Most of this is fascinating, insightful and deep - from what I can understand of Parts I to IV. (I am wondering: did you have more than cosmetic help from AI?)
I would also be interested to know your definition of 'information' (as bitstrings or equivalent? or as their chosen interpretation? or something else?). Semantic imprecision can be a barrier to adequate understanding and agreement in these (and many other) kinds of situation, so good definitions are important.
My own preferred version of physicalism has thought events as mass neural events and so can include ideas, concepts etc, including thoughts in and about a language, any of which could in theory be correct or incorrect (the physical laws underpinning those events operate correctly regardless). It would not appear to fall foul of any of the criticisms in part I of the article if these are framed outside the context of information as being ontologically primary; ie from this point of view physicalism is self-consistent, in this version of it at least, and so contradicts the assertion that ontologically primary information is the only self-consistent position available.
We may well have already detected electrical signals corresponding to thoughts and could even one day decode them, if we can for example individualise them to key neurons or assemblies and then bulk-analyse them across macro-time; but I don't understand sufficiently to say whether or not this this would refute the idea that information is ontologically primary - this brings us back to the definition of information used, and perhaps also to that of 'computational structures'.
Alastair