he admitted what he called a miracle, we cannot diagonalise against the universal machine, and that is really a miracle in the sense that it is the first epistemic notion admitting a mathematical definition. No such definition exists for provability, definissability, etc. 

Then once we have that mathematical definition, it is just a bit tedious, but not that much difficult, to prove that they exist, and even in the sense that they are are emulated by, in arithmetic. That can be proved syntactically, or using the model theory tools.

And that leads to a thoroughly precise (even constructive) version of the antic dream argument, which was the informal basic motivation to doubt the existence of a primitively material realm.

Bruno

If you can't answer this question, your model should not be taken seriously. OTOH, I leave the answer open. I'm willing to acknowledge that I don't know how our universe is "supported", or if it needs to be supported. You claim to have the answer.  But you're like the King who has no clothes. AG

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[Bruno Marchal]

Well if we create one day a full AGI, then that's what it will mean... it will be a consciousness and computed... And for any computation, there are an infinity of possible implementations, we are then in the idea of Bruno. But that only work if computations have an ontological status (meaning they're all *existing* timelessly)… 

Yes, and then it is easy to write one program, which generates all programs, and execute them by Dovetailing. And that can be used as anointed method to eventually show that such a program is implemented in the arithmetical reality (no real need to show that this is provable in PA, we need only the more intuitive notion of model of arithmetic, i.e. the structure (N, 0, +, *) taught in high school.

But instead of insulting, you should read, we're in a discussion group after all, and if you're not interrested in some hypothesis, don't read them... You can have all the beliefs you want, here we're discussing, not asserting one's belief is better and the other stupid...

At least being able to create a full AGI would give credence to the computational hypothesis, but much more would need to be done, I'm not even sure that can be settled, because it can easily lead to everything is geography.

Quentin

AGI = artificial general intelligence? I see a world. It seems real.

Actually I would bet that it *is* real. Mechanism does not make it unreal, but it makes it *not primary real”, as it has to be explained by the statistic on all computations “seen from inside” (that is what will eventually required a bit of mathematical logic for getting the mathematical definition (of “seen from inside”).

Your hypothesis is that it's an illusion generated by computations, which are somehow "real”.

You can derive this from digital mechanism, which is basically what Darwin used in the theory of evolution. He foreseen the digital aspect of mechanism, confirmed partially by Mendel and Watson and Crick, but also implied by all known physical theories.

Why should anyone entertain that hypothesis?

If you accept Darwin, there is no more choice in the matter. Then you can refute it by finding that Nature violate the laws of the physics which is the head of any universal machine/number.

How could consciousness be generated by computations, and what is doing the computations?

So what is doing the computation: the natural number, in virtue of the true number relations (we can limit them to the computable one, which are known as the sigma_1 propositions).

Then consciousness is explained if you agree that consciousness is:

True, 

immediately knowable,

non rationally justifiable,

non definable without invoking a notion of truth,

And, with mechanism, unchanged from a functional digital substitution made at some description level. Here “my” mechanist hypothesis is far weaker than most from the literature, which usually take a rather high level of description (like neural nets) for granted. To get the conclusion, all you need is that such a level of description exist, even if to copy your brain you need to coy the whole physical universe at the level of the superstring, the reasoning will still follow.

A person's brain, or some super brain existing in hyperspace, or beyond the space-time continuum? I get annoyed because I don't see anything to hang my hat on, so to speak. It seems like fantasy talk. AG 

I think you are just missing the fact that the notion of computation does not require more than 2+2=4 and Co. (which has assumed in all theories of physics).

When doing metaphysics seriously, logic is very useful, if only to put all the hypothesis on the table. You would realise that this is insuperably difficult when you try to put an ontological commitment at the start in the theory. Most of the time, this leads to inconsistency. But even if your theory is consistent, you will see that it has top assume something Turing universal, and with mechanism, that Turing universal thing is not not only necessary and sufficient, but the theory get oincosietnt once you assume more. Sets, functions, analysis, continua, and physical realities are better explained in the internal phenomenology made by the machines (represented faithfully through the sigma_1 number relations).

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

This describes the computation implemented in a physical reality. But since Gödel 1931, we know (or should know) that they are implemented also in arithmetic. If you believe that only the physical computations can be conscious, you might try to find what in matter is not Turing emulable, and would play a role in consciousness. Now, if you find that, you will have to reject Digital Mechanism, which is my point.

Bruno 

There is no external, abstract computation outside matter that has ever existed.

@philipthrift 

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[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, February 19, 2020 at 10:04:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Feb 2020, at 12:14, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wednesday, February 19, 2020 at 3:13:35 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Wednesday, February 19, 2020 at 12:34:20 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Wednesday, February 19, 2020 at 12:54:21 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

What is being computed? What, or who wrote the program? Or is there no program? If no program, your claim makes no sense in being an analogy with computers we have.  AG 

 Matter is

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programmable_matter

but naturally, not synthetically.

@philipthrift

Matter computes when it has specific structures and inputs. It doesn't create or sustain reality in an ontological sense, which is what the argument is about. That is, matter and computations in the link you offer, is preexisting and assumed. AG 

That's exactly right.

And also all human-made computers we've ever made - from abacus to laptop - perform computations by moving stuff - beads or electrons - from one place to another.

This describes the computation implemented in a physical reality. But since Gödel 1931, we know (or should know) that they are implemented also in arithmetic. If you believe that only the physical computations can be conscious, you might try to find what in matter is not Turing emulable, and would play a role in consciousness. Now, if you find that, you will have to reject Digital Mechanism, which is my point.

Bruno 

There is no external, abstract computation outside matter that has ever existed.

@philipthrift 

That numerical machines can emulate the apparent behavior of everything is the conventional view of science (what Philip Goff's book is about), and what Tegmark and every other physicist I've come across says. (It from [qu]bit.)

But the experiential (Galen Strawson) machine (intrinsically conscious) relies on nonnumerical entities.

@philipthrift

[Bruno Marchal]

Not to bad. Of course, with mechanism, it is the other way round: the simplest theory of consciousness (mechanism) is used to explain the quantum (appearances) (*)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CT7SiRiqK-Q&list=WL

My comment on Facebook(**):

<<<<

That's not to bad, but of course still ignore that Everett should have pushed the idea a bit further.
My comment there:

<<
The problem with Everett "many world/histories" is that it needs the digital mechanist hypothesis in the cognitive science, but then computer science, and mathematical logic, teach that all computations are emulated in virtue of the simple elementary (sigma_1) arithmetical truth, and this enforces to derive the wave itself, and/or the laws of physics, from a statistics on all computations "see from inside" (which needs the logic of self-reference, but that is what a theorem by Solovay provides, and it works!). The quantum seems to be "only" the digital "seen from inside", and the advantage of extracting physics from the mind of the universal Turing machine is that we can use incompleteness to separate the rationally probable part from the true but not rationally justifiable, which is handy for a mathematics of qualia. Quanta appears as sharable qualia among universal machines/numbers.
>>

Mathematical logic extracts a simple theory of consciousness, which is the truth that any universal machine/number encounters when looking inward in the Gödel manner, and which is immediately knowable, indubitable, yet non rationally justifiable and non definable without invoking some notion of truth (like here the arithmetical truth). 

And from that theory of consciousness, the Gödel-Löb-Solovay interview of the "enough rich" (Löbian) machine gives the propositional part of the whole "machine theology", which includes physics (like a neoplatonist theology) which can be compared with Nature, and thanks to the quantum "many-histories" weirdness, and thanks also to the formalism itself, that fits rather well, and we get a precise theory of qualia extending the quanta.

There is a lot of crap on consciousness and quantum mechanics, but those things are related, and the gy here is correct on the relation except that digital mechanism is used, and that enforce pursuing the embedding of the physicists in the physical reality by an embedding of the mathematicians in the arithmetical reality.

>>>>

Bruno

(*) I explain this also in my paper:

Marchal B., 2001, Computation, Consciousness and the Quantum, in Teorie & Modelli, n.s., VI, 1, 2001, pp. 29-43. Special issue on the History and Problems of Quantum Interpretations of Consciousness, ed. by M. Battacchi, V. Fano.

(**) https://www.facebook.com/Bruno.Marchal24

[Alan Grayson]

IMO, a world created by arithmetic computations is Platonism run amok. I see no reason to entertain this hypothesis. What is your plausibility argument? AG

[Bruno Marchal]

Yes, and the universal machine go in the direction of Galen Strawson. The universal machine knows already that only a very tiny part of the arithmetical reality is Turing emulable (the sigma_1 part). 

And the same occur with the physical reality, which has to be non Turing emulable. If you can survive with Digital brain, then it is impossible to emulate your body, or *any* part of your body with a computer.

And we have the same with consciousness, at least in the 1p view. If []p (my belief) is Turing emulable, then I can believe that me-1p ([]p & p, at the meta level) is Turing emulable. Consciousness is a semantical notion, and no semantic is Turing emulable. Truth is beyond all machine, even when we restrict the truth on the 3p arithmetical reality. The general concept of truth is not just not computable, it is, like truth, not even definable.

Digital Physicalism (the physical universe exist and is Turing emulable) is false, with or without mechanism.

Indeed Digital physicalism entails Digital Mechanism, but, very importantly, Digital Mechanism refutes Digital Physicalism (see my post or paper, or ask). So Digital Physicalism entails the negation of Physical Digitalism, and so Digital physicalism must be false, no matter what.

I am not sure Tegmark defend the digital physicalism, as he is open to mathematicalism, which is something a priori larger and typically non digital physicalist, but can still be phsyicaliist, by choosing a mathematical structure among another.

It is the lack of knowledge in logic which makes some (perhaps many) people confusing digital physicalism and digital mechanism. I make it clear that those thing are at the antipode of each other.

Sometimes I sum ins saying “If I am a machine, then everything which is not me is highly not computable (not a machine).

Or better: If the part of my body relevant to sustain my consciousness is Turing emulable, then neither my body, nor my consciousness are Turing emulable.

Bruno

@philipthrift

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[Bruno Marchal]

That expression is super-ambiguous, but as far I can make sense, I agree, and the universal machine lardy agree too.

The physical reality is never created or constructed, it is only dreamed, and the physical reality emerges from the dreams, in a non computable way.

The dreams are all emulated with a big redundancy in arithmetic, and physics is determined by the mathematics of that redundancy, and that mathematics does not depend on the choice of the universal dreamer, nor of the basic ontology (which can be any Turing complete theory or system).

Bruno

I see no reason to entertain this hypothesis. What is your plausibility argument? AG

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All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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