Symposium on axioms of consciousness

[Philip Thrift]

via Hedda Hassel Mørch @heddamorch

https://twitter.com/heddamorch/status/113048705070737817

A lot to read:

On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated information theory of consciousness 

Tim Bayne [ https://research.monash.edu/en/persons/timothy-bayne ]

https://academic.oup.com/nc/article/2018/1/niy007/5047367

Symposium on Bayne, “On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated information theory of consciousness”

http://philosophyofbrains.com/2019/05/20/symposium-on-bayne-on-the-axiomatic-foundations-of-the-integrated-information-theory-of-consciousness.aspx

includes 

Hedda Hassel Mørch (commentary):

"[IIT] can also be and is in some ways better interpreted as a form of Russellian monism, the view that conscious or protoconscious properties constitute the intrinsic nature of physical properties (which physics reveals as purely extrinsic and structural), and therefore would not be (purely) physical. This could be understood as compatible with IIT’s claim that consciousness is identical with integrated information, which could be interpreted to say that consciousness is identical with integrated information understood, not as a purely physical property, but as a property that may include a non-physical intrinsic nature."

@philipthrift

[Brent Meeker]

But read https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799 first.

Brent

[Philip Thrift]

I think Scott (who wrote that in 2014) needs to read this symposium article.

He knows something about - and may be considered an expert in - computational complexity (classical and quantum), but he doesn't know much more than anyone else outside his specialty, especially - he doesn't know much about the subject of consciousness.

@philipthrift

[Cosmin Visan]

IIT is just a materialistic fairy-tale.

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, May 22, 2019 at 3:38:47 AM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:

IIT is just a materialistic fairy-tale.

But isn't Hedda's response in the symposium: 

     IIT is a physicalistic fairy-tale

?

@philipthrift 

[Brent Meeker]

Neither does Tononi.  And Scott knows how to calculate integrated information.

Brent

[Philip Thrift]

"integrated information" (in the context of consciousness science) is not a well-defined term. That was part of what the underlying paper (on "axioms") and commentary critical of IIT was all about.

So why doesn't Scott write an update post from the one he wrote 5 years ago? Because he is not in the field of conscious science - his field is computational complexity, which is pretty useless in contributing anything to the subject.

@philipthrift

[Bruno Marchal]

I could agree with you, in the sense that computational complexity can address some aspect of consciousness, but could be use to hide the conceptual issue. 

As they use mechanism, they should better “just" listen to the machine, and what she says about herself.

“Just” is in quote because today that requires the study of Gödel 1931, Turing 1936, Church 1936, Löb 1955,  … Solovay 1975 (G and G*).

I don’t remember if you agree with the following quasi-definition of consciousness, which is that “I am conscious”, from the first person point of view of a machine is something verifying the following conditions;

It is immediately known

It is indubitable

It is non provable

It is non definable

The machine has soul, it lives at the intersection of the believable and truth, it is like a inner God, nobody can define it, although everybody can use the indexical “I” to get a local ostensive temporary “not-a-name” but 3p image in the mind of the others.The machine knows that this soul is not just non definable, but she can refute explicitly all effective theories made about her and what she could be. 

The Gödel-Löbian machine can destroy effectively all reductionist conception you could have about her.

And that does not need a lot of complexity. Just Robinson Arithmetic (RA, a sub theory of all branches in “exact sciences” if not implicit in most human sciences as well) + the induction axioms (the axioms responsible for the rich cognitive ability. (RA emulates all machines, and I interview the richer Löbian machine that RA emulates. I mean, the induction axioms are not in the ontological part). Arithmetic emulates/enacted relative numbers believing in sets and infinities.

Bruno

@philipthrift

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[Philip Thrift]

The Experientialists are in the right ballpark in this regard: The "richest" Löbian machine will still be missing the real semantics and entities of experiences.

One needs a Löbian-Husserlian machine.

@philipthrift

[Bruno Marchal]

In your materialist theory, that makes sense. But why commit oneself ontologically in absence of evidence, and apparently just to make some entities deprived of consciousness and experience?

One needs a Löbian-Husserlian machine.

The Husserlian aspect is given by the modes of the self which invoke the notion of truth, like []p & p and []p & <>t & p, I would say.

Bruno

@philipthrift

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