The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the wf. This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system and nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG
On 11/14/2019 3:56 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:49:36 PM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the wf. This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system and nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG
Physics is only models that come and go. One model (an expression in a language) can be replaced by another if it's useful. Physicists who jump from a model to an absolute statement about reality are out over their skis.
How Models Are Used to Represent RealityRonald N. Giere
Most recent philosophical thought about the scientific representation of the world has focused on dyadic relationships between language-like entities and the world, particularly the semantic relationships of reference and truth. Drawing inspiration from diverse sources, I argue that we should focus on the pragmatic activity of representing, so that the basic representational relationship has the form: Scientists use models to represent aspects of the world for specific purposes. Leaving aside the terms "law" and "theory," I distinguish principles, specific conditions, models, hypotheses, and generalizations. I argue that scientists use designated similarities between models and aspects of the world to form both hypotheses and generalizations.
@philipthrift.
I fundamentally disagree. The premise underlying models is that they progressively approach a "true" discription of the external world. Do you really think the Earth-centered model of the solar system is equally true as our present understanding? AG
The Earth centric view of Ptolemy was not as true as Newton's heliocentric view...but that's because it was not as accurate.
Newton is considered superior, not just because his theory was more accurate, but because it had a universal application. The greatest importance of Newton was that he broke the idea that the heavens went by different rules than the Earth. So "truth" per se is not the distinction. As Bill can tell you astronomers have no problem with regarding the Earth as stationary and the Sun going around it. But they use Newton's equations to determine how it goes. It's convenience...not truth.
The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the wf. This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system and nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG
Newton is considered superior, not just because his theory was more accurate, but because it had a universal application. The greatest importance of Newton was that he broke the idea that the heavens went by different rules than the Earth. So "truth" per se is not the distinction. As Bill can tell you astronomers have no problem with regarding the Earth as stationary and the Sun going around it. But they use Newton's equations to determine how it goes. It's convenience...not truth.
Bill's failing, as I recall, was the belief and insistence that he's always right. No astronomer of sound mind would regard the Earth as stationary and the Sun going around it. AG
This is a form of relativity, let's call it the relativity of truth, that find obscures the value of evolving models in better describing the external world. AG
On 11/14/2019 6:30 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 7:18:02 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
On 11/14/2019 5:48 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 5:34:02 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
On 11/14/2019 4:20 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
Newton is considered superior, not just because his theory was more accurate, but because it had a universal application. The greatest importance of Newton was that he broke the idea that the heavens went by different rules than the Earth. So "truth" per se is not the distinction. As Bill can tell you astronomers have no problem with regarding the Earth as stationary and the Sun going around it. But they use Newton's equations to determine how it goes. It's convenience...not truth.
Bill's failing, as I recall, was the belief and insistence that he's always right. No astronomer of sound mind would regard the Earth as stationary and the Sun going around it. AG
Not at all. They do it all the time, because when it comes to aiming your telescope you do it relative to the Earth, not the Sun.
Brent
I was thinking of calculating the orbit of a planet. For stars apparently fixed on the celestial sphere, Earth centered calculations are convenient. AG
Which is the point. There is no "true" center of the solar system, there are just more and less convenient coordinate systems in which to calculate things. So you need to ask yourself what do you mean when you say it is more true that the Sun is the center of the solar system and the Earth orbits the Sun than the other way around? If you're honest you will conclude that you mean it is easier to make good estimates of the future in that coordinate system. Why is Einstein's gravity "truer" than Newton's. Why is the quantum atom better than the Bohr atom? Why is Darwinian theory better than Lamarckian. The reason one scientific theory is better than another is three dimensional:
1. It gives more accurate predictions where the theories overlap and no emprically false ones.
2. It has a wider domain of application. It applies in more places or over a bigger range of parameters.
3. It is consilient with our other best theories. So it reduces the number of different things we must understand as independent.
A theory that is better on all three dimensions, we regard as truer. Not the other way around: It is not the case that we judge it better because it's truer, because we don't, and can't, know where the truth is.
Brent
So when we see ~200 billion stars rotating around the galactic enter, it's equally true that each star can be regarded as the center, with everything rotating about itself.
Sure.
You know there's no 'center of the universe' in any current model.
For such a center to have any operational meaning would require that momentum not be conserved.
This is a form of relativity, let's call it the relativity of truth, that find obscures the value of evolving models in better describing the external world. AG
Except that still invites looking at it backwards; as though there is something called "the truth" but it's relative to what we know. I'm saying that there is a concept of "truer" that has an operational meaning, but there is no operational meaning to "the truth" that we are approximating. The only meaning I can give "the truth" is the collection of propositions expressing the known empirical facts; but even those are ambiguous because every observation depends on some theories.
I've explicitly described how we define models as better ("truer") when we evolve them. Do you have some other criterion? Something involving what's true?
Brent
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 5:09:15 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
On 11/14/2019 3:56 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
It's not as accurate because it's not as "true". If the Earth had approximately the same mass as the Sun, the most accurate model would be different. But that's not the reality. It's because the Sun is so much more massive than the Earth, that we use the Sun centered model. All models are not equal; some are truer than others. That was my point. AG
Where the epistemology stuff got into QM you have to ask that weird cult of physicists who got into that.
@philipthrift
"Interpretations of quantum mechanics, unlike Gods, are not jealous, and thus it is safe to believe in more than one at the same time. So if the many-worlds interpretation makes it easier to think about the research you’re doing in April, and the Copenhagen interpretation makes it easier to think about the research you’re doing in June, the Copenhagen interpretation is not going to smite you for praying to the many-worlds interpretation. At least I hope it won’t, because otherwise I’m in big trouble." -Peter Shor
Il 14 novembre 2019 alle 23.25 Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> ha scritto:
The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the wf. This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system and nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG
"The question of whether the waves are something 'real' or a fiction to describe and predict phenomena in a convenient way is a matter of taste. I personally like to regard a probability wave, even in 3N-dimensional space, as a real thing, certainly as more than a tool for mathematical calculations. For it has the character of an invariant of observation; that means it predicts the results of counting experiments, and we expect to find the same average numbers, the same mean deviations, etc., if we actually perform the experiment many times under the same experimental condition. Quite generally, how could we rely on probability predictions if by this notion we do not refer to something real and objective ?" -M. Born, 1949, p. 105-106
https://archive.org/stream/naturalphilosoph032159mbp/naturalphilosoph032159mbp_djvu.txt
> I notice you habitually avoid discussing the problem of ontological versus epistemological
> Applying an epistemological interpretation doesn't guarantee that everything in nature will be explained; rather, it avoids the worst interpretations that egregiously depart from common sense.
> Apply Occam's Razor.
On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 9:49:02 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 6:51:45 PM UTC-7, Lawrence Crowell wrote:On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 3:06:08 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:27 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
> I notice you habitually avoid discussing the problem of ontological versus epistemological
It is a ontological fact that Bell's inequality is violated and there is no epistemological explanation for that fact. You keep wanting a mental picture of the quantum world that conforms with your common sense everyday expectations of how things should work, I'd like that too but our wish will never be granted. I like Many Worlds because although it's very bizarre it's the least bizarre quantum interpretation that fits the hyper bizarre facts; but the universe doesn't care what I think is strange so if it turns out Many Worlds is not true then we would know that something even stranger is.
John K Clark
There is no decision procedure to determine if QM is ψ-epistemic or ψ-ontic. It is not provable either way.
LC
Occam's Razor. AG
Allowing the ψ-epistemic is equivalent to"scientifically" positing that all there is (all reality - whether one calls it the cosmos, nature, the universe-in-toto, ...) is a product of "mind".
It's laughable that those - physicists I guess - who believe the ψ-epistemic are some of the ones decrying "postmodernism". This is basically the Deepak Chopra philosophy that he has seminars on.
The epistemic interpretation just says the wf is our mathematical representation of what we know about reality.
On Saturday, November 16, 2019 at 10:54:06 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:The epistemic interpretation just says the wf is our mathematical representation of what we know about reality.
If that is the definition of epistemic, then any mathematical physics is epistemic ("ur mathematical representation of what we know"):
Einstein Field Equations [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Einstein_field_equations ] is epistemicMaxwell's Equations [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maxwell%27s_equations ] is epistemic,..
Obvious we write down down some math to model some aspect of nature, because that's what we know to do.
@philipthrift
...
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On 11/16/2019 2:38 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Saturday, November 16, 2019 at 10:54:06 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:The epistemic interpretation just says the wf is our mathematical representation of what we know about reality.
If that is the definition of epistemic, then any mathematical physics is epistemic ("ur mathematical representation of what we know"):
It is the definition of epistemic. And it is in contrast to the ontic interpretation of QM which says that the wave function is real and changing it due to a measurement must be described a some physical process, not just taking the measurement into account to update our knowledge.
Brent
>> Apply Einstein's Razor too, "make things as simple as possible but not simpler."
But the MWI is the most UN-parsimonious interpretation possible!
> Can't you see that?
@philipthrift
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On 11/17/2019 2:47 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Sunday, November 17, 2019 at 4:36:13 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
On 11/16/2019 11:39 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Saturday, November 16, 2019 at 4:45:56 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
On 11/16/2019 2:38 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Saturday, November 16, 2019 at 10:54:06 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:The epistemic interpretation just says the wf is our mathematical representation of what we know about reality.
If that is the definition of epistemic, then any mathematical physics is epistemic ("ur mathematical representation of what we know"):
It is the definition of epistemic. And it is in contrast to the ontic interpretation of QM which says that the wave function is real and changing it due to a measurement must be described a some physical process, not just taking the measurement into account to update our knowledge.
Brent
From an applied mathematics perspective, it seems that Schrödinger equation, Einstein equations, Maxwell's equations, ... are all tools for making predictions about measurements, whether those measurements are made by lab instruments or telescopes.
I don't see where a philosophically metaphysical and esoteric term like "knowledge" comes in in any of those equations.
It comes into QM because it's probabilistic. If you wrote Maxwell's equations for the field produced by charged particles whose position was only given by a probability density function you would get a probabilistic prediction and when you measured the field at a few points and got definite answers, you would change you prediction of the field so that it matched the measurements at those points. Your knowledge of the field would still not be definite but it would have changed due to the measurement. Schrodinger's equation only predicts probabilistic measurement results, so it's always like that.
Brent
Just because one formulates stochastic vs. deterministic models doesn't mean "knowledge" has any special place in one type vs. the other,
I took a course in stochastic differential equations
and I don't think the philosophical subject of "knowledge" came up in any special way vs. the subject of (deterministic) differential equations.
Then there was something that changed when you got a measurement, whatever you called it. Maybe the Bayesian estimated density function.
Brent
On 15 Nov 2019, at 00:56, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:49:36 PM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the wf. This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system and nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG
Physics is only models that come and go. One model (an expression in a language) can be replaced by another if it's useful. Physicists who jump from a model to an absolute statement about reality are out over their skis.How Models Are Used to Represent RealityRonald N. GiereMost recent philosophical thought about the scientific representation of the world has focused on dyadic relationships between language-like entities and the world, particularly the semantic relationships of reference and truth. Drawing inspiration from diverse sources, I argue that we should focus on the pragmatic activity of representing, so that the basic representational relationship has the form: Scientists use models to represent aspects of the world for specific purposes. Leaving aside the terms "law" and "theory," I distinguish principles, specific conditions, models, hypotheses, and generalizations. I argue that scientists use designated similarities between models and aspects of the world to form both hypotheses and generalizations.@philipthrift.
I fundamentally disagree. The premise underlying models is that they progressively approach a "true" discription of the external world. Do you really think the Earth-centered model of the solar system is equally true as our present understanding? AG
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On 15 Nov 2019, at 01:06, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:56:33 PM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:49:36 PM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the wf. This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system and nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AGPhysics is only models that come and go. One model (an expression in a language) can be replaced by another if it's useful. Physicists who jump from a model to an absolute statement about reality are out over their skis.How Models Are Used to Represent RealityRonald N. GiereMost recent philosophical thought about the scientific representation of the world has focused on dyadic relationships between language-like entities and the world, particularly the semantic relationships of reference and truth. Drawing inspiration from diverse sources, I argue that we should focus on the pragmatic activity of representing, so that the basic representational relationship has the form: Scientists use models to represent aspects of the world for specific purposes. Leaving aside the terms "law" and "theory," I distinguish principles, specific conditions, models, hypotheses, and generalizations. I argue that scientists use designated similarities between models and aspects of the world to form both hypotheses and generalizations.@philipthrift.I fundamentally disagree. The premise underlying models is that they progressively approach a "true" discription of the external world. Do you really think the Earth-centered model of the solar system is equally true as our present understanding? AG
I notice you habitually avoid discussing the problem of ontological versus epistemological
in the context of superposition and wf's. But this is where, IMO, the rubber hits the road for the fantasies which are so prevalent today. AG
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On 15 Nov 2019, at 01:23, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 5:20:59 PM UTC-7, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the wf. This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system and nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG
As I see it the wave function is epistemological on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, but ontological on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Sundays. On Shabbat it is neither.LCOn the days the wf is ontological, what does it look like? AG
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On 15 Nov 2019, at 03:17, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 11/14/2019 5:48 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 5:34:02 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
On 11/14/2019 4:20 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
Newton is considered superior, not just because his theory was more accurate, but because it had a universal application. The greatest importance of Newton was that he broke the idea that the heavens went by different rules than the Earth. So "truth" per se is not the distinction. As Bill can tell you astronomers have no problem with regarding the Earth as stationary and the Sun going around it. But they use Newton's equations to determine how it goes. It's convenience...not truth.
Bill's failing, as I recall, was the belief and insistence that he's always right. No astronomer of sound mind would regard the Earth as stationary and the Sun going around it. AG
Not at all. They do it all the time, because when it comes to aiming your telescope you do it relative to the Earth, not the Sun.
Brent
I was thinking of calculating the orbit of a planet. For stars apparently fixed on the celestial sphere, Earth centered calculations are convenient. AG
Which is the point. There is no "true" center of the solar system, there are just more and less convenient coordinate systems in which to calculate things. So you need to ask yourself what do you mean when you say it is more true that the Sun is the center of the solar system and the Earth orbits the Sun than the other way around? If you're honest you will conclude that you mean it is easier to make good estimates of the future in that coordinate system. Why is Einstein's gravity "truer" than Newton's. Why is the quantum atom better than the Bohr atom? Why is Darwinian theory better than Lamarckian. The reason one scientific theory is better than another is three dimensional:
1. It gives more accurate predictions where the theories overlap and no emprically false ones.
2. It has a wider domain of application. It applies in more places or over a bigger range of parameters.
3. It is consilient with our other best theories. So it reduces the number of different things we must understand as independent.
A theory that is better on all three dimensions, we regard as truer. Not the other way around: It is not the case that we judge it better because it's truer, because we don't, and can't, know where the truth is.
Brent
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On 15 Nov 2019, at 04:15, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 11/14/2019 6:30 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 7:18:02 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
On 11/14/2019 5:48 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 5:34:02 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
On 11/14/2019 4:20 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
Newton is considered superior, not just because his theory was more accurate, but because it had a universal application. The greatest importance of Newton was that he broke the idea that the heavens went by different rules than the Earth. So "truth" per se is not the distinction. As Bill can tell you astronomers have no problem with regarding the Earth as stationary and the Sun going around it. But they use Newton's equations to determine how it goes. It's convenience...not truth.
Bill's failing, as I recall, was the belief and insistence that he's always right. No astronomer of sound mind would regard the Earth as stationary and the Sun going around it. AG
Not at all. They do it all the time, because when it comes to aiming your telescope you do it relative to the Earth, not the Sun.
Brent
I was thinking of calculating the orbit of a planet. For stars apparently fixed on the celestial sphere, Earth centered calculations are convenient. AG
Which is the point. There is no "true" center of the solar system, there are just more and less convenient coordinate systems in which to calculate things. So you need to ask yourself what do you mean when you say it is more true that the Sun is the center of the solar system and the Earth orbits the Sun than the other way around? If you're honest you will conclude that you mean it is easier to make good estimates of the future in that coordinate system. Why is Einstein's gravity "truer" than Newton's. Why is the quantum atom better than the Bohr atom? Why is Darwinian theory better than Lamarckian. The reason one scientific theory is better than another is three dimensional:
1. It gives more accurate predictions where the theories overlap and no emprically false ones.
2. It has a wider domain of application. It applies in more places or over a bigger range of parameters.
3. It is consilient with our other best theories. So it reduces the number of different things we must understand as independent.
A theory that is better on all three dimensions, we regard as truer. Not the other way around: It is not the case that we judge it better because it's truer, because we don't, and can't, know where the truth is.
Brent
So when we see ~200 billion stars rotating around the galactic enter, it's equally true that each star can be regarded as the center, with everything rotating about itself.
Sure. You know there's no 'center of the universe' in any current model. For such a center to have any operational meaning would require that momentum not be conserved.
This is a form of relativity, let's call it the relativity of truth, that find obscures the value of evolving models in better describing the external world. AG
Except that still invites looking at it backwards; as though there is something called "the truth" but it's relative to what we know. I'm saying that there is a concept of "truer" that has an operational meaning, but there is no operational meaning to "the truth" that we are approximating.
The only meaning I can give "the truth" is the collection of propositions expressing the known empirical facts; but even those are ambiguous because every observation depends on some theories.
I've explicitly described how we define models as better ("truer") when we evolve them. Do you have some other criterion? Something involving what's true?
Brent
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Then a huge technical problem is that the term “model” is used in opposite sense by physicists and logicians, and the sense of “model” used by logicians is technical and required some good understanding of what is a theory as considered in logic (basically a finite machine, actually).
Bruno
On 15 Nov 2019, at 09:21, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 6:06:22 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:56:33 PM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:49:36 PM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the wf. This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system and nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG
Physics is only models that come and go. One model (an expression in a language) can be replaced by another if it's useful. Physicists who jump from a model to an absolute statement about reality are out over their skis.How Models Are Used to Represent RealityRonald N. GiereMost recent philosophical thought about the scientific representation of the world has focused on dyadic relationships between language-like entities and the world, particularly the semantic relationships of reference and truth. Drawing inspiration from diverse sources, I argue that we should focus on the pragmatic activity of representing, so that the basic representational relationship has the form: Scientists use models to represent aspects of the world for specific purposes. Leaving aside the terms "law" and "theory," I distinguish principles, specific conditions, models, hypotheses, and generalizations. I argue that scientists use designated similarities between models and aspects of the world to form both hypotheses and generalizations.@philipthrift.
I fundamentally disagree. The premise underlying models is that they progressively approach a "true" discription of the external world. Do you really think the Earth-centered model of the solar system is equally true as our present understanding? AG
I notice you habitually avoid discussing the problem of ontological versus epistemological in the context of superposition and wf's. But this is where, IMO, the rubber hits the road for the fantasies which are so prevalent today. AGThere is no "epistemology" without human-level consciousness,
and quantum stuff happens without humans.
Where the epistemology stuff got into QM you have to ask that weird cult of physicists who got into that.
@philipthrift
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On 15 Nov 2019, at 11:02, 'scerir' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
Il 15 novembre 2019 alle 1.20 Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> ha scritto:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the wf. This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system and nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG
As I see it the wave function is epistemological on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, but ontological on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Sundays. On Shabbat it is neither.
LC
"Interpretations of quantum mechanics, unlike Gods, are not jealous, and thus it is safe to believe in more than one at the same time. So if the many-worlds interpretation makes it easier to think about the research you’re doing in April, and the Copenhagen interpretation makes it easier to think about the research you’re doing in June, the Copenhagen interpretation is not going to smite you for praying to the many-worlds interpretation. At least I hope it won’t, because otherwise I’m in big trouble." -Peter Shor
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On 15 Nov 2019, at 11:04, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 1:34:40 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 6:20:07 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 5:09:15 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
On 11/14/2019 3:56 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
It's not as accurate because it's not as "true". If the Earth had approximately the same mass as the Sun, the most accurate model would be different. But that's not the reality. It's because the Sun is so much more massive than the Earth, that we use the Sun centered model. All models are not equal; some are truer than others. That was my point. AGDid you ever read philosophy, I mean technically, even like SEP articles on things like truth?I don't mean having taking formal courses in philosophy, but read something of a technical nature [ e.g. https://plato.stanford.edu/index.html ] on the subject.Are you formulating your own theory of truth?Some might call that BS, just winging it on their own.(I cite articles written by well-known philosophers. Who do you cite?)@philipthriftThose seeking a Theory of Everything implicitly believe in the possiblity that our models are progressing towards a description of the external world.
That's all I am saying. But I see getting lost in technical jargon about "truth" obscures this basic pov of most seeking it. AG
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On 15 Nov 2019, at 11:07, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 3:02:57 AM UTC-7, scerir wrote:
Il 15 novembre 2019 alle 1.20 Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> ha scritto:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the wf. This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system and nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG
As I see it the wave function is epistemological on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, but ontological on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Sundays. On Shabbat it is neither.
LC"Interpretations of quantum mechanics, unlike Gods, are not jealous, and thus it is safe to believe in more than one at the same time. So if the many-worlds interpretation makes it easier to think about the research you’re doing in April, and the Copenhagen interpretation makes it easier to think about the research you’re doing in June, the Copenhagen interpretation is not going to smite you for praying to the many-worlds interpretation. At least I hope it won’t, because otherwise I’m in big trouble." -Peter Shor
Friend; I sent you an email about a week ago. As for the MWI, it fits what Nietzsche said about Plato; the great viaduct of corruption. AG
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On 15 Nov 2019, at 11:23, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 4:02:57 AM UTC-6, scerir wrote:
Il 15 novembre 2019 alle 1.20 Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> ha scritto:
On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the wf. This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system and nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG
As I see it the wave function is epistemological on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, but ontological on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Sundays. On Shabbat it is neither.
LC"Interpretations of quantum mechanics, unlike Gods, are not jealous, and thus it is safe to believe in more than one at the same time. So if the many-worlds interpretation makes it easier to think about the research you’re doing in April, and the Copenhagen interpretation makes it easier to think about the research you’re doing in June, the Copenhagen interpretation is not going to smite you for praying to the many-worlds interpretation. At least I hope it won’t, because otherwise I’m in big trouble." -Peter Shor
His (Peter Shor @PeterShor1 Discovered Shor's algorithm for prime factorization on quantum computers) algorithm is very clever, but it's bizarre that a quantum "interpretation" is to some either Many Worlds or "Copenhagen”.
@philipthrift
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On 15 Nov 2019, at 22:05, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:27 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
> I notice you habitually avoid discussing the problem of ontological versus epistemological
It is a ontological fact that Bell's inequality is violated and there is no epistemological explanation for that fact.
You keep wanting a mental picture of the quantum world that conforms with your common sense everyday expectations of how things should work, I'd like that too but our wish will never be granted. I like Many Worlds because although it's very bizarre it's the least bizarre quantum interpretation that fits the hyper bizarre facts; but the universe doesn't care what I think is strange so if it turns out Many Worlds is not true then we would know that something even stranger is.
John K Clark
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On 16 Nov 2019, at 02:51, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 3:06:08 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:27 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
> I notice you habitually avoid discussing the problem of ontological versus epistemological
It is a ontological fact that Bell's inequality is violated and there is no epistemological explanation for that fact. You keep wanting a mental picture of the quantum world that conforms with your common sense everyday expectations of how things should work, I'd like that too but our wish will never be granted. I like Many Worlds because although it's very bizarre it's the least bizarre quantum interpretation that fits the hyper bizarre facts; but the universe doesn't care what I think is strange so if it turns out Many Worlds is not true then we would know that something even stranger is.John K Clark
There is no decision procedure to determine if QM is ψ-epistemic or ψ-ontic. It is not provable either way.
LC
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On 16 Nov 2019, at 04:49, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 6:51:45 PM UTC-7, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 3:06:08 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:27 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:> I notice you habitually avoid discussing the problem of ontological versus epistemologicalIt is a ontological fact that Bell's inequality is violated and there is no epistemological explanation for that fact. You keep wanting a mental picture of the quantum world that conforms with your common sense everyday expectations of how things should work, I'd like that too but our wish will never be granted. I like Many Worlds because although it's very bizarre it's the least bizarre quantum interpretation that fits the hyper bizarre facts; but the universe doesn't care what I think is strange so if it turns out Many Worlds is not true then we would know that something even stranger is.John K ClarkThere is no decision procedure to determine if QM is ψ-epistemic or ψ-ontic. It is not provable either way.
LCOccam's Razor. AG
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On Monday, November 18, 2019 at 1:16:46 PM UTC-7, John Clark wrote:
> Adrian Kent's https://arxiv.org/abs/1305.6565 "real path quantum theory" RPQT
If you fire electrons at 2 slits and observe the slits then each electron takes a real path through one and only one slit and no interference pattern is produced. If you fire electrons at 2 slits and do NOT observe the slits then a interference pattern is produced indicating that each electron went through both slits. Thus real path quantum theory needs 2 sets of physical laws, one for when things are observed and one when they are not. Many Worlds only needs one set of physical laws, and one set is more parsimonious than two.
And if everything that can happen does happen then unlike its competition Many Worlds doesn't have to explain exactly what a "observation" is or worry about the true nature of consciousness because it has nothing to do with it.
John K Clark
You're hopelessly deluded. AG
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>> If you fire electrons at 2 slits and observe the slits then each electron takes a real path through one and only one slit and no interference pattern is produced. If you fire electrons at 2 slits and do NOT observe the slits then a interference pattern is produced indicating that each electron went through both slits. Thus real path quantum theory needs 2 sets of physical laws, one for when things are observed and one when they are not. Many Worlds only needs one set of physical laws, and one set is more parsimonious than two.
> That's what the evangelists for MWI say.
> But in fact some more stuff is needed to explain why we see the world as we do, i.e. how probability comes into it
> Maybe this more stuff can be derived from Schroedinger's equation, but even to do so seems to require additional assumptions.
On Mon, Nov 18, 2019 at 4:14 PM 'Brent Meeker' via <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:>> If you fire electrons at 2 slits and observe the slits then each electron takes a real path through one and only one slit and no interference pattern is produced. If you fire electrons at 2 slits and do NOT observe the slits then a interference pattern is produced indicating that each electron went through both slits. Thus real path quantum theory needs 2 sets of physical laws, one for when things are observed and one when they are not. Many Worlds only needs one set of physical laws, and one set is more parsimonious than two.
> That's what the evangelists for MWI say.I think "evangelists" is unfair. Even the most ardent fan doesn't say we know for certain the MWI is true, they just say it's the least crazy idea that anybody has so far thought of that explains the crazy experimental facts, and they readily admit it's possible the problem is just that nobody has thought hard enough yet. And they certainly don't say anybody who disagrees with the MWI will be eternally tortured as the loving Christian God constantly threatens to do to those who don't believe in Him.> But in fact some more stuff is needed to explain why we see the world as we do, i.e. how probability comes into itIf the Schrödinger equation really means what it says and everything that can happen does happen
then probability would have to come into it when answering the question "What will a being that remembers being Brent Meeke today see tomorrow?".> Maybe this more stuff can be derived from Schroedinger's equation, but even to do so seems to require additional assumptions.Additional assumptions are needed only if you insist on getting rid of those other worlds,
just as you can get a theory that very accurately predicts how the planets move in the night sky even though the theory has the Earth at the center and the sun and all the planets moving around it, you just have to assume lots and lots of epicycles. But the Copernicus theory won because it was more parsimonious in its assumptions. Hugh Everett's genius wasn't that he added something new to Quantum Mechanics, his genius was in getting rid of useless junk.
In using path integrals you arrive a probabilities for various possible outcomes. But that's not the end of the science. You also observe/measure/experience some particular outcome. And then you compute future path integrals starting from the observed state...using the observed state implies you went from a state of uncertainty expressed by probabilities to a state of certainty regarding the new state....aka using knowledge.
Brent
On Mon, Nov 18, 2019 at 4:14 PM 'Brent Meeker' via <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>> If you fire electrons at 2 slits and observe the slits then each electron takes a real path through one and only one slit and no interference pattern is produced. If you fire electrons at 2 slits and do NOT observe the slits then a interference pattern is produced indicating that each electron went through both slits. Thus real path quantum theory needs 2 sets of physical laws, one for when things are observed and one when they are not. Many Worlds only needs one set of physical laws, and one set is more parsimonious than two.
> That's what the evangelists for MWI say.
I think "evangelists" is unfair. Even the most ardent fan doesn't say we know for certain the MWI is true, they just say it's the least crazy idea that anybody has so far thought of that explains the crazy experimental facts, and they readily admit it's possible the problem is just that nobody has thought hard enough yet. And they certainly don't say anybody who disagrees with the MWI will be eternally tortured as the loving Christian God constantly threatens to do to those who don't believe in Him.> But in fact some more stuff is needed to explain why we see the world as we do, i.e. how probability comes into it
If the Schrödinger equation really means what it says and everything that can happen does happen then probability would have to come into it when answering the question "What will a being that remembers being Brent Meeke today see tomorrow?".
> Maybe this more stuff can be derived from Schroedinger's equation, but even to do so seems to require additional assumptions.
Additional assumptions are needed only if you insist on getting rid of those other worlds,
just as you can get a theory that very accurately predicts how the planets move in the night sky even though the theory has the Earth at the center and the sun and all the planets moving around it, you just have to assume lots and lots of epicycles.
But the Copernicus theory won because it was more parsimonious in its assumptions. Hugh Everett's genius wasn't that he added something new to Quantum Mechanics, his genius was in getting rid of useless junk.
John K Clark
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>> If the Schrödinger equation really means what it says and everything that can happen does happen> The Schroedinger equation says nothing of the sort.. Only things that are nomologically possible given your particular initial conditions can happen.
> And that rules out things like "there is a copy of me that turns left whenever I turn right....".
>> Additional assumptions are needed only if you insist on getting rid of those other worlds,> Additional assumptions are needed if you want to make sense of questions like" "What will a being that remembers being John Clark today see tomorrow."
>> Hugh Everett's genius wasn't that he added something new to Quantum Mechanics, his genius was in getting rid of useless junk.> And he was something of an idiot because he did not see that you could not get probabilities out of a deterministic theory
Schrödinger says absolutely nothing about [wave function collapse, it was tacked on by people who wanted only one world.John K Clark
True about Schrödinger, but there are one world formulations in which there is no wave function collapse, or no wave function at all to begin with.
@philipthrift
“The idea that they [measurement outcomes] be not alternatives but all really happen simultaneously seems lunatic to him [the quantum theorist], just impossible. He thinks that if the laws of nature took this form for, let me say, a quarter of an hour, we should find our surroundings rapidly turning into a quagmire, or sort of a featureless jelly or plasma, all contours becoming blurred, we ourselves probably becoming jelly fish. It is strange that he should believe this. For I understand he grants that unobserved nature does behave this way – namely according to the wave equation. The aforesaid alternatives come into play only when we make an observation - which need, of course, not be a scientific observation. Still it would seem that, according to the quantum theorist, nature is prevented from rapid jellification only by our perceiving or observing it. [........] The compulsion to replace the simultaneous happenings, as indicated directly by the theory, by alternatives, of which the theory is supposed to indicate the respective probabilities, arises from the conviction that what we really observe are particles - that actual events always concern particles, not waves."
-Erwin Schroedinger, The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Dublin Seminars (1949-1955) and Other Unpublished Essays (Ox Bow Press, Woodbridge, Connecticut, 1995), pages 19-20.
True about Schrödinger, but there are one world formulations in which there is no wave function collapse, or no wave function -- and no observers -- at all to begin with.
On Mon, Nov 18, 2019 at 6:48 PM Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:>> If the Schrödinger equation really means what it says and everything that can happen does happen> The Schroedinger equation says nothing of the sort.. Only things that are nomologically possible given your particular initial conditions can happen.Or to say the exact same thing with different words, everything that can happen does happen.
> And that rules out things like "there is a copy of me that turns left whenever I turn right....".That would be true only if you assume the wave function collapses, and Schrödinger says absolutely nothing about that, it was tacked on by people who wanted only one world.
>> Additional assumptions are needed only if you insist on getting rid of those other worlds,> Additional assumptions are needed if you want to make sense of questions like" "What will a being that remembers being John Clark today see tomorrow."Like what?
>> Hugh Everett's genius wasn't that he added something new to Quantum Mechanics, his genius was in getting rid of useless junk.> And he was something of an idiot because he did not see that you could not get probabilities out of a deterministic theoryYou can if the theory is deterministic but not realistic as Many Worlds is, that is to say if a deterministic interaction between 2 particles always produces more than one outcome.
On 18 Nov 2019, at 15:28, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Monday, November 18, 2019 at 8:01:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:Then a huge technical problem is that the term “model” is used in opposite sense by physicists and logicians, and the sense of “model” used by logicians is technical and required some good understanding of what is a theory as considered in logic (basically a finite machine, actually).BrunoI have thought about this almost 50 years, and have come to the conclusion that 'model' as used in physics to mean a mathematical formulation of a theory is correct, and that mathematical logicians should have never used that word for what they are using it for. It should be 'interpretation', 'semantics', or domain' instead.So Peano axioms is a model of arithmetic, and is ℕ a possible interpretation (or semantics, or domain).
Mathematical logicians just goofed up, that's all.
@philipthrift--
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On 18 Nov 2019, at 22:14, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 11/18/2019 12:20 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
On Monday, November 18, 2019 at 1:16:46 PM UTC-7, John Clark wrote:
> Adrian Kent's https://arxiv.org/abs/1305.6565 "real path quantum theory" RPQT
If you fire electrons at 2 slits and observe the slits then each electron takes a real path through one and only one slit and no interference pattern is produced. If you fire electrons at 2 slits and do NOT observe the slits then a interference pattern is produced indicating that each electron went through both slits. Thus real path quantum theory needs 2 sets of physical laws, one for when things are observed and one when they are not. Many Worlds only needs one set of physical laws, and one set is more parsimonious than two.
That's what the evangelists for MWI say. But in fact some more stuff is needed to explain why we see the world as we do, i.e. how probability comes into it and why is there a preferred basis. Maybe this more stuff can be derived from Schroedinger's equation, but even to do so seems to require additional assumptions.
Brent
--And if everything that can happen does happen then unlike its competition Many Worlds doesn't have to explain exactly what a "observation" is or worry about the true nature of consciousness because it has nothing to do with it.
John K Clark
You're hopelessly deluded. AG
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>>> Only things that are nomologically possible given your particular initial conditions can happen.>> Or to say the exact same thing with different words, everything that can happen does happen.> Hmmm! You have to be careful that you are not just saying the hat happens, happens!
>>> And that rules out things like "there is a copy of me that turns left whenever I turn right....".>> That would be true only if you assume the wave function collapses, and Schrödinger says absolutely nothing about that, it was tacked on by people who wanted only one world.> Nothing to do with collapse.
> Why is it that you many-worlds advocates always accuse someone who opposes you of assuming some collapse? Rubbish, it assumes no such thing.
>>> Additional assumptions are needed if you want to make sense of questions like" "What will a being that remembers being John Clark today see tomorrow.">> Like what?> That beings like John Clark, with identifiable characteristics, actually exist at all.
>>> he [Everett] was something of an idiot because he did not see that you could not get probabilities out of a deterministic theory
>> You can if the theory is deterministic but not realistic as Many Worlds is, that is to say if a deterministic interaction between 2 particles always produces more than one outcome.
> Actually, I thought one of the attractions of the many worlds theory was that it was realistic -- in the sense that the wave function really exists a a physical object,
> How much more realistic do you want?
> Nevertheless, the SWE does not give a probability without some further assumptions. Why do you think that MWI advocates spend so much time an effort trying to derive the Born rule? You cannot get probabilities from the Schroedinger equation without some additional assumptions.
On 19 Nov 2019, at 01:33, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Monday, November 18, 2019 at 3:48:35 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
In using path integrals you arrive a probabilities for various possible outcomes. But that's not the end of the science. You also observe/measure/experience some particular outcome. And then you compute future path integrals starting from the observed state...using the observed state implies you went from a state of uncertainty expressed by probabilities to a state of certainty regarding the new state....aka using knowledge.
BrentKnowledge is something having to do with human brains ("knowing"), and when they became the "engines" of speaking and writing, then knowledge could be communicated between intelligent beings. (Perhaps other primates too are knowledge-able, but that's debatable.)
Now it seems to me that in the first few billion years at least of the universe (after the Big Bang) there were no knowledge-able beings, There hadn't been time for them to evolve anywhere.But during that time quantum processes (and chemical, and at least somewhere at some point biological precesses) were going along fine without any knowledge-able beings exiting, and thus there was no knowledge changing" -- because there was no knowledge during that time.So how is knowledge needed as a concept in any way in QM when QM processes were occurring in the universe fine before knowledge existed?Whoever put "knowledge: in QM screwed up.
@philipthrift
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@philipthrift
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On 18 Nov 2019, at 15:28, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Monday, November 18, 2019 at 8:01:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:Then a huge technical problem is that the term “model” is used in opposite sense by physicists and logicians, and the sense of “model” used by logicians is technical and required some good understanding of what is a theory as considered in logic (basically a finite machine, actually).BrunoI have thought about this almost 50 years, and have come to the conclusion that 'model' as used in physics to mean a mathematical formulation of a theory is correct, and that mathematical logicians should have never used that word for what they are using it for. It should be 'interpretation', 'semantics', or domain' instead.So Peano axioms is a model of arithmetic, and is ℕ a possible interpretation (or semantics, or domain).Usually the domain is the set from which the model is built. N is the domain, But the Model is the whole structure set (N, 0, +, *). The interpretation is the function going from the syntactic symbol to diverse object or construction made on the domain.In some more vague context, we can use “interpretation”, “semantic” and “model” as quasi synonym. The term “domain” has acquired a more technical sense in the theory of domain by Scott, but very often is used to described the set used in the model.Logicians use “model" like painters. The naked model is the reality, and the painting is the syntax or theory pointing to that reality. Physicists use model, like in Toy model, a simplification, or a theory, and is used most of the time as both a theory or its interpretation (taken for granted most of the time, although this has evolved a little bit, notably through the difficulties to interpret QM).Mathematical logicians just goofed up, that's all.Logic is mainly the study of proof theory, model theory, and the relations between both. “Model” has acquired a technical meaning. I think the term has been introduced by Löwenheim, probably in his "cornerstone paper” on this subject “Über Möglichkeiten im Relativkalkül” (“On Possibility In the Relative Calculus” in German).A good interesting book on the birth of Model Theory is the book by Calixto Badesa: “The Birth of Model Theory”, 2004, Princeton University Press (translated from Spanish).Bruno
>> Schrödinger says absolutely nothing about [wave function collapse, it was tacked on by people who wanted only one world.
> True about Schrödinger, but there are one world formulations in which there is no wave function collapse, or no wave function at all to begin with.
On Monday, November 18, 2019 at 6:50:38 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
On 11/18/2019 4:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Monday, November 18, 2019 at 3:48:35 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
In using path integrals you arrive a probabilities for various possible outcomes. But that's not the end of the science. You also observe/measure/experience some particular outcome. And then you compute future path integrals starting from the observed state...using the observed state implies you went from a state of uncertainty expressed by probabilities to a state of certainty regarding the new state....aka using knowledge.
Brent
Knowledge is something having to do with human brains ("knowing"), and when they became the "engines" of speaking and writing, then knowledge could be communicated between intelligent beings. (Perhaps other primates too are knowledge-able, but that's debatable.)
Now it seems to me that in the first few billion years at least of the universe (after the Big Bang) there were no knowledge-able beings, There hadn't been time for them to evolve anywhere.
But during that time quantum processes (and chemical, and at least somewhere at some point biological precesses) were going along fine without any knowledge-able beings exiting, and thus there was no knowledge changing" -- because there was no knowledge during that time.
So how is knowledge needed as a concept in any way in QM when QM processes were occurring in the universe fine before knowledge existed?
Whoever put "knowledge: in QM screwed up.
You're dodging the question like you're running for office on the know-nothing ticket.
I've already asked all the way I can think of what it is that causes you to change your estimate of the future evolution of a quantum system when you measure it. I've concluded you have no knowledge of this process.
Brent
You are dodging the question:
Was there any knowledge to be changed (or updated) - or my "knowledge of this process" - or "my estimate of the future evolution of a quantum process" - anywhere in he universe 10 billion years ago?
Knowledge (changing/updating knowledge) in any way whatsoever is completely irrelevant to anything in quantum mechanics.
That;s been stated at least 100 times, and that that was stated 20 years ago on Vic's Atoms and Void. You keep objecting. OK. We get it.
@philipthrift
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On 18 Nov 2019, at 22:14, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 11/18/2019 12:20 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
On Monday, November 18, 2019 at 1:16:46 PM UTC-7, John Clark wrote:
> Adrian Kent's https://arxiv.org/abs/1305.6565 "real path quantum theory" RPQT
If you fire electrons at 2 slits and observe the slits then each electron takes a real path through one and only one slit and no interference pattern is produced. If you fire electrons at 2 slits and do NOT observe the slits then a interference pattern is produced indicating that each electron went through both slits. Thus real path quantum theory needs 2 sets of physical laws, one for when things are observed and one when they are not. Many Worlds only needs one set of physical laws, and one set is more parsimonious than two.
That's what the evangelists for MWI say. But in fact some more stuff is needed to explain why we see the world as we do, i.e. how probability comes into it and why is there a preferred basis. Maybe this more stuff can be derived from Schroedinger's equation, but even to do so seems to require additional assumptions.
With mechanism: it requires *less* assumptions. Any physics accepting the mechanist theory of mind must explain the physical appearance from a measure on all (relative) computations.
The math required for doing this requires more axioms (like the distribution of prime number studies seems to require analytical axioms). That is normal, given incompleteness.
Bruno
Brent
--And if everything that can happen does happen then unlike its competition Many Worlds doesn't have to explain exactly what a "observation" is or worry about the true nature of consciousness because it has nothing to do with it.
John K Clark
You're hopelessly deluded. AG
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On Tue, Nov 19, 2019 at 5:26 AM Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> Only things that are nomologically possible given your particular initial conditions can happen.
>> Or to say the exact same thing with different words, everything that can happen does happen.
> Hmmm! You have to be careful that you are not just saying the hat happens, happens!
Anything that does not violate the laws of physics, particularly quantum physics, can happen.
If you fire a electron at 2 slits observing it going through the left slit would be OK with Schrodinger's equation, and so would observing it going through the right slit, and if you don't observe the slits at all it would be OK with Schrodinger's equation to deduce from the resulting interference pattern that the single electron went through both slits. Yes that is absolutely ridiculous but don't blame me, blame God.
>>> And that rules out things like "there is a copy of me that turns left whenever I turn right....".
>> That would be true only if you assume the wave function collapses, and Schrödinger says absolutely nothing about that, it was tacked on by people who wanted only one world.
> Nothing to do with collapse.
It has everything to do with collapse. Copenhagen people say when the electron hits the photographic plate the wave function collapses and the electron makes up its mind where it is and assumes a discreet position, and that's why it makes a sharp spot and not a big smudge on the plate. Many Worlds people say otherwise, not because they enjoy being contrary but because they don't know how else to explain the bizarre results of the 2 slit exparament.
> Why is it that you many-worlds advocates always accuse someone who opposes you of assuming some collapse? Rubbish, it assumes no such thing.
If the wave function collapses then an evolving quantum object, such as yourself, will be in one and only one state tomorrow. If the wave function does NOT collapse then you won't be ( "you" being defined as anything that remembers being Bruce Kellett today).
>>> Additional assumptions are needed if you want to make sense of questions like" "What will a being that remembers being John Clark today see tomorrow."
>> Like what?
> That beings like John Clark, with identifiable characteristics, actually exist at all.
The only assumption is that the Schrodinger equation means what it says, and it says nothing about it collapsing. You can add extra terms to the equation and make it collapse but Occam would not approve, those additional mathematical complexities do not improve predictions one bit, they do nothing but get rid of those other worlds.>>> he [Everett] was something of an idiot because he did not see that you could not get probabilities out of a deterministic theory
>> You can if the theory is deterministic but not realistic as Many Worlds is, that is to say if a deterministic interaction between 2 particles always produces more than one outcome.
> Actually, I thought one of the attractions of the many worlds theory was that it was realistic -- in the sense that the wave function really exists a a physical object,
I don't know where in the world you got that idea. Even probability is pretty abstract but you don't even get that until you take the square of the absolute value of the wave function, which contains imaginary numbers by the way. How much more different from a physical object do you want?
> How much more realistic do you want?It would need one hell of a lot more to be realistic! A theory is realistic if it says a particle is in one and only one definite state both before and after an interaction even if it has not been observed. Many Worlds is about as far from that as you can get.
> Nevertheless, the SWE does not give a probability without some further assumptions. Why do you think that MWI advocates spend so much time an effort trying to derive the Born rule? You cannot get probabilities from the Schroedinger equation without some additional assumptions.
Irrelevant for this discussion because EVERY quantum interpretation assumes the Born Rule. I don't claim the MWI can solve every quantum problem but it can solve one, the mystery of the observer, and it is at least the equal of the other interpretations in explaining the other mysteries. In other words the Many Worlds Interpretation is the least bad idea anybody has come up with over the last century to explain the weird nature of the quantum world.
John K Clark
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On 11/19/2019 12:30 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Monday, November 18, 2019 at 6:50:38 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
On 11/18/2019 4:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Monday, November 18, 2019 at 3:48:35 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
In using path integrals you arrive a probabilities for various possible outcomes. But that's not the end of the science. You also observe/measure/experience some particular outcome. And then you compute future path integrals starting from the observed state...using the observed state implies you went from a state of uncertainty expressed by probabilities to a state of certainty regarding the new state....aka using knowledge.
Brent
Knowledge is something having to do with human brains ("knowing"), and when they became the "engines" of speaking and writing, then knowledge could be communicated between intelligent beings. (Perhaps other primates too are knowledge-able, but that's debatable.)
Now it seems to me that in the first few billion years at least of the universe (after the Big Bang) there were no knowledge-able beings, There hadn't been time for them to evolve anywhere.
But during that time quantum processes (and chemical, and at least somewhere at some point biological precesses) were going along fine without any knowledge-able beings exiting, and thus there was no knowledge changing" -- because there was no knowledge during that time.
So how is knowledge needed as a concept in any way in QM when QM processes were occurring in the universe fine before knowledge existed?
Whoever put "knowledge: in QM screwed up.
You're dodging the question like you're running for office on the know-nothing ticket.
I've already asked all the way I can think of what it is that causes you to change your estimate of the future evolution of a quantum system when you measure it. I've concluded you have no knowledge of this process.
Brent
You are dodging the question:
Was there any knowledge to be changed (or updated) - or my "knowledge of this process" - or "my estimate of the future evolution of a quantum process" - anywhere in he universe 10 billion years ago?
Your knowledge of processes 10 billion years ago is based on measurements done in telescopes and laboratories today and inferences from them.
Knowledge (changing/updating knowledge) in any way whatsoever is completely irrelevant to anything in quantum mechanics.
Forget "knowledge". I'm not arguing about semantics. I'm asking what changes when there is a measurement of a quantum system?
Brent
>>Anything that does not violate the laws of physics, particularly quantum physics, can happen.
> That's not quite right. Events inconsistent with the laws of physics can't happen. But also things inconsistent with initial or boundary conditions (which are typically classical) can't happen. So it is not JUST the SWE.
>> EVERY quantum interpretation assumes the Born Rule. I don't claim the MWI can solve every quantum problem but it can solve one, the mystery of the observer, and it is at least the equal of the other interpretations in explaining the other mysteries. In other words the Many Worlds Interpretation is the least bad idea anybody has come up with over the last century to explain the weird nature of the quantum world.
>The Born rule is a way of predicting probabilities. But how do these probabilities apply in MWI. Do they apply to "observations"...but there are no observations in MWI;