My view of Bruno's theory

[Alan Grayson]

It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG

[Alan Grayson]

On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG

It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG 

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:

It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG

http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html :

Predictions are overrated

anyway.

@philipthrift 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:00, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG

It refutes Newton’s physics, and it makes me discover QM, including the “many-histories”, which was enough to be mocked, by people, who have eventually admitted that they were wrong (the wiser among them at least).

It certainly does not predict everything. 

Even Schmidhuber theory (which missed the first person indeterminacy, consciousness, qualia) does not predicts everything, despite david Deutsch attacked him in this way.

I think you might not have grasped the theory. I am pretty sure that you have not study it, for sating that it predicts everything, which is just obviously false (unless inconsistent of course). 

Keep in mind that the TOE extracted from Mechanism, is very clear. It is just two equations (and some identity rules): 

Kxy = x + Sxyz = xz(yz). 

This does not predict everything, but explain entirely the phenomenological existence of quanta and qualia, and their relations, which is just impossible to do with physicalism (that is why physicalist dismiss consciousness since 2000 years).

Physics only works (for prediction) by requiring Descartes and Darwin to be false. It necessitates magic.

Explain me how to predict a solar eclipse, and I will show you the exact place you will be obliged to use some non-mechanist theory of mind.

Mechanism is the only theory today which explains both consciousness and the appearance of matter. As it predicts the whole of physics, it is hard to imagine a theory less refutable, but not yet refuted today. 

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. Except that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is shown to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in the mathematics iff self-reference.

The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained a year ago.

The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without using more than the two axioms above. 

“My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 

Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:

Bohr:

- the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)

- a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.

Everett

- the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)

- Mechanism

Your servitor:

- arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)

- Mechanism.

If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is the Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories predict everything.

I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is not mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from mechanism and computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be done by Gödel, Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise a lot are the two theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the machine in one modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you want to really address the “mechanist mind-body problem”.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

To predict is not the same as to explain. I agree with this. René Thom wrote convincing text about this.

But an explanation which cannot make predictions is a poor explanation.

Bruno

@philipthrift 

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[Alan Grayson]

On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG

It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG 

Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. Except that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is shown to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in the mathematics iff self-reference.

The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained a year ago.

The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without using more than the two axioms above. 

“My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 

Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:

Bohr:

- the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)

- a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.

Everett

- the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)

- Mechanism

Your servitor:

- arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)

- Mechanism.

If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is the Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories predict everything.

I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is not mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from mechanism and computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be done by Gödel, Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise a lot are the two theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the machine in one modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you want to really address the “mechanist mind-body problem”.

Bruno

I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are possible, it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a possible Newtonian gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our universe, let alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field approximation of GR. AG 

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[Alan Grayson]

On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG

It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG 

Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. Except that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is shown to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in the mathematics iff self-reference.

The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained a year ago.

The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without using more than the two axioms above. 

“My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 

Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:

Bohr:

- the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)

- a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.

Everett

- the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)

- Mechanism

Your servitor:

- arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)

- Mechanism.

If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is the Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories predict everything.

I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is not mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from mechanism and computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be done by Gödel, Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise a lot are the two theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the machine in one modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you want to really address the “mechanist mind-body problem”.

Bruno

I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are possible, it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a possible Newtonian gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our universe, let alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field approximation of GR. AG 

Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of arithmetic, can distinguish one G from another, to obtain the weak field approximation of GR, aka Newtonian gravity; or that the measured velocity of light is independent of the motions of source and recipient. AG 

[Brent Meeker]

She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good description of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding the question, which is how do we tell a theory that is a good description from a theory that is a bad description.  Popper says making wrong predicitons means the theory is bad.  He didn't say making correct predictions make a theory good...although Hossenfelder's made-up counter examples pretend that he did.

Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience with other good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise and unambiguous predictions.   Clarity and ease of comprehension.   Hossenfelder advocates "explanatory power" as a better critereon.  I think the preceding are what constitute explantory power in the scientific sense.  Without that qualification things like "God did it" or "It's all simulated inside arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.

Brent

anyway.

@philipthrift 

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[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 2:32:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 6/7/2020 11:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:

It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG

http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html :

Predictions are overrated

She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good description of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding the question, which is how do we tell a theory that is a good description from a theory that is a bad description.  Popper says making wrong predicitons means the theory is bad.  He didn't say making correct predictions make a theory good...although Hossenfelder's made-up counter examples pretend that he did.

Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience with other good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise and unambiguous predictions.   Clarity and ease of comprehension.   Hossenfelder advocates "explanatory power" as a better critereon.  I think the preceding are what constitute explantory power in the scientific sense.  Without that qualification things like "God did it" or "It's all simulated inside arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.

Brent

It's not clear, but a point she has made before is that although general relativity has a bunch of "confirmation" success, it is (literally) "wrong" (for very small stuff anyway), and quantum mechanics, which also  has "confirmation" successes, is is incomplete. So both are ultimately failed theories. 

Physicists who leap from the the "success" of the mathematics in the theories to claims about what physical stuff really is are clueless (in her view).

But as Jim Baggott has said (in a tweet), she is a sloppy writer.

@philipthrift

@philipthrift

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/8/2020 2:24 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 2:32:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 6/7/2020 11:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:

It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG

http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html :

Predictions are overrated

She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good description of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding the question, which is how do we tell a theory that is a good description from a theory that is a bad description.  Popper says making wrong predicitons means the theory is bad.  He didn't say making correct predictions make a theory good...although Hossenfelder's made-up counter examples pretend that he did.

Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience with other good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise and unambiguous predictions.   Clarity and ease of comprehension.   Hossenfelder advocates "explanatory power" as a better critereon.  I think the preceding are what constitute explantory power in the scientific sense.  Without that qualification things like "God did it" or "It's all simulated inside arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.

Brent

It's not clear, but a point she has made before is that although general relativity has a bunch of "confirmation" success, it is (literally) "wrong" (for very small stuff anyway), and quantum mechanics, which also  has "confirmation" successes, is is incomplete. So both are ultimately failed theories.

I think that's strange meaning of "failed".  90% of (very successful) engineering is based on Newton and Maxwell.  We will never know we have an ultimately successful theory even if we do have it. 

Brent

Physicists who leap from the the "success" of the mathematics in the theories to claims about what physical stuff really is are clueless (in her view).

But as Jim Baggott has said (in a tweet), she is a sloppy writer.

@philipthrift

@philipthrift

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[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 5:42:36 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 6/8/2020 2:24 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 2:32:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 6/7/2020 11:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:

It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG

http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html :

Predictions are overrated

She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good description of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding the question, which is how do we tell a theory that is a good description from a theory that is a bad description.  Popper says making wrong predicitons means the theory is bad.  He didn't say making correct predictions make a theory good...although Hossenfelder's made-up counter examples pretend that he did.

Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience with other good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise and unambiguous predictions.   Clarity and ease of comprehension.   Hossenfelder advocates "explanatory power" as a better critereon.  I think the preceding are what constitute explantory power in the scientific sense.  Without that qualification things like "God did it" or "It's all simulated inside arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.

Brent

It's not clear, but a point she has made before is that although general relativity has a bunch of "confirmation" success, it is (literally) "wrong" (for very small stuff anyway), and quantum mechanics, which also  has "confirmation" successes, is is incomplete. So both are ultimately failed theories.

I think that's strange meaning of "failed".  90% of (very successful) engineering is based on Newton and Maxwell.  We will never know we have an ultimately successful theory even if we do have it. 

Brent

Physicists who leap from the the "success" of the mathematics in the theories to claims about what physical stuff really is are clueless (in her view).

But as Jim Baggott has said (in a tweet), she is a sloppy writer.

@philipthrift

All descriptions of reality are inadequate, Feyerabend said. "You think that this one-day fly, this little bit of nothing, a human being--according to today's cosmology!--can figure it all out? This to me seems so crazy! It cannot possibly be true! What they figured out is one particular response to their actions, and this response gives this universe, and the reality that is behind this is laughing! 'Ha ha! They think they have found me out!'"

https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/was-philosopher-paul-feyerabend-really-science-s-worst-enemy/

@philipthrift 

[Alan Grayson]

This guy's a "philosopher"? He's just a jerk and you shouldn't waste our time with this total crap! AG 

[Philip Thrift]

When the extraterrestrials come with their science orders of magnitudes beyond ours that makes us look like little ants just building anthills, then we will see who the jerks are.

@philipthrift

[Alan Grayson]

Do us all a favor and cease posting crap from wannabe philosophers. AG 

[Philip Thrift]

He was a famous philosopher of the 20th century.

    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feyerabend/

I'm sure you too with your Ph.D. and publications are revered for your knowledge in your field.

@philipthrift

 

[Alan Grayson]

Face it. His words are revealing. Your "philosopher" is a stupid prick.  AG

 

[Alan Grayson]

I got my answer, by default. AG 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 8 Jun 2020, at 18:29, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG

It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG 

Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. Except that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is shown to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in the mathematics iff self-reference.

The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained a year ago.

The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without using more than the two axioms above. 

“My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 

Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:

Bohr:

- the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)

- a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.

Everett

- the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)

- Mechanism

Your servitor:

- arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)

- Mechanism.

If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is the Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories predict everything.

I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is not mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from mechanism and computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be done by Gödel, Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise a lot are the two theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the machine in one modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you want to really address the “mechanist mind-body problem”.

Bruno

I am not motivated to study your theory.

I have no theory, just a theorem in the Digital Mechanist theory of mind. You can bypass it to do physics, but not to do metaphysics.

If all computation are possible,

They are all “actual”. Would you say that “all prime numbers are possible” needs to be assumed to understand Rieman hypothesis?

it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a possible Newtonian gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our universe, let alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field approximation of GR. AG 

The contrary is true. With mechanism, physics become a statistic on all (relative) computations, and it can be shown that this leads to one physics. The laws of physics are entirely determined once we assume mechanism. There will be opportunities to say more on this, but you might study some of may papers, also. 

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

You seem to assume a physical reality. That’s all good for doing physics, but cannot work when doing mechanist metaphysics. With Mechanism, invoking an ontological commitment is no more available. You would need to explain how it would make possible to distinguish the arithmetical and the physical reality from introspection only, which is not possible when we assume digital mechanism. Eventually, you might understand that there are no evidence for a primary physical universe (primary = in need to be assumed and not explainable from something non physical).

Bruno 

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 8 Jun 2020, at 21:32, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 6/7/2020 11:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:

It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG

http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html :

Predictions are overrated

She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good description of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding the question, which is how do we tell a theory that is a good description from a theory that is a bad description.  Popper says making wrong predicitons means the theory is bad.  He didn't say making correct predictions make a theory good...although Hossenfelder's made-up counter examples pretend that he did.

Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience with other good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise and unambiguous predictions.   Clarity and ease of comprehension.   Hossenfelder advocates "explanatory power" as a better critereon.  I think the preceding are what constitute explantory power in the scientific sense.  Without that qualification things like "God did it”

Which is the error of the materialist. 

or "It's all simulated inside arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.

Not at all. This is refuted by Mechanism (Descartes, Darwin, Turing, …). The physical universe is NOT simulated by any computer, given that it arises from a non computable (non simulable) statistics on all simulations. It might be, or not, relatively well approximable by some computations, but that’s all we can hope.

Bruno

Brent

anyway.

@philipthrift 

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 9 Jun 2020, at 00:42, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 6/8/2020 2:24 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 2:32:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 6/7/2020 11:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:

It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG

http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html :

Predictions are overrated

She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good description of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding the question, which is how do we tell a theory that is a good description from a theory that is a bad description.  Popper says making wrong predicitons means the theory is bad.  He didn't say making correct predictions make a theory good...although Hossenfelder's made-up counter examples pretend that he did.

Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience with other good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise and unambiguous predictions.   Clarity and ease of comprehension.   Hossenfelder advocates "explanatory power" as a better critereon.  I think the preceding are what constitute explantory power in the scientific sense.  Without that qualification things like "God did it" or "It's all simulated inside arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.

Brent

It's not clear, but a point she has made before is that although general relativity has a bunch of "confirmation" success, it is (literally) "wrong" (for very small stuff anyway), and quantum mechanics, which also  has "confirmation" successes, is is incomplete. So both are ultimately failed theories.

I think that's strange meaning of "failed".  90% of (very successful) engineering is based on Newton and Maxwell.  We will never know we have an ultimately successful theory even if we do have it. 

Indeed. The best we can hope is to derive it from some simpler assumption, but those will also never be known as such.

Bruno

Brent

Physicists who leap from the the "success" of the mathematics in the theories to claims about what physical stuff really is are clueless (in her view).

But as Jim Baggott has said (in a tweet), she is a sloppy writer.

@philipthrift

@philipthrift

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[Bruno Marchal]

I tend to agree with you on this. In fact, philosophy, metaphysics, theology, …  has lost its scientific attitude after the separation of theology and science, mainly done by terror, violence, and the mix of state and religion (the authentic blasphemy arguably, as it confuse Earth and Heaven, in their abstract sense). Yet, that does not mean that all philosophers or all theologian, even from the institutions, are jerk. Feyerabend is just not quite convincing on this matter.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

I don’t know. If you are right on this, this entails that “G” is geographical. Of course, this comes from the fact that mechanism has to re-define the physical by the laws on the observable available to all universal numbers. If not, some non Turing elulable magic is brought in the theory of mind (implicitly).

to obtain the weak field approximation of GR, aka Newtonian gravity; or that the measured velocity of light is independent of the motions of source and recipient. AG 

I got my answer, by default. AG 

?

Bruno

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[Alan Grayson]

I am not crucifying all philosophers, but this guy, Feyerabend, is just plain stupid. Any civilization hugely in advance of us, will be just that; hugely in advance! Should we cease our research, as meager as it is from some ridiculous pov? I think we should be very proud of our scientific accomplishments, but nonetheless humble due to what we don't know. AG 

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[Alan Grayson]

Firstly, I don't take any firm position on the ontological status of the physical universe. What I AM saying is that logic alone and the property of numbers do not have sufficient inherent information to distinguish the validity of physical theories, where validity means predictability. Good predictions are what we use to distinguish good theories, and this has nothing to do with the ontological status of the physical universe. As for "the observable available to all universal numbers", I also doubt that numbers can observe anything. AG 

to obtain the weak field approximation of GR, aka Newtonian gravity; or that the measured velocity of light is independent of the motions of source and recipient. AG 

I got my answer, by default. AG 

?

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

OK.

What I AM saying is that logic alone and the property of numbers do not have sufficient inherent information to distinguish the validity of physical theories,

I doubt this. Since 1931/1936, we know that the simple laws of addition and multiplication of the natural numbers (not the real numbers), when taking together, leads to a Turing-complete theory, i.e. notably a Turing universal system. They can define what is a computation, and prove the existence of all of them. Assuming Mechanism, we belongs to all of them, so to make any physical (observable) prediction, we have to take them into account  to make any prediction. Newtonian-like physics does not work without invoking an ontological primary physical “computation selection” which can be shown incompatible with mechanism. With QM: that selection (the wave collapse) is made more obvious, more tangible, and … more doubtful, and indeed, if we reject it, QM becomes a confirmation of the main startling aspect of mechanism (we have infinitely many relative “bodies”. 

where validity means predictability.

Actually, I believe only that predictability of the absurd means non-validity. Non predictability by itself does not lead to non validity, unless … you take Aristotle physicalist stance at the start (which *is* invalid).

Good predictions are what we use to distinguish good theories,

OK.

and this has nothing to do with the ontological status of the physical universe.

It has, if you want to predict some physical happening, you need either a physical universe to start with, or a theory which explains where the physical universe comes from. With Mechanism, the first option is just not available, and you have to recover the *appearance* of the physical universe from some statistic on all computations going through your actual brain or body relative representation/incarnation/implementation. Without Mechanism you need a non mechanist theory of mind, which does not yet exist.

As for "the observable available to all universal numbers", I also doubt that numbers can observe anything. AG 

A number cannot think, or make observation, per se. Nor can a physical body. Nor can anything purely third person describable.

Nor can a number be universal per se.

So when I say that a number can think, observe, or even just be (Turing) universal, it is always a short manner to say that relatively to some “base” phi_i, that number belongs to a (true) relation making it mirroring perfectly (at the mechanist substitution level) the behaviour of a person, as related to its brain.

So, either you were mislead by my short way to express myself, or you are just asserting that you believe that the Mechanist philosophy is wrong. I am agnostic on all this. My point is that mechanism can be tested, and that the currently available evidences favour Mechanism, and quasi-disprove physicalism.

Bruno

to obtain the weak field approximation of GR, aka Newtonian gravity; or that the measured velocity of light is independent of the motions of source and recipient. AG 

I got my answer, by default. AG 

?

Bruno

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[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, June 12, 2020 at 4:43:59 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

So when I say that a number can think, observe, or even just be (Turing) universal, it is always a short manner to say that relatively to some “base” phi_i, that number belongs to a (true) relation making it mirroring perfectly (at the mechanist substitution level) the behaviour of a person, as related to its brain.

Bruno

But can it be conscious?

@philipthrift 

[Alan Grayson]

I disagree. One need not assume any ontological status for the physical universe, but one can still determine whether Newtonian physics "works". AG

 

With QM: that selection (the wave collapse) is made more obvious, more tangible, and … more doubtful, and indeed, if we reject it, QM becomes a confirmation of the main startling aspect of mechanism (we have infinitely many relative “bodies”. 

where validity means predictability.

Actually, I believe only that predictability of the absurd means non-validity. Non predictability by itself does not lead to non validity, unless … you take Aristotle physicalist stance at the start (which *is* invalid).

The physical universe manifests some level of existence, even if it's not the ultimate reality, and there's nothing absurd in testing physics with reference to this reality. AG 

Good predictions are what we use to distinguish good theories,

OK.

and this has nothing to do with the ontological status of the physical universe.

It has, if you want to predict some physical happening, you need either a physical universe to start with, or a theory which explains where the physical universe comes from.

One can verify a physical theory without having a theory of the origin of the physical universe. Just do some measuring! AG

 

With Mechanism, the first option is just not available, and you have to recover the *appearance* of the physical universe from some statistic on all computations going through your actual brain or body relative representation/incarnation/implementation. Without Mechanism you need a non mechanist theory of mind, which does not yet exist.

As for "the observable available to all universal numbers", I also doubt that numbers can observe anything. AG 

A number cannot think, or make observation, per se. Nor can a physical body. Nor can anything purely third person describable.

Nor can a number be universal per se.

So when I say that a number can think, observe, or even just be (Turing) universal, it is always a short manner to say that relatively to some “base” phi_i, that number belongs to a (true) relation making it mirroring perfectly (at the mechanist substitution level) the behaviour of a person, as related to its brain.

So, either you were mislead by my short way to express myself, or you are just asserting that you believe that the Mechanist philosophy is wrong. I am agnostic on all this. My point is that mechanism can be tested, and that the currently available evidences favour Mechanism, and quasi-disprove physicalism.

Bruno

to obtain the weak field approximation of GR, aka Newtonian gravity; or that the measured velocity of light is independent of the motions of source and recipient. AG 

I got my answer, by default. AG 

?

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

If “it” means the body, or the (extensional) number, the answer is no. Now, the person associated to all equivalent relative states can be conscious. Indeed, all relative universal number in arithmetic initiate a consciousness flux, and the physical reality emerges from that internal arithmetic flux, somehow. To be continued.

Bruno

@philipthrift 

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[Bruno Marchal]

No problem. But whatever the physics you are assuming, eventually, if you want to get the qualia, you need to explain the physical laws from arithmetic (and its internal meta-arithmetic-aka-computer science).

 

With QM: that selection (the wave collapse) is made more obvious, more tangible, and … more doubtful, and indeed, if we reject it, QM becomes a confirmation of the main startling aspect of mechanism (we have infinitely many relative “bodies”. 

where validity means predictability.

Actually, I believe only that predictability of the absurd means non-validity. Non predictability by itself does not lead to non validity, unless … you take Aristotle physicalist stance at the start (which *is* invalid).

The physical universe manifests some level of existence, even if it's not the ultimate reality, and there's nothing absurd in testing physics with reference to this reality. AG 

OK.

Good predictions are what we use to distinguish good theories,

OK.

and this has nothing to do with the ontological status of the physical universe.

It has, if you want to predict some physical happening, you need either a physical universe to start with, or a theory which explains where the physical universe comes from.

One can verify a physical theory without having a theory of the origin of the physical universe. Just do some measuring! AG

Absolutely, but to get the qualia, you need to justify the appearance of the physical reality without invoking it.

Physics is just not metaphysics, nor theology, unless you assume physicalism, and in that case you will need some form of non-mechanist theory of mind, and you are out of the scope of my working hypothesis. You will have to present a non computational theory of mind, or just not doing metaphysics/theology.

Bruno

 

With Mechanism, the first option is just not available, and you have to recover the *appearance* of the physical universe from some statistic on all computations going through your actual brain or body relative representation/incarnation/implementation. Without Mechanism you need a non mechanist theory of mind, which does not yet exist.

As for "the observable available to all universal numbers", I also doubt that numbers can observe anything. AG 

A number cannot think, or make observation, per se. Nor can a physical body. Nor can anything purely third person describable.

Nor can a number be universal per se.

So when I say that a number can think, observe, or even just be (Turing) universal, it is always a short manner to say that relatively to some “base” phi_i, that number belongs to a (true) relation making it mirroring perfectly (at the mechanist substitution level) the behaviour of a person, as related to its brain.

So, either you were mislead by my short way to express myself, or you are just asserting that you believe that the Mechanist philosophy is wrong. I am agnostic on all this. My point is that mechanism can be tested, and that the currently available evidences favour Mechanism, and quasi-disprove physicalism.

Bruno

to obtain the weak field approximation of GR, aka Newtonian gravity; or that the measured velocity of light is independent of the motions of source and recipient. AG 

I got my answer, by default. AG 

?

Bruno

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[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, June 13, 2020 at 3:45:40 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Jun 2020, at 11:52, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Friday, June 12, 2020 at 4:43:59 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

So when I say that a number can think, observe, or even just be (Turing) universal, it is always a short manner to say that relatively to some “base” phi_i, that number belongs to a (true) relation making it mirroring perfectly (at the mechanist substitution level) the behaviour of a person, as related to its brain.

Bruno

But can it be conscious?

If “it” means the body, or the (extensional) number, the answer is no. Now, the person associated to all equivalent relative states can be conscious. Indeed, all relative universal number in arithmetic initiate a consciousness flux, and the physical reality emerges from that internal arithmetic flux, somehow. To be continued.

Bruno

No one but me and you will probably even look at the abstracts of this fall's The Science of Consciousness conference (online presentations) 

https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/abs_report_bysession.php?p=C

(these are just the 139 concurrent session papers)

but there's a lot of stuff that might be fun to read (for those who have any imagination), like

How In The Penrose-Hameroff Paradigm The Forms of Space-time Curvatures Can Be Connected With The Eternal Platonic Ideas Or Forms In The Qualia Of Our Experiences And Choices

Gerard Blommestijn (Amstelveen, Netherlands)  

The Penrose-Hameroff paradigm plays a crucial role in the current shift from a causal and local (classical physics) view of brain processes to a quantum-mechanical indeterministic and non-local, entanglement view. The most important ingredient is the Orchestrated Objective Reduction process (Orch OR). Each Orch OR event is a self-selection of space-time geometry, coupled to the brain via microtubules and other biomolecules. Each instantaneous (and non-computable) Orch OR or self-collapse is equated with a discrete conscious event, a perception or a choice, the outcome of the Orch OR. Roger Penrose has contended that, at a deeper level of description, the choice of which outcome of an Orch OR event will occur (which of the superposed space-time geometries will become real) may arise as a result of a presently unknown non-computational mathematical/physical (i.e. Platonic realm) theory, that is it cannot be deduced algorithmically. In my presentation I want to suggest what the outline of such a non-computational theory might look like: The central idea is that the outcome of an Orch OR is not determined by an already existing hidden variable, but by a non computable free choice of the ontologically independent consciousness essence, the I of the mind, defined as abstract Ego by John Von Neumann. In the common non-quantum mechanical view of brain processes the Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC) must somehow encode all details of the sensory and mental experiences that we have at a given moment, as well as all choices for physical and mental movement that we make at that time. Similarly the space-time geometry selected in an Orch OR process must contain the same detailed information of all these qualia of the total of our experience and choose perspective in the coded form of space-time curvatures in the substrate in which they are located. These space-time curvatures arise from the mass distribution in the biomolecules involved, such as tubulin in microtubules, and can be described by the respective metric tensor field. We could imagine this coding of qualia by space-time curvatures, much as meanings are coded for by letters, sentences, paragraphs. Then all aspects and elements of the total of our experiences and choices at a certain moment can be considered to be made up of both elementary and compound Platonic ideas or forms. As a result, the Platonic ideas are not only limited to mathematical ideas such as point, line, circle, number or to ideas like beauty, courage, love, etc.,but are applied very generally and generously to all senses, thoughts, feelings, as well as to all aspects of choices, decisions, plans, visions. The primitives of these experiences etc. (e.g. this color green, this sound on the piano, this artistic feeling), these elementals are used as letters in words to build up the sentences and paragraphs of the total of our experiences and choices. Because they together form the space-time geometry selected in an Orch OR, they must be coded by fundamental space-time geometry letters, phrases etc.

Crazy.

@philipthrift 

[Alan Grayson]

Maybe you're trying to do too much? If all computations are possible (Turing complete?), which allows you to compute all possible physical laws, but you can't determine which laws correspond to our universe, there's no way to discover anything. AG  

With QM: that selection (the wave collapse) is made more obvious, more tangible, and … more doubtful, and indeed, if we reject it, QM becomes a confirmation of the main startling aspect of mechanism (we have infinitely many relative “bodies”. 

where validity means predictability.

Actually, I believe only that predictability of the absurd means non-validity. Non predictability by itself does not lead to non validity, unless … you take Aristotle physicalist stance at the start (which *is* invalid).

The physical universe manifests some level of existence, even if it's not the ultimate reality, and there's nothing absurd in testing physics with reference to this reality. AG 

OK.

Good predictions are what we use to distinguish good theories,

OK.

and this has nothing to do with the ontological status of the physical universe.

It has, if you want to predict some physical happening, you need either a physical universe to start with, or a theory which explains where the physical universe comes from.

One can verify a physical theory without having a theory of the origin of the physical universe. Just do some measuring! AG

Absolutely, but to get the qualia, you need to justify the appearance of the physical reality without invoking it.

Justifying the appearance of physical reality might be, and probably is an ultimate goal, but one should be able to determine which possible physical laws correspond to our universe without it. I don't believe this is possible solely via logic and the postulates of arithmetic, and I see nothing in your comments to convince me otherwise.  AG 

Physics is just not metaphysics, nor theology, unless you assume physicalism, and in that case you will need some form of non-mechanist theory of mind, and you are out of the scope of my working hypothesis. You will have to present a non computational theory of mind, or just not doing metaphysics/theology.

Bruno

 

With Mechanism, the first option is just not available, and you have to recover the *appearance* of the physical universe from some statistic on all computations going through your actual brain or body relative representation/incarnation/implementation. Without Mechanism you need a non mechanist theory of mind, which does not yet exist.

As for "the observable available to all universal numbers", I also doubt that numbers can observe anything. AG 

A number cannot think, or make observation, per se. Nor can a physical body. Nor can anything purely third person describable.

Nor can a number be universal per se.

So when I say that a number can think, observe, or even just be (Turing) universal, it is always a short manner to say that relatively to some “base” phi_i, that number belongs to a (true) relation making it mirroring perfectly (at the mechanist substitution level) the behaviour of a person, as related to its brain.

So, either you were mislead by my short way to express myself, or you are just asserting that you believe that the Mechanist philosophy is wrong. I am agnostic on all this. My point is that mechanism can be tested, and that the currently available evidences favour Mechanism, and quasi-disprove physicalism.

Bruno

to obtain the weak field approximation of GR, aka Newtonian gravity; or that the measured velocity of light is independent of the motions of source and recipient. AG 

I got my answer, by default. AG 

?

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

Yes.

Bruno

@philipthrift 

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[Bruno Marchal]

You misinterpret what I said. The laws of physics arise from relative but global statistics on all computations (which are arithmetical object). The laws of physics are unique, and entirely determined by the arithmetical reality of the computations.

“Our universe” has no meaning. There is just no “universe” at all. The empirical physical reality is a psychological or theological phenomenon, and it is the same for (almost) all universal machine (all, but a finite number of exceptions).

With QM: that selection (the wave collapse) is made more obvious, more tangible, and … more doubtful, and indeed, if we reject it, QM becomes a confirmation of the main startling aspect of mechanism (we have infinitely many relative “bodies”. 

where validity means predictability.

Actually, I believe only that predictability of the absurd means non-validity. Non predictability by itself does not lead to non validity, unless … you take Aristotle physicalist stance at the start (which *is* invalid).

The physical universe manifests some level of existence, even if it's not the ultimate reality, and there's nothing absurd in testing physics with reference to this reality. AG 

OK.

Good predictions are what we use to distinguish good theories,

OK.

and this has nothing to do with the ontological status of the physical universe.

It has, if you want to predict some physical happening, you need either a physical universe to start with, or a theory which explains where the physical universe comes from.

One can verify a physical theory without having a theory of the origin of the physical universe. Just do some measuring! AG

Absolutely, but to get the qualia, you need to justify the appearance of the physical reality without invoking it.

Justifying the appearance of physical reality might be, and probably is an ultimate goal, but one should be able to determine which possible physical laws correspond to our universe without it. I don't believe this is possible solely via logic and the postulates of arithmetic, and I see nothing in your comments to convince me otherwise.  AG 

That has been proved (I would say). With mechanism, the laws of physics are given by the statistics on the first person experiences, and eventually we are saved from solipsism by the math, as we get a notion of first person plural, sharable, physical reality.

That is is needed, of course (like any thesis on any reality assumed to be “out there”) of continual testing. It could be refuted tomorrow, or in 2 billions years. We never know the truth-for-sure (except for consciousness), but all our beliefs can be corrected sometimes, or not. Today all the evidences favours mechanism. There are simply no evidence for a physical universe “in-necessary-need-to-be-assumed" (a primitive physical universe). 

I don’t expect this to be understood in few posts. This requires a lot of works, and some familiarity with mathematical logic.

Bruno

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[Alan Grayson]

What does this mean? AG

 

The laws of physics are unique, and entirely determined by the arithmetical reality of the computations.

Can't there be a universe where gravity acts as 1/r^3? AG

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[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, June 14, 2020 at 5:26:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Jun 2020, at 15:00, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

How In The Penrose-Hameroff Paradigm The Forms of Space-time Curvatures Can Be Connected With The Eternal Platonic Ideas Or Forms In The Qualia Of Our Experiences And Choices

Gerard Blommestijn (Amstelveen, Netherlands)  

Crazy.

Yes.

Bruno

I found this to be the most interesting (in physical terms) by a grad student:

Which abstract (talks or posters) is most interesting to you?

Is Subjectivity a Field? 

Greg Horne ( https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/directory/greg-horne/ )

(Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, ONTARIO Canada)

https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/report_poster_detail.php?abs=3872

(in Poster Sessions, TSC Consciousness Reboot, https://consciousness.arizona.edu/concurrents )

@phiiiptjhrift

 

[Bruno Marchal]

To answer this, you need to understand that all computations are run in the standard model of arithmetic (actually, in *all* models of arithmetic, but I do not use this here).

It is not more or less astonishing that the fact that some computation are run by the physical reality, even when seen as a static 4D space-time “bloc-universe”. The arithmetical reality is a sort of bloc-mindscape. We can come back on this, as indeed not so much people are aware of this, despite this is “well known” since the 1930s.

Then, as I explained usually with the Universal Dovetailer Argument, it is easy to understand that to predict any first person experience, you need to take into account the infinitely many computations going through your state right “now”. Not only arithmetic run all the computation (made by your brain at the relevant level), but it does it infinitely many “often”, that is in different number relations.

 

The laws of physics are unique, and entirely determined by the arithmetical reality of the computations.

Can't there be a universe where gravity acts as 1/r^3? AG

Most plausibly not. The computation where there is an apparent gravity acting as 1/r^3 will not be stable/relatively-numerous enough to allow the consciousness flux to remain stable “in there”.

Of course, there is no universe at all, as only 0, 1, 2, 3 … are said to exist. But in the phenomenological physics, all the laws are well determined, and unique. The unicity is easy to prove given that the physical laws are given by a unique measure on the set of all computations, structured by the precise laws of the mathematics of self-reference. 

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Jun 2020, at 16:12, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sunday, June 14, 2020 at 5:26:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Jun 2020, at 15:00, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

How In The Penrose-Hameroff Paradigm The Forms of Space-time Curvatures Can Be Connected With The Eternal Platonic Ideas Or Forms In The Qualia Of Our Experiences And Choices

Gerard Blommestijn (Amstelveen, Netherlands)  

Crazy.

Yes.

Bruno

I found this to be the most interesting (in physical terms) by a grad student:

Which abstract (talks or posters) is most interesting to you?

Is Subjectivity a Field? 

Subjectivity concerns the first person experience. We cannot equate a first person notion with a third person notion. May be subjectivity can be associated to some filed, and indeed, to any Turing universal one, but we cannot associate a field to any subjective experience, we have to associate all computation leading to that experience, which will contains those supported by Turing universal fields, but also those supported by the game of life, the lambda expressions, the natural numbers, etc.

I let you read the paper to mention, and to see if it is coherent with mechanism.

Bruno

PS I am interrogating student “at a distance” right now …. Apology if I am to short in my answers. Ask any question, and be patient for the answer.

Greg Horne ( https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/directory/greg-horne/ )

(Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, ONTARIO Canada)

https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/report_poster_detail.php?abs=3872

(in Poster Sessions, TSC Consciousness Reboot, https://consciousness.arizona.edu/concurrents )

@phiiiptjhrift

 

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[Alan Grayson]

IMO, your theory, or theorem, is self contradictory. You apparently use the CT theorem to calculate all possible laws of physics, but to determine which laws of physics correspond to our "universe" (to actually discover anything), you must do measurements in THIS particular universe, which you claim doesn't exist. AG 

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[spudb...@aol.com]

I have liked the arguments about 15 years ago tween Hameroff and Penrose on one side and Max Tegmark on the other. What was involved with the idea that the brain's microtubles function as quantum computing, while Tegmark said, No it can't be because quantum computing involved insanely COLD environments and that is not the human brain. What Penrose and Hameroff were really promoting were quantum fields aka quantum electrodynamics, which we find everywhere in nature, including bird splat on the sidewalks. I could surely see that quantum fields functioning as a basis for consciousness. Tegmark and Hameroff ended their argument several years, ago, amicably, with Tegmark.

https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/FFDAD537-1A65-4F96-82F5-8F52F9717748%40ulb.ac.be

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[Bruno Marchal]

“My” theory is the old idea, rediscovered and developed by Descartes, Mechanism, and revised through the “digital”  version made possible by Turing’s discovery of the universal machine. I discovered the main idea in books of Molecular Biology, and then in arithmetic, when reading Gödel’s 1931 paper. I published to get the reaction of my peer, and made it into a PhD thesis. Since then, I found only one important error, but it was not a fatal error, the contrary: after correction, the theology of the Turing machine was both closer to Plotinus and quantum mechanics. I did have problem with materialist philosophers though, but that was to be expected.

You apparently use the CT theorem

If CT is for Church-Turing, it is an hypothesis (also called a thesis). It is a thesis which overlap mathematics and philosophy. 

to calculate all possible laws of physics,

… to execute all computations. At no point I “calculate” any law of physics. Only the computations, which is a notion which is not related to physics. Tell me if you have understand the phi_i (the enumeration of all partial computable function), and I can explain you how to write a simple program which generate and execute all programs. Then, it is a matter of a bit of work to understand that such a program is implemented “naturally” in Arithmetic.

The physical laws are never calculate by that program, or in arithmetic. By the “padding theorem”, for all number i there is an infinity of number j such that phi_j = phi_i, so that  our computational state are accessed by an infinity of computations, and  If you have understood the first person indeterminacy, you can understand that it is that infinite set of computations which gives the range of that indeterminacy, which can be shown to be structure by the mathematics of self-reference, and indeed that gives some quantum logic with the many-histories “interpretation” (made by the universal machines in arithmetic).

The laws of physics are unique. The same for all universal numbers.The reason is that they emerge from the indeterminacy on *all* relative computations. 

but to determine which laws of physics correspond to our “universe"

… to “our” universe, I would write. “Us” = the universal number (believing in enough induction axioms, like PA, ZF, etc.).

(to actually discover anything), you must do measurements in THIS particular universe, which you claim doesn't exist. AG 

There is only one physical reality, but it is not a “physical universe”. What we call “physical universe” becomes the first person plural unavoidable appearance of the region of Arithmetic where the consciousness flux can stabilise. It is how the arithmetical reality is seen from inside by self-referentially correct machine. It is more like a giant “video game”, but where the histories multiplies when we look closely to our environment. 

Not only this explains why “nature” looks quantum, but this explains also why quanta are just the sharable qualia in that first person plural reality. 

From a physicist view, mechanism imposes a new strong invariant. The laws of physics are the same for all universal machines, and is invariant for the choice of the phi_i.

This extends the idea of Darwin, that life has evolved to an evolution of the physical laws, although this “solution” occurs in the mind of the universal numbers/machines. This reduces physics to a theory of mind/consciousness, and then we can observe nature and see if it complies to the consequence of mechanism, and indeed, quantum mechanics confirms all this, up to now.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Jun 2020, at 21:21, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

I have liked the arguments about 15 years ago tween Hameroff and Penrose on one side and Max Tegmark on the other. What was involved with the idea that the brain's microtubles function as quantum computing, while Tegmark said, No it can't be because quantum computing involved insanely COLD environments and that is not the human brain. What Penrose and Hameroff were really promoting were quantum fields aka quantum electrodynamics, which we find everywhere in nature, including bird splat on the sidewalks. I could surely see that quantum fields functioning as a basis for consciousness. Tegmark and Hameroff ended their argument several years, ago, amicably, with Tegmark.

But here, Hameroff has NOT follow Penrose “anti-mechanism”. Hameroff has defended the idea that the brain is a quantum computer, which are emulated in arithmetic. Hameroff has always been Mechanist, and his view is coherent with the consequence of Mechanism. It just put he substitution level very low. Tegmark put it implicitly, like Putnam’s functionalism, at some high level, and seems to miss entirely the first person indeterminacy. On the contrary Penrose get the right conclusion, like Maudlin, i.e. the impossibility to keep both Mechanism and Materialism. They seem to both keep Materialism and to abandon Mechanism. I keep Mechanism (because it is my working hypothesis, and my goal was to show it testable).

Maudlin argument was valid, but Penrose argument was based on a misunderstanding of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. He saw the error, and corrected it in his second book volume, but dismiss it, where in reality, that correction makes the whole difference. Penrose thought, like Lucas, that machine’s ineluctable incompleteness shows that we are not machine, but it shows only that IF we are machine, we cannot know which one (among infinitely many in arithmetic) which is the reason of the first person indeterminacy.

The physicist have the right metaphysical motivation, but ignore mathematical logic.

Mathematical logicians have the right tools, but for historical reason, have no interest in metaphysics. That is well explained in the book by Daniel E. Cohen(*), although the roots of this problem come from much early (the separation of metaphysics/theology from science around +500).

Bruno

(*) Cohen J. Daniel, 2007. Equations from God, Pure Mathematics and Victorian Faith, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore.

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[spudb...@aol.com]

Bruno, we must also ask how well Goedel's maths fit the observable universe? Is the Hubble Volume rotating or not? We have not detected it through astronomy, yet it could still be possible. We'll know more (I believe) when we are able as a species, to place lots of massive telescopes at the edge of solar system, avoiding interference from solar emissions. Then, we will receive a better view of where we all are.

Mitch

https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/A65425C5-4C9E-43BE-A381-FA96959B0CB8%40ulb.ac.be

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[Bruno Marchal]

Spudboy,

On 17 Jun 2020, at 22:25, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

Bruno, we must also ask how well Goedel's maths fit the observable universe?

That is the whole point, indeed. And the facts is that it fits well, thanks to the “quantum weirdness” which is a consequence of the digital mechanist assumption (qualitatively cf many worlds, and quantitatively, through the quantum logics and their interpretations).

Is the Hubble Volume rotating or not?

That is way beyond what we can say today. We have not yet derived the idea of “volume”.

Or are you talking about Gödel’s work in GR (the rotating universe). That is a different subject. But here too, Gödel’s main motivation was logical or philosophical, notably by showing that the existence of circular time was consistent with GR.

We have not detected it through astronomy, yet it could still be possible. We'll know more (I believe) when we are able as a species, to place lots of massive telescopes at the edge of solar system, avoiding interference from solar emissions. Then, we will receive a better view of where we all are.

With Mechanism, we are not human beings dreaming about numbers (and universes), but we are numbers dreaming about humans (and universes).

My goal is not doing physics or astronomy, but to explain where the physical reality comes from, and how to relate it coherently with the universal machine’s theory of consciousness.

Metaphysics and Physics are just not the same domain of inquiry, unless you *assume* a physical universe and assume that you have to assume it, (i.e a primitive or primary universe)? Yet that  can be shown incoherent with the idea that a brain capture consciousness in virtue of implementing a universal machine (aka computer). This is more fundamental cognitive science or epistemology than physics.

Bruno

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