The implication seem to be that an attacker might be able to guess the
salted hmac of the password, which should be pretty much worthless, and
they would also have to guess the session ID, so this is more hardening
than a security vulnerability.
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Ticket URL: <https://code.djangoproject.com/ticket/26614>
Django <https://code.djangoproject.com/>
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* has_patch: 0 => 1
Comment:
[https://github.com/django/django/pull/6597 PR]
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Ticket URL: <https://code.djangoproject.com/ticket/26614#comment:1>
* status: new => closed
* resolution: => fixed
Comment:
In [changeset:"094ea69e072779661d36e46a6caec0fea4b3ca16" 094ea69]:
{{{
#!CommitTicketReference repository=""
revision="094ea69e072779661d36e46a6caec0fea4b3ca16"
Fixed #26614 -- Used constant_time_compare() in checking session auth hash
in login().
}}}
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Ticket URL: <https://code.djangoproject.com/ticket/26614#comment:2>