London-based Financial Times如何看今年五月北京的川習會?
david chou
david chou
A cold peace between the US and China is good enough
Rather than trying to engineer a grand bargain, this is a moment to prevent deterioration
Jessica Chen Weiss
[The writer, a professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, is author of the forthcoming book ‘What China Wants’]
Published MAY 16 2026
https://www.ft.com/content/63aa35fe-91cf-45db-ba11-2d2e2b23b2a0
Xi Jinping’s warning to Donald Trump this week about the critical importance of Taiwan was predictable — and alarming. The Chinese president needed strong words about a potential “conflict” to satisfy domestic hardliners. But both leaders know a war in the region would destroy their economies. The more surprising outcome was that Xi and Trump seem to have a genuine interest in stabilising US-China relations. If hawks on both sides of the Pacific can stomach it, stalemate could become the durable détente both countries need. There is now a window of opportunity for this.
Remarkably, Trump has created real breathing room in US-China relations. He’s waved away ideological objections, calling Xi a “good friend” and dismantling many of the tools the US has long used to challenge autocracy. He has signalled an openness to Chinese investment that would bring jobs and deals for American farmers and industry. He has even welcomed 600,000 Chinese students to attend US universities.
That said, Trump has also performed his usual flip-flops. He approved Chinese purchases of Iranian oil in March and has imposed some secondary sanctions. Even as senior US officials acknowledge Chinese efforts to push Iran to accept a ceasefire, others have accused China of taking advantage of the conflict. In Beijing, Xi told Trump he would not sell arms to Iran, curbing speculation about Chinese military support.
The forces that support a schism between the US and China include leading lawmakers as well as tech titans who invoke a race with Beijing to resist safeguards on AI. Meanwhile the American public is more anxious about jobs, affordability and the future of humanity than outdated notions of competition for global primacy.
China has its own reasons to want stability. Between 10-20mn Chinese jobs depend on trade with the US. Amid double-digit youth unemployment, the Chinese leadership would rather extend the trade truce than risk further turbulence. Xi is preparing to seek a fourth term next year. Beijing wants to show domestic audiences that it can avoid a showdown with Washington, especially as the Chinese military scrambles to recover from a purge of its top brass.
To seize this moment, the US and China need to accept four hard truths.
First, decoupling is a fantasy. The economies of the two superpowers are so symbiotic that prising them apart is impossible. Washington and Beijing are wasting time and energy trying to prove otherwise — and will continue to discover the limits of their ability to succeed without the other. For instance, the US can’t quickly wean itself off Chinese rare earths. In 15 years, Japan has only cut its reliance on them from over 90 per cent to 60 per cent. More than a third of American active pharmaceutical ingredients are sourced exclusively from China. And Chinese companies are equally reliant on the US for advanced chips, animal feed and more. Interdependence runs both ways.
The more important task is how to stabilise these ties. Recoupling in specific areas is sensible — economically and symbolically. For example, US auto workers could benefit from Chinese technology and investment in batteries and electric vehicle plants. Security and labour concerns can be mitigated with local ownership, union participation and more. To create jobs in the auto, battery and other advanced industries and catch up, US manufacturers need to be training with, rather than always against, the Chinese companies that currently dominate these sectors.
Second, stop talking about “strategic competition”. In Chinese the equivalent term (zhànlüè jìngzhēng) is more linguistically loaded — the government reportedly discourages its use. Such adversarial framing cuts off a coexistence both sides might actually be able to live with. On the US side, it was always more of a catchphrase than a strategy. Even a foreign bogeyman could not assuage public fatigue with unwinnable wars, exploding debt and political dysfunction. Two dozen American and Chinese experts I convened this spring agreed: finding new language is key to changing the mental models on both sides. Alternatives included “coevolution” and “managed interdependence”
Third, nurture moderates. In the US, those urging a “middle way” and restraint are gaining momentum inside and outside the administration but still lack a deep bench. Their ideas need the political infrastructure to sustain them. Sympathetic voices on Capitol Hill need space to test new ideas and the political cover that comes from strength in numbers. The same problem exists in China. Here too moderate voices face real constraints, including social media channels increasingly filled with inflammatory narratives, as well as the great firewall and limits on what can be said publicly. The people on both sides who knew how to talk to each other are ageing or have been pushed out of office.
The goal right now may just be a “cold peace”. Rather than trying to engineer a breakthrough, this is a moment to prevent deterioration. Keeping enough channels open so that a better relationship becomes possible, despite any bluster over Taiwan, is a modest mission, but it may be the only viable one.
Because there is a fourth hard truth for Trump and Xi to face: there is no military solution to that political impasse, only sustained and creative diplomacy.
A Professor Who Challenges the Washington Consensus on China
Jessica Chen Weiss argues that Biden Administration policy is contributing to an “action-reaction spiral.”
By Ian Johnson
December 13, 2022
david chou
長期在The Financial Times寫World Affairs專欄的Gideon Rachman始終不改他親台灣與台灣人的本色,我們應該敬佩他
在老川離開北京後的第四天, Gideon在他發表的一篇專論中這樣寫道:
“Taiwan is not a colony or an uninhabited island, whose future can be negotiated away by outsiders. If the Taiwanese continue to resist the idea of coerced incorporation into mainland China, they have an excellent chance of success---with or without American support.”
他對我們台灣與台灣人的抗支保台戰爭很有信心, 他的論據是, 親西方的烏克蘭人能成功地抗擊俄羅斯的侵略, 伊朗神權政權能成功地抗擊美國與以色列那, 親美國.日本.西方的台灣人也能成功地抗擊支那的侵略或武裝進犯.[不過, 我與絕大多數的美國專家則認為, 若無美國及時的軍事介入, 我台灣與台灣人無法在支共發動以佔領台灣為目的的武裝侵略下存活.]
Gideon對我台灣人如此有信心, 如此親善我們台灣人, 我們台灣與台美Patriots都應感謝他.[他寫的是專欄,不是社論,所以不代表倫敦金融時報的觀點與立場.]
[to be continued]
David Chou
Founder
Formosa Statehood Movement
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Appendix I
[Excerpt] A weakened Trump arrives at Xi’s court
Gideon Rachman
Published MAY 11 2026
https://www.ft.com/content/b2db7ec0-9293-4f22-855f-c6c059378736?syn-25a6b1a6=1
The big geopolitical issue on the table will be the future of Taiwan. The Chinese have made it clear they want something on this. In advance of the visit there has been speculation that Trump may change the American position on the island’s future by saying explicitly that the US opposes Taiwanese independence rather than simply not supporting it. That may sound like a tiny semantic change. But it would be regarded as a big win for Xi in both Beijing and Taipei — increasing the pressure on the Taiwanese to agree to “reunification” talks. I have even heard some eager Chinese commentators compare Trump’s visit this week to Margaret Thatcher’s trip to Beijing in 1984 during which the British leader agreed to return sovereignty over Hong Kong to China.
That analogy is flawed. Taiwan is not an American colony so Trump cannot sign it over to China. The US president can, however, seriously weaken Taiwan’s position by signalling a reduction in political and military support for the self-governing island. Trump himself may not care much about the fate of Taiwan. But many of his advisers and the US Congress do. They are likely to object strongly if the president makes a radical shift in policy.
Trump arrives in Beijing as an unpopular leader in a weakened position. But Xi may be satisfied with incremental gains for now. He can afford to play a long game.
Recommended
Trump returns to Beijing: what’s at stake
Appendix II
[Excerpt] Trump and Xi will not determine Taiwan’s fate
Gideon Rachman
Financial Times
18 May 2026 19:23
https://www.ft.com/content/d072db90-5167-420b-a9b2-11e84c7c5c77?syn-25a6b1a6=1
So how bad was it? Donald Trump’s remarks on Taiwan, after his visit to Beijing, have been pored over for clues to the future of the island.
The US president equivocated about possible future arms sales to Taiwan---portraying them as a bargaining chip in talks with Beijing. He sounded sceptical about the idea that the US could ever really defend Taiwan. And he repeated his tired charge that the Taiwanese had “stolen” their semiconductor industry from America.
In Taiwan. These remarks are likely to be seen as alarming In Beijing, they will be regarded as encouraging signs that Trump is backing away from the unequivocal support for the island expressed by President Joe Biden.
But the concentration on the bilateral conversation between Xi and Trump is missing a crucial point. Decisions made in Washington and Beijing are vital to the future of Taiwan. But they are not the last word.
Taiwan is not a colony or an uninhabited island, whose future can be negotiated away by outsiders. If the Taiwanese continue to resist the idea of coerced incorporation into mainland China, they have an excellent chance of success---with or without American support.
[omit]
This is the Bay Area Taiwanese American E-Mail Group. Our main objective is to provide open communication channel for the Taiwanese American community, let the Taiwan Spirit grow and pass down to the future.
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這是 Google 網路論壇針對「Bay Area Taiwanese American」群組發送的訂閱通知郵件。
如要取消訂閱這個群組並停止接收來自這個群組的郵件，請傳送電子郵件到 bay-area-taiwanese-...@googlegroups.com。
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david chou
The Chinese president raised with Trump the idea of the Thucydides Trap, the notion made popular by Harvard historian Graham Allison that a rising power often ends up in conflict with the incumbent hegemon.
Xi has previously said that such a trap would only be a problem if major powers made repeated strategic miscalculations. But this time he seemed to suggest it was a pressing danger.
“Can China and the United States overcome the Thucydides Trap and create a new paradigm of major-country relations?” he asked his guest.
The Chinese president then introduced a new, if vague, concept that he called “new constructive strategic stability”, which he defined as keeping “competition within proper limits” to ensure “stability” and a predictable peace.
Analysts say the concept — which Chinese state media said was agreed with Trump — appeared to be an attempt to impose “guardrails” on the US.
“It’s a way to also set Beijing up to criticise Washington for being unreliable should Washington do anything that Beijing doesn’t like,” said the NUS’s Chong.
=========================
What did Donald Trump achieve in talks with Xi Jinping?
US president returns from Beijing after summit that yielded no big deals but brought hope of more stable ties
What did Donald Trump achieve in talks with Xi Jinping?
As a parting gesture to Donald Trump before he left China, Xi Jinping promised to send some rose seeds to the White House to be planted at the seat of the American presidency.
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But over two days of talks in Beijing — spanning the Temple of Heaven, the Great Hall of the People and, finally, the gardens of the Chinese leadership’s tightly guarded compound — Xi appeared to concede little else to the US president.
Their discussions yielded no clear breakthroughs on the big foreign policy and economic fissures between the two countries and fell short of delivering the sort of big business deals the White House covets from international summits.
The talks did, however, cement a fragile sense of stability and mutual non-aggression between Washington and Beijing at a time of high geopolitical tension and economic disruption triggered by the US-Israel war against Iran and the ensuing rise in global energy prices.
[Xi Jinping, left, and Donald Trump in Zhongnanhai garden, within the Chinese leaders’ compound in Beijing, on Friday © Evan Vucci/Reuters/AP]
Trump, who hailed Xi to his face as a “great leader”, seemed to be looking for more out of the summit — in particular, Chinese help in putting pressure on Iran to strike a deal to open the vital Strait of Hormuz waterway to commercial shipping. But while the US president and Xi had “similar” views on how the Iran war should end, Beijing offered no public commitment to play along.
“I think in terms of optics and rhetoric, Xi probably came across as stronger,” said Ja Ian Chong, associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore. While the Chinese president displayed the grandeur and might of his nation, “Trump looked like he was pleading, needing something from Xi, with all of the unrequited praise”.
From his first remarks to Trump, Xi sought to portray China as a confident nation at least as powerful as the US and able to defend its interests. He underlined this message with a warning on Thursday that any “mishandling” of Taiwan could result in conflict between the world’s two leading powers.
As he flew back to the US on Air Force One, Trump said he had not yet decided whether to press ahead with a planned $14bn arms sale to Taiwan — a comment likely to fuel alarm in Taipei and regional allies.
China backs its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan with threats of force and wants the US to oppose any move towards formal independence for the democratic island. But Trump dismissed worries about the potential for conflict.
[RESUME Show video description The Donald Trump-Xi Jinping summit was cordial but short on substance © FT]
“I think we’ll be fine,” Trump said, adding that Xi “doesn’t want to see a war”, though he had stressed China’s opposition to Taiwan’s independence. “I heard him out . . . I didn’t make a comment,” the US president said.
Separately, Trump said he was considering lifting sanctions on Chinese purchasers of Iranian oil, a concession that would be welcomed in Beijing.
Apart from his lavish praise for Xi, Trump was relatively restrained in the Chinese capital, sticking largely to his script in short public remarks, refraining from making any controversial posts on social media and declining to hold any press conferences.
Trump also seemed to set a low bar for success: he made a generic plea for China to open up to American investment, but despite having surrounded himself with top US executives on the visit, he secured no formal announcements of new contracts for US companies or regulatory changes in Beijing. On Air Force One, the president said Boeing had secured an order from China of 200 planes with General Electric engines, but gave no additional details.
Strategically, it was Xi who sought to reframe the nature of the relationship.
The Chinese president raised with Trump the idea of the Thucydides Trap, the notion made popular by Harvard historian Graham Allison that a rising power often ends up in conflict with the incumbent hegemon.
Xi has previously said that such a trap would only be a problem if major powers made repeated strategic miscalculations. But this time he seemed to suggest it was a pressing danger.
“Can China and the United States overcome the Thucydides Trap and create a new paradigm of major-country relations?” he asked his guest.
The Chinese president then introduced a new, if vague, concept that he called “new constructive strategic stability”, which he defined as keeping “competition within proper limits” to ensure “stability” and a predictable peace.
Analysts say the concept — which Chinese state media said was agreed with Trump — appeared to be an attempt to impose “guardrails” on the US.
“It’s a way to also set Beijing up to criticise Washington for being unreliable should Washington do anything that Beijing doesn’t like,” said the NUS’s Chong.
Zhu Feng, an international relations expert at Nanjing University, said the new concept originated with the cold war US-Soviet idea of “strategic stability”, though in this case, it suggested a greater level of engagement on trade and business.
[PLAY | 00:29 Show video description High-profile attendees at the Trump-Xi meeting in China © FT/Getty]
Kevin Rudd, the former Australian prime minister and now head of the Asia Society, said on LinkedIn that Xi’s formulation “sounds like a form of leader-led détente but still with deep red lines on Taiwan”.
But even though Xi is aiming at steadier ties with the US, Beijing will still have to contend with an erratic American president prone to abrupt shifts in policy and strategy on everything from trade to national security — meaning a new flare-up on trade or Taiwan is still very possible.
Andrew Gilholm, head of China analysis at consultancy Control Risks, said the summit reflected a shift in the nature of US-China negotiations and leverage since the start of Trump’s first term as president.
[Recommended News in-depthUS-China relations Donald Trump’s China trip melds corporate interests and communist pomp]
Previously, said Gilholm, the dynamic in talks was mainly US demands and pressure, with China trying to manage these with concessions. But by later in Trump’s first term, Beijing’s position had hardened, and it has ever since been building its capacity for resilience, leverage and retaliation.
Last year, Trump backed down on tariffs after Chinese retaliation triggered a market backlash and Beijing’s imposition of export controls on rare earths led to alarm in Washington. The US president has subsequently sought to avoid new escalation.
“Now, China handles the US more by deterrence than concessions — it makes concessions only in exchange for US concessions, and has proved willing and able to meet escalation with escalation,” Gilholm said.
“This partly explains why a year of diplomacy and multiple rounds of cabinet meetings — and now even Trump’s visit to Beijing — have not brought a major breakthrough or deal.”