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My general question is: What does it mean for x to be concretized as y?
The RO definition of concretizes only talks about this in terms of dependence between the GDC and SDC:
Definition for concretizes (RO_0000059): A relationship between a specifically dependent continuant and a generically dependent continuant, in which the generically dependent continuant depends on some independent continuant in virtue of the fact that the specifically dependent continuant also depends on that same independent continuant. Multiple specifically dependent continuants can concretize the same generically dependent continuant.
Some in the OBO community want to relate plan specifications to the thing in peoples' heads, presumably a plan, that is causally relevant to carrying out the plan specification. I agree that it is useful to relate plan specifications to the agents that carry them out, but I am unsure concretizing plan specifications as dispositions provides a satisfactory solution that adds any “ontological” value.
I do not know enough about how the brain works to evaluate how (or if) GDCs concretize in the brain, but let's take a simpler model of computer (and its CPU).
The software is a type of plan specification. Now suppose I write a python program with the simple instruction print("hello world 1"). Under the current proposal, it seems the computer would:
- concretize the plan specification print("hello world 1") as a disposition d1.
- then d1 would be realized in some planned process.
I have five concerns about this.
1. The BFO-ISO release (which I am told will be open source) elucidates the concretizes at relation as follows:
Elucidation: an s-dependent continuant or process b concretizes a g-dependent continuant c at t when c is the pattern or content which b shares with actual or potential copies [207-BFO]
A disposition is definitely not a pattern, and I am skeptical that a disposition can be thought of as 'content' in any meaningful way.
2. For every instruction issued to the computer, a new disposition would be created. E.g., print("hello word 2"), print("hello word 3"), print("hello word 4"), ... would each be a separate disposition that comes to be in computer. I find this suspicious. It seems more reasonable to model this as:
- The computer has a particular disposition to print strings to standard output.
- A particular string concretizes a GDC (e.g., "hello world X") as electronic/magnetic pattern (i.e., a particular quality).
- A particular process realizes the print disposition that reads the string.
3. We can end up with a kind of mirroring between plan specifications and dispositions. That is, every plan specification will have a corresponding disposition. This could lead to a lot of extra work.
4. How do we account for failures to execute plan specifications? Dispositions are binary in their realizations. The either fire or don't. If I issue the command print("hello world 1"), and the computer prints "foo bar", I want to say the computer failed to execute the command. Perhaps we can say the plan specification failed to be concretized, but representing this may be complicated.
5. Many plan specifications/protocols involve multiple agents. An agent may understand the protocol as a whole, but only be responsible for certain parts. Does the agent have a disposition that concretizes the whole protocol, the part the agent is responsible for, or two dispositions (one for the whole protocol and one for the part)? I'm not saying that it is not possible to account for this by concretizing dispositions, I'm just worried it might be overly obtuse.
As a counter proposal consider the following account for the aforementioned computer example:
- Computer c1 has particular disposition d1 to print strings to standard output.
- GDC g1 is an instance of the plan specification print("hello world").
- String s1 is a particular electromagnetic quality/pattern that concretizes g1.
- The memory location m1 is the particular location that bears s1.
- The particular planned process p1 realizes d1, has specified input m1, and has specified output o1.
- o1 is the set of qualities and continuants that represent a particular instance of "hello world" displaying on the screen.
This counter proposal addresses my concerns raised above.
- Regarding #1 & #2: We only have a general disposition to read/execute instructions. Not a disposition for each instruction.
Depending on the level of granularity
you want, you may end up mirroring of the qualities (and associated continuants) that concretize the plan specification. In some cases this is useful; e.g., you want to track a letter or number of copies printed. In others you can simply use anonymous individuals.
- Regarding #3: We can establish relations between the process that carries out the plan specification and the plan specification itself; e.g.; a particular process is prescribed by a particular plan specification,
or a the process adheres to a plan specification.
The determination of whether a particular process adheres to plan specification can, if necessary, be the output of some evaluation process. I'm thinking of cases in which you need to validate experimental results.
- Regarding #4: We can more easily distinguish between specification parts. Agent 1 executes a process that is prescribed by part 1 of the specification. Agent 2 executes a process that is prescribed by part 2 of the specification.
Ok ... I've said a lot (perhaps too much).
What are your thoughts?
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I'm going to apologize in advance if the tone isn't relaxed enough. I'm trying to get something out before I get distracted by something else :-)Hopefully enough thoughts to be of some use, though.On Tue, Nov 12, 2019 at 5:44 PM Bill Duncan <wddu...@gmail.com> wrote:(Apologies for cross-posting)FYI I only see the bfo-discuss thread and am responding to it, so no visible cross-posting here.My general question is: What does it mean for x to be concretized as y?A fine question. I don't think we've made it clear enough because I don't think we're clear enough about it.The original source for the term, Ingarden, has concretizations not being copies, as we usually do, but personal adaptations.We haven't explored what the boundaries of concretizations are, even though we tend to be loose about its use. For example, is a translation of a document a concretization? When is a version another concretization vs being a new GDC?
The RO definition of concretizes only talks about this in terms of dependence between the GDC and SDC:
Definition for concretizes (RO_0000059): A relationship between a specifically dependent continuant and a generically dependent continuant, in which the generically dependent continuant depends on some independent continuant in virtue of the fact that the specifically dependent continuant also depends on that same independent continuant. Multiple specifically dependent continuants can concretize the same generically dependent continuant.
Some in the OBO community want to relate plan specifications to the thing in peoples' heads, presumably a plan, that is causally relevant to carrying out the plan specification. I agree that it is useful to relate plan specifications to the agents that carry them out, but I am unsure concretizing plan specifications as dispositions provides a satisfactory solution that adds any “ontological” value.Some in the OBO community have. The state you describe was put into practice years ago. It brings value because otherwise there is no clear relation between some information and some action. It makes some sense and doesn't require inventing yet another way to say it.
I do not know enough about how the brain works to evaluate how (or if) GDCs concretize in the brain, but let's take a simpler model of computer (and its CPU).It's clear that I can memorize things, and it isn't clear at all what the inner workings of the brain are. What is clear is that there's something about me once I've memorized something that is realized in me e.g. reciting it. Whatever I have is manifested by a correlated process, if it is manifested. That sounds like a disposition. That doesn't mean there isn't more. Seems to me that we are on safer ground claiming a disposition than anything else that requires a more detailed understanding of the brain.
The software is a type of plan specification. Now suppose I write a python program with the simple instruction print("hello world 1"). Under the current proposal, it seems the computer would:
- concretize the plan specification print("hello world 1") as a disposition d1.
- then d1 would be realized in some planned process.
I have five concerns about this.
1. The BFO-ISO release (which I am told will be open source) elucidates the concretizes at relation as follows:
Elucidation: an s-dependent continuant or process b concretizes a g-dependent continuant c at t when c is the pattern or content which b shares with actual or potential copies [207-BFO]
A disposition is definitely not a pattern, and I am skeptical that a disposition can be thought of as 'content' in any meaningful way.Well, it's an elucidation.
I'm not sure how you are so sure about disposition while accepting that qualities are patterns. Neither is manifested other than by their material (or occurrent) incarnations. So is it only material that can have patterns? And if not, please explain why qualities are and dispositions are not. And why can qualities be thought of as 'content' but dispositions not?
2. For every instruction issued to the computer, a new disposition would be created. E.g., print("hello word 2"), print("hello word 3"), print("hello word 4"), ... would each be a separate disposition that comes to be in computer. I find this suspicious. It seems more reasonable to model this as:
- The computer has a particular disposition to print strings to standard output.
- A particular string concretizes a GDC (e.g., "hello world X") as electronic/magnetic pattern (i.e., a particular quality).
- A particular process realizes the print disposition that reads the string.
3. We can end up with a kind of mirroring between plan specifications and dispositions. That is, every plan specification will have a corresponding disposition. This could lead to a lot of extra work.There are many cases where there's a lot more to say(represent) than what we do. Part of this is handled by implication, and part that we make choices about what we need to represent because we can't represent everything in the world. There are a heck of a lot relational qualities that inhere in a body but we don't have any plans to enumerate them all. I've come, over time, to accept that there is an abundance of entities in the world, and that we necessarily have to choose what we are going to represent.
4. How do we account for failures to execute plan specifications? Dispositions are binary in their realizations. The either fire or don't. If I issue the command print("hello world 1"), and the computer prints "foo bar", I want to say the computer failed to execute the command. Perhaps we can say the plan specification failed to be concretized, but representing this may be complicated.I think this is interesting topic, but I don't think it is specific to concretizing. Same issue with function and dysfunction.
5. Many plan specifications/protocols involve multiple agents. An agent may understand the protocol as a whole, but only be responsible for certain parts. Does the agent have a disposition that concretizes the whole protocol, the part the agent is responsible for, or two dispositions (one for the whole protocol and one for the part)? I'm not saying that it is not possible to account for this by concretizing dispositions, I'm just worried it might be overly obtuse.We have the same issue with roles. Doesn't seem specific to dispositions, nor to concretizing.The issue with wholes vs parts is an open one when it comes to GDCs, and while BFO doesn't have a mereology for specific dependents others have proposed such - I think Andrien Barton. That there is ongoing work reinforces that that we don't have the full story yet.As a counter proposal consider the following account for the aforementioned computer example:
- Computer c1 has particular disposition d1 to print strings to standard output.Seems that there is arbitrary choice of level. Why the disposition to print strings to standard output vs the disposition to print strings to a buffer with certain streams having the disposition to render on stdout.
Why not a disposition to send characters to stdout. Why not the instruction set? The microcode, the hardware built-in cascades? Why aren't the only dispositions those related to the properties of the materials on a chip that determine how electrons move? Seems to me that if you can move up from the material dispositions (why transistors work) to a higher level of abstraction (instructions of any sort) then there's nothing to prevent you from keeping on abstracting upwards. In any case, representing this (there's a lot), and its all real "could lead to a lot of extra work".- GDC g1 is an instance of the plan specification print("hello world").Are there one or two things here: As written there are two - g1, and 'the plan specification print("hello world").'. The latter is written as a class, as the relation in the sentence is instance-of.Maybe better: GDC g1 is the plan specification 'print("hello world")'. Or to be more precise, maybe, GDC g1 is the plan specification, a concretization of which is: 'print("hello world")'- String s1 is a particular electromagnetic quality/pattern that concretizes g1.We all handwave here. We're not clear whether all electromagnetic stuff is quality vs disposition vs process. Its because of this indeterminacy that I've fought to have the possibilities for concretizations be broad. That way I can just say it's concretized by something and move on.- The memory location m1 is the particular location that bears s1.is location a site? I'm presuming you mean some physical material that bears a quality that is the concretization. Knowing how computers work, however, kind of destroys this simple notion.
1) Dynamic Ram - depends on a process too2) Copying - contents of memory are constantly being copied / moved, etc. In memory due to GC or allocation, on flash because writing something "nearby" necessarily rewrites the neighbors too, and usually in a different place (wear leveling)3) Registers and internal states of all sorts. Where do you draw the boundary. In order for that bit to be executed there's lots of movement among registers and its entirely plausible that the device/CPU doesn't have at one time a complete copy of the ram in question while having several copies of some piece of it. Regarding representing all this see "could lead to a lot of extra work".- The particular planned process p1 realizes d1, has specified input m1, and has specified output o1.yup.- o1 is the set of qualities and continuants that represent a particular instance of "hello world" displaying on the screen.Not at all clear there's only qualities involved. Requires a deep understanding of the display technology if we want to get the story right.
This counter proposal addresses my concerns raised above.
- Regarding #1 & #2: We only have a general disposition to read/execute instructions. Not a disposition for each instruction.Wait, didn't your story say: "Computer c1 has particular disposition d1 to print strings to standard output" There are a whole lot of instructions to read an execute if you want to accomplish that.Depending on the level of granularityGranularity. Now that's something we *really* need more work on.you want, you may end up mirroring of the qualities (and associated continuants) that concretize the plan specification. In some cases this is useful; e.g., you want to track a letter or number of copies printed. In others you can simply use anonymous individuals.The concretizing dispositions that you're worrying about can also be anonymous individuals, or better existentially implied.- Regarding #3: We can establish relations between the process that carries out the plan specification and the plan specification itself; e.g.; a particular process is prescribed by a particular plan specification,concretizes o realizesor a the process adheres to a plan specification.
The determination of whether a particular process adheres to plan specification can, if necessary, be the output of some evaluation process. I'm thinking of cases in which you need to validate experimental results.Ok, but how is this relevant? Here's we're talking about a process (evaluation) that involves making measurements on another process (the plan specification) and relating it to a plan specification. That concretizations can be dispositions doesn't mean they aren't concretized in other ways.
- Regarding #4: We can more easily distinguish between specification parts. Agent 1 executes a process that is prescribed by part 1 of the specification. Agent 2 executes a process that is prescribed by part 2 of the specification.If part 1 prescribes some process, then that's sufficient to be a disposition. Plan specifications have natural parts - the actions and subgoals, perhaps dispositions mirror it, along the line of Adrien's mereology.
There's got to be *some* way in which the part relates to the process. Using disposition/concretization means we can use something we already (to some extent ) understand, as opposed to inventing something new that perhaps even fewer people understand (or remember). It's useful to only have to invent new relations when one has to.
Ok ... I've said a lot (perhaps too much).Nah :-)What are your thoughts?The bottom line, from my point of view, is that concretization by dispositions makes as much sense as many other things we say, and it allows us to build on top of what we already have. It's easy to see that there's lots of potential to develop this area - plenty of work to go around. The question of whether concretizations can be dispositions or not hardly registers a blip against that. I don't see how changing it one way or another is going to help us make progress on the open issues, but I have noted where having it does address *some* issues of interest.
--Best,Alan--
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I have five concerns about this.
1. The BFO-ISO release (which I am told will be open source) elucidates the concretizes at relation as follows:
Elucidation: an s-dependent continuant or process b concretizes a g-dependent continuant c at t when c is the pattern or content which b shares with actual or potential copies [207-BFO]
A disposition is definitely not a pattern, and I am skeptical that a disposition can be thought of as 'content' in any meaningful way.
2. For every instruction issued to the computer, a new disposition would be created. E.g., print("hello word 2"), print("hello word 3"), print("hello word 4"), .
.. would each be a separate disposition that comes to be in computer. I find this suspicious. It seems more reasonable to model this as:
- The computer has a particular disposition to print strings to standard output.
- A particular string concretizes a GDC (e.g., "hello world X") as electronic/magnetic pattern (i.e., a particular quality).
- A particular process realizes the print disposition that reads the string.
3. We can end up with a kind of mirroring between plan specifications and dispositions. That is, every plan specification will have a corresponding disposition. This could lead to a lot of extra work.
4. How do we account for failures to execute plan specifications? Dispositions are binary in their realizations. The either fire or don't.
If I issue the command print("hello world 1"), and the computer prints "foo bar", I want to say the computer failed to execute the command. Perhaps we can say the plan specification failed to be concretized, but representing this may be complicated.
5. Many plan specifications/protocols involve multiple agents. An agent may understand the protocol as a whole, but only be responsible for certain parts. Does the agent have a disposition that concretizes the whole protocol, the part the agent is responsible for, or two dispositions (one for the whole protocol and one for the part)? I'm not saying that it is not possible to account for this by concretizing dispositions, I'm just worried it might be overly obtuse.
d has specified output o1.
- o1 is the set of qualities and continuants that represent a particular instance of "hello world" displaying on the screen.
This counter proposal addresses my concerns raised above.
- Regarding #1 & #2: We only have a general disposition to read/execute instructions. Not a disposition for each instruction.
Depending on the level of granularity you want, you may end up mirroring of the qualities (and associated continuants) that concretize the plan specification. In some cases this is useful; e.g., you want to track a letter or number of copies printed. In others you can simply use anonymous individuals.
Responses to Bill in-line
I have five concerns about this.
1. The BFO-ISO release (which I am told will be open source) elucidates the concretizes at relation as follows:
Elucidation: an s-dependent continuant or process b concretizes a g-dependent continuant c at t when c is the pattern or content which b shares with actual or potential copies [207-BFO]
A disposition is definitely not a pattern, and I am skeptical that a disposition can be thought of as 'content' in any meaningful way.I do not see how you infer from this that a disposition is a pattern
2. For every instruction issued to the computer, a new disposition would be created. E.g., print("hello word 2"), print("hello word 3"), print("hello word 4"), .this seems exactly right to me; when you follow a recipe in your kitchen as you read each line you formal a corresponding disposition which you then execute in corresponding cooking actions
.. would each be a separate disposition that comes to be in computer. I find this suspicious. It seems more reasonable to model this as:
- The computer has a particular disposition to print strings to standard output.
- A particular string concretizes a GDC (e.g., "hello world X") as electronic/magnetic pattern (i.e., a particular quality).
- A particular process realizes the print disposition that reads the string.when the process realizes the disposition to print "hello world X" then it thereby all realizes a disposition to print strings to standard output (the latter is not something extra, it is there just as, when you sing Jingle Bells you also realize a disposition to sing.
3. We can end up with a kind of mirroring between plan specifications and dispositions. That is, every plan specification will have a corresponding disposition. This could lead to a lot of extra work.BFO is here to help us represent reality, not to help us find shortcuts.
4. How do we account for failures to execute plan specifications? Dispositions are binary in their realizations. The either fire or don't.If the printer runs out of power after it printed only "hello wo"?
If I issue the command print("hello world 1"), and the computer prints "foo bar", I want to say the computer failed to execute the command. Perhaps we can say the plan specification failed to be concretized, but representing this may be complicated.Life is hard.
5. Many plan specifications/protocols involve multiple agents. An agent may understand the protocol as a whole, but only be responsible for certain parts. Does the agent have a disposition that concretizes the whole protocol, the part the agent is responsible for, or two dispositions (one for the whole protocol and one for the part)? I'm not saying that it is not possible to account for this by concretizing dispositions, I'm just worried it might be overly obtuse.It would be obtuse (complicated) but only to the appropriate degree.d has specified output o1.
- o1 is the set of qualities and continuants that represent a particular instance of "hello world" displaying on the screen.
This counter proposal addresses my concerns raised above.
- Regarding #1 & #2: We only have a general disposition to read/execute instructions. Not a disposition for each instruction.We acquire said disposition every time we read an instruction; same applies to the computer
Depending on the level of granularity you want, you may end up mirroring of the qualities (and associated continuants) that concretize the plan specification. In some cases this is useful; e.g., you want to track a letter or number of copies printed. In others you can simply use anonymous individuals.There are two issues here: how granular do we want to description/representation to be (for a given purpose)And: what does on on the different levels of granularity within whatever it is that is (e.g.) realizing a plan.We need the resources to deal with the latter at all levels of granularity.
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Victor writes (roughly translated):
Dear colleagues, these are from the group close to Barry Smith, the ones we had criticized in the 2010 article. As you can see, we were confused. The ontological philosophy is improving in its accuracy.
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Hopefully, this example makes clear my skepticism about plan specifications being concretized as dispositions in the case of computer systems.
Consider an AND logic gate:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AND_gate
The behavior of this gate can be summarized as:
Given inputs A, B, and output C:
C = 1, if A = 1 and B = 1
Otherwise, C = 0
Let’s say this device is implemented as a physical device with A, B, and C being electronic registers that are either on (+) or off (-). Basically, “+” represents a “1”, “-“ represents a “0”, and the value of C (i.e., whether C is on or off) is determined by the +/- values of A and B.
If I have a simple language that consists of characters “1” and “0”, and an instruction is 2 characters long, I can write programs (i.e., sequences of instructions) that result in some value being loaded into C.
I agree that the physical device has dispositions (although, whether it is one complex disposition or a set of dispositions seems a bit unclear to me). However, the possession of said disposition/s by the physical device is not the same as concretizing ICEs as dispositions. Suppose, I load the instruction “10” into the device. This gets translated into A being on, B being off, and resulting in C being off. Symbolically, we could represent this behavior something like this:
If we take the instruction to be an ICE, we have “10” concretized as A(+), B(-). The electromagnetic properties of A and B then trigger the realization of the behavior of the electronic device, which results in C(-).
In this scenario, it makes sense that “10” is concretized as A(+), B(-). It is a transformation of one pattern into another. The question at hand, however, is whether “10” is concretized as the disposition whose realization is described by:
A(+), B(-) -> C(-)
I think the answer to this question is “no”. The device already has the disposition to process (so to speak) the instruction “10”. The loading of registers A and B triggers the realization of this disposition.
I realize my example has been from the vantage point of a simple computational system. The human brain may function much differently.
Bill
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label: concretizes (http://purl.obolibrary.org/obo/RO_0000059)
Definition: A relationship between a specifically dependent continuant and a generically dependent continuant, in which the generically dependent continuant depends on some independent continuant in virtue of the fact that the specifically dependent continuant also depends on that same independent continuant. Multiple specifically dependent continuants can concretize the same generically dependent continuant.
label: planned process (http://purl.obolibrary.org/obo/OBI_0000011)
Definition: A processual entity that realizes a plan which is the concretization of a plan specification.
realizes some (concretizes some 'plan specification')
label: concretizes
Elucidation: an s-dependent continuant or process b concretizes a g-dependent continuant c at t when c is the pattern or content which b shares with actual or potential copies [207-BFO]
realizes some (concretizes some 'plan specification')
has_specfied_input some (concretizes some 'plan specification')
Since realizable entities are not observable (only their manifestations are observable), it does not makes sense that a realizable entity can be a shareable pattern.
On Jan 24, 2020, at 11:26, Bill Duncan <wddu...@gmail.com> wrote:
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James:I never said that realizables are GDCs, only that concretizing GDCs as realizables is problematic. The previous email threads detail why I think the notion of realizables concretizing plan specifications is ontologically imprecise.By "minor change", I meant that it is a minor change syntactically. I know the OBI modeling has been in place for a long time. I've been advocating this change for a long time. Doing something wrong for a long time doesn't make it right. From a pragmatic perspective, you need to get a sense of how many users actually instantiate 'concretizations of plan specifications' in order to assess the impact.
Barry:In general, I think I agree with you. It depends on whether you are using the expression 'computer program is plan' in the dispositional sense of 'plan' or the informational sense of 'plan' (i.e., plan specification).I hold that a particular computer program (i.e., code embedded in some medium, such as magnetic patterns on disk) is a concretization of a plan specification. The computer system has many processes that behave in well defined ways in the presence of certain patterns (i.e., read and execution processes). Please see my previous email using an AND logic gate as an example of this.
Speaking loosely, you could say that a computer system has the disposition to execute computer programs. But, since only computer systems that are actively running, can execute computer programs, this can be misleading.
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On Fri, Jan 24, 2020 at 1:24 PM Bill Duncan <wddu...@gmail.com> wrote:James:I never said that realizables are GDCs, only that concretizing GDCs as realizables is problematic. The previous email threads detail why I think the notion of realizables concretizing plan specifications is ontologically imprecise.By "minor change", I meant that it is a minor change syntactically. I know the OBI modeling has been in place for a long time. I've been advocating this change for a long time. Doing something wrong for a long time doesn't make it right. From a pragmatic perspective, you need to get a sense of how many users actually instantiate 'concretizations of plan specifications' in order to assess the impact.I think we should drop the idea of realizables as concretizationsBarry:In general, I think I agree with you. It depends on whether you are using the expression 'computer program is plan' in the dispositional sense of 'plan' or the informational sense of 'plan' (i.e., plan specification).I hold that a particular computer program (i.e., code embedded in some medium, such as magnetic patterns on disk) is a concretization of a plan specification. The computer system has many processes that behave in well defined ways in the presence of certain patterns (i.e., read and execution processes). Please see my previous email using an AND logic gate as an example of this.YesSpeaking loosely, you could say that a computer system has the disposition to execute computer programs. But, since only computer systems that are actively running, can execute computer programs, this can be misleading.Anything can be misleading. But a computer in which program p is installed has a disposition to execute p even when it is turned off (which is triggered by turning it on and pressing enter).Methinks
BS
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On Jan 25, 2020, at 09:02, Adrien Barton <adrien...@gmail.com> wrote:
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On Jan 25, 2020, at 10:30, Bill Duncan <wddu...@gmail.com> wrote:
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[James wrote:]
> I'm not persuaded that a STOP sign is a plan specification or action specification. As
> you describe the case, the STOP sign is a trigger for a realizable that Max and Sam
> bear as trained car drivers, or perhaps as English language speakers.
In BFO, realizables are triggered by occurrents. The STOP sign, however, is a continuant. Hence, it cannot be a trigger. Maybe the cognitive process of seeing the STOP sign could be a trigger though. And indeed, I agree that Max and Sam, as trained car drivers, have a general disposition to stop when seeing a STOP sign. But it does not mean that those are the only dispositions relevant here (more on this below); and moreover, this scenario is complexified by the fact that a deontic is involved, namely the obligation to stop at a STOP sign.
So if you prefer, consider the simpler example of a part of a recipe reading ICE3 = ‘crack an egg’ (I’m not sure why you have doubts that ICE0=‘STOP’ would be an action specification, but I hope it’s less controversial that ICE3 is an action specification?). People don’t necessarily develop a disposition to crack an egg when they read ICE3. However, if Sam decides to follow the recipe, she will develop a disposition (which I call her intention to crack an egg) that will be realized by her cracking an egg, in case this disposition is not blocked. This disposition may appear some time later after she reads ICE3 though (for example, she might deliberate about whether she will follow the recipe), that’s why I don’t think it can be the concretization of ICE3.
[Alan wrote:]
> Here it seems you are equating having an intention with having a plan. While I
> recognize that this equivalence is recognized in some uses of the word plan, the
> word can also have a more neutral interpretation and this is the one I intend when
> I use it in these conversations.
Actually I was trying not to commit too much about this, as this seems to me to be a secondary question here, that’s why I mentioned very generally “an intention or a plan” without discussing it. I won’t use the word “plan” anymore here.
> However, let's work with the example. My sense of what is happening is that first
> the stop sign is comprehended and predisposes the driver to stop. The disposition
> may or may not be realized. Consider a situation in which the driver first decides
> not to stop, but then sees police at the intersection. That decision might be
> revoked. To my mind the choices and deliberation happen *after* the sign is
> comprehended / concretized, and they seem to act as trigger/blocker for the
> concretized stop disposition.
I would agree that the deliberation happens after the ICE from the sign (ICE0) is concretized in her cognitive system, but I don’t think that ICE0 is concretized by a disposition of the driver to stop.
Let’s consider the above example of ICE3 = ‘crack an egg’. Suppose that Max reads ICE3 but has no intention to follow the instruction: then it does not seem that ICE3 is concretized by a disposition of Max to crack an egg.
> this step of assuming that the representation of in the
> brain is a quality is not obvious and is not backed by science that I'm aware of.
> There's certainly some specifically dependent continuant involved. Its the choice of
> which one that is harder to assert.
I agree that this question is complicated. However, my main point here is that a concretization of an action specification such as ‘STOP’ (resp. ‘crack an egg’) in a reader is not a disposition to stop (resp. a disposition to crack an egg).
> It does not follow that the independence means that the representation isn't a
> disposition. Unless you only believe the disposition can exist if there's intent. I
> don't. The dispositions of inanimate objects exist just fine without intent, and I see
> no reason to insist that dispositions in humans require it. I'm pretty sure that's not
> the case for roles. You can have a role before there's any situation in which the
> realization could be triggered.
I certainly agree that dispositions can exist without intent – as you mention, inanimate objects do have plenty of dispositions. For example, Sam has a disposition d0 to push the break pedal when some heavy object pushes down her right foot on the break pedal. That’s purely mechanical, and does not imply any intention. But this disposition d0 of Sam has nothing to do with her reading ICE0=’STOP’.
On the other hand, I’d say that reading ICE0 leads to the apparition of a disposition d1 of Sam to push the break pedal intentionally (note that d0 and d1 do not have the same kinds of triggers: d1 is not triggered by a heavy object pushing down Sam’s right foot; hence those are two different dispositions). d1 is related in some way to the concretization of ICE0 in her cognitive system, but I don’t think it is identical to this concretization, for the reason I mentioned above. Rather, I’d say that d1 is the output of Sam’s decision process after ICE0 is concretized in her cognitive system.
> Moreover it's not clear to me that in executing planned processes there is always
> 'intent'. First, is easy to talk loosely when there's been no offer of any definition of
> intent. Second you may plan to, e.g. fight back in a certain way when attacked, but
> when the attack happens you may react with muscle memory/ 'instinct' without
> any deliberative process. Again this depends on what one defines intent to be.
I was using the word “intention” rather than “intent”, as the former does not seem to imply that there has been a deliberative process. In particular, an intention (as I understand it) can result not only from a deliberative decision process, but also from a heuristic decision process. I can have a disposition to act that is due to an instinctive decision process, but this disposition might still be blocked (although such dispositions may be harder to block that the dispositions to act that result from a deliberative decision process).
> Do you have an argument ruling out that the deliberation and intent function as
> trigger to an existing disposition as opposed to *being* the disposition, as I
> understand your analysis to be saying.
It seems to me that intentions behave more like continuants than like occurrents: my intention to read this book can exist fully at both t1 and t2, and wax and wane as time passes.
Moreover, intentions seem to have a dispositional character, in the sense that my intention to do A can lead to me doing A, or can be blocked. For example, I formed the intention to go for lunch but suddenly I remember that I have to write this email, so my intention is not realized. Or more radically, I decided to stand up but suddenly I’m paralyzed, so I can’t.
> A 'cognitive representation'. What's that? I'm all for expanding on this notion, if
> possible. So far I haven't heard much defining the nature of these representations
> and how they function. To me it looks like the model is that our decision making
> looks like what a simple computer does - there are some symbolic inputs
> processed in a data transform of sorts. I think the idea that all cognition takes that
> form has been debunked a ways back when ai planning found it didn't work. The
> proposed alternative to that, at the time, was 'situated action'
I certainly agree that much more remains to be done in the field of the ontology of mental entities. Here, I was just pointing to one direction in which a (maybe naïve) ontology of mental entities could be developed to account for some phenomena. But we have to get progressively closer to the underlying cognitive science indeed.
To summarize, let me rephrase my point more carefully by distinguishing two questions:
Q1) Is an ICE always concretized by a quality?
This is admittedly a complex question, in particular because the links between qualities and realizable entities are complex. I won’t argue about this here.
Q2) Is an action specification that specifies to do A (such as ICE0=‘STOP’ or ICE3=‘crack an egg’) concretized in a reader by a disposition to do A?
The answer, I think, is “no”: the disposition to do A intentionally will only appear after the action specification was concretized in the agent’s cognitive system and a (deliberative or heuristic) decision process has taken place (and the dispositions of the agent to do A non-intentionally, in a purely mechanical way, have nothing to do with this action specification, so they cannot be the concretization of this action specification either).
Best,
Adrien
[James wrote:]
> I'm not persuaded that a STOP sign is a plan specification or action specification. As
> you describe the case, the STOP sign is a trigger for a realizable that Max and Sam
> bear as trained car drivers, or perhaps as English language speakers.
In BFO, realizables are triggered by occurrents.
The STOP sign, however, is a continuant. Hence, it cannot be a trigger. Maybe the cognitive process of seeing the STOP sign could be a trigger though. And indeed, I agree that Max and Sam, as trained car drivers, have a general disposition to stop when seeing a STOP sign. But it does not mean that those are the only dispositions relevant here (more on this below); and moreover, this scenario is complexified by the fact that a deontic is involved, namely the obligation to stop at a STOP sign.
So if you prefer, consider the simpler example of a part of a recipe reading ICE3 = ‘crack an egg’ (I’m not sure why you have doubts that ICE0=‘STOP’ would be an action specification, but I hope it’s less controversial that ICE3 is an action specification?).
People don’t necessarily develop a disposition to crack an egg when they read ICE3.
However, if Sam decides to follow the recipe, she will develop a disposition (which I call her intention to crack an egg) that will be realized by her cracking an egg, in case this disposition is not blocked. This disposition may appear some time later after she reads ICE3 though (for example, she might deliberate about whether she will follow the recipe), that’s why I don’t think it can be the concretization of ICE3.
[Alan wrote:]
> Here it seems you are equating having an intention with having a plan. While I
> recognize that this equivalence is recognized in some uses of the word plan, the
> word can also have a more neutral interpretation and this is the one I intend when
> I use it in these conversations.
Actually I was trying not to commit too much about this, as this seems to me to be a secondary question here, that’s why I mentioned very generally “an intention or a plan” without discussing it. I won’t use the word “plan” anymore here.
> However, let's work with the example. My sense of what is happening is that first
> the stop sign is comprehended and predisposes the driver to stop. The disposition
> may or may not be realized. Consider a situation in which the driver first decides
> not to stop, but then sees police at the intersection. That decision might be
> revoked. To my mind the choices and deliberation happen *after* the sign is
> comprehended / concretized, and they seem to act as trigger/blocker for the
> concretized stop disposition.
I would agree that the deliberation happens after the ICE from the sign (ICE0) is concretized in her cognitive system, but I don’t think that ICE0 is concretized by a disposition of the driver to stop.
Let’s consider the above example of ICE3 = ‘crack an egg’. Suppose that Max reads ICE3 but has no intention to follow the instruction: then it does not seem that ICE3 is concretized by a disposition of Max to crack an egg.
> this step of assuming that the representation of in the
> brain is a quality is not obvious and is not backed by science that I'm aware of.
> There's certainly some specifically dependent continuant involved. Its the choice of
> which one that is harder to assert.
I agree that this question is complicated. However, my main point here is that a concretization of an action specification such as ‘STOP’ (resp. ‘crack an egg’) in a reader is not a disposition to stop (resp. a disposition to crack an egg).
> It does not follow that the independence means that the representation isn't a
> disposition. Unless you only believe the disposition can exist if there's intent. I
> don't. The dispositions of inanimate objects exist just fine without intent, and I see
> no reason to insist that dispositions in humans require it. I'm pretty sure that's not
> the case for roles. You can have a role before there's any situation in which the
> realization could be triggered.
I certainly agree that dispositions can exist without intent – as you mention, inanimate objects do have plenty of dispositions. For example, Sam has a disposition d0 to push the break pedal when some heavy object pushes down her right foot on the break pedal. That’s purely mechanical, and does not imply any intention. But this disposition d0 of Sam has nothing to do with her reading ICE0=’STOP’.
On the other hand, I’d say that reading ICE0 leads to the apparition of a disposition d1 of Sam to push the break pedal intentionally (note that d0 and d1 do not have the same kinds of triggers: d1 is not triggered by a heavy object pushing down Sam’s right foot; hence those are two different dispositions).
d1 is related in some way to the concretization of ICE0 in her cognitive system, but I don’t think it is identical to this concretization, for the reason I mentioned above. Rather, I’d say that d1 is the output of Sam’s decision process after ICE0 is concretized in her cognitive system.
> Moreover it's not clear to me that in executing planned processes there is always
> 'intent'. First, is easy to talk loosely when there's been no offer of any definition of
> intent. Second you may plan to, e.g. fight back in a certain way when attacked, but
> when the attack happens you may react with muscle memory/ 'instinct' without
> any deliberative process. Again this depends on what one defines intent to be.
I was using the word “intention” rather than “intent”, as the former does not seem to imply that there has been a deliberative process. In particular, an intention (as I understand it) can result not only from a deliberative decision process, but also from a heuristic decision process. I can have a disposition to act that is due to an instinctive decision process, but this disposition might still be blocked (although such dispositions may be harder to block that the dispositions to act that result from a deliberative decision process).
> Do you have an argument ruling out that the deliberation and intent function as
> trigger to an existing disposition as opposed to *being* the disposition, as I
> understand your analysis to be saying.
It seems to me that intentions behave more like continuants than like occurrents: my intention to read this book can exist fully at both t1 and t2, and wax and wane as time passes.
Moreover, intentions seem to have a dispositional character, in the sense that my intention to do A can lead to me doing A, or can be blocked. For example, I formed the intention to go for lunch but suddenly I remember that I have to write this email, so my intention is not realized. Or more radically, I decided to stand up but suddenly I’m paralyzed, so I can’t.
> A 'cognitive representation'. What's that? I'm all for expanding on this notion, if
> possible. So far I haven't heard much defining the nature of these representations
> and how they function. To me it looks like the model is that our decision making
> looks like what a simple computer does - there are some symbolic inputs
> processed in a data transform of sorts. I think the idea that all cognition takes that
> form has been debunked a ways back when ai planning found it didn't work. The
> proposed alternative to that, at the time, was 'situated action'
I certainly agree that much more remains to be done in the field of the ontology of mental entities. Here, I was just pointing to one direction in which a (maybe naïve) ontology of mental entities could be developed to account for some phenomena. But we have to get progressively closer to the underlying cognitive science indeed.
To summarize, let me rephrase my point more carefully by distinguishing two questions:
Q1) Is an ICE always concretized by a quality?
This is admittedly a complex question, in particular because the links between qualities and realizable entities are complex. I won’t argue about this here.
Q2) Is an action specification that specifies to do A (such as ICE0=‘STOP’ or ICE3=‘crack an egg’) concretized in a reader by a disposition to do A?
The answer, I think, is “no”: the disposition to do A intentionally will only appear after the action specification was concretized in the agent’s cognitive system and a (deliberative or heuristic) decision process has taken place (and the dispositions of the agent to do A non-intentionally, in a purely mechanical way, have nothing to do with this action specification, so they cannot be the concretization of this action specification either).
Best,
Adrien
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