Wolfram Models as Set Substitution Systems

[Philip Thrift]

Wolfram Models as Set Substitution Systems

https://github.com/maxitg/SetReplace

cf. https://www.wolframphysics.org/

Stephen Wolfram (Ph.D. in theoretical physics at the California Institute of Technology in 1979—at the age of 20): 

“I’m disappointed by the naivete of the questions that you’re communicating.” 

https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/physicists-criticize-stephen-wolframs-theory-of-everything/

“I don’t know of any others in this field that have the wide range of understanding of Dr. Wolfram,” Feynman wrote ( in 1981).

@philipthrift

[ronaldheld]

Not  a favorable review from SA.   If he submitted peer reviewed documents years ago, things might be different today.

      Ronald

[Lawrence Crowell]

My primary difficulty with this is not that this is a possibly useful math-method, but that I have little physical sense of what this means. As some combinatorics or paths or states this may have some utility, but this to me is not terribly much a real physical theory.

LC

[Philip Thrift]

But we know though, there is no real physical theory.

@philipthrift

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 May 2020, at 00:26, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

But we know though, there is no real physical theory.

In which metaphysics?

In arithmetic all universal machine already knows that there is no REAL physical universe, and that physics is a calculus of prediction on computational histories as seen from their first person points of view.

*we* might still observe a difference, in which case either Mechanism is wrong or we are in a second order normal simulation. But up to now, there is no evidence that physics is different from the physics “in the head” of the Universal Turing machine.

This is a progress, as this assumes only very elementary arithmetic for the ontology, and the standard definition for the phenomenology, (with direct motivation with the mechanist assumption at the meta level) and it explains both the quanta and the qualia, and why it looks so different (and is different, actually).

It is very simple. One reality (the sigma_1 arithmetical reality), and 8 points of view:

p (truth)

[]p (provable, rationally believable)

[]p & p (knowable, first person)

[]p & <>t (observable, “bettable”, first person plural)

[]p & <>t & p (sensible, feelable, first person singular)

Those five nuances provides 8 mathematical theory, because three of them split along the key incompleteness difference between G1 and G1*. (Those are the logic of []p, which emulates all the others,including G1*, and the “1” comes from the limitation of the arithmetical interpretation on the sigma_1 sentences).That is handy to distinguish quanta from qualia.

G1 = G + p-> []p for p atomic letter. (Already discover and axiomatised by Visser).

G1 can emulate G1*. For example, G* proves A iff G prove the conjunction of the refection of the boxed sub-formula of A. (The reflection of p is the formula []p -> p). It is a form of “YD”: G* believes (about the machine, not about itself) that the machine survives if all its subpart “survives”, somehow. (The arithmetical interpretation of p is always limited

G1* proves the equivalence of all the modalities above, but G1 does not prove most of them.

It is a complete (at the propositional level) theology valid for all self-rerefntially correct machine believing in “enough induction” axiom, and it is testable, by comparing the physical theories related to the “observable” with Nature.

I recall that a machine is universal if it p -> []p (for all p sigma_1) is true for that machine. That is the case for RA.

A machine is by definition Löbian (or Gödel-Löbian) if it proves p -> []p (for all p sigma_1).

That theology is complete for all their effective consistent extensions.

But this becomes as undecidable as it could logically be at the first oder modal logical level. qG is PI_2 complete, and qG* is PI_1 complete in the oracle of truth (!). In this theology, The One is overwhelmed by the Noùs! It is quite Poitinian, as Matter is brought by the Soul at the place where God loses control, to talk poetically (perhaps).

Wolfram is not bad in some part of c computer science, but I am not sure he is serious about “new science” or in metaphysics.

With mechanism, Gödel-Löb-Solovay (G*) solves the mind-body problem in a testable way, as the physics is given by some modalities above, and that can be tested.

Bruno

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[ronaldheld]

I agree that I have no idea how to relate what I have read, to any Physics I have learned.

     Ronald

On Tuesday, May 12, 2020 at 4:13:05 AM UTC-4, Philip Thrift wrote:

[Philip Thrift]

I learned Physics = Math + Witchcraft.

@philipthrift

[spudb...@aol.com]

Hmm! Reminds me of the Laundry Novels by writer Charles Stross.

"I learned Physics = Math + Witchcraft."

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.

[Philip Thrift]

This is true!

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Laundry_Files

 "Magic" is described as being a branch of applied computation (mathematics), therefore computers and equations are just as useful, and perhaps more potent, than classic spellbooks, pentagrams, and sigils for the purpose of influencing ancient powers and opening gates to other dimensions. 

@philipthrift

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 May 2020, at 12:09, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

This is true!

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Laundry_Files

 "Magic" is described as being a branch of applied computation (mathematics), therefore computers and equations are just as useful, and perhaps more potent, than classic spellbooks, pentagrams, and sigils for the purpose of influencing ancient powers and opening gates to other dimensions. 

I don’t believe in “real magic”. If time travel was possible and a time-traveller comes back with a documentary showing Jesus making water into wine, I would still consider that the most plausible explanation would be that Jesus is a good prestidigitator. 

Why? Just by considering the degree of credulity of the humans, and their craft in prestidigitation. 

Similarly, I find far more reasonable, even “Occam-reasonable” that the appearance of a physical universe is due to number’s prestidigitation, because incompleteness shows the numbers being both terribly naïve, but also incredibly gifted in the art of making their fellow number believing almost everything. Gödel’s theorem warned us; if we are consistent, it is even consistent that we are inconsistent (<>t -> <>[]f).

Computationalism is Prestidigitalism. Lol. 

Wolfram is correct about “[]p”, but forget completely []p & p (and thus missed physics, theology, etc.)

At least Penrose is aware of the abyssal difference between “[]p” and “[]p & p”, but literally confusse them in its use of Gödel’s incompleteness against Mechanism.

So, with respect to metaphysics and to the Mind-Body problem in the frame of Descartes-Darwin Mechanism, we can say that Penrose is less wrong than Wolfram, and more interestingly-wrong.

I am not claiming that Penrose or Wolfram are wrong. I am just comparing them with the canonical theology of the universal machine, that is, with the 8 modes of self-truth/belief/knowledge/observation/sensation of the universal machine having enough induction beliefs/axioms, in any hard or soft relative implementation.

Those modes can be motivated through Mechanist thought experiments and/or through the Theaetetus of Plato.

Bruno

@philipthrift

On Wednesday, May 13, 2020 at 4:48:16 PM UTC-5, spudb...@aol.com wrote:

Hmm! Reminds me of the Laundry Novels by writer Charles Stross.

"I learned Physics = Math + Witchcraft."

-----Original Message-----
From: Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com>
To: Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Wed, May 13, 2020 4:49 pm
Subject: Re: Wolfram Models as Set Substitution Systems

I learned Physics = Math + Witchcraft.

@philipthrift

On Wednesday, May 13, 2020 at 2:03:50 PM UTC-5, ronaldheld wrote:

I agree that I have no idea how to relate what I have read, to any Physics I have learned.

     Ronald

On Tuesday, May 12, 2020 at 4:13:05 AM UTC-4, Philip Thrift wrote:

Wolfram Models as Set Substitution Systems

https://github.com/maxitg/ SetReplace

cf. https://www.wolframphysics. org/

Stephen Wolfram (Ph.D. in theoretical physics at the California Institute of Technology in 1979—at the age of 20): 

“I’m disappointed by the naivete of the questions that you’re communicating.” 

https://www. scientificamerican.com/ article/physicists-criticize- stephen-wolframs-theory-of- everything/

“I don’t know of any others in this field that have the wide range of understanding of Dr. Wolfram,” Feynman wrote ( in 1981).

@philipthrift

-

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[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, May 15, 2020 at 11:08:44 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 May 2020, at 12:09, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

This is true!

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Laundry_Files

 "Magic" is described as being a branch of applied computation (mathematics), therefore computers and equations are just as useful, and perhaps more potent, than classic spellbooks, pentagrams, and sigils for the purpose of influencing ancient powers and opening gates to other dimensions. 

I don’t believe in “real magic”. If time travel was possible and a time-traveller comes back with a documentary showing Jesus making water into wine, I would still consider that the most plausible explanation would be that Jesus is a good prestidigitator. 

Why? Just by considering the degree of credulity of the humans, and their craft in prestidigitation. 

Similarly, I find far more reasonable, even “Occam-reasonable” that the appearance of a physical universe is due to number’s prestidigitation, because incompleteness shows the numbers being both terribly naïve, but also incredibly gifted in the art of making their fellow number believing almost everything. Gödel’s theorem warned us; if we are consistent, it is even consistent that we are inconsistent (<>t -> <>[]f).

Computationalism is Prestidigitalism. Lol. 

Wolfram is correct about “[]p”, but forget completely []p & p (and thus missed physics, theology, etc.)

At least Penrose is aware of the abyssal difference between “[]p” and “[]p & p”, but literally confusse them in its use of Gödel’s incompleteness against Mechanism.

So, with respect to metaphysics and to the Mind-Body problem in the frame of Descartes-Darwin Mechanism, we can say that Penrose is less wrong than Wolfram, and more interestingly-wrong.

I am not claiming that Penrose or Wolfram are wrong. I am just comparing them with the canonical theology of the universal machine, that is, with the 8 modes of self-truth/belief/knowledge/observation/sensation of the universal machine having enough induction beliefs/axioms, in any hard or soft relative implementation.

Those modes can be motivated through Mechanist thought experiments and/or through the Theaetetus of Plato.

Bruno

Wolfram thinks that his Hypergraphic Universe Modeling (HUM) language can lead to a unified QM+GR theory.

Do you think consciousness is needed for this unification?

That would be bizarre.

@philipthrift

[Bruno Marchal]

Not necessarily, in the sense that it is still possible to conceive a theory of "everything physical” which would be logically independent of a theory of consciousness, as far as we are interested in predicting first person plural observation.

But such a theory would be cut from reality, as it would not be able to explain why our consciousness satisfies those prediction, so it would not be a theory of everything.

To get that theory of everything including mind and consciousness, there are two options: a mechanist theory of mind, or a non mechanist theory of mind. With a mechanist theory, you will need to derive the “theory of everything-physical” from arithmetic. I don’t see any other way to get a theory of consciousness adequate with the physical observation.

With a non-mechanist theory of mind, everything remains open, if only because such a theory of mind does not exist (except in faith tales).

Bruno

That would be bizarre.

@philipthrift

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[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, May 18, 2020 at 6:52:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 May 2020, at 21:12, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Friday, May 15, 2020 at 11:08:44 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 May 2020, at 12:09, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

This is true!

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Laundry_Files

 "Magic" is described as being a branch of applied computation (mathematics), therefore computers and equations are just as useful, and perhaps more potent, than classic spellbooks, pentagrams, and sigils for the purpose of influencing ancient powers and opening gates to other dimensions. 

I don’t believe in “real magic”. If time travel was possible and a time-traveller comes back with a documentary showing Jesus making water into wine, I would still consider that the most plausible explanation would be that Jesus is a good prestidigitator. 

Why? Just by considering the degree of credulity of the humans, and their craft in prestidigitation. 

Similarly, I find far more reasonable, even “Occam-reasonable” that the appearance of a physical universe is due to number’s prestidigitation, because incompleteness shows the numbers being both terribly naïve, but also incredibly gifted in the art of making their fellow number believing almost everything. Gödel’s theorem warned us; if we are consistent, it is even consistent that we are inconsistent (<>t -> <>[]f).

Computationalism is Prestidigitalism. Lol. 

Wolfram is correct about “[]p”, but forget completely []p & p (and thus missed physics, theology, etc.)

At least Penrose is aware of the abyssal difference between “[]p” and “[]p & p”, but literally confusse them in its use of Gödel’s incompleteness against Mechanism.

So, with respect to metaphysics and to the Mind-Body problem in the frame of Descartes-Darwin Mechanism, we can say that Penrose is less wrong than Wolfram, and more interestingly-wrong.

I am not claiming that Penrose or Wolfram are wrong. I am just comparing them with the canonical theology of the universal machine, that is, with the 8 modes of self-truth/belief/knowledge/observation/sensation of the universal machine having enough induction beliefs/axioms, in any hard or soft relative implementation.

Those modes can be motivated through Mechanist thought experiments and/or through the Theaetetus of Plato.

Bruno

Wolfram thinks that his Hypergraphic Universe Modeling (HUM) language can lead to a unified QM+GR theory.

Do you think consciousness is needed for this unification?

Not necessarily, in the sense that it is still possible to conceive a theory of "everything physical” which would be logically independent of a theory of consciousness, as far as we are interested in predicting first person plural observation.

But such a theory would be cut from reality, as it would not be able to explain why our consciousness satisfies those prediction, so it would not be a theory of everything.

To get that theory of everything including mind and consciousness, there are two options: a mechanist theory of mind, or a non mechanist theory of mind. With a mechanist theory, you will need to derive the “theory of everything-physical” from arithmetic. I don’t see any other way to get a theory of consciousness adequate with the physical observation.

With a non-mechanist theory of mind, everything remains open, if only because such a theory of mind does not exist (except in faith tales).

Bruno

The get a theory of consciousness (or experience), one starts with a "sixth" force/field, allowing for the other five -  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fifth_force- around now.

It's nature would be "localized" in a way different from the other five (or four).

And no one knows what gravity - for example - really is either, aside from some mathematical formulas - we invented - matching its "behavior".

@philipthrift

[Bruno Marchal]

The notion of (physical force) is, by default, a 3p notion (even if later we discover that it is a 1p-plural) notion, yet with clear 3p describable theories. I don’t see how adding a 3p notion can help. What is it, where does it come from, and, how is is related to consciousness, first person, qualia, etc.

And why? When you understand that the elementary truth related to any Turing complete theory is enough to explain the qualia, including the quanta, and that Nature seems to obey to the theory of quanta extracted from arithmetic. It looks like adding difficulties without needing them, just to make the problem more complex?

It's nature would be "localized" in a way different from the other five (or four).

And no one knows what gravity - for example - really is either, aside from some mathematical formulas - we invented - matching its "behavior".

Yes, why not use gravity, like Penrose, but again, what would be explained about qualia by gravitation, which is not already explained by the universal machineries.

When we do metaphysics with the scientific method: the staring point is that we don’t know the (metaphyical) truth, and we start from hypothesis that we understand, and build from it, without adding anything not needed in the search of the explanation. Since Plato, we know that adding a primitive matter leads to the apparently unsolvable mind-body problem. The problem of mind is hard, but not so when you learn the abyssal difference that all machine is obliged to make between []p (2p self-reference) and ([]p & p) the unnameable, and never 3p descriptible, first person. That entails a reversal, as this forces us to derive physics from those intensional (modal) variant of provability.

Maybe you are right, but up to now, the evidences favours strongly mechanism and its non materialism.

Bruno

@philipthrift

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