> On 3 Jul 2019, at 19:54, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> You may be able to access your subjective time, but does it provide a measure...and if so what is it?
We get three candidates for the logic of the measure one, given by the logic of the intensional variant of G ([]p):
[]p & p
[]p & <>t
[]p & <>t & p
With “[]” = Gödel’s beweisbar, and p is any sigma_1 arithmetical sentences (it models the Universal dovetailing).
If that logic verifies some technical condition (described by Von Neuman in some papers), the logic should provides the entire probability calculus, as it has to do if Mechanism is correct.
G and G* splits both []p & <>t and []p & <>t & p. So we get 5 logics, but normally, only the starred logic should provides the measure, because it depends on the true structure made by the 1p experiences, and not the experienced experiences. Our future depends non locally of all our existing “preparation” or “reconstitution” that exists in the (sigma_1) arithmetic (the universal dovetailer).
Bruno
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On 8 Jul 2019, at 12:42, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Monday, July 8, 2019 at 4:58:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 6 Jul 2019, at 13:32, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Saturday, July 6, 2019 at 1:42:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 6 Jul 2019, at 05:57, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:Whatever logic it is, its semantics (of a theory in that logic) is the elephant in the room.e.g. Whereas universal algebra provides the semantics for a signature, logic provides the syntax.Semantics is the wild, wild west of logic.You might try to make a point, perhaps. Semantic is obviously very important.Logic can be divided in three chapters:- theory of theories and proofs (cf Gödel)- semantics (Model theory) (cf Lowenheim, Skolem and Tarski, Mostowski, …)- the relation between, theories and models, that is the study of (all) theories and all their semantics, usually through completeness and incompleteness theorems.Semantic is the heart of “modern logic”. I do avoid using it here to much, because it is quickly rather technical. I hope people have some idea that the structure (N, 0, +, *) (which is the set N with the usual standard interpretation of + and *) is a model of both RA and PA. I might say a bit more in the glossary I am preparing. All “rich” theories have infinitely many non isomorphic models, and by incompleteness no theories at all can study its own semantics, but some theories can still say a lot about it, like its own incompleteness.BrunoSemantics is real thing, so to speak, to me.There are two types of semantics:Fictional - regarding all the mathematical structures of standard model theory you refer to above (Hartry Field)
Material - things/entities in the material world
Semantics and substrates are connected, it not identical. That's my blog.
AlsoThere is in my opinion no important theoretical difference between natural languages and the artificial languages of logicians. (Richard Montague)
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If no computer scientist will ever make a conscious machine out of whatever size network of ARM (or even QuARM) processors running its native machine code, then that's a clue.
(ot course on could go the total consciousness/qualia monism route, but that is another problem-maker)
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> On 10 Jul 2019, at 23:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 7/10/2019 7:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The machine define by the two following equations Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz) + S ≠ K, and with the combinator induction axiom (that I gave some posts ago) is already as much conscious than you and me.
>
> Which in it self is a reductio of your theory.
Why? If you agree with the definition of consciousness that I have given (true, knowable, non provable, non definable without invoking truth) then SK+induction *is* provably conscious, and indeed has the G/G* theology applicable to it.
On 11 Jul 2019, at 14:23, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 8:40 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 10 Jul 2019, at 23:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 7/10/2019 7:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The machine define by the two following equations Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz) + S ≠ K, and with the combinator induction axiom (that I gave some posts ago) is already as much conscious than you and me.
>
> Which in it self is a reductio of your theory.
Why? If you agree with the definition of consciousness that I have given (true, knowable, non provable, non definable without invoking truth) then SK+induction *is* provably conscious, and indeed has the G/G* theology applicable to it.Come now. That is just the cat=dog argument for which I have often criticised you. You take a superficial resemblance between two things and claim identity.
Very poor logic, I must say.
"True, knowable, non-provable, definable without invoking truth" is but a poor definition of consciousness,
even if it may be a property of your feeble combinators.
Bruce
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On 11 Jul 2019, at 14:23, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 8:40 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 10 Jul 2019, at 23:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 7/10/2019 7:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The machine define by the two following equations Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz) + S ≠ K, and with the combinator induction axiom (that I gave some posts ago) is already as much conscious than you and me.
>
> Which in it self is a reductio of your theory.
Why? If you agree with the definition of consciousness that I have given (true, knowable, non provable, non definable without invoking truth) then SK+induction *is* provably conscious, and indeed has the G/G* theology applicable to it.Come now. That is just the cat=dog argument for which I have often criticised you. You take a superficial resemblance between two things and claim identity.Not identity, but equivalence.
Conscience is a general term, like cat and dog are both quadrupeds mammals.You are criticising the axiomatic method.
I certainly do not identify the many consciousness possible, as numerous as possible persons, human or not, and in fact, the works shows the existence of very variate forms of consciousness.
It is not because both dog and cat are quadrupeds mammals that Dog = Cat.
But if you are OK that consciousness is characterised by the quasi axiomatic I give, then all universal machine can be said to be conscious, and the Löbian machine can be said to be self-conscious.
Very poor logic, I must say.It is called the axiomatic method, and it is the jewel brought by modern logic. The idea is to characterise things by searching some principles on which we agree about those things, letting open that we might later add incompatible proposition to gives different examples of the thing, like we could add “barking” to "quadruplet mammals” if we want distinguish dog from cat.
Since Gödel we have good reason for doing that, because we know that all concepts “rich enough” cannot be defined at all, but can be characterised by first order logical axiomatic system, or by definition *in* such system. We can’t do better a priori, unless we are gods or something non Turing emulable. All theories about computer programs are essentially undecidable, and most concept there are not univocally definable: you need to add non computable set of postulates to characterise them univocally, which of course cannot be done."True, knowable, non-provable, definable without invoking truth" is but a poor definition of consciousness,That is an opinion, and I have no clue why you say this.
Keep in mind that we have already precise mathematical definition of truth (for the simple Löbian machine), provable, knowable, non-definable, and that all what <I say makes sense thanks to the theorems of Gödel 1931, and Löb 1955, and Solovay 1976 (on G and G*).
even if it may be a property of your feeble combinators
Feeble?
On 12 Jul 2019, at 03:12, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 11:09 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 11 Jul 2019, at 14:23, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 8:40 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 10 Jul 2019, at 23:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 7/10/2019 7:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The machine define by the two following equations Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz) + S ≠ K, and with the combinator induction axiom (that I gave some posts ago) is already as much conscious than you and me.
>
> Which in it self is a reductio of your theory.
Why? If you agree with the definition of consciousness that I have given (true, knowable, non provable, non definable without invoking truth) then SK+induction *is* provably conscious, and indeed has the G/G* theology applicable to it.Come now. That is just the cat=dog argument for which I have often criticised you. You take a superficial resemblance between two things and claim identity.Not identity, but equivalence.Is not identity an equivalence relationship? You are chopping logic.
Conscience is a general term, like cat and dog are both quadrupeds mammals.You are criticising the axiomatic method.Science is not axiomatic.
I certainly do not identify the many consciousness possible, as numerous as possible persons, human or not, and in fact, the works shows the existence of very variate forms of consciousness.It is not because both dog and cat are quadrupeds mammals that Dog = Cat.No, one can point to many more dissimilarities than there are similarities. So your attempt at equivalence or identity between your pathetically inadequate definition of consciousness and your combinator logic fails at every level.
In other words, you have not 'explained' consciousness -- you are not even talking about consciousness as usually understood.
But if you are OK that consciousness is characterised by the quasi axiomatic I give, then all universal machine can be said to be conscious, and the Löbian machine can be said to be self-conscious.I reject your definition of consciousness as totally inadequate. As Brent points out, it does not even begin to cover important aspects of consciousness, such as awareness of an environment.
Very poor logic, I must say.It is called the axiomatic method, and it is the jewel brought by modern logic. The idea is to characterise things by searching some principles on which we agree about those things, letting open that we might later add incompatible proposition to gives different examples of the thing, like we could add “barking” to "quadruplet mammals” if we want distinguish dog from cat.And we could add "interacting with an environment", or "capable of autonomous action", or "can pass a Turing Test" to the list of characteristics of consciousness. None of these additional features are satisfied by your combinators,
so your equivalence relationship is far from being satisfied.Since Gödel we have good reason for doing that, because we know that all concepts “rich enough” cannot be defined at all, but can be characterised by first order logical axiomatic system, or by definition *in* such system. We can’t do better a priori, unless we are gods or something non Turing emulable. All theories about computer programs are essentially undecidable, and most concept there are not univocally definable: you need to add non computable set of postulates to characterise them univocally, which of course cannot be done."True, knowable, non-provable, definable without invoking truth" is but a poor definition of consciousness,That is an opinion, and I have no clue why you say this.That would suggest that you don't know what consciousness is.
Keep in mind that we have already precise mathematical definition of truth (for the simple Löbian machine), provable, knowable, non-definable, and that all what <I say makes sense thanks to the theorems of Gödel 1931, and Löb 1955, and Solovay 1976 (on G and G*).What has 'truth' got to do with it?
Is an axiom conscious?
even if it may be a property of your feeble combinatorsFeeble?Yes, feeble. You put your combinators and a logic text into a room and shut the door. They couldn't even report back the colour of the wallpaper, much less initiate any autonomous action, or pass a Turing test.
Bruce--
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I have been mocked for twenty years on this, by dogmatic materialist believers, until I proved the point (which has transformed the funny mockery in violent hate and defamation).Everyone would benefit of making the discussion emotionally neutral. Ask specific question on what you don’t understand, or what you find false. If you know a better (meta)definition of consciousness, maybe try to explain it here.
On 12 Jul 2019, at 12:24, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 4:56:31 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:I have been mocked for twenty years on this, by dogmatic materialist believers, until I proved the point (which has transformed the funny mockery in violent hate and defamation).Everyone would benefit of making the discussion emotionally neutral. Ask specific question on what you don’t understand, or what you find false. If you know a better (meta)definition of consciousness, maybe try to explain it here.I was thinking we (real) materialists are mocked today. :)
Physicists (and even philosophers) have gone over to "It's all just information [number] processing, including consciousness" [SeanCarroll, Max Tegmark, etc.], thus becoming today's anti-materialists.
@philipthrift
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of some type of qualia among different universal machine.
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On 12 Jul 2019, at 12:24, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 4:56:31 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:I have been mocked for twenty years on this, by dogmatic materialist believers, until I proved the point (which has transformed the funny mockery in violent hate and defamation).Everyone would benefit of making the discussion emotionally neutral. Ask specific question on what you don’t understand, or what you find false. If you know a better (meta)definition of consciousness, maybe try to explain it here.I was thinking we (real) materialists are mocked today. :)Where? Maybe the naïve one, who still believe that the observable are boolean, or something like that. But the paradigm today in metaphysics is implicitly or explicitly physicalist/materialist.Physicists (and even philosophers) have gone over to "It's all just information [number] processing, including consciousness" [SeanCarroll, Max Tegmark, etc.], thus becoming today's anti-materialists.They have to, if Digital Mechanism is assumed, that has been proven. Without Mechanism, it is unclear to me if we can really make sense of that primitive matter concept.It is worst than in the Napoleon-Laplace dialog. I cannot say that I don’t need the hypothesis of Matter, I have to say that any notion of Matter which would be related to my consciousness leads to a contradiction (using very small amount of Occam razor).Let us pursue the testing. To assume Matter (and what would that be?) is far more premature. To invoke it in our explanation of Nature and Consciousness seems to me quite premature. Ontological commitment are better to avoid when doing science, especially so in metaphysics-theology.IF the three of S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*, described in my papers, depart from nature, well, some oracle or matter might be at play, but that has not yet been shown. An hard computationalist will only deduce that we are in a malevolent simulation, like when seeing the pixels in a video game.Bruno
The first 2 are not real without the 3rd.
Without the 1st, the 3rd would be without order and would disintegrate. Without the 2nd, there would be no conscious beings made of the 3rd.One can't untie the Trinity Knot of Being.
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I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and (weak) Materialism, it would be nice to explain why.
On 13 Jul 2019, at 12:31, PGC <multipl...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Saturday, July 13, 2019 at 10:41:00 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and (weak) Materialism, it would be nice to explain why."Mechanism" is not refutable.
Who could refute that working works?
Personal mysticism/philosophy as long as the means to test it enjoy the same ontological status as duplicating machines and ideal quantum computers; wishful thinking until credible evidence exists.It's clear you get off selling people a bill of goods, posing as a worldwide expert on this list for years, as you don't have the means to test for yourself what you attack "physicalists" for believing.None of this is about "debate". That's the con. Everybody knows and justifies their miseries to themselves. Falsities and ambiguities perpetuated in some validation screen addiction, instead of accomplishment, effort, respect, and risk. All we need is the semblance of "debate".You need to confirm your positions to yourselves? And you're looking to do so on the internet? Lol it's 2019. PGC
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* Cornell Scientists Create Lifelike Biomachines That Eat, Grow, And Race CompetitivelyApril 22, 201 (via @HotHardware)Dan Luo [professor of biological and environmental engineering at Cornell] and his team developed a biomaterial that was placed into a nanoscale scaffolding. The material then autonomously emerged to "arrange itself – first into polymers and eventually mesoscale shapes. Acting much like slime molds, the biomaterial was able to move under its own power, moving forward against a liquid flow of energy.Not surprisingly, the researchers pitted these new bio machines against one another in competitive races – because, why not? Given the self-locomotive properties of each and the total randomness of the environments (and of the machines themselves), the team says that the race outcomes and eventual winners were always dynamic.Besides their racing antics and ability to sustain themselves, the Cornell researchers also witnessed their new machines grow, decay and eventual die (after two cycles of synthesis) like true living organisms.“The designs are still primitive, but they showed a new route to create dynamic machines from biomolecules," added Shogo Hamada, a research associate from the Luo lab. "We are at a first step of building lifelike robots by artificial metabolism.“Ultimately, the system may lead to lifelike self-reproducing machines."Luo and his team are just getting started with these machines, and hope to eventually advance their research to the point where this biomaterial can be used as biosensors in the medical field.
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And it doesn't comport with your definition.I am intersted in knowing why you say that. Which part doesn’t comport ?
On 13 Jul 2019, at 12:31, PGC <multipl...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Saturday, July 13, 2019 at 10:41:00 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and (weak) Materialism, it would be nice to explain why."Mechanism" is not refutable.Digital Mechanism is not refutable by introspection. But as it implies that physics, and notably the logic of the observable obeys some logics (indeed some quantum logic), it can be refuted (or judged less plausible) by comparing the physical principles extracted from Mechanism with the observation. Up to now, thanks to the “quantum weirdness” and its “many-histories” interpretation, Mechanism fits with the observation.
That is the great leap of faith.
Panpsychism is the conservative view that only with particular material complexes consciousness exits.
One can simulate thermonuclear fusion in a supercomputer, but it's not real. Same with consciousness.
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Brent
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On 14 Jul 2019, at 15:01, PGC <multipl...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Sunday, July 14, 2019 at 11:00:30 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 13 Jul 2019, at 12:31, PGC <multipl...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Saturday, July 13, 2019 at 10:41:00 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and (weak) Materialism, it would be nice to explain why."Mechanism" is not refutable.Digital Mechanism is not refutable by introspection. But as it implies that physics, and notably the logic of the observable obeys some logics (indeed some quantum logic), it can be refuted (or judged less plausible) by comparing the physical principles extracted from Mechanism with the observation. Up to now, thanks to the “quantum weirdness” and its “many-histories” interpretation, Mechanism fits with the observation.Retrodiction plus the usual oversimplification. What a surprise.A historically nuanced view encompassing developments in all supposed fields up to the present day, which conveniently don't include philosophical (assemble Greek scholars for your interpretations and cite them, if you hold yours truly to be wrong), metaphysical, literal, and aesthetic developments - "mechanism fitting with observation" is an unclear aesthetic/personal standard of evidence - and would never pass any university department/academic panel worth its salt.
Anybody with even an inclination of the complexity involved in the sweeping generality of the claims purporting to explain the origin of physical laws, reality, existence etc. - even a failed literature bachelor - would red flag the ubiquitous truth assignments, the lack of verifiability, and ask for extraordinary amounts - and measures of proof along with consequences of an alleged metaphysics. Results. Not non-results, particularly as semantically, the whole enterprise can be interpreted as anti-scientific, as well as a confidence trick.Technically, it might have passed in isolated, less rigorous settings in the past. But ethically, philosophically, linguistically, metaphysically, physically? Today, in 2019? Sorry, but folks would laugh at the coarse takeover attempt of the scientific enterprise with such an innocent, personalized conception of evidence, science etc. They'd ask to be shown the goods and your non-answer is clear. An infinite amount of posting/explanation won't change it. Science is a "show me" kind of enterprise. You overrate explanations and excuses. PGC
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Bruce
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On 14 Jul 2019, at 15:01, PGC <multipl...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Sunday, July 14, 2019 at 11:00:30 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 13 Jul 2019, at 12:31, PGC <multipl...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Saturday, July 13, 2019 at 10:41:00 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and (weak) Materialism, it would be nice to explain why."Mechanism" is not refutable.Digital Mechanism is not refutable by introspection. But as it implies that physics, and notably the logic of the observable obeys some logics (indeed some quantum logic), it can be refuted (or judged less plausible) by comparing the physical principles extracted from Mechanism with the observation. Up to now, thanks to the “quantum weirdness” and its “many-histories” interpretation, Mechanism fits with the observation.Retrodiction plus the usual oversimplification. What a surprise.A historically nuanced view encompassing developments in all supposed fields up to the present day, which conveniently don't include philosophical (assemble Greek scholars for your interpretations and cite them, if you hold yours truly to be wrong), metaphysical, literal, and aesthetic developments - "mechanism fitting with observation" is an unclear aesthetic/personal standard of evidence - and would never pass any university department/academic panel worth its salt.I don’t understand well what you say.
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On 16 Jul 2019, at 13:44, PGC <multipl...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Monday, July 15, 2019 at 1:53:11 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 14 Jul 2019, at 15:01, PGC <multipl...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Sunday, July 14, 2019 at 11:00:30 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 13 Jul 2019, at 12:31, PGC <multipl...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Saturday, July 13, 2019 at 10:41:00 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and (weak) Materialism, it would be nice to explain why."Mechanism" is not refutable.Digital Mechanism is not refutable by introspection. But as it implies that physics, and notably the logic of the observable obeys some logics (indeed some quantum logic), it can be refuted (or judged less plausible) by comparing the physical principles extracted from Mechanism with the observation. Up to now, thanks to the “quantum weirdness” and its “many-histories” interpretation, Mechanism fits with the observation.Retrodiction plus the usual oversimplification. What a surprise.A historically nuanced view encompassing developments in all supposed fields up to the present day, which conveniently don't include philosophical (assemble Greek scholars for your interpretations and cite them, if you hold yours truly to be wrong), metaphysical, literal, and aesthetic developments - "mechanism fitting with observation" is an unclear aesthetic/personal standard of evidence - and would never pass any university department/academic panel worth its salt.I don’t understand well what you say.Nobody, including yourself, understands what you say generally.
It changes every week to accommodate the latest discourse.The whole discursive setup you practice here, with transparent ideological vilification of alleged physicalists and victimization of some allegedly holy platonic side depends on one thing: distance. At least a perceived distance. It depends on people not knowing each other and therefore on folks willing to fear and blame each other because your discourse isn't informed to the contrary.That's a highly warped and sad, cynical view of the world. I hope you do better for yourself and those around you.You're being dismissive to the world + yourself: Who questions peoples’ alleged attachments to “Aristotle hypothesis” or whatever the flavor of the week or month is?
Who assumes themselves to have a mandate to interfere in how other people parse reality? Who tries to force everybody's discourse into their own interpretations without asking? I'm telling you for years: it's rude. Quit the games. Respect people along with yourself. You care about your work? Then work on building consensus - listen and read others as equals - instead of trying to conquer discourse. Folks that force their topics and interpretations each and every chance they get lack good faith in others and themselves. The hyper polite humble non-aggressive style doesn't fool anybody. The academic "with mechanism - we xyz blah blah" => there is no "we" or "mechanism" with your monologues of some entitled feeling leader and agreements from a few credulous minions.Everybody knows that violence can be hidden in the most neutral, non-aggressive discourse.Do yourself the favor of being you, instead of the muppet of some alleged platonism. Stop robbing time from yourself and members of this list with this kind of discourse. PGC
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On 16 Jul 2019, at 13:44, PGC <multipl...@gmail.com> wrote:On Monday, July 15, 2019 at 1:53:11 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:I don’t understand well what you say.Nobody, including yourself, understands what you say generally.Just tell me what you don’t understand specifically, and avoid ad hominem attack. It bores everybody, and distract from the thread.
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Bruce
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On Wed, Jul 17, 2019, at 00:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:On Wed, Jul 17, 2019 at 12:55 AM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 16 Jul 2019, at 13:44, PGC <multipl...@gmail.com> wrote:On Monday, July 15, 2019 at 1:53:11 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:I don’t understand well what you say.Nobody, including yourself, understands what you say generally.Just tell me what you don’t understand specifically, and avoid ad hominem attack. It bores everybody, and distract from the thread.That is just bullying, Bruno. You accuse everyone who disagrees with you of ad hominem attacks.That is a lie and you know it.
And you should be ashamed of yourself for saying it. I challenge you to find one instance on this mailing list where Bruno accused anyone of ad hominem without having been directed insulted: "pee pee theories", "you don't make sense", "nobody knows what you're talking about", etc etc. I know you won't produce this example because it doesn't exist, and I also know that you will just avoid the topic and focus on the next insult / patronizing comment.Well, I have been participating in this mailing list on and off for more than one decade, and more or less the only original ideas being discussed here come from Bruno. I have witnessed multi-year threads discussing what he is saying in great detail, so clearly some people must have some idea of what he is saying.
Maybe the limitation is on your side?You insist on rigor when you talk to Bruno (as you should), and then you side with someone who produced exactly zero arguments, that writes long and incoherent rants
that aim only at insulting Bruno for personal reasons. Unlike John Clark for example. Say what you will, but I have never seen John Clark side with bullshit just because "the enemy of my enemy is my friend". Give me a break here. You are about as far from having a scientific attitude as I am from becoming the next Miss Universe.
Bravo PGC. Very Well Said.
Delusions of reality as based in a purely mathematical scheme will never amount to a "theory of everything..."
Just another quaint, historically bounded, and deeply ontologically committed idea with absolutely no practical relevance, much like Thales' commitment that "all is water" or Anaximander's idea of the "apeiron" as a metaphysical absolute. Sounds great on paper... try to do something with it... well, that's a Turing TarPit right there.
And just a further comment to Bruno's constant use of "Aristotelian assumption" of "primary matter." Can I have primary source citation, please? From what I recall of my Aristotle, a fair bit of it, I can't even once remember him talking about "matter" in the ordinary, "post-Cartesian" sense of the term. And you know why? Because he didn't have that distinction in his lexicon!!! In his metaphysics, he talks of "particulars," not "matter" per se, unless you think this is based on his idea of one of the four forms of causation. And he argued that all four need to be present before a thing comes to be (efficient, formal, teleological, final). Nowhere does he mention the very modern (i.e. post-Descartes) idea of "matter" in this metaphysic.
Please defend your claims philologically, and not by way of obscure mathematical formula supposedly designed to lead us to some sort of ultimate Platonic conclusion. And also not by way of convenient redefinitions of common words (God, matter, machine) that leave most people in a dust of confusion. (but maybe that's your intent?)
I can already feel you writing... "but the hypothesis of mechanism dictates that ... x must be y.... " ... "numbers must have dreams, and they must be us... " the hypostases of the ultimate one talked about by plotinus (which numbered 8) must be the only way if we assume mechanism... "
ENOUGH!
Your rhetoric and constant pompous references to your previous posts have chased many great minds away from this list. (Craig Weinberg comes to mind.) And I mostly come here to see John Clark constantly body slam you with respect to the question of hardware implementation of computations... which you never answer... like a true cultist... "Go back to step 3" -- fuck step three. There are no matter duplicating machines. There is no "absolute first person perspective"... referred to by a pronoun "I". And even if there were a matter duplicating machine, it would have to be made of "matter" (pace John Clark) and so couldn't simply just happen by virtue of the mathematical formalism. (Remember Pythagoras? See where he ended up? Not because what he said was true... because it was ANNOYINGLY FALSE) Therefore, your mind experiment is done as far as practical consequences. So what? Who cares? What are we even doing here?
God bless John Clark for fighting this nonsense.
Remember what this list was meant to do -- CULTIVATE THEORIES OF EVERYTHING... NOT "Cultivate what conforms to Bruno's idea of a Theory of Everything Is."
And, please, no disrepect to any of the other participants on this thread. I have followed you all for so long (10+) years that you are all family (including Bruno, you silly bastard)
I love the salutary conclusions that seem to emerge from your speculations, Bruno, I really do... but so much effort has been dedicated to trying to make you see that you have blindspots (Brent Meeker, John Clark, Craig Weinberg) and you never modify your theory to cover them, you only insist that they don't understand your genius plan.
Let me ask you: if you are the only car traveling in a certain direction (let's call it North) and you encounter multiple cars traveling at other directions (namely, South), are the other guys driving in the wrong direction? Or are you?
And before anyone charges me of just dropping in uninvited, my claimed 10+ years experience a lie, I have posted here before, in different guises. I'll leave it up to the readers (if they're interested) in figuring out who I am.
Doesn't matter now, though, my anonymity is blown.
Please be kind (or not, this is the internet, after all...)
Anyway, I found it irresistible to drop in and let you all know I love you all and this forum, and Bruno too for being so god damned STUBBORN!! But it's looking like you might need to re evaluate some stuff?
Go ahead, cut me up in the comments...
On Thursday, July 18, 2019 at 10:18:38 PM UTC-5, Dan Sonik wrote:Bravo PGC. Very Well Said.
Delusions of reality as based in a purely mathematical scheme will never amount to a "theory of everything..."
Just another quaint, historically bounded, and deeply ontologically committed idea with absolutely no practical relevance, much like Thales' commitment that "all is water" or Anaximander's idea of the "apeiron" as a metaphysical absolute. Sounds great on paper... try to do something with it... well, that's a Turing TarPit right there.
And just a further comment to Bruno's constant use of "Aristotelian assumption" of "primary matter." Can I have primary source citation, please? From what I recall of my Aristotle, a fair bit of it, I can't even once remember him talking about "matter" in the ordinary, "post-Cartesian" sense of the term. And you know why? Because he didn't have that distinction in his lexicon!!! In his metaphysics, he talks of "particulars," not "matter" per se, unless you think this is based on his idea of one of the four forms of causation. And he argued that all four need to be present before a thing comes to be (efficient, formal, teleological, final). Nowhere does he mention the very modern (i.e. post-Descartes) idea of "matter" in this metaphysic.
Please defend your claims philologically, and not by way of obscure mathematical formula supposedly designed to lead us to some sort of ultimate Platonic conclusion. And also not by way of convenient redefinitions of common words (God, matter, machine) that leave most people in a dust of confusion. (but maybe that's your intent?)
I can already feel you writing... "but the hypothesis of mechanism dictates that ... x must be y.... " ... "numbers must have dreams, and they must be us... " the hypostases of the ultimate one talked about by plotinus (which numbered 8) must be the only way if we assume mechanism... "
ENOUGH!
Your rhetoric and constant pompous references to your previous posts have chased many great minds away from this list. (Craig Weinberg comes to mind.) And I mostly come here to see John Clark constantly body slam you with respect to the question of hardware implementation of computations... which you never answer... like a true cultist... "Go back to step 3" -- fuck step three. There are no matter duplicating machines. There is no "absolute first person perspective"... referred to by a pronoun "I". And even if there were a matter duplicating machine, it would have to be made of "matter" (pace John Clark) and so couldn't simply just happen by virtue of the mathematical formalism. (Remember Pythagoras? See where he ended up? Not because what he said was true... because it was ANNOYINGLY FALSE) Therefore, your mind experiment is done as far as practical consequences. So what? Who cares? What are we even doing here?
God bless John Clark for fighting this nonsense.
Remember what this list was meant to do -- CULTIVATE THEORIES OF EVERYTHING... NOT "Cultivate what conforms to Bruno's idea of a Theory of Everything Is."
And, please, no disrepect to any of the other participants on this thread. I have followed you all for so long (10+) years that you are all family (including Bruno, you silly bastard)
I love the salutary conclusions that seem to emerge from your speculations, Bruno, I really do... but so much effort has been dedicated to trying to make you see that you have blindspots (Brent Meeker, John Clark, Craig Weinberg) and you never modify your theory to cover them, you only insist that they don't understand your genius plan.
Let me ask you: if you are the only car traveling in a certain direction (let's call it North) and you encounter multiple cars traveling at other directions (namely, South), are the other guys driving in the wrong direction? Or are you?
And before anyone charges me of just dropping in uninvited, my claimed 10+ years experience a lie, I have posted here before, in different guises. I'll leave it up to the readers (if they're interested) in figuring out who I am.
Doesn't matter now, though, my anonymity is blown.
Please be kind (or not, this is the internet, after all...)
Anyway, I found it irresistible to drop in and let you all know I love you all and this forum, and Bruno too for being so god damned STUBBORN!! But it's looking like you might need to re evaluate some stuff?
Go ahead, cut me up in the comments...
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Hi Dan,It is OK to be critical. I always welcome this.
But you are a bit short of argument. You seem convince by John Clark’s posts. At least John Clark told us where in the reasoning he thinks there is a mistake, but has not yet been able to explain it, or convince anybody.
So, if you understand his critics of the step 3 in the 8-steps version of the Universal Dovetailer argument, you are welcome to explain it to us. If you want, I re-explain the argument, but most people in this list have no problem with it, so you might insist, or just read it here:
About Aristotle primary substance, I am not sure I understand your remark. I discuss this on many groups on antic philosophy, and, you are the first to make this very astonishing remark. You might need to revise Aristotle's “Metaphysics” which is all about this (beware the different translations though).
Concerning Craig Weinberg, we have agreed on everything. He just choose the option “weak-materialism” instead of mechanism, but seem to understand there incompatibility.
Most of its philosophy is very close to what I extract from the theaetetus’ definition of knowledge, when applied to Gödel’s provability predicate (which I motivate either through thought experiments or by referring to Plato). We opus quasi everyday since the dialog on Facebook, as Craig seems to prefer.
Please, explain John Clark’s argument, if you understand it. Brent has acknowledge having no problem up to step 6, and is unclear (or undecided perhaps) on step 7.
You might ignored like many that all computations occurs in already a tiny segment of the arithmetical reality: the truth of the sigma_1 sentences (which is indeed equivalent to a universal dovetailing).
That is required for step seven. This is well known by logicians since almost Gödel’s 1931 paper. That makes the believer in “Matter"forced to explain how their “Matter” can influence or interfere with the statistics on computations which are run in arithmetic (where “run” is taken in the sense of Church, Kleene, Turing, etc.
Bruno
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"I’m happy to be described as a monist. There aren’t multiple different kinds of things; there is only the wave function of the universe. As an emergent approximation it’s useful to characterize the wave function as describing multiple worlds."
So for Sean Carroll, reality is a mathematical entity: a wave function.At least Thales believed in stuff (matter).
On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:47, Dan Sonik <dania...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 6:17:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:Hi Dan,It is OK to be critical. I always welcome this.
Thank you.
But you are a bit short of argument. You seem convince by John Clark’s posts. At least John Clark told us where in the reasoning he thinks there is a mistake, but has not yet been able to explain it, or convince anybody.
On the contrary, I just think the criticism has fallen on deaf ears -- reading some of these threads puts me in mind of those unfortunate individuals who are struck with agnosia. No matter how blatant and paramount the input for people with this condition, they simply pass it over, unaware of what is right under their noses.So, if you understand his critics of the step 3 in the 8-steps version of the Universal Dovetailer argument, you are welcome to explain it to us. If you want, I re-explain the argument, but most people in this list have no problem with it, so you might insist, or just read it here:Sure, I'll take a crack. Referring to your paper...
"Computationalism", or "comp" for short-- the idea that 1) our brains are made of some digitally fungible units
(at a level of description which is unknowable)
such that if some or all of it were replaced it would make no difference to that individual 2) computers themselves are equivalent at some level of description (Church Turing hypothesis) 3) arithmetical realism -- true statements about numbers are true absent any observers. Step 1: Computationalism implies the possibility of teleportation "in principle" -- that, according to you, is sufficient to prove your conclusion.
Step 2: Consider the difference between the first and third person perspectives, where the third person perspective is ascertained from a record contained in a personal diary.
Step 3: Assume you are a person being teleported -- you are told beforehand you will be teleported to either Washington or Moscow, with a 50 50 chance. The question is then put to the person about to be teleported -- where will YOU end up...
As far as I can tell there have been two main criticisms of this thought experiment up to this point.
First, the question "where will YOU end up" is poorly formed in a counterfactual world of duplicating machines.
There is no more YOU if YOU can be copied. There has to be a You-1 and a You-2, and the use of basic pronouns (that have evolved in a world absent of perfect duplicating machines) elides this distinction.
The second problem seems to be that computations absent any form of instantiation don't "DO” anything
-- in order for a computation to be performed, it must be instantiated in some hardware, and therefore the domain of physics is larger than the domain of mathematics,
because the details of implementing a Turing machine in the real world are just as if not more important than the kinds of computations you will end up feeding it.
Over and above these criticisms, however, is the recurrently identified insistence on using words with completely arbitrary definitions that do not map to how most of the rest of the English speaking community use them -- God, theology, machine, materialism/primary matter as examples -- and it seems that this move signals a bit of bad faith on your part, or at least a willingness to obfuscate in order to avoid inconvenient (and yet quite legitimate) counterpoints many have raised over the years. Again, I am reminded of agnosia sufferers.
About Aristotle primary substance, I am not sure I understand your remark. I discuss this on many groups on antic philosophy, and, you are the first to make this very astonishing remark. You might need to revise Aristotle's “Metaphysics” which is all about this (beware the different translations though).
I'm not sure what is so "astonishing" about the remark.
Seeing a flying saucer land and 5 little grey beings come out? That would be astonishing to me.
A world where we could be teleported from Helsinki to Moscow? Astonishing.
Making a possibly incorrect claim about Aristotelian hermeneutics... eh, not that astonishing. And I think you might have meant to say "review" rather than "revise," -- to revise is to edit something with the goal of making it clearer or better. I wouldn't want to take on the job of editing Aristotle (although, God knows, he did need an editor). If I recall correctly, Aristotle thought the world was made of 5 elements, each telelogically drawn to their own place in the natural order of things. So that's 5 substances, not one -- it's not a monism, and therefore to conflate it with materialism and continually refer to it as Aristotelian belief in primary substance seems a bit careless. The modern notion of matter has no telos.
Concerning Craig Weinberg, we have agreed on everything. He just choose the option “weak-materialism” instead of mechanism, but seem to understand there incompatibility.
I would say here that you grossly mischaracterize his ideas as "weak materialism"…
but if you are going to go off using words in special ways (as is your wont), then no one can stop you. His website is called "Multisense realism." As far as I can tell, he argues for the ontological primacy of sensation diffracted across multiple modes of interpretation-- not sure how that can be put in the "materialist" box. Sounds more like a brand of idealism to me…
Most of its philosophy is very close to what I extract from the theaetetus’ definition of knowledge, when applied to Gödel’s provability predicate (which I motivate either through thought experiments or by referring to Plato). We opus quasi everyday since the dialog on Facebook, as Craig seems to prefer.
Glad to hear! (what is "opus quasi"?)
Please, explain John Clark’s argument, if you understand it. Brent has acknowledge having no problem up to step 6, and is unclear (or undecided perhaps) on step 7.
See above.
You might ignored like many that all computations occurs in already a tiny segment of the arithmetical reality: the truth of the sigma_1 sentences (which is indeed equivalent to a universal dovetailing).OK, that's what you say. (??) Not sure how it's relevant to the objection 1) counterfactual worlds with teleportation devices need clearer ways of referring to those who are duplicated.
2) Computations don't compute anything without something on which to compute (paper and pencil, a machine (in the commonly used sense, not in your neologized sense), a brain).
That is required for step seven. This is well known by logicians since almost Gödel’s 1931 paper. That makes the believer in “Matter"forced to explain how their “Matter” can influence or interfere with the statistics on computations which are run in arithmetic (where “run” is taken in the sense of Church, Kleene, Turing, etc.
I think the main "leap of faith" that you make (and many others simply can't, because it appears absurd) is somehow thinking that the completed computations are already "out there,”
in some sort of Platonic superspace.
Perhaps this is what the implication of AR is, although it seems a somewhat stronger claim than just AR. This takes far more suspension of disbelief than assuming (and then getting actual, real world consequences from) a material world that needs to be engineered in order to deliver the results we expect from our computations. You can't build something with only equations,
and all the computations being "out there" are as good as none of them being out there if you can't distinguish correct from incorrect ones.
And the only way you can distinguish them is by actually building a real machine made out of stuff of some kind and go ahead and run the computation and wait for the answer. This has been mentioned multiple times, but again, agnosia.
Seeing how previous threads go, I am holding little hope in persuading you that your thought experiment does not establish what you want it to,
(i.e. we are eternal computations in an ever unfolding dovetailer algorithm) but that's fine... the thinking and writing process is fun and it would be really cool if it were true (but it probably ain't). And I could be full of shit myself, so there's that.
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On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:48, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 7/19/2019 12:33 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
"I’m happy to be described as a monist. There aren’t multiple different kinds of things; there is only the wave function of the universe. As an emergent approximation it’s useful to characterize the wave function as describing multiple worlds."
So for Sean Carroll, reality is a mathematical entity: a wave function.At least Thales believed in stuff (matter).
"Stuff" is sufficiently vague that the wave-function could qualify as "stuff". The contentious question seems to be where conscious thoughts fall in the ontology. Are they processes realized by stuff (Vic), or do they exist in a separate Platonic real(Bruno),
do they constitute a separate realm(pt), do they constitute everything(Cosmin)?
Brent
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On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:48, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 7/19/2019 12:33 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
"I’m happy to be described as a monist. There aren’t multiple different kinds of things; there is only the wave function of the universe. As an emergent approximation it’s useful to characterize the wave function as describing multiple worlds."
So for Sean Carroll, reality is a mathematical entity: a wave function.At least Thales believed in stuff (matter).
"Stuff" is sufficiently vague that the wave-function could qualify as "stuff". The contentious question seems to be where conscious thoughts fall in the ontology. Are they processes realized by stuff (Vic), or do they exist in a separate Platonic real(Bruno),
Elementary arithmetic is that realm, and I ask you: how it could be separated, and mostly: from what?
From your irreducible material universe in which you seem to believe?
Why invoke such a thing.
It is not used in physics. It is used in physicalism, which until now just put the mind-body problem under the rug. With mechanism, we have a “simple” explanation of consciousness, and a “simple” explanation of where the observable comes from, and we can test it.
Your use of metaphysics is like the pseudo-religious one. You claim that your god (Matter) is enough to not do the experimental testing.
Brent
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There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply factual.
Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you
> will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
> being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it is
> quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
> experience.
>
> There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply factual.
But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second person
plural and second person singular being the same word in English. In
the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
they say "youse". I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
duplication thought experiments.
Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both subject, and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...
Quentin
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Brent
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On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:47, Dan Sonik <dania...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 6:17:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:Hi Dan,It is OK to be critical. I always welcome this.
Thank you.
But you are a bit short of argument. You seem convince by John Clark’s posts. At least John Clark told us where in the reasoning he thinks there is a mistake, but has not yet been able to explain it, or convince anybody.
On the contrary, I just think the criticism has fallen on deaf ears -- reading some of these threads puts me in mind of those unfortunate individuals who are struck with agnosia. No matter how blatant and paramount the input for people with this condition, they simply pass it over, unaware of what is right under their noses.So, if you understand his critics of the step 3 in the 8-steps version of the Universal Dovetailer argument, you are welcome to explain it to us. If you want, I re-explain the argument, but most people in this list have no problem with it, so you might insist, or just read it here:Sure, I'll take a crack. Referring to your paper...
"Computationalism", or "comp" for short-- the idea that 1) our brains are made of some digitally fungible unitsThat is already a bit implicitly physicalist. Once, I suggested to abandon the expression “made of” because it is misleading. But OK, I will not cut the air. Computationalism is just the digital version of Descartes mechanism. Once (informal and colloquial) version is that there is no magic nor use of any actual infinities in the brain (that will entail later that there are some infinities at play for the mind, soul or consciousness).(at a level of description which is unknowable)Yes, although that is proved later.such that if some or all of it were replaced it would make no difference to that individual 2) computers themselves are equivalent at some level of description (Church Turing hypothesis) 3) arithmetical realism -- true statements about numbers are true absent any observers. Step 1: Computationalism implies the possibility of teleportation "in principle" -- that, according to you, is sufficient to prove your conclusion.I prove only at step 1 that computationalism entails the possibility of (classical) teleportation. (I am unsure which conclusion is alluded here).
To be clear, I never try to prove computationalism to be true. It is my working hypothesis. I study the consequences, and show them testable and well tested by QM (which proves nothing of course).Step 2: Consider the difference between the first and third person perspectives, where the third person perspective is ascertained from a record contained in a personal diary.By an observer which does not enter the cut-and-copy bow.
The important point here is the definition of the first person view, which is the content of the diary that the candidate take with him in the teleportation box. That plays an important role in the sequel.The first person is also the content of a diary.
It is 3P operational approximation of the first person experience: the personal diary content. Everett use something equivalent.In step two: a delay is intrigued in the reconstitution,
and the point is that the delay is measurable in the 3p view, but is able,nt from the 1p diary: the first person is not aware of the delay. That is used again in step 4. You seem to have pass this.
Step 3: Assume you are a person being teleported -- you are told beforehand you will be teleported to either Washington or Moscow, with a 50 50 chance. The question is then put to the person about to be teleported -- where will YOU end up...“You” in the indexical first person sense, which means here, what will be written in the personal diaries.
As far as I can tell there have been two main criticisms of this thought experiment up to this point.
First, the question "where will YOU end up" is poorly formed in a counterfactual world of duplicating machines.Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it is quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the experience.
There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply factual.
There is no more YOU if YOU can be copied. There has to be a You-1 and a You-2, and the use of basic pronouns (that have evolved in a world absent of perfect duplicating machines) elides this distinction.But we agree, in the 3p description, that you-1 is still you, and you-2 is still you too, but in a different “incarnation”.This shows that in Helsinki (the place where you decide to do the experience, and try too predict what your experience will look like in your 1p view, which exists by computationalism).
If you just say that there is no more YOU, then we die in the duplication, and thus also in the simple teleportation, and thus you cannot say “yes” qua computation to the digitalist doctor and Mechanism is false.
The second problem seems to be that computations absent any form of instantiation don't "DO” anythingBut that is the case only in step 7 and 8. Up to step 6 the computations are all physically instantiated. You jumped to step 7 here.Should I guess that you are OK with the first 6 steps?-- in order for a computation to be performed, it must be instantiated in some hardware, and therefore the domain of physics is larger than the domain of mathematics,Assuming a physical primitive universe. But you cannot invalidate a reasoning by adding an hypothesis not there. That is not valid.because the details of implementing a Turing machine in the real world are just as if not more important than the kinds of computations you will end up feeding it.
Over and above these criticisms, however, is the recurrently identified insistence on using words with completely arbitrary definitions that do not map to how most of the rest of the English speaking community use them -- God, theology, machine, materialism/primary matter as examples -- and it seems that this move signals a bit of bad faith on your part, or at least a willingness to obfuscate in order to avoid inconvenient (and yet quite legitimate) counterpoints many have raised over the years. Again, I am reminded of agnosia sufferers.
About Aristotle primary substance, I am not sure I understand your remark. I discuss this on many groups on antic philosophy, and, you are the first to make this very astonishing remark. You might need to revise Aristotle's “Metaphysics” which is all about this (beware the different translations though).
I'm not sure what is so "astonishing" about the remark.I think I see the point. You might have thought that I said that Aristotle is the one introducing Materialism (as used in philosophy of mind), but I say only that Aristotle introduced “weak materialism”, the metaphysical assumption that an irreducible physical reality exists all by itself. There has never been any evidences for this, and that was exactly what Plato is all about. Aristotle is a reaction to Plato, and a vindication that physics is part of any fundamental theory, like most believe today. That is the point that we have to abandon when we assume digital mechanism, but that is after step 7 or 8.Seeing a flying saucer land and 5 little grey beings come out? That would be astonishing to me.That would astonish me too, but not be conceptually important. It is just discovering that we have neighbours.A world where we could be teleported from Helsinki to Moscow? Astonishing.Technologically, but conceptually banal when we assume Digital Mechanism.
Making a possibly incorrect claim about Aristotelian hermeneutics... eh, not that astonishing. And I think you might have meant to say "review" rather than "revise," -- to revise is to edit something with the goal of making it clearer or better. I wouldn't want to take on the job of editing Aristotle (although, God knows, he did need an editor). If I recall correctly, Aristotle thought the world was made of 5 elements, each telelogically drawn to their own place in the natural order of things. So that's 5 substances, not one -- it's not a monism, and therefore to conflate it with materialism and continually refer to it as Aristotelian belief in primary substance seems a bit careless. The modern notion of matter has no telos.It is WEAK materialism. The belief that we have to assume a physical universe. The idea that we cannot explain matter without invoking primitive, assumed matter, be it earth, fire stare and air, or any element of the same material nature.
It is the belief that Pythagorean have to be false, as for them matter has to be explained by numbers, and indeed they begun to explain geometry with numbers, something pursued by Descartes, etc.
Concerning Craig Weinberg, we have agreed on everything. He just choose the option “weak-materialism” instead of mechanism, but seem to understand there incompatibility.
I would say here that you grossly mischaracterize his ideas as "weak materialism"…I don’t think I have ascribe weal materialism to Craig Weinberg. I don’t see where or what you allude too. On the century, his approach is 100% coherent with the consequence of mechanism.but if you are going to go off using words in special ways (as is your wont), then no one can stop you. His website is called "Multisense realism." As far as I can tell, he argues for the ontological primacy of sensation diffracted across multiple modes of interpretation-- not sure how that can be put in the "materialist" box. Sounds more like a brand of idealism to me…I have never claim that Weinberg is weak, still less not weak, materialist.
His multisense realism is quite comparable to the 8 modes of the self implied by incompleteness. My work shows that the universal number in arithmetic get the same non materialist insight. Yet in a more mathematically precise way so that we can test Mechanism and the immaterialist consequences.
Most of its philosophy is very close to what I extract from the theaetetus’ definition of knowledge, when applied to Gödel’s provability predicate (which I motivate either through thought experiments or by referring to Plato). We opus quasi everyday since the dialog on Facebook, as Craig seems to prefer.
Glad to hear! (what is "opus quasi"?)A mispelling (aggravated by the automated spelling corrector) for “we discuss this quasi everyday since we dialog on this on Facebook).
Please, explain John Clark’s argument, if you understand it. Brent has acknowledge having no problem up to step 6, and is unclear (or undecided perhaps) on step 7.
See above.Above you say that we die when we are multiplied, but that contradict the working hypothesis. If you don’t die in a simple teleportation experience (step one), you cannot die because a copy is made at a distance, that would involve non local action at a distance, which makes no sense if we assume that mechanism is true and that the substitution has been well chosen.
You might ignored like many that all computations occurs in already a tiny segment of the arithmetical reality: the truth of the sigma_1 sentences (which is indeed equivalent to a universal dovetailing).OK, that's what you say. (??) Not sure how it's relevant to the objection 1) counterfactual worlds with teleportation devices need clearer ways of referring to those who are duplicated.That is why the UDA reasoning should be seen, like originally, only as a motivation for the translation of this in arithmetic, where the notion of first and third person leads to 8 important nuances imposed by incompleteness. The UDA is for the young people. It asks for a minimum of good willing, and a dilate for hand waving type of Sunday philosophy.
If you mean what you say above, we die at step 3, and you leave the digital Mechanist frame.
2) Computations don't compute anything without something on which to compute (paper and pencil, a machine (in the commonly used sense, not in your neologized sense), a brain).Wait we arrive at step 7, and don’t add a new hypothesis, which looks like a string metaphysical commitment in an entity for which no evidences have were be given (just brainwashing since Aristotle, I would say).
That is required for step seven. This is well known by logicians since almost Gödel’s 1931 paper. That makes the believer in “Matter"forced to explain how their “Matter” can influence or interfere with the statistics on computations which are run in arithmetic (where “run” is taken in the sense of Church, Kleene, Turing, etc.I think the main "leap of faith" that you make (and many others simply can't, because it appears absurd) is somehow thinking that the completed computations are already "out there,”You seem to not have study Gödel’s 1931 paper and the 1930s paper which followed, or Emil Post anticipation, or any paper in Davis Dover “Undecidable” or any textbook in theoretical computer science.If you agree that 2+2=4 implies Ex(x+2 = 4), or more simply that the equation x+2=0 has a solution in the integers, then you have to believe that the computations all exists in arithmetic. Peano Arithmetical proves the existence of those computations, like it proves the existence of the prime number.
in some sort of Platonic superspace.Not at all? Realism in arithmetic is only the statement that you have no objection to what is taught in primary school. That is why I insist all the time to use “realism” instead of “platonism”, which I keep only for the metaphysics.
You need only the arithmetic without which we cannot define what is a digital machine, and that is needed to define Digital Mechanism.*All* papers in physics assumes the same amount of arithmetic (actually most assumes much more powerful mathematical hypotheses).
Perhaps this is what the implication of AR is, although it seems a somewhat stronger claim than just AR. This takes far more suspension of disbelief than assuming (and then getting actual, real world consequences from) a material world that needs to be engineered in order to deliver the results we expect from our computations. You can't build something with only equations,Of course. The arithmetical reality is provably beyond all theories and not obtainable from any system of equations.
Even a theory as powerful than ZF, or ZFC + large cardinals can only scratch the arithmetical reality, and cannot avoid the non standard model.After Gödel we just understand that we know about nothing about numbers and the arithmetical reality, and we know that this is forever. We know that there is an infinity of surprise, and with mechanism, that there is an infinity points of view that the number can develop relatively to those surprise.
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem sign the breakdown of all reductionist conception of number and machine, and a fortiori of man (assuming mechanism).and all the computations being "out there" are as good as none of them being out there if you can't distinguish correct from incorrect ones.A theory can be correct or incorrect. A computation cannot. It is just an activity of a machine. It might be different to what you expect, like if there was a bug, but that is dependent of what you want.
Eyud Shapiro debugging algorithm illustrate this well. You can consider that the program correctly computing the factorial function is a bugged version of a program computing the Fibonacci number, and you can debug it automatically, from samples of inputs outputs, until it computes fibonacci.
The notion of correct, non correct is for the theories, or the asserting machines.And the only way you can distinguish them is by actually building a real machine made out of stuff of some kind and go ahead and run the computation and wait for the answer. This has been mentioned multiple times, but again, agnosia.You assume a irreducible physical universe; but you cannot invoke a metaphysical assumption not present in a theory to refute that theory. That is simply not valid. That is like a creationist saying that the theory of evolution is all nice and well except that it fails to account for most statement in the bible.
Seeing how previous threads go, I am holding little hope in persuading you that your thought experiment does not establish what you want it to,You need to work more on the step 3 issues. You say that after the duplication “YOU” does not exist anymore, but this means that you died in the process, contra the Mechanist hypothesis.
Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will need some telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of substitution was correctly chosen.So, do you die or not in the step 3?
(i.e. we are eternal computations in an ever unfolding dovetailer algorithm) but that's fine... the thinking and writing process is fun and it would be really cool if it were true (but it probably ain't). And I could be full of shit myself, so there's that.Thanks for showing some hope toward a possible understanding,
Bruno
All the Best,
DanBruno
<div style="font-size:small" c
Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you
> will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
> being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it is
> quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
> experience.
>
> There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply factual.
But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second person
plural and second person singular being the same word in English. In
the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
they say "youse". I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
duplication thought experiments.
Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both subject, and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...
Quentin
Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find youse-self is "Washington and Moscow."
It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not on the duplicated bodies.
--
Brent
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Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
On 7/20/2019 10:59 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you
> will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
> being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it is
> quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
> experience.
>
> There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply factual.
But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second person
plural and second person singular being the same word in English. In
the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
they say "youse". I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
duplication thought experiments.
Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both subject, and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...
Quentin
Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find youse-self is "Washington and Moscow."
It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not on the duplicated bodies.
The pov gets duplicated with the bodies.
No there is two unique pov, one that sees Moscow, one that sees Washington, none that sees Washington and Moscow.
Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
On 7/20/2019 10:59 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you
> will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
> being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it is
> quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
> experience.
>
> There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply factual.
But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second person
plural and second person singular being the same word in English. In
the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
they say "youse". I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
duplication thought experiments.
Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both subject, and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...
Quentin
Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find youse-self is "Washington and Moscow."
It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not on the duplicated bodies.
The pov gets duplicated with the bodies.
No there is two unique pov, one that sees Moscow, one that sees Washington, none that sees Washington and Moscow.
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On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <dania...@gmail.com> wrote:
Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will need some telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of substitution was correctly chosen.So, do you die or not in the step 3?
I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and let's find out -- you go first.
On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <dania...@gmail.com> wrote:<snip>
Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will need some telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of substitution was correctly chosen.So, do you die or not in the step 3?
I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and let's find out -- you go first.Let me rephrase the question:
I didn't say there was. I said youse-self sees Moscow and Washington. "Youse-self" is second person plural.
Brent
Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's clear and meaningful.
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(God plays Monte Carlo.)
@philipthrift
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On 7/21/2019 4:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 4:39:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
I didn't say there was. I said youse-self sees Moscow and Washington. "Youse-self" is second person plural.
Brent
Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's clear and meaningful.
But does it have a clear answer?
The MWI has it's own problems with probability. It's straightforward if there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we implicitly assume they are equi-probable). But what if there are two possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other? Does the world split into three, two of which are the same? If two worlds are the same, can they really be two. Aren't they just one? And what if there are two possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand chance. Does the world then split into 1001 worlds? And what if the probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds. But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely many times and there is no natural measure of probability.
Brent
Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer.
"The potential for multiple worlds is always there in the quantum state, whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do multiple-world superpositions of the form written [above] ever actually come into being? And the answer again is: yes, automatically, without any additional assumptions."
But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and how does probability come into it? Do we have to just assign probabilities to branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead of deriving it)? And what about continuous processes like detecting the decay in Schroedinger's cat box? Is a continuum of worlds produced corresponding to the different times the decay might occur?
Brent
Tegmark could be on the mark by taking the position that infinities of all types should be removed from physics.
So there would be no "continuum of worlds". The way I think about it (without getting into the formality of computable analysis) is to just think of the worlds being generated as in a quantum Monte Carlo program: There will be lots of worlds randomly made, but not an actual infinity of them.
That would just be equivalent to weighting them with the Born Rule. If you're going to have worlds generated per a MC program with weightings (probabilities) then why not just have world generated per the Born MC program.
Brent
(God plays Monte Carlo.)
@philipthrift
On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:47, Dan Sonik <dania...@gmail.com> wrote:
>I think the main "leap of faith" that you make (and many others simply can't, because it >appears absurd) is somehow thinking that the completed computations are already "out >there,”
If you agree that 2+2=4 implies Ex(x+2 = 4), or more simply that the equation x+2=0 has a solution in the integers, then you have to believe that the computations all exists in arithmetic. Peano Arithmetical proves the existence of those computations, like it proves the existence of the prime number.
in some sort of Platonic superspace.Not at all? Realism in arithmetic is only the statement that you have no objection to what is taught in primary school.
On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <dania...@gmail.com> wrote:
<snip>
Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will need some telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of substitution was correctly chosen.
So, do you die or not in the step 3?
I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and let's find out -- you go first.
Let me rephrase the question:
Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3?
According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original is cut. The scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after a delay, or in several different places.
The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the original disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more sophisticated view of personal identity, depending on a lot more the just memories of previous states, but depending also on bodily continuity, then the question of whether the original dies or not depends on the details of your theory of personal identity. For example, in Nozik's "closest continuer" theory, if the duplicate has an equivalent body and environment, then a single continuer is the closest continuer of the original, and can be considered the same person in some sense. Nozik's argument is that if there are two or more continuers, and there is a tie in the relevant sense of "closeness", then each continuer is a new person, and the original no longer exists (dies).
So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than your simplistic assumptions allow: it is actually an empirical question as to whether the "person" continues unaltered or not. So rather than armchair philosophising, we should wait until the relevant brain scans are indeed possible and we perform the experiment, before we pontificate absolutely on what will or will not happen.
As for assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT), it is not a matter of assuming this. It is a matter of whether the assumptions that you are building in make sense or not. And that is an empirical matter. Does any of it comport with our usual understandings of personal identity and other matters.
Bruce
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On 7/21/2019 9:12 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <dania...@gmail.com> wrote:
<snip>
Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will need some telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of substitution was correctly chosen.
So, do you die or not in the step 3?
I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and let's find out -- you go first.
Let me rephrase the question:
Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3?
According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original is cut. The scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after a delay, or in several different places.
The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the original disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more sophisticated view of personal identity, depending on a lot more the just memories of previous states, but depending also on bodily continuity, then the question of whether the original dies or not depends on the details of your theory of personal identity. For example, in Nozik's "closest continuer" theory, if the duplicate has an equivalent body and environment, then a single continuer is the closest continuer of the original, and can be considered the same person in some sense. Nozik's argument is that if there are two or more continuers, and there is a tie in the relevant sense of "closeness", then each continuer is a new person, and the original no longer exists (dies).
So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than your simplistic assumptions allow: it is actually an empirical question as to whether the "person" continues unaltered or not. So rather than armchair philosophising, we should wait until the relevant brain scans are indeed possible and we perform the experiment, before we pontificate absolutely on what will or will not happen.
Given the limitations on quantum level measurements, it is certain that the continuer will not be identical. But I'm not identical with Brent Meeker of yesterday or last year or of 1939. I have a continuous causal connection with those Brent Meekers and I have some similarities (DNA for example). So it hardly makes sense to demand a sharp answer to "What will you experience." in a duplication experiment when we don't even have a sharp definition of "you". And it doesn't even take something as scifi as a duplicator to raise the question. I might have a stroke tonight and lose my ability to recognize names. Will I be the same person tomorrow? I will have some of the same memories, but not all. Will I experience being Brent Meeker or not?
On 22 Jul 2019, at 01:06, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 4:39:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
I didn't say there was. I said youse-self sees Moscow and Washington. "Youse-self" is second person plural.
Brent
Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's clear and meaningful.
But does it have a clear answer?
The MWI has it's own problems with probability. It's straightforward if there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we implicitly assume they are equi-probable). But what if there are two possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other? Does the world split into three, two of which are the same? If two worlds are the same, can they really be two. Aren't they just one? And what if there are two possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand chance. Does the world then split into 1001 worlds? And what if the probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds. But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely many times and there is no natural measure of probability.
Brent
Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer.
"The potential for multiple worlds is always there in the quantum state, whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do multiple-world superpositions of the form written [above] ever actually come into being? And the answer again is: yes, automatically, without any additional assumptions."
But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and how does probability come into it? Do we have to just assign probabilities to branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead of deriving it)? And what about continuous processes like detecting the decay in Schroedinger's cat box? Is a continuum of worlds produced corresponding to the different times the decay might occur?
BrentTegmark could be on the mark by taking the position that infinities of all types should be removed from physics.
So there would be no "continuum of worlds”.
The way I think about it (without getting into the formality of computable analysis) is to just think of the worlds being generated as in a quantum Monte Carlo program: There will be lots of worlds randomly made, but not an actual infinity of them.
(God plays Monte Carlo.)@philipthrift
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On 22 Jul 2019, at 01:16, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 7/21/2019 4:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 4:39:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
I didn't say there was. I said youse-self sees Moscow and Washington. "Youse-self" is second person plural.
Brent
Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's clear and meaningful.
But does it have a clear answer?
The MWI has it's own problems with probability. It's straightforward if there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we implicitly assume they are equi-probable). But what if there are two possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other? Does the world split into three, two of which are the same? If two worlds are the same, can they really be two. Aren't they just one? And what if there are two possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand chance. Does the world then split into 1001 worlds? And what if the probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds. But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely many times and there is no natural measure of probability.
Brent
Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer.
"The potential for multiple worlds is always there in the quantum state, whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do multiple-world superpositions of the form written [above] ever actually come into being? And the answer again is: yes, automatically, without any additional assumptions."
But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and how does probability come into it? Do we have to just assign probabilities to branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead of deriving it)? And what about continuous processes like detecting the decay in Schroedinger's cat box? Is a continuum of worlds produced corresponding to the different times the decay might occur?
Brent
Tegmark could be on the mark by taking the position that infinities of all types should be removed from physics.
So there would be no "continuum of worlds". The way I think about it (without getting into the formality of computable analysis) is to just think of the worlds being generated as in a quantum Monte Carlo program: There will be lots of worlds randomly made, but not an actual infinity of them.
That would just be equivalent to weighting them with the Born Rule. If you're going to have worlds generated per a MC program with weightings (probabilities) then why not just have world generated per the Born MC program.
Brent
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(God plays Monte Carlo.)
@philipthrift
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On 22 Jul 2019, at 07:01, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Sat, Jul 20, 2019 at 8:16 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:47, Dan Sonik <dania...@gmail.com> wrote:>I think the main "leap of faith" that you make (and many others simply can't, because it >appears absurd) is somehow thinking that the completed computations are already "out >there,”If you agree that 2+2=4 implies Ex(x+2 = 4), or more simply that the equation x+2=0 has a solution in the integers, then you have to believe that the computations all exists in arithmetic. Peano Arithmetical proves the existence of those computations, like it proves the existence of the prime number.This is your standard conflation of the Existential Quantifier over a domain with an ontology, Bruno.
Or, equivalently, your oft-repeated assertion that people confuse "2+2=4" with 2+2=4.
What you refer to here is the fact that the word "dog" is not actually a dog, namely a 4-legged mamal that barks and greets you affectionately at the door. That is, the name is not the same as the physical object.
But that distinction does not exist for arithmetic -- given nominalism (the fact that the integers are not independently existing objects),
the name "2+2=4" is the same thing as 2+2=4.
There is no object that differs from the name of the relationship expressed in 2+2=4. The claim "that all computations exist in arithmetic" has no content.
Peano arithmetic no more "proves" the existence of these computations than it proves the existence of the moon.
in some sort of Platonic superspace.Not at all? Realism in arithmetic is only the statement that you have no objection to what is taught in primary school.There you go again, Bruno: re-defining terms so that you are always right.
"Realism", or more particularly, "arithmetical realism" means no such thing, Students are taught elementary calculations and multiplication tables in primary school, they are not taught philosophical platonism,.
Bruce
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On 22 Jul 2019, at 06:12, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <dania...@gmail.com> wrote:<snip>Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will need some telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of substitution was correctly chosen.So, do you die or not in the step 3?
I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and let's find out -- you go first.Let me rephrase the question:Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3?According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original is cut. The scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after a delay, or in several different places.The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the original disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more sophisticated view of personal identity, depending on a lot more the just memories of previous states, but depending also on bodily continuity, then the question of whether the original dies or not depends on the details of your theory of personal identity. For example, in Nozik's "closest continuer" theory, if the duplicate has an equivalent body and environment, then a single continuer is the closest continuer of the original, and can be considered the same person in some sense. Nozik's argument is that if there are two or more continuers, and there is a tie in the relevant sense of "closeness", then each continuer is a new person, and the original no longer exists (dies).
So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than your simplistic assumptions allow: it is actually an empirical question as to whether the "person" continues unaltered or not.
So rather than armchair philosophising, we should wait until the relevant brain scans are indeed possible and we perform the experiment, before we pontificate absolutely on what will or will not happen.
As for assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT), it is not a matter of assuming this. It is a matter of whether the assumptions that you are building in make sense or not.
And that is an empirical matter.
Does any of it comport with our usual understandings of personal identity and other matters.
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On 22 Jul 2019, at 08:09, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 3:22 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:On 7/21/2019 9:12 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <dania...@gmail.com> wrote:
<snip>
Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will need some telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of substitution was correctly chosen.
So, do you die or not in the step 3?
I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and let's find out -- you go first.
Let me rephrase the question:
Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3?
According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original is cut. The scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after a delay, or in several different places.
The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the original disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more sophisticated view of personal identity, depending on a lot more the just memories of previous states, but depending also on bodily continuity, then the question of whether the original dies or not depends on the details of your theory of personal identity. For example, in Nozik's "closest continuer" theory, if the duplicate has an equivalent body and environment, then a single continuer is the closest continuer of the original, and can be considered the same person in some sense. Nozik's argument is that if there are two or more continuers, and there is a tie in the relevant sense of "closeness", then each continuer is a new person, and the original no longer exists (dies).
So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than your simplistic assumptions allow: it is actually an empirical question as to whether the "person" continues unaltered or not. So rather than armchair philosophising, we should wait until the relevant brain scans are indeed possible and we perform the experiment, before we pontificate absolutely on what will or will not happen.
Given the limitations on quantum level measurements, it is certain that the continuer will not be identical. But I'm not identical with Brent Meeker of yesterday or last year or of 1939. I have a continuous causal connection with those Brent Meekers and I have some similarities (DNA for example). So it hardly makes sense to demand a sharp answer to "What will you experience." in a duplication experiment when we don't even have a sharp definition of "you". And it doesn't even take something as scifi as a duplicator to raise the question. I might have a stroke tonight and lose my ability to recognize names. Will I be the same person tomorrow? I will have some of the same memories, but not all. Will I experience being Brent Meeker or not?These are good questions. That is why the 'closest continuer' theory has some merit. It gives a reasonable account of how you remain the same person under the continual changing of the atoms/molecules that make up your body and brain. In the case of stroke or other head injury, memories may be seriously disrupted or lost, but your family will still recognise 'you' as the same Brent as yesterday, showing that bodily continuity is a significant component in the concepts of personal identity over changes in body and mind. It is not all down to clear memories of the earlier self.
Nozick's closest continuer theory was developed in the light of data from, and experience of, split brain individuals, which are the closest we can currently come to the idea of personal duplication. The philosophy of personal identity is complex, and there are not necessarily any clear winners in the debate. In my opinion, that is a cogent reason for being sceptical about Bruno's simplistic models.
Bruce--
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On 22 Jul 2019, at 07:01, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Sat, Jul 20, 2019 at 8:16 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:47, Dan Sonik <dania...@gmail.com> wrote:>I think the main "leap of faith" that you make (and many others simply can't, because it >appears absurd) is somehow thinking that the completed computations are already "out >there,”If you agree that 2+2=4 implies Ex(x+2 = 4), or more simply that the equation x+2=0 has a solution in the integers, then you have to believe that the computations all exists in arithmetic. Peano Arithmetical proves the existence of those computations, like it proves the existence of the prime number.This is your standard conflation of the Existential Quantifier over a domain with an ontology, Bruno.It is not a conflation. It is a necessary conclusion.
Or, equivalently, your oft-repeated assertion that people confuse "2+2=4" with 2+2=4.? (Yes, some people just did it many times just recently, but I don’t see the relation with the ontological existence).
What you refer to here is the fact that the word "dog" is not actually a dog, namely a 4-legged mammal that barks and greets you affectionately at the door. That is, the name is not the same as the physical object.
The name of an object is not the same as the object (physical or not).But that distinction does not exist for arithmetic -- given nominalism (the fact that the integers are not independently existing objects),But that is not among my assumption. My assumption is (at the meta-level) only YD and CT.
Then, from this we show that the TOE is “only” elementary arithmetic, or combinators, or any first order specification of a universal machinery, or universal machine.
the name "2+2=4" is the same thing as 2+2=4.That is a huge mistake (even for a nominalist). It is beyond ridiculous.
There is no object that differs from the name of the relationship expressed in 2+2=4. The claim "that all computations exist in arithmetic" has no content.Hmm… I *can* agree. It is a shortcut for the model (N, 0, +, *, s) satisfies all the condition for the computations to be relatively run.
Peano arithmetic no more "proves" the existence of these computations than it proves the existence of the moon.In the Aristotelian metaphysics, that might be given some sense, but you cannot invoke your metaphysics in a work in metaphysics.
That is the same, in metaphysics, as saying that the structure (N, +) refutes group theory, in mathematics.
in some sort of Platonic superspace.Not at all? Realism in arithmetic is only the statement that you have no objection to what is taught in primary school.There you go again, Bruno: re-defining terms so that you are always right.Ad hominem
+ I only show how weak the realist assumption is."Realism", or more particularly, "arithmetical realism" means no such thing, Students are taught elementary calculations and multiplication tables in primary school, they are not taught philosophical platonism,.Of course. But we do metaphysics, and it is important to understand that the metaphysics is in CT and “yes doctor”, not in the arithmetical realism, which is used only to make sense of CT (needed to make mathematical precise sense of “digital”).
On 22 Jul 2019, at 06:12, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <dania...@gmail.com> wrote:<snip>Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will need some telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of substitution was correctly chosen.So, do you die or not in the step 3?
I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and let's find out -- you go first.Let me rephrase the question:Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3?According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original is cut. The scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after a delay, or in several different places.The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the original disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more sophisticated view of personal identity, depending on a lot more the just memories of previous states, but depending also on bodily continuity, then the question of whether the original dies or not depends on the details of your theory of personal identity. For example, in Nozik's "closest continuer" theory, if the duplicate has an equivalent body and environment, then a single continuer is the closest continuer of the original, and can be considered the same person in some sense. Nozik's argument is that if there are two or more continuers, and there is a tie in the relevant sense of "closeness", then each continuer is a new person, and the original no longer exists (dies).That shows, as I explained in details in my long version, that Nozick’s closer continuer is incompatible with digital Mechanism.
But I ma not sure you get it right. From memory, it seems Nozick chose the closest continuer. In step 4, he would choose the one on the branche without the delay.Anyway, are you saying that you stop at step 4? Then you have to stop at step 2, then step 1, and then you are just saying that you do not assume mechanism, but then you are outside the scope of the reasoning.
So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than your simplistic assumptions allow: it is actually an empirical question as to whether the "person" continues unaltered or not.Not at all. There is nothing that we can verify empirically at this stage, except by assessing having personally survived, which typically cannot be used here.
Yet, what I say follows from the theoretical Digital Mechanist assumption, very easily.So rather than armchair philosophising, we should wait until the relevant brain scans are indeed possible and we perform the experiment, before we pontificate absolutely on what will or will not happen.Then you condemn all theories, including all theoretical physics.
On the contrary, we have to take our assumptions seriously, to get some consequences that we can test, in the usual 3p way. Mechanism itself is not directly testable.
As for assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT), it is not a matter of assuming this. It is a matter of whether the assumptions that you are building in make sense or not.We can never known that in advance. But mechanism is one of the most fertile assumption in the history of science, used by Darwin. Diderot consider it to be the most rational theory, and if you shows it making nonsense, it is up to you to show the contradiction.
And that is an empirical matter.Yes. But not from what you say, just from the fact that if mechanism is true, then the logic of the observable must be given by the “probability” and credibility one, and that has been tested positively up to now.
Does any of it comport with our usual understandings of personal identity and other matters.It does so, where physicalism needs a non computationalist theory of mind, which they usually does not even handle yet.
If you are OK with Digital Mechanism, you are the one who need to abandon the metaphysical assumption of (weak) materialism. Or just say that you don’t believe in Mechanism, or find an error in the reasoning (which you didn’t).
On 22 Jul 2019, at 08:09, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:Nozick's closest continuer theory was developed in the light of data from, and experience of, split brain individuals, which are the closest we can currently come to the idea of personal duplication. The philosophy of personal identity is complex, and there are not necessarily any clear winners in the debate. In my opinion, that is a cogent reason for being sceptical about Bruno's simplistic models.Ad hominem insult.
Bruce--
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On 22 Jul 2019, at 14:12, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 9:17 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 22 Jul 2019, at 08:09, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:Nozick's closest continuer theory was developed in the light of data from, and experience of, split brain individuals, which are the closest we can currently come to the idea of personal duplication. The philosophy of personal identity is complex, and there are not necessarily any clear winners in the debate. In my opinion, that is a cogent reason for being sceptical about Bruno's simplistic models.Ad hominem insult.Bullying again, Bruno!No, you did the bullying here, toward me, or toward all people studying the very rich and subtle consequence of the Mechanist hypothesis in the cognitive science.If not, you would have used “simple models” or even “elegant” instead of “simplistic models",