Panpsychism: 3 Reasons Why Our World is Brimming with Sentience

[Philip Thrift]

Thus the rejection of panpsychism can be overcome by logical analysis, historical and cultural reflection, and perhaps even by chemical ingestion. 

https://highexistence.com/panpsychism-3-reasons-why-our-world-brimming-sentience/

via @PeterSjostedtH

Not quite my panpsychic materialism, but chemistry is involved!

@philipthrift

[Cosmin Visan]

Panpsychism is just the position adopted by those still afraid to leave materialism behind and go to idealism.

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, June 15, 2019 at 1:57:24 PM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:

Panpsychism is just the position adopted by those still afraid to leave materialism behind and go to idealism.

That's basically right, except it seems that it's idealists who are "afraid" of matter. :)

@philipthrift

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Panpsychiam is not consistent with functionalism, whereby if you change a part of the brain with a functional equivalent the subject notices no difference. This is because panpsychism is fundamentally substrate dependent. But there are good reasons for assuming that consciousness is substrate independent.

--

Stathis Papaioannou

[Philip Thrift]

What are those?

@philipthrift 

[Stathis Papaioannou]

It would lead to a decoupling of consciousness and behaviour or to partial zombies, entities which undergo gross changes in consciousness but neither change their behaviour nor recognise it. See this paper by David Chalmers:

http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html

--

Stathis Papaioannou

[Philip Thrift]

See this paper by David Chalmers (which I think is written more than 20 years after the above paper). At least Chalmers seems to be closer now to Philip Goff and Hedda Mørch.

http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf

Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism

David J. Chalmers

..

In my Hegelian argument, the thesis is materialism, the antithesis is dualism, and the

synthesis is panpsychism. The argument for the thesis is the causal argument for materialism

(and against dualism). The argument for the antithesis is the conceivability argument for dualism

(and against materialism). Synthesized, these yield the Hegelian argument for panpsychism. In

effect, the argument presents the two most powerful arguments for and against materialism and

dualism, and motivates a certain sort of panpsychism as a view that captures the virtues of both

views and the vices of neither.

It turns out that the Hegelian argument does not support only panpsychism. It also supports a

certain sort of panprotopsychism: roughly, the view that fundamental entities are protoconscious, that is, that they have certain special properties that are precursors to consciousness

and that can collectively constitute consciousness in larger systems. Later in the article, I will

examine the relative merits of panpsychism and panprotopsychism, and examine problems that

arise for both.

...

,I think that the Hegelian argument gives good reason to take both panpsychism and

panprotopsychism very seriously. If we can find a reasonable solution to the combination

problem for either, this view would immediately become the most promising solution to the

mind–body problem. So the combination problem deserves serious and sustained attention.

@philipthrift

 

[Cosmin Visan]

"Proto" = empty word that we just use in order to make fancy theories that don't mean anything.

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, June 16, 2019 at 2:35:18 AM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:

"Proto" = empty word that we just use in order to make fancy theories that don't mean anything.

That is pretty much right. "Theories" are funny things. Physicists think that they have 'theories" for stuff, but don't realize how meager their "theories" are. 

@philipthrift

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Jun 2019, at 20:57, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

Panpsychism is just the position adopted by those still afraid to leave materialism behind and go to idealism.

I agree. And it eliminates or trivialises the psychism by identifying it with everything. It is materialism, structured in a way to prevent *any* theory of mind.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Jun 2019, at 09:20, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Saturday, June 15, 2019 at 5:40:56 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:

On Sun, 16 Jun 2019 at 00:21, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Saturday, June 15, 2019 at 4:06:27 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:

On Sat, 15 Jun 2019 at 14:16, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

Thus the rejection of panpsychism can be overcome by logical analysis, historical and cultural reflection, and perhaps even by chemical ingestion. 

https://highexistence.com/panpsychism-3-reasons-why-our-world-brimming-sentience/

via @PeterSjostedtH

Not quite my panpsychic materialism, but chemistry is involved!

Panpsychiam is not consistent with functionalism, whereby if you change a part of the brain with a functional equivalent the subject notices no difference. This is because panpsychism is fundamentally substrate dependent. But there are good reasons for assuming that consciousness is substrate independent.

--

Stathis Papaioannou

What are those?

It would lead to a decoupling of consciousness and behaviour or to partial zombies, entities which undergo gross changes in consciousness but neither change their behaviour nor recognise it. See this paper by David Chalmers:

http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html

--

Stathis Papaioannou

See this paper by David Chalmers (which I think is written more than 20 years after the above paper). At least Chalmers seems to be closer now to Philip Goff and Hedda Mørch.

http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf

Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism

David J. Chalmers

..

In my Hegelian argument, the thesis is materialism, the antithesis is dualism,

Of course, with Mechanism, dualism is still a “Materialism” in the weak sense that I used, and the antithesis ion materialism is just immaterialism.

To make sense of this panpsychism, you need to assume a non computationalist theory of mind.

His analysis of Everett in one of its book was also going in the anti-mechanist conception of mind.

Bruno

and the

synthesis is panpsychism. The argument for the thesis is the causal argument for materialism

(and against dualism). The argument for the antithesis is the conceivability argument for dualism

(and against materialism). Synthesized, these yield the Hegelian argument for panpsychism. In

effect, the argument presents the two most powerful arguments for and against materialism and

dualism, and motivates a certain sort of panpsychism as a view that captures the virtues of both

views and the vices of neither.

It turns out that the Hegelian argument does not support only panpsychism. It also supports a

certain sort of panprotopsychism: roughly, the view that fundamental entities are protoconscious, that is, that they have certain special properties that are precursors to consciousness

and that can collectively constitute consciousness in larger systems. Later in the article, I will

examine the relative merits of panpsychism and panprotopsychism, and examine problems that

arise for both.

...

,I think that the Hegelian argument gives good reason to take both panpsychism and

panprotopsychism very seriously. If we can find a reasonable solution to the combination

problem for either, this view would immediately become the most promising solution to the

mind–body problem. So the combination problem deserves serious and sustained attention.

@philipthrift

 

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[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, June 16, 2019 at 6:25:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Jun 2019, at 20:57, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

Panpsychism is just the position adopted by those still afraid to leave materialism behind and go to idealism.

I agree. And it eliminates or trivialises the psychism by identifying it with everything. It is materialism, structured in a way to prevent *any* theory of mind.

Bruno

But I adhere to panpsychic materialism.

So there. :)

@philipthrift 

[Stathis Papaioannou]

The “fading qualia” argument in the earlier paper is a robust one, not dependent on any assumptions about consciousness, or even a definition beyond a minimal operational one: you know it if you have it. It has not been refuted. Although Chalmers has panpsychist tendencies he has not addressed the clash with his own argument.

--

Stathis Papaioannou

[Philip Thrift]

I (and Philip Goff) is glad he's evolving. :)

@philipthrift 

[Bruno Marchal]

If you assume a material reality at the start, you need to abandon the mechanist hypothesis in cognitive science. Your brain and body need a non computational solution of some differential equation, so that your “substitution level” is made infinitely low. But then, you need to abandon the theory of evolution by Darwin, molecular genetics, and this leads to a form of super determinism, where you and your brain exists only due to infinitely precise initial conditions. This eliminates the possibility of using the Mechanist theory of consciousness, to allow a necessity of some ontological commitment. That looks like making things more complicated, without evidence, just to cherish a conception of reality that you like, and which speculates on evidences not yet obtained. It is logically coherent (unlike those who want both primary matter and Mechanism), but seems *very* speculative to me. 

Bruno

@philipthrift 

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[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, June 17, 2019 at 2:54:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Jun 2019, at 13:46, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sunday, June 16, 2019 at 6:25:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Jun 2019, at 20:57, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

Panpsychism is just the position adopted by those still afraid to leave materialism behind and go to idealism.

I agree. And it eliminates or trivialises the psychism by identifying it with everything. It is materialism, structured in a way to prevent *any* theory of mind.

Bruno

But I adhere to panpsychic materialism.

So there. :)

If you assume a material reality at the start, you need to abandon the mechanist hypothesis in cognitive science. Your brain and body need a non computational solution of some differential equation, so that your “substitution level” is made infinitely low. But then, you need to abandon the theory of evolution by Darwin, molecular genetics, and this leads to a form of super determinism, where you and your brain exists only due to infinitely precise initial conditions. This eliminates the possibility of using the Mechanist theory of consciousness, to allow a necessity of some ontological commitment. That looks like making things more complicated, without evidence, just to cherish a conception of reality that you like, and which speculates on evidences not yet obtained. It is logically coherent (unlike those who want both primary matter and Mechanism), but seems *very* speculative to me. 

Bruno

As I wrote elsewhere:

The problem with "all is arithmetic/numbers" and "all is consciousness/qualia"  is that while we know we have a "self" (our self-experience of consciousness) and may even believe in (the fiction of) mathematics, we are in a world where we see the science news* of materials science -- where some scientists/technologists find some really frickingly weird property of some exotic material. So there is all this weird stuff we find out about new materials, to say nothing of stuff we don't know about, like dark matter. (As Auden said, "Matter is much / Odder than we thought.")

If there isn't some sort of "independent" material world (which we are embedded in though), then where does these surprising material properties discovered by materials scientists come from? Do we just dream them up as we dream up matter itself, or they come out of Peano arithmetic?

* https://news.google.com/search?q=materials%20science

Since we don't know all the properties of matter (it could have both extrinsic arithmetical and intrinsic qualial properties), one can't conclude anything about what follows from assuming its "primary" existence.

@philipthrift

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Jun 2019, at 11:13, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Monday, June 17, 2019 at 2:54:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Jun 2019, at 13:46, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sunday, June 16, 2019 at 6:25:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Jun 2019, at 20:57, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

Panpsychism is just the position adopted by those still afraid to leave materialism behind and go to idealism.

I agree. And it eliminates or trivialises the psychism by identifying it with everything. It is materialism, structured in a way to prevent *any* theory of mind.

Bruno

But I adhere to panpsychic materialism.

So there. :)

If you assume a material reality at the start, you need to abandon the mechanist hypothesis in cognitive science. Your brain and body need a non computational solution of some differential equation, so that your “substitution level” is made infinitely low. But then, you need to abandon the theory of evolution by Darwin, molecular genetics, and this leads to a form of super determinism, where you and your brain exists only due to infinitely precise initial conditions. This eliminates the possibility of using the Mechanist theory of consciousness, to allow a necessity of some ontological commitment. That looks like making things more complicated, without evidence, just to cherish a conception of reality that you like, and which speculates on evidences not yet obtained. It is logically coherent (unlike those who want both primary matter and Mechanism), but seems *very* speculative to me. 

Bruno

As I wrote elsewhere:

The problem with "all is arithmetic/numbers" and "all is consciousness/qualia” 

Of course, that is already a contradiction.

is that while we know we have a "self" (our self-experience of consciousness) and may even believe in (the fiction of) mathematics, we are in a world

We certainly “are in a world”. The question is what is the nature of the world. A dream? A computation? Infinitely many computations? Or an irreducibly material world. My point is that IF Mechanism is true in cognitive science, then the physical reality is explainable without an ontological commitment in an irreducible physical reality. 

There is nothing from with physics, but physicalism is incoherent, in that mechanist setting.

where we see the science news* of materials science -- where some scientists/technologists find some really frickingly weird property of some exotic material. So there is all this weird stuff we find out about new materials, to say nothing of stuff we don't know about, like dark matter. (As Auden said, "Matter is much / Odder than we thought.”)

That is a prediction of mechanism: the phenomenology is unbounded in the number of surprises, even just ion numbers. Yes, matter is much odder than we can think, and the mind too. But with mechanism, the first is reducible to the second.

If there isn't some sort of "independent" material world (which we are embedded in though),

But there is an independent of “us” (us the humans) physical reality.

There is no independent of “us” (us the universal numbers) physical reality.

then where does these surprising material properties discovered by materials scientists come from?

It comes from the more sophisticated consequences of 2+2=4. That is the amazing consequence of incompleteness. Even limited to third person arithmetical facts, there is an infinity of surprises.

Do we just dream them up as we dream up matter itself, or they come out of Peano arithmetic?

They comes from Robinson Arithmetic (a quite tiny subset of Peano Arithmetic). Peano arithmetic is the dreamer, whose existence is provided by Robinson arithmetic.

* https://news.google.com/search?q=materials%20science

Since we don't know all the properties of matter (it could have both extrinsic arithmetical and intrinsic qualial properties), one can't conclude anything about what follows from assuming its "primary" existence.

If we assume that matter has a primary existence, and that there is a relation between matter and consciousness (that matter is related to what we observe), we have to bring a non computational theory of mind. 

Bruno

@philipthrift

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