I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.Not convincing.Bruce
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b29bdc48-d9c8-4ee7-9578-dc430ead02a5%40googlegroups.com.
On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.
Not convincing.
BruceLC
On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 10:56:24 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm
Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world. Our world is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell inequality more than does quantum theory. This serves to debunk the myth that equates local realism with local hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along the way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were right in their questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory, provided one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our journey, we strive to explain our views from first principles, without expecting mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge from the reader.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSO1jvSdDVz5uoi6CBN4KvgNvBxX%2BVuc4kLhdjF7r%2BL_w%40mail.gmail.com.
On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.
I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
Brent
On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.
I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
Brent
On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.
I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
Brent
--
Not convincing.
BruceLC
On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 10:56:24 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm
Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world. Our world is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell inequality more than does quantum theory. This serves to debunk the myth that equates local realism with local hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along the way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were right in their questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory, provided one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our journey, we strive to explain our views from first principles, without expecting mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge from the reader.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSO1jvSdDVz5uoi6CBN4KvgNvBxX%2BVuc4kLhdjF7r%2BL_w%40mail.gmail.com.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/49134300-90d0-e42d-57e6-e39736fb8c76%40verizon.net.
On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.
I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed lower than light.
Bruce
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSbeRn8o8jWdGEybBNqy_HQeYjQJ2wmmosXx50u1si1QA%40mail.gmail.com.
On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.
I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed lower than light.
On 16 Aug 2019, at 13:30, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:23 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.
I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed lower than light.That doesn't explain anything.I know you’ve already try to expand on this, but it seems to me that this was based on some incorrect interpretation of the notion of worlds, like if a measurement made by Alice has to change the possible outcomes available to Bob, but that does not happen in the relative state view. Only a physical collapse would entail some “action at a distance”; without collapse anywhere, I don’t see how could such influence at a distance occurs. We did disagree also on the numbers of histories involved, which I take to be always infinite.
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/cb22c6df-4616-9ddf-26c5-c795187f089b%40verizon.net.
On 15 Aug 2019, at 17:56, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htmAbstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world. Our world is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell inequality more than does quantum theory. This serves to debunk the myth that equates local realism with local hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along the way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were right in their questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory, provided one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our journey, we strive to explain our views from first principles, without expecting mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge from the reader.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUi3HAX3yu%3Dcfe8%3DhiQOqONihzdGx-aYjZSLF4ZtCp4o3g%40mail.gmail.com.
On 17 Aug 2019, at 21:49, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote: On 8/17/2019 6:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself relatively. And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it means that her accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her photon and d for bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he will meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices seeing u will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will access a world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or slower, and no physical influence exist at all.If there is no physical influence, then why is it limited to light speed?Because the spreading of the superposition is a local phenomenon.
Brent, Bruce,On 16 Aug 2019, at 22:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:On 8/16/2019 4:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.
I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed lower than light.
But as Bruce says, it's a kind of magic as stated. To not be magic there must be some physical interactions communicating Alice's result to Bob's system: Photons would the obvious candidate, but how exactly do they interact with Bob and his system to make them orthogonal to one of Alice's results and not the other?The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself relatively.
And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it means that her accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her photon and d for bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he will meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices seeing u will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will access a world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or slower, and no physical influence exist at all. They both only localise themselves in the multiverse, at different possible cosmic branches.
The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob, which would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than light physical influence.
A quantum state does not describe a world, but is only an indexical map, for a subject, of the histories that he/she can access to. ud-du means only, to Alice and Bob, that they will always means their corresponding correlated counterpart, whatever they found.
Even if we give sense to “they both find u”, each of us will meet they counterparts, which they can interact with when meeting again, having found d.
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/11e64fd4-8375-7287-1f1f-936bada30cec%40verizon.net.
On 19 Aug 2019, at 04:02, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:Brent, Bruce,On 16 Aug 2019, at 22:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:On 8/16/2019 4:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.
I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed lower than light.
But as Bruce says, it's a kind of magic as stated. To not be magic there must be some physical interactions communicating Alice's result to Bob's system: Photons would the obvious candidate, but how exactly do they interact with Bob and his system to make them orthogonal to one of Alice's results and not the other?The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself relatively.That is exactly the magic that needs to be explained.
And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it means that her accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her photon and d for bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he will meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices seeing u will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will access a world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or slower, and no physical influence exist at all. They both only localise themselves in the multiverse, at different possible cosmic branches.What makes a history "accessible"? You have offered only magic to rule out histories that violate the basic conservation rules.
The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob, which would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than light physical influence.The argument does not depend on any "one world" assumption. The problem is clearly present even in the Everettian setting, when there are copies of Alice and Bob who see each result. These always exist, since both up and down results are always possible for any measurement on the separated singlet particles.
A quantum state does not describe a world, but is only an indexical map, for a subject, of the histories that he/she can access to. ud-du means only, to Alice and Bob, that they will always means their corresponding correlated counterpart, whatever they found.Given the miracle that occurs at this step in your account.
Even if we give sense to “they both find u”, each of us will meet they counterparts, which they can interact with when meeting again, having found d.You are not convincing anyone other than yourself here, Bruno.
Bruce
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRbaP3K_VTybf6DtG%3D_Aq4hDgKGa9JzoRzZ6-TsoXEG8Q%40mail.gmail.com.
On 19 Aug 2019, at 04:02, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself relatively.That is exactly the magic that needs to be explained.I don’t see this. ud - du predicts this, by the quantum formalism.
The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob, which would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than light physical influence.The argument does not depend on any "one world" assumption. The problem is clearly present even in the Everettian setting, when there are copies of Alice and Bob who see each result. These always exist, since both up and down results are always possible for any measurement on the separated singlet particles.I don’t see this. Alice and Bob have prepared the particle together (or by some entanglement swapping technic), the state ud-du require the correlations, in all base. Once separated, they can only access to their correlate parts, which requires the “creation” of “new” Bob and Alice.
It is up to you, if you think that some FTL influence occur, to explain why and how.
Both EPR and Bell assumes that "Alice and Bob” are well defined and keep their identity throughout the experience, which indeed would require some FTL influence, but I don’t see that FTL when we keep all branch of the superposition into account.
On 19 Aug 2019, at 13:59, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 6:41 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 19 Aug 2019, at 04:02, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself relatively.That is exactly the magic that needs to be explained.I don’t see this. ud - du predicts this, by the quantum formalism.Yes, and that formalism requires what for you is "the dreaded collapse". Think about it. How else does this work in conventional QM?The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob, which would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than light physical influence.The argument does not depend on any "one world" assumption. The problem is clearly present even in the Everettian setting, when there are copies of Alice and Bob who see each result. These always exist, since both up and down results are always possible for any measurement on the separated singlet particles.I don’t see this. Alice and Bob have prepared the particle together (or by some entanglement swapping technic), the state ud-du require the correlations, in all base. Once separated, they can only access to their correlate parts, which requires the “creation” of “new” Bob and Alice.No, this is just an appeal to magic. "They can only have access to their correlate parts"? That is what you have to explain. What prevents them from accessing all the other combinations.
Look, it is actually quite simple for you. All you have to do is provide a local causal explanation for the appearance of the cos^2(theta/2) dependence on the relative angle between Alice's and Bob's separate and independent measurements. If Alice gets 'up', Bob has a probability of sin^2(theta/2) of getting 'up', and cos^2(theta/2) probability of getting 'down'. Do that, and I might be convinced. So far, you haven't even come close.
It is up to you, if you think that some FTL influence occur, to explain why and how.It is not up to me to provide a local explanation. I claim that the effect is non-local.
You are the one who is required to provide a local explanation.
You claim that it is a consequence of many worlds, or the absence of collapse. OK, then convince me…….
Both EPR and Bell assumes that "Alice and Bob” are well defined and keep their identity throughout the experience, which indeed would require some FTL influence, but I don’t see that FTL when we keep all branch of the superposition into account.Bell does not require that assumption. I have given you full accounts of Bell that did not rely on any collapse assumption, accounts in which both Alice and Bob get both up and down results. You just have to show how the (theta/2) dependence between their results arises from purely local interactions in the many worlds situation.
I can offer you considerable odds that you will not be able to do this.
Bruce--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQw1a3AP-nsUP3n_7EPH%2BPWxKEV7vZqv%3D5S3fnKxK4zow%40mail.gmail.com.
On 19 Aug 2019, at 04:02, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:Brent, Bruce,On 16 Aug 2019, at 22:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed lower than light.
But as Bruce says, it's a kind of magic as stated. To not be magic there must be some physical interactions communicating Alice's result to Bob's system: Photons would the obvious candidate, but how exactly do they interact with Bob and his system to make them orthogonal to one of Alice's results and not the other?The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself relatively.That is exactly the magic that needs to be explained.I don’t see this. ud - du predicts this, by the quantum formalism.
And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it means that her accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her photon and d for bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he will meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices seeing u will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will access a world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or slower, and no physical influence exist at all. They both only localise themselves in the multiverse, at different possible cosmic branches.What makes a history "accessible"? You have offered only magic to rule out histories that violate the basic conservation rules.I don’t see this at all. (I assume QM here, not mechanism).
The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob, which would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than light physical influence.The argument does not depend on any "one world" assumption. The problem is clearly present even in the Everettian setting, when there are copies of Alice and Bob who see each result. These always exist, since both up and down results are always possible for any measurement on the separated singlet particles.I don’t see this. Alice and Bob have prepared the particle together (or by some entanglement swapping technic), the state ud-du require the correlations, in all base. Once separated, they can only access to their correlate parts, which requires the “creation” of “new” Bob and Alice.
It is up to you, if you think that some FTL influence occur, to explain why and how.
A quantum state does not describe a world, but is only an indexical map, for a subject, of the histories that he/she can access to. ud-du means only, to Alice and Bob, that they will always means their corresponding correlated counterpart, whatever they found.Given the miracle that occurs at this step in your account.Which miracle? I just use the fact that once a superposition is there, it never collapse. It is the collapse which would be magical.
Even if we give sense to “they both find u”, each of us will meet they counterparts, which they can interact with when meeting again, having found d.You are not convincing anyone other than yourself here, Bruno.I don’t think so. I am not sure if you are not the only one, perhaps with one other, who believes that the violation of Bell’s inequality entails physical action at a distance (which have no meaning for me in a relativistic context).
Both EPR and Bell assumes that "Alice and Bob” are well defined and keep their identity throughout the experience, which indeed would require some FTL influence, but I don’t see that FTL when we keep all branch of the superposition into account.
On 20 Aug 2019, at 08:24, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 6:41 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 19 Aug 2019, at 04:02, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:Brent, Bruce,On 16 Aug 2019, at 22:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurement....and vice versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed lower than light.
But as Bruce says, it's a kind of magic as stated. To not be magic there must be some physical interactions communicating Alice's result to Bob's system: Photons would the obvious candidate, but how exactly do they interact with Bob and his system to make them orthogonal to one of Alice's results and not the other?The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself relatively.That is exactly the magic that needs to be explained.I don’t see this. ud - du predicts this, by the quantum formalism.Yes. And that is the standard non-local argument. Don't forget that, as Maudlin points out, the quantum wave function is, itself, a non-local object.
And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it means that her accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her photon and d for bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he will meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices seeing u will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will access a world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or slower, and no physical influence exist at all. They both only localise themselves in the multiverse, at different possible cosmic branches.What makes a history "accessible"? You have offered only magic to rule out histories that violate the basic conservation rules.I don’t see this at all. (I assume QM here, not mechanism).I don't know how I can make you understand that just multiplying the number of "worlds", and appealing to some obscure notion of "histories", does nothing towards providing a coherent local causal account of the observed correlations.
The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob, which would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than light physical influence.The argument does not depend on any "one world" assumption. The problem is clearly present even in the Everettian setting, when there are copies of Alice and Bob who see each result. These always exist, since both up and down results are always possible for any measurement on the separated singlet particles.I don’t see this. Alice and Bob have prepared the particle together (or by some entanglement swapping technic), the state ud-du require the correlations, in all base. Once separated, they can only access to their correlate parts, which requires the “creation” of “new” Bob and Alice.Any copies of Alice and Bob that there might be are created at the time they make their measurements and observe (record) their results. This happens at space-like separations, so any correlations are necessarily non-local in origin. All else is magic or mysticism.
It is up to you, if you think that some FTL influence occur, to explain why and how.Don't try and divert attention from your own failings by claiming that it is all my responsibility. This is about you, and your failure to provide the advertised local causal account through many worlds, that is at issue.
A quantum state does not describe a world, but is only an indexical map, for a subject, of the histories that he/she can access to. ud-du means only, to Alice and Bob, that they will always means their corresponding correlated counterpart, whatever they found.Given the miracle that occurs at this step in your account.Which miracle? I just use the fact that once a superposition is there, it never collapse. It is the collapse which would be magical.Collapse is irrelevant.
This is just another of your diversionary tactics. You claim that there is "some collapse" if you have no answer to the points being made. I have not made any collapse assumption; all along I have been working in a many-worlds setting. I maintain that this does not result in a local account. You claim different, so prove it by providing this local account.
Even if we give sense to “they both find u”, each of us will meet they counterparts, which they can interact with when meeting again, having found d.You are not convincing anyone other than yourself here, Bruno.I don’t think so. I am not sure if you are not the only one, perhaps with one other, who believes that the violation of Bell’s inequality entails physical action at a distance (which have no meaning for me in a relativistic context).Don't change the subject, and ascribe to me views that I have never held and have never advocated. There is no FTL physical action. The no-signalling theorems guarantee this.
Both EPR and Bell assumes that "Alice and Bob” are well defined and keep their identity throughout the experience, which indeed would require some FTL influence, but I don’t see that FTL when we keep all branch of the superposition into account.Your conclusion does not follow from your premises. I have given a clear account of how Alice and Bob can maintain their identities, even though they split according to the results obtained, and still meet to exchange data and calculate non-local correlations, even though there are no physical FTL effects.
This account explicitly keeps all branches of the superposition in play, even though that does not really alter anything.
Bruce--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRfGxyn26xRJ03feO1xTrA-aHSLzsCBBVUbqotP1xeSkg%40mail.gmail.com.
Bruno,I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical nonsense.Bruce
On 21 Aug 2019, at 01:11, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:Bruno,I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.
So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality,
but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to shed some light on the matter.
If you could have done so, it would have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.
As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real existence of the other worlds.
One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics,
and one can safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.
It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a substitute for non-locality is now dead,
and we are left with physics as it always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical nonsense.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSnhSZt8JPF4NBU4Nutm2xd0cWk%2BvKPX9EpQWmZpHzKRg%40mail.gmail.com.
On 21 Aug 2019, at 03:42, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:Bruno,I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical nonsense.BruceI started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I will try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of PR box argument.MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence to QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the problem into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if any interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a "it feels good" sort of argument.
I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently:No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding to a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is this idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, the world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer who is in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on that measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic jump.If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I may work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's theorem.
The implication is there is no decidable way to determine whether QM is ψ-epistemic, say in the sense of Bohr and Copenhagen Interpretation and Fuch's QuBism, or if it is ψ-ontic in the sense of MWI and GRW and … .
All of these have problems. Bohr and CI posit as fundamental quantum and classical domains. However as pointed out by Heisenberg early on there is an ambiguous boundary between these two domains. MWI proposes a splitting of worlds, but there is no definitive meaning to a spatial surface or set of them according to probabilities. Bohm's idea really only has sense in nonrelativistic domain, but that could hold for physics on a holographic screen, so while this has serious weaknesses I will not throw it completely under the bus. There are I read at last count over 50 interpretations. Collapses are not the result of unitary evolution and so appear inconsistent with the evolution of quantum states.
I think this is some sort of incompleteness in the axioms or postulate of QM.
It might be compared to the fifth axiom of Euclid in geometry. I think in the end, or if I am right, then this is simply a state of affairs that exists, there is no causal process behind it and we are best to just accept this and press on. Maybe this is Mermin's Shut up and calculate and this search for interpretations is a waste of time.
LC
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/15101a72-fb2f-4be0-96ef-dd1a703f70a2%40googlegroups.com.
On 21 Aug 2019, at 03:42, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:Bruno,I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical nonsense.BruceI started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I will try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of PR box argument.MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence to QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the problem into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if any interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a "it feels good" sort of argument.My point is that with the MWI (by which I mean the QM axiomatics without the collapse postulate) the violation of Bell’s inequality does not entail Faster than Light action at a distance (FTLAD), it entails only a local appearance of such action.So Aspect experience proves the disjunction “FTLAD or Many-worlds”. But the term “world” should be taken with some caution (there are mathematical phenomenological constructs).
I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently:No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding to a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is this idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, the world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer who is in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on that measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic jump.If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I may work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's theorem.That is a good insight, and it can be proved when you assume (explicitly) the Mechanist hypothesis. All computations exist in the arithmetical reality, and physics emerges from a statistics on all first person experience related to those computations. Eventually “physical prediction” with “measure one” have to obey to the logic of []p & <>t, with p partially computable (sigma_1). That gives already a quantum logic.
The implication is there is no decidable way to determine whether QM is ψ-epistemic, say in the sense of Bohr and Copenhagen Interpretation and Fuch's QuBism, or if it is ψ-ontic in the sense of MWI and GRW and … .The only physics become a subbranch of machine/number psychology/theology, once we assume Mechanism. There is no problem with physics, but there is a problem with physicalism, if we make that Mechanist assumption.
All of these have problems. Bohr and CI posit as fundamental quantum and classical domains. However as pointed out by Heisenberg early on there is an ambiguous boundary between these two domains. MWI proposes a splitting of worlds, but there is no definitive meaning to a spatial surface or set of them according to probabilities. Bohm's idea really only has sense in nonrelativistic domain, but that could hold for physics on a holographic screen, so while this has serious weaknesses I will not throw it completely under the bus. There are I read at last count over 50 interpretations. Collapses are not the result of unitary evolution and so appear inconsistent with the evolution of quantum states.Indeed.I think this is some sort of incompleteness in the axioms or postulate of QM.Eventually QM is related to the intrinsic incompleteness of all theories on arithmetic.It might be compared to the fifth axiom of Euclid in geometry. I think in the end, or if I am right, then this is simply a state of affairs that exists, there is no causal process behind it and we are best to just accept this and press on. Maybe this is Mermin's Shut up and calculate and this search for interpretations is a waste of time.Things are much simpler if we assume mechanism, like Everett. But Everett stil assumes some universal wave, which, when we assume mechanism, must be justify by the mechanist first person indeterminacy in arithmetic.To apply physics, “shut up and calculate” is all good, but in Metaphysics, it is pure authoritative argument to prevent finding and testing possible solutions of the problem. That is doubly true in the Mechanist frame, probably because the Mechanist solution is troubling for those who are physicalist, and believe in an ontological physical universe.The mechanist solution is empirically testable, so let us test it. Up to now, Mechanism is the only theory which explains the appearance without eliminating consciousness and its mechanist explanation (the theology G* and its variants).With Mechanism, physics is not the fundamental science. Physics is reduced to a sort of arithmetical probability/credibility machine theory.Bruno
LC--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
Things are much simpler if we assume mechanism, like Everett. But Everett stil assumes some universal wave, which, when we assume mechanism, must be justify by the mechanist first person indeterminacy in arithmetic.To apply physics, “shut up and calculate” is all good, but in Metaphysics, it is pure authoritative argument to prevent finding and testing possible solutions of the problem. That is doubly true in the Mechanist frame, probably because the Mechanist solution is troubling for those who are physicalist, and believe in an ontological physical universe.The mechanist solution is empirically testable, so let us test it. Up to now, Mechanism is the only theory which explains the appearance without eliminating consciousness and its mechanist explanation (the theology G* and its variants).With Mechanism, physics is not the fundamental science. Physics is reduced to a sort of arithmetical probability/credibility machine theory.Bruno
On 21 Aug 2019, at 15:47, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 4:42:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 21 Aug 2019, at 03:42, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:Bruno,I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical nonsense.BruceI started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I will try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of PR box argument.MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence to QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the problem into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if any interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a "it feels good" sort of argument.My point is that with the MWI (by which I mean the QM axiomatics without the collapse postulate) the violation of Bell’s inequality does not entail Faster than Light action at a distance (FTLAD), it entails only a local appearance of such action.So Aspect experience proves the disjunction “FTLAD or Many-worlds”. But the term “world” should be taken with some caution (there are mathematical phenomenological constructs).I would agree with that. MWI and this curious quantum frame dragging along a restricted quantum basis is not some causal influence. I doubt any MWI upholder is saying that.I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently:No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding to a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is this idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, the world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer who is in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on that measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic jump.If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I may work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's theorem.That is a good insight, and it can be proved when you assume (explicitly) the Mechanist hypothesis. All computations exist in the arithmetical reality, and physics emerges from a statistics on all first person experience related to those computations. Eventually “physical prediction” with “measure one” have to obey to the logic of []p & <>t, with p partially computable (sigma_1). That gives already a quantum logic.It is of course not clear whether this Gödel self-reference is what nature actually does, or whether this is something we do with our QM theory.
Gödel's theorem involves an infinite number of statements or predicates that act on Gödel numbers of such predicates. For physics this is tantamount to the assumption the number of qubits N → ∞, which mirrors in some ways statistical mechanics and how classical thermodynamics is considered to emerge. Nature may do something approximate to this, and we make the assumption this is a Gödel loop of sorts.
The implication is there is no decidable way to determine whether QM is ψ-epistemic, say in the sense of Bohr and Copenhagen Interpretation and Fuch's QuBism, or if it is ψ-ontic in the sense of MWI and GRW and … .The only physics become a subbranch of machine/number psychology/theology, once we assume Mechanism. There is no problem with physics, but there is a problem with physicalism, if we make that Mechanist assumption.Clearly though caution is advised. There is a long history of comparing nature to our devices, from pumps to clocks and steam engines to now computers.
LCAll of these have problems. Bohr and CI posit as fundamental quantum and classical domains. However as pointed out by Heisenberg early on there is an ambiguous boundary between these two domains. MWI proposes a splitting of worlds, but there is no definitive meaning to a spatial surface or set of them according to probabilities. Bohm's idea really only has sense in nonrelativistic domain, but that could hold for physics on a holographic screen, so while this has serious weaknesses I will not throw it completely under the bus. There are I read at last count over 50 interpretations. Collapses are not the result of unitary evolution and so appear inconsistent with the evolution of quantum states.Indeed.I think this is some sort of incompleteness in the axioms or postulate of QM.Eventually QM is related to the intrinsic incompleteness of all theories on arithmetic.It might be compared to the fifth axiom of Euclid in geometry. I think in the end, or if I am right, then this is simply a state of affairs that exists, there is no causal process behind it and we are best to just accept this and press on. Maybe this is Mermin's Shut up and calculate and this search for interpretations is a waste of time.Things are much simpler if we assume mechanism, like Everett. But Everett stil assumes some universal wave, which, when we assume mechanism, must be justify by the mechanist first person indeterminacy in arithmetic.To apply physics, “shut up and calculate” is all good, but in Metaphysics, it is pure authoritative argument to prevent finding and testing possible solutions of the problem. That is doubly true in the Mechanist frame, probably because the Mechanist solution is troubling for those who are physicalist, and believe in an ontological physical universe.The mechanist solution is empirically testable, so let us test it. Up to now, Mechanism is the only theory which explains the appearance without eliminating consciousness and its mechanist explanation (the theology G* and its variants).With Mechanism, physics is not the fundamental science. Physics is reduced to a sort of arithmetical probability/credibility machine theory.BrunoLC--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/15101a72-fb2f-4be0-96ef-dd1a703f70a2%40googlegroups.com.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/19aa479e-a48b-4403-b4a9-a532458620f0%40googlegroups.com.
LC--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8994f00e-474d-4593-92da-a525b7814f3a%40googlegroups.com.
On 21 Aug 2019, at 15:47, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 4:42:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 21 Aug 2019, at 03:42, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:Bruno,I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical nonsense.BruceI started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I will try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of PR box argument.MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence to QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the problem into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if any interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a "it feels good" sort of argument.My point is that with the MWI (by which I mean the QM axiomatics without the collapse postulate) the violation of Bell’s inequality does not entail Faster than Light action at a distance (FTLAD), it entails only a local appearance of such action.So Aspect experience proves the disjunction “FTLAD or Many-worlds”. But the term “world” should be taken with some caution (there are mathematical phenomenological constructs).I would agree with that. MWI and this curious quantum frame dragging along a restricted quantum basis is not some causal influence. I doubt any MWI upholder is saying that.I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently:No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding to a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is this idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, the world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer who is in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on that measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic jump.If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I may work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's theorem.That is a good insight, and it can be proved when you assume (explicitly) the Mechanist hypothesis. All computations exist in the arithmetical reality, and physics emerges from a statistics on all first person experience related to those computations. Eventually “physical prediction” with “measure one” have to obey to the logic of []p & <>t, with p partially computable (sigma_1). That gives already a quantum logic.It is of course not clear whether this Gödel self-reference is what nature actually does, or whether this is something we do with our QM theory.With Mechanism, nature does not exist. The appearance of nature and physical laws must be recovered by the statistics on the (relative) computations (which exists in arithmetic). The logic of the observable becomes the logic of what is invariant in the “sum” of all computations. At first sight, this cannot work, but then the Gödelian limitation just put the right structure (as far as we can judge today) on the consistent computational extensions, so that we an say that … mechanism is not refuted, neither by Gödel (as Penrose or Lucas argued), nor by QM.
Gödel's theorem involves an infinite number of statements or predicates that act on Gödel numbers of such predicates. For physics this is tantamount to the assumption the number of qubits N → ∞, which mirrors in some ways statistical mechanics and how classical thermodynamics is considered to emerge. Nature may do something approximate to this, and we make the assumption this is a Gödel loop of sorts.With mechanism, we have no choice than recover the wave appearance (“nature” and the collapse) from a “many-world”, or more simply “many computations” in arithmetic. We just cannot assume a nature, made of something. It is all but a statistics on infinitely many computations (all computations which bring us, from under our substitution level).
The implication is there is no decidable way to determine whether QM is ψ-epistemic, say in the sense of Bohr and Copenhagen Interpretation and Fuch's QuBism, or if it is ψ-ontic in the sense of MWI and GRW and … .The only physics become a subbranch of machine/number psychology/theology, once we assume Mechanism. There is no problem with physics, but there is a problem with physicalism, if we make that Mechanist assumption.Clearly though caution is advised. There is a long history of comparing nature to our devices, from pumps to clocks and steam engines to now computers.Searle made a similar critics. But the discovery of the universal machine, Imo, changes this completely. For them first time we get a notion of universality which is close for Cantor’s diagonalisation, and which prevents reductionism. It is something entirely new. Normally, it should have been discovered before incompleteness, which is an easy consequence of the Church-Turing thesis, which recognise that universality has being genuine.After the discovery of the universal machine, and all its computations in arithmetic, it is very natural to doubt about physicalism. The doubt will be more between digital physics (the physical universe result from the execution of a particular programs or set of programs) and Mechanism, which precludes the possibility that the physical universe is Turing computable (as physics emerges from an finite sum on all computations, which is not computable a priori). Digital physics destroys itself, as it entails Mechanism, and Mechanism entails the negation of any entirely computable physics.Of course, caution is advised. Mechanism can be false, and that would entail the consistency of the existence of a primitively physical universe. Yet, Mechanism is the simplest (conceptually) theory in cognitive science, so, strong evidences that mechanism is false is needed to make that move, I would say, especially with quantum mechanics which seems to confirm the most “shocking” consequences of Digital Mechanism.Bruno
LCAll of these have problems. Bohr and CI posit as fundamental quantum and classical domains. However as pointed out by Heisenberg early on there is an ambiguous boundary between these two domains. MWI proposes a splitting of worlds, but there is no definitive meaning to a spatial surface or set of them according to probabilities. Bohm's idea really only has sense in nonrelativistic domain, but that could hold for physics on a holographic screen, so while this has serious weaknesses I will not throw it completely under the bus. There are I read at last count over 50 interpretations. Collapses are not the result of unitary evolution and so appear inconsistent with the evolution of quantum states.Indeed.I think this is some sort of incompleteness in the axioms or postulate of QM.Eventually QM is related to the intrinsic incompleteness of all theories on arithmetic.It might be compared to the fifth axiom of Euclid in geometry. I think in the end, or if I am right, then this is simply a state of affairs that exists, there is no causal process behind it and we are best to just accept this and press on. Maybe this is Mermin's Shut up and calculate and this search for interpretations is a waste of time.Things are much simpler if we assume mechanism, like Everett. But Everett stil assumes some universal wave, which, when we assume mechanism, must be justify by the mechanist first person indeterminacy in arithmetic.To apply physics, “shut up and calculate” is all good, but in Metaphysics, it is pure authoritative argument to prevent finding and testing possible solutions of the problem. That is doubly true in the Mechanist frame, probably because the Mechanist solution is troubling for those who are physicalist, and believe in an ontological physical universe.The mechanist solution is empirically testable, so let us test it. Up to now, Mechanism is the only theory which explains the appearance without eliminating consciousness and its mechanist explanation (the theology G* and its variants).With Mechanism, physics is not the fundamental science. Physics is reduced to a sort of arithmetical probability/credibility machine theory.BrunoLC--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/15101a72-fb2f-4be0-96ef-dd1a703f70a2%40googlegroups.com.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/19aa479e-a48b-4403-b4a9-a532458620f0%40googlegroups.com.
On 23 Aug 2019, at 03:34, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:On Thursday, August 22, 2019 at 8:41:40 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 21 Aug 2019, at 15:47, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 4:42:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 21 Aug 2019, at 03:42, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:Bruno,I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical nonsense.BruceI started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I will try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of PR box argument.MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence to QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the problem into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if any interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a "it feels good" sort of argument.My point is that with the MWI (by which I mean the QM axiomatics without the collapse postulate) the violation of Bell’s inequality does not entail Faster than Light action at a distance (FTLAD), it entails only a local appearance of such action.So Aspect experience proves the disjunction “FTLAD or Many-worlds”. But the term “world” should be taken with some caution (there are mathematical phenomenological constructs).I would agree with that. MWI and this curious quantum frame dragging along a restricted quantum basis is not some causal influence. I doubt any MWI upholder is saying that.I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently:No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding to a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is this idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, the world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer who is in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on that measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic jump.If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I may work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's theorem.That is a good insight, and it can be proved when you assume (explicitly) the Mechanist hypothesis. All computations exist in the arithmetical reality, and physics emerges from a statistics on all first person experience related to those computations. Eventually “physical prediction” with “measure one” have to obey to the logic of []p & <>t, with p partially computable (sigma_1). That gives already a quantum logic.It is of course not clear whether this Gödel self-reference is what nature actually does, or whether this is something we do with our QM theory.With Mechanism, nature does not exist. The appearance of nature and physical laws must be recovered by the statistics on the (relative) computations (which exists in arithmetic). The logic of the observable becomes the logic of what is invariant in the “sum” of all computations. At first sight, this cannot work, but then the Gödelian limitation just put the right structure (as far as we can judge today) on the consistent computational extensions, so that we an say that … mechanism is not refuted, neither by Gödel (as Penrose or Lucas argued), nor by QM.I tend to see nature as primary and mechanism as something we impose.
I guess there is a little bit in me that is sympathetic to the 19th century Romantics in this way. As I see it nature bats last, and we humans can only try to emulate nature, but that our mechanisms will probably never be able to capture nature.
Gödel's theorem involves an infinite number of statements or predicates that act on Gödel numbers of such predicates. For physics this is tantamount to the assumption the number of qubits N → ∞, which mirrors in some ways statistical mechanics and how classical thermodynamics is considered to emerge. Nature may do something approximate to this, and we make the assumption this is a Gödel loop of sorts.With mechanism, we have no choice than recover the wave appearance (“nature” and the collapse) from a “many-world”, or more simply “many computations” in arithmetic. We just cannot assume a nature, made of something. It is all but a statistics on infinitely many computations (all computations which bring us, from under our substitution level).Nature exhibit various symmetries that from a Lie algebraic level are a set of transformation that have some analogue to computing systems. These symmetries may be inexact, say a physical vacuum of broken symmetry, and our modeling of these as cybernetic systems are ways of drawing analogies. These are things we impose and not things which we can say with much certainty are absolutely intrinsic.
The implication is there is no decidable way to determine whether QM is ψ-epistemic, say in the sense of Bohr and Copenhagen Interpretation and Fuch's QuBism, or if it is ψ-ontic in the sense of MWI and GRW and … .The only physics become a subbranch of machine/number psychology/theology, once we assume Mechanism. There is no problem with physics, but there is a problem with physicalism, if we make that Mechanist assumption.Clearly though caution is advised. There is a long history of comparing nature to our devices, from pumps to clocks and steam engines to now computers.Searle made a similar critics. But the discovery of the universal machine, Imo, changes this completely. For them first time we get a notion of universality which is close for Cantor’s diagonalisation, and which prevents reductionism. It is something entirely new. Normally, it should have been discovered before incompleteness, which is an easy consequence of the Church-Turing thesis, which recognise that universality has being genuine.After the discovery of the universal machine, and all its computations in arithmetic, it is very natural to doubt about physicalism. The doubt will be more between digital physics (the physical universe result from the execution of a particular programs or set of programs) and Mechanism, which precludes the possibility that the physical universe is Turing computable (as physics emerges from an finite sum on all computations, which is not computable a priori). Digital physics destroys itself, as it entails Mechanism, and Mechanism entails the negation of any entirely computable physics.Of course, caution is advised. Mechanism can be false, and that would entail the consistency of the existence of a primitively physical universe. Yet, Mechanism is the simplest (conceptually) theory in cognitive science, so, strong evidences that mechanism is false is needed to make that move, I would say, especially with quantum mechanics which seems to confirm the most “shocking” consequences of Digital Mechanism.BrunoI honestly see this as all a sort of model system, which may have some pattern or parallel to nature,
but which I doubt absolutely captures nature.
After all there could be things beyond Gödel, and they are themselves not Gödel. It has a sort of Zen quality to it.
LCLCAll of these have problems. Bohr and CI posit as fundamental quantum and classical domains. However as pointed out by Heisenberg early on there is an ambiguous boundary between these two domains. MWI proposes a splitting of worlds, but there is no definitive meaning to a spatial surface or set of them according to probabilities. Bohm's idea really only has sense in nonrelativistic domain, but that could hold for physics on a holographic screen, so while this has serious weaknesses I will not throw it completely under the bus. There are I read at last count over 50 interpretations. Collapses are not the result of unitary evolution and so appear inconsistent with the evolution of quantum states.Indeed.I think this is some sort of incompleteness in the axioms or postulate of QM.Eventually QM is related to the intrinsic incompleteness of all theories on arithmetic.It might be compared to the fifth axiom of Euclid in geometry. I think in the end, or if I am right, then this is simply a state of affairs that exists, there is no causal process behind it and we are best to just accept this and press on. Maybe this is Mermin's Shut up and calculate and this search for interpretations is a waste of time.Things are much simpler if we assume mechanism, like Everett. But Everett stil assumes some universal wave, which, when we assume mechanism, must be justify by the mechanist first person indeterminacy in arithmetic.To apply physics, “shut up and calculate” is all good, but in Metaphysics, it is pure authoritative argument to prevent finding and testing possible solutions of the problem. That is doubly true in the Mechanist frame, probably because the Mechanist solution is troubling for those who are physicalist, and believe in an ontological physical universe.The mechanist solution is empirically testable, so let us test it. Up to now, Mechanism is the only theory which explains the appearance without eliminating consciousness and its mechanist explanation (the theology G* and its variants).With Mechanism, physics is not the fundamental science. Physics is reduced to a sort of arithmetical probability/credibility machine theory.BrunoLC--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/15101a72-fb2f-4be0-96ef-dd1a703f70a2%40googlegroups.com.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/19aa479e-a48b-4403-b4a9-a532458620f0%40googlegroups.com.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/66d19d88-9e1a-48d1-a568-c6e6a9f3b573%40googlegroups.com.