2025 National Defense Strategy將於下月公布, 但有機會參贊機要的軍事家Toshi Yoshihara已透露了兩個很重大的訊息
david chou
2025 National Defense Strategy將於下月公布, 但有機會參贊機要的軍事家Toshi Yoshihara已透露了兩個很重大的訊息 (I)
1今年三月, 華盛頓郵報有一份報導[Appendix I], 部分內容如下:"Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has reoriented the U.S. military to prioritize deterring China’s seizure of Taiwan and shoring up homeland defense by “assuming risk” in Europe and other parts of the world, according to a secret internal guidance memo-----------The document, known as the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance--------"由於這份報導, 我們與台灣及支那與印太各國的戰略家與軍事家開始密切注意Elbridge Colby即將負責撰寫的2025 National Defense Strategy(NDS)的有關報導, 在他的提名案被參院通過後.22025 NDS在八月底如期完成, Colby將它提交給國防部長, 部長將它提交給白宮及國安會 [現在Secretary of State Marco Rubio兼任國安顧問] 還有一些有關人士參閱並提供意見, 以做為定稿及公布前最後修改的參考. 在九月初傳出一項訊息 [Appendix II], 該訊息指出, "Pentagon officials are proposing the department prioritize protecting the homeland and Western Hemisphere, a striking reversal from the military’s yearslong mandate to focus on the threat from China."我研判這項訊息為假消息, 所以我沒有任何回應與批評, 但這項訊息被台灣的赤藍媒與赤媒廣為宣傳, 赤藍營與赤營的人馬亦大加運用, 用來打擊綠營與台派.3最近與美國國防部關係良好的日裔美國軍事家Toshi Yoshihara接受日本Sankei Shimbun專訪, 他指出---"新版國防戰略以「美國優先」與「以實力維護和平」兩大概念為基礎，將「美國本土防衛」與「阻止中國控制台灣」設定為最大重點。"
"所謂的「阻止」不僅是強化軍事嚇阻能力，還包括中國若真的對台灣發動大規模侵攻與登陸作戰，美軍將進行介入，阻止其達成目標的具體策略。"
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Appendix I
Secret Pentagon memo on China, homeland has Heritage fingerprints
Story by Alex Horton, Hannah Natanson
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has reoriented the U.S. military to prioritize deterring China’s seizure of Taiwan and shoring up homeland defense by “assuming risk” in Europe and other parts of the world, according to a secret internal guidance memo that bears the fingerprints of the conservative Heritage Foundation, including some passages that are nearly word-for-word duplications of text published by the think tank last year.
The document, known as the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance and marked “secret/no foreign national” in most passages, was distributed throughout the Defense Department in mid-March and signed by Hegseth. It outlines, in broad and sometimes partisan detail, the execution of President Donald Trump’s vision to prepare for and win a potential war against Beijing and defend the United States from threats in the “near abroad,” including Greenland and the Panama Canal.
The document — setting out a prioritization framework for senior defense officials and a vision to execute that work — also instructs the military to take a more direct role in countering illegal migration and drug trafficking.
The first Trump administration and the Biden administration characterized China as the greatest threat to the U.S. and postured the force to prepare for and deter conflict in the Pacific region. But Hegseth’s guidance is extraordinary in its description of the potential invasion of Taiwan as the exclusive animating scenario that must be prioritized over other potential dangers — reorienting the vast U.S. military architecture toward the Indo-Pacific region beyond its homeland defense mission.
The Pentagon will “assume risk in other theaters” given personnel and resource constraints, and pressure allies in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia to spend more on defense to take on the bulk of the deterrence role against threats from Russia, North Korea and Iran, according to the guidance.
The agency will shift focus to counterterrorism missions against groups with the capability and intent to strike the U.S., the guidance says, signaling that it will deprioritize militants in the Middle East and Africa who are regionally destabilizing but don’t have ambition to launch international attacks.
“China is the Department’s sole pacing threat, and denial of a Chinese fait accompli seizure of Taiwan — while simultaneously defending the U.S. homeland is the Department’s sole pacing scenario,” Hegseth wrote. Its force planning construct — a concept of how the Pentagon will build and resource the armed services to take on perceived threats — will consider conflict only with Beijing when planning contingencies for a major power war, it says, leaving the threat from Moscow largely attended by European allies.
Where the Biden administration’s 2022 National Defense Strategy emphasized alliances in countering Russia’s aggression, calling “mutually-beneficial Alliances and allies … our greatest global strategic advantage,” the Hegseth interim guidance says NATO must take on “far greater” burden sharing because the U.S. will be reluctant to provide forces with its priorities focused elsewhere.
The Defense Department did not return a request for comment.
The guidance was provided to congressional national security committees, where Republicans and Democrats have described it as confusing, according to a congressional aide who reviewed the document. It calls for withdrawing from a presence in most of the world, including the Middle East, but the administration has focused on demonstrating firepower and deterrence against the Houthis in Yemen and pressuring Iran, the aide noted.
“There’s tension between ‘We want American strength and military dominance in the world, and we want to be everywhere, but also nowhere,’” the aide said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive documents. “And that’s inconsistent and going to be difficult for them to design a strategy around.”
The interim guidance is nine pages. Several passages throughout are similar to a longer 2024 report by the Heritage Foundation, some of which are nearly identical, according to The Washington Post’s analysis of both documents. One of the Heritage report’s co-authors, Alexander Velez-Green, is now in an interim role as the Pentagon’s top policy official.
The Heritage report, published in August, recommends that the Pentagon prioritize three core issues: Taiwan invasion deterrence, homeland defense, and increased burden sharing among allies and partners — which the Hegseth guidance mirrors. The congressional aide said it was readily apparent to Capitol Hill staff that the document bore the influence of the conservative think tank.
The Heritage Foundation did not return a request for comment.
Trump as a presidential candidate denied that Heritage’s Project 2025 plan, which set out a far-right transition agenda across the entirety of the federal government, was a blueprint for his second term. But his policies and appointments — including the Pentagon guidance — have made clear that Heritage’s plans have been deeply influential in the first months of his administration.
Senior U.S. military officials have directly tied Heritage’s vision to Hegseth’s guidance.
Maj. Gen. Garrick Harmon, the head of strategy and plans at Africa Command, recommended to staff that they read the Heritage report as part of a discussion of how to align their priorities with the new Pentagon guidance, according to a command staff member who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. Another official within the command distributed a copy of the Heritage report, the staff member said.
The recommendation did not appear partisan in nature, the staff member said, adding that the similarities suggest the Pentagon’s document was partly inspired by the Heritage report and that the information could be complementary to understanding Hegseth’s guidance.
Africa Command declined to comment on internal discussions but said the staff meets with experts on Africa to inform planning, said Kelly Cahalan, a spokesperson for the command. “The staff also regularly reads and shares publicly available research and reports,” she said. “As with all prudent military planning, we are continually leveraging the latest research to assess and develop our strategy.”
Hegseth recently visited the Pacific region to emphasize his priorities against China, telling service members in Guam that they are “the tip of the spear” for U.S. military operations.
The new Pentagon guidance for a “denial defense” of Taiwan includes increasing the troop presence through submarines, bombers, unmanned ships, and specialty units from the Army and Marine Corps, as well as a greater focus on bombs that destroy reinforced and subterranean targets. The plan also calls for improving defense of U.S. troop locations in the Indo-Pacific, generating pre-positioned stocks and improving logistics.
While emphasizing support to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan, the document also calls for “pressuring” Taipei to “significantly increase” its defense spending. Trump and his allies have criticized Taiwan as underinvesting in its own defense, urging the self-ruled democratic island to spend up to 10 percent of its GDP on military readiness — a proportion well above what the U.S. and its allies spend on defense.
Since taking office, he has dodged the question of whether the U.S. would allow Beijing to take the island by force.
Two people familiar with Taiwan’s official discussions said the government in Taipei has struggled to make inroads with the new U.S. administration, amid growing doubts about Washington’s support — concerns that intensified after February’s disastrous Oval Office meeting of Trump, Vice President JD Vance and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
In a message of reassurance to Washington, President Lai Ching-te said last week that Taiwan will boost its defense spending to over 3 percent of its GDP — up from around 2.5 percent — as part of an ongoing overhaul of its military infrastructure. China responded by launching a wave of fighter jets and ships near the island, warning that “those who play with fire will get burned.”
In 2023, U.S. analysts concluded Taiwan’s forces would be unlikely to thwart Chinese military air superiority, according to leaked classified documents.
Hegseth’s guidance synchronizes the Pentagon with some of Trump’s international fixations, describing undetermined threats from the “near abroad.” U.S. forces, he wrote, must be “ready to defend American interests wherever they might be threatened in our hemisphere, from Greenland, to the Panama Canal, to Cape Horn.”
Trump told reporters Friday that “we have to have Greenland,” escalating tensions with Denmark, a NATO ally that governs the foreign policy and defense of the island.
The guidance also directs military leaders to ensure access to the Panama Canal and take a more assertive role in combating drug trafficking, border protection and deportations, which are normally carried out by the Department of Homeland Security. Those details were previously reported by CNN and NBC News. It also calls for the expansion of U.S. nuclear forces and homeland missile defense through the still conceptual “Golden Dome” described by Trump.
Hegseth’s guidance acknowledges that the U.S. is unlikely to provide substantial, if any, support to Europe in the case of Russian military advances, noting that Washington intends to push NATO allies to take primary defense of the region. The U.S. will support Europe with nuclear deterrence of Russia, and NATO should only count on U.S. forces not required for homeland defense or China deterrence missions, the document says.
A significant increase in Europe sharing its defense burden, the document says, “will also ensure NATO can reliably deter or defeat Russian aggression even if deterrence fails and the United States is already engaged in, or must withhold forces to deter, a primary conflict in another region.”
Appendix II
Pentagon plan prioritizes homeland over China threat
This marks a major departure from the first Trump administration, which emphasized deterring Beijing.
By Paul McLeary and Daniel Lippman
09/05/2025 01:39 PM EDT
Pentagon officials are proposing the department prioritize protecting the homeland and Western Hemisphere, a striking reversal from the military’s yearslong mandate to focus on the threat from China.
A draft of the newest National Defense Strategy, which landed on Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s desk last week, places domestic and regional missions above countering adversaries such as Beijing and Moscow, according to three people briefed on early versions of the report.
02:00
The move would mark a major shift from recent Democrat and Republican administrations, including President Donald Trump’s first term in office, when he referred to Beijing as America’s greatest rival. And it would likely inflame China hawks in both parties who view the country’s leadership as a danger to U.S. security.
“This is going to be a major shift for the U.S. and its allies on multiple continents,” said one of the people briefed on the draft document. “The old, trusted U.S. promises are being questioned.”
The report usually comes out at the start of each administration, and Hegseth could still make changes to the plan. But in many ways, the shift is already occurring. The Pentagon has activated thousands of National Guard troops to support law enforcement in Los Angeles and Washington, and dispatched multiple warships and F-35 fighter planes to the Caribbean to interdict the flow of drugs to the U.S.
A U.S. military strike this week allegedly killed 11 suspected members of the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua gang in international waters, a major step in using the military to kill noncombatants.
The Pentagon also has established a militarized zone across the southern border with Mexico that allows troops to detain civilians, a job normally reserved for law enforcement.
The new strategy would largely overturn the focus of the first Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy, which placed deterring China at the forefront of the Pentagon’s efforts.
“It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model,” the opening paragraphs of that document said.
The shift “doesn’t seem aligned with President Trump’s hawkish views on China at all,” said a Republican foreign policy expert briefed on the report, who like others was granted anonymity to discuss sensitive issues.
The president has continued to express tough rhetoric toward China, including imposing staggering tariffs on Beijing and accusing Chinese President Xi Jinping of “conspiring against” the U.S. after he met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin at a military parade in the country’s capital.
Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s policy chief, is leading the strategy. He played a key role in writing the 2018 version during Trump’s first term and has been a staunch supporter of a more isolationist American policy. Despite his long track record as a China hawk, Colby aligns with Vice President JD Vance on the desire to disentangle the U.S. from foreign commitments.
Colby’s policy team is also responsible for a forthcoming global posture review, which outlines where U.S. forces are stationed around the globe, and a theater air and missile defense review, which takes stock of U.S. and allies’ air defenses and makes recommendations for where to locate American systems. The Pentagon is expected to release both reviews as soon as next month.
A Pentagon spokesperson declined to comment on the reviews. The White House did not respond to a request for comment.
The three documents will be intertwined in many ways. Each will emphasize telling allies to take more responsibility for their own security, the people said, while the U.S. consolidates efforts closer to home.
Allies are especially worried about the fallout of the global posture review, given that it could pull U.S. troops away from Europe and the Middle East and cut critical security assistance programs.
A Pentagon official and European diplomat confirmed a Financial Times report that the Pentagon’s Baltic Security Initiative — which grants hundreds of millions of dollars a year to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to help build up their defenses and military infrastructure — will lose funding this year.
The diplomat pointed out that money from that initiative has gone to buying American-made weapons and “has received strong support, helping accelerate the development of key capabilities and enabling the acquisition of U.S. systems like HIMARS.”
NATO allies increasingly expect some of the roughly 80,000 U.S. troops in Europe to leave over the next several years. But countries will feel the impacts differently and, in the end, are subject to the whims of Trump.
During a Wednesday visit by Poland’s new president to the White House, Trump said the U.S. would not remove troops from the country. But he acknowledged he’s considering service member reductions elsewhere on the continent.
“If anything,” Trump said, “we’ll put more there.”
Pentagon plan prioritizes homeland over China threat
This marks a major departure from the first Trump administration, which emphasized deterring Beijing.
By Paul McLeary and Daniel Lippman
09/05/2025 01:39 PM EDT
Pentagon officials are proposing the department prioritize protecting the homeland and Western Hemisphere, a striking reversal from the military’s yearslong mandate to focus on the threat from China.
A draft of the newest National Defense Strategy, which landed on Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s desk last week, places domestic and regional missions above countering adversaries such as Beijing and Moscow, according to three people briefed on early versions of the report.
02:00
The move would mark a major shift from recent Democrat and Republican administrations, including President Donald Trump’s first term in office, when he referred to Beijing as America’s greatest rival. And it would likely inflame China hawks in both parties who view the country’s leadership as a danger to U.S. security.
“This is going to be a major shift for the U.S. and its allies on multiple continents,” said one of the people briefed on the draft document. “The old, trusted U.S. promises are being questioned.”
The report usually comes out at the start of each administration, and Hegseth could still make changes to the plan. But in many ways, the shift is already occurring. The Pentagon has activated thousands of National Guard troops to support law enforcement in Los Angeles and Washington, and dispatched multiple warships and F-35 fighter planes to the Caribbean to interdict the flow of drugs to the U.S.
A U.S. military strike this week allegedly killed 11 suspected members of the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua gang in international waters, a major step in using the military to kill noncombatants.
The Pentagon also has established a militarized zone across the southern border with Mexico that allows troops to detain civilians, a job normally reserved for law enforcement.
The new strategy would largely overturn the focus of the first Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy, which placed deterring China at the forefront of the Pentagon’s efforts.
“It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model,” the opening paragraphs of that document said.
The shift “doesn’t seem aligned with President Trump’s hawkish views on China at all,” said a Republican foreign policy expert briefed on the report, who like others was granted anonymity to discuss sensitive issues.
The president has continued to express tough rhetoric toward China, including imposing staggering tariffs on Beijing and accusing Chinese President Xi Jinping of “conspiring against” the U.S. after he met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin at a military parade in the country’s capital.
Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s policy chief, is leading the strategy. He played a key role in writing the 2018 version during Trump’s first term and has been a staunch supporter of a more isolationist American policy. Despite his long track record as a China hawk, Colby aligns with Vice President JD Vance on the desire to disentangle the U.S. from foreign commitments.
Colby’s policy team is also responsible for a forthcoming global posture review, which outlines where U.S. forces are stationed around the globe, and a theater air and missile defense review, which takes stock of U.S. and allies’ air defenses and makes recommendations for where to locate American systems. The Pentagon is expected to release both reviews as soon as next month.
A Pentagon spokesperson declined to comment on the reviews. The White House did not respond to a request for comment.
The three documents will be intertwined in many ways. Each will emphasize telling allies to take more responsibility for their own security, the people said, while the U.S. consolidates efforts closer to home.
Allies are especially worried about the fallout of the global posture review, given that it could pull U.S. troops away from Europe and the Middle East and cut critical security assistance programs.
A Pentagon official and European diplomat confirmed a Financial Times report that the Pentagon’s Baltic Security Initiative — which grants hundreds of millions of dollars a year to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to help build up their defenses and military infrastructure — will lose funding this year.
The diplomat pointed out that money from that initiative has gone to buying American-made weapons and “has received strong support, helping accelerate the development of key capabilities and enabling the acquisition of U.S. systems like HIMARS.”
NATO allies increasingly expect some of the roughly 80,000 U.S. troops in Europe to leave over the next several years. But countries will feel the impacts differently and, in the end, are subject to the whims of Trump.
During a Wednesday visit by Poland’s new president to the White House, Trump said the U.S. would not remove troops from the country. But he acknowledged he’s considering service member reductions elsewhere on the continent.
Appendix III
美新版國防戰略曝光 日媒：中國武力犯台將軍事介入
自由時報
2025/09/24 20:23
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前美國國防部政策顧問吉原俊井指出，川普政府的新版「國家防衛戰略」，將「阻止中國控制台灣」列為2大重點之一，包括中國一旦對台灣發動大規模侵攻與登陸作戰，美軍將進行介入，阻止其達成目標的具體策略。（取自戰略暨預算評估中心官網）
〔駐日特派員林翠儀／東京24日報導〕前美國國防部政策顧問吉原俊井（Toshi Yoshihara），接受日本「產經新聞」專訪時指出，川普政府即將公布的新版「國家防衛戰略」（NDS），將「阻止中國控制台灣」列為2大重點之一，包括中國一旦對台灣發動大規模侵攻與登陸作戰，美軍將進行介入，阻止其達成目標的具體策略。報導指出，該戰略還包括呼籲台灣加強防衛努力。
報導指出，美國的「台灣關係法」雖然並未明文規定台海有事之際美軍是否介入，川普政府迄今也維持「戰略模糊」政策，但新版國防戰略是以介入為前提，明確提出防止中國軍隊控制台灣，展現第二次川普政府對中政策的新態度。
美國歷屆政府約每4年更新「國家防衛戰略」一次，做為國防與對外戰略的基本方針。川普政府在2018年第一任期內曾發表過一次，當時將中國和俄羅斯定位為國際秩序的挑戰者，並提出在競爭中取勝的方針。在國防部長赫格塞斯領導下，這次新版國防戰略完成最終草案，預定10月發表。
由於川普在上任後強調「美國本土防衛優先」，各方擔心川普政府守護同盟國的態度轉趨消極，但吉原指出，新版國防戰略以「美國優先」與「以實力維護和平」兩大概念為基礎，將「美國本土防衛」與「阻止中國控制台灣」設定為最大重點。
在美國本土防衛方面，目標是透過大幅強化飛彈防禦網，建構「金穹」（Golden Dome）防禦系統。
在對外戰略方面，「阻止中國對台灣的軍事控制」被視為最優先課題。值得注意的是，所謂的「阻止」不僅是強化軍事嚇阻能力，還包括中國若真的對台灣發動大規模侵攻與登陸作戰，美軍將進行介入，阻止其達成目標的具體策略。
此外，吉原還指出，川普政府對於台灣強化國防的現狀並不滿意，新版國防戰略中將納入對台灣大幅增強防衛努力的期待。
報導指出，中國對台行動除了正面登陸作戰，也可能包括海上封鎖，以及對台灣內部的軍事、政治進行擾亂工作。因此，該戰略也將論及如何因應這些威脅。
強化對中嚇阻，還需要新的軍事強化措施，例如持續開發潛射巡弋核飛彈，以及加強美屬關島的飛彈防禦等。同時，日本等盟國與志同道合國家的防衛合作將更顯重要。
david chou
========================
美軍介入台海衝突？學者：疑釋政治訊號
聯合報／ 記者張文馨／台北報導
2025-09-25 00:35
傳美國總統川普的國防戰略將聲明介入台海衝突，台灣學者態度多傾向保留，猜測這可能是釋放政治訊號，或者是為提供總統決策的軍事準備之一；相較於先喊出要介入台海衝突，美國更可能的是協助台灣強化威嚇及落實拒止。
淡江大學國際事務與戰略研究所兼任副教授黃介正表示，川普對海外用兵和戰爭的態度保守謹慎，會這麼斬釘截鐵地說美軍會介入，可能是釋放政治訊號，或者是無論總統如何決定，五角大廈都會做的各種軍事準備之一（至於實際用不用，端賴川普決定），此外，也不排除這篇報導的真實性是否足夠權威，相關發展待觀察。
成大政治系教授、國策院執行長王宏仁則說，從今年三月美國防長機密備忘錄到即將發表的國防戰略，重點圍繞在協助台灣做接下來的準備，以及對台海衝突的正視，這點一以貫之；俄中朝的關係發展至今，被美國認為是中國在拉幫結派形成對抗，美國軍方自然會認為這是很嚴重的問題。
王宏仁說，按報導所述，即將發表的戰略文件可理解為川普意志，當然，美國在外交上可能會依然維持模糊立場，軍事上則愈來愈具體，操作更加清楚，強化協助台灣落實拒止戰略，所以說，要強化威嚇和拒止是有的；至於談到要介入，王宏仁說，這可能是個人的想法，他認為就算美軍已經準備好要介入，也不會這樣寫。
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david chou
2025 National Defense Strategy將於下月公布, 但有機會參贊機要的軍事家Toshi Yoshihara已透露了兩個很重大的訊息 (III)[我本來已結束本欄, 但因有鄉親來此留下Remarks, 所以必須加以回應, 以免被誤解為傲慢與無禮.][我尚未回應Dr. Michael Yeun, 請他稍候.]
1
2我尚未有機會讀到 "The Greatest Danger in the Taiwan Strait :Even If China Avoids a War of Choice, a Miscalculation Could Spark a War of Chance" (by Joel Wuthnow , The Foreign Affairs; September 12, 2025) 這篇論文, 不過, 我已讀到赤藍營的軍事記者郭崇倫先生對該文的報導 [Appendix]. 郭先生的報導指出, 美國Stimson Center的一篇報告認為, "中共高層傾向對台使用非戰爭手段".
我們過去經常跟鄉親說, 支共的對台戰爭會有四種手段或方式: 前兩者是透過國民黨與赤黨與柯痞黨這些內應與內奸, 以民主選舉的方式, 以和平方式 [對支共而言論, 和平也是戰爭的一種形式] 及政治或統戰手段, 來建立傀儡政權及 "支那台灣立法局" (香港模式的立法局, 現在台灣的立法院已是), 這在2028年達標的機會會超過百分之五十, 如此一來, 老共就可以不費一兵一卒, 拿下台灣.
我們猜測, 美國國防部看起來已傾向於認為, 老共應該會透過我們所說的四種方式或模式 [還有兩種是透過戰爭的方式, 但會以 "北平模式" 或 "Tibet模式" 進行, 達標的概率也都很可能會超過百分之五十] 來拿下台灣, 因此, 根據Toshi Yoshihara的說法, 即將發佈的2025 National Defense Strategy會論及 "如何因應老共的這些對台灣內部的政治與軍事擾亂".不過, 我認為, 這部分確實太敏感, 因此, 國防部長發佈的2025 National Defense Strategy在這部分很可能刻意被留白, 之後, 五角大廈與國會軍事委員會的人馬會把訊息直接傳達給台灣的最高當局, 國防部長, 國安會秘書長.
David ChouFounderFormosa Statehood Movement
=========================Appendix美中台博弈／開啟台海戰爭的3種型態！美雖不會旁觀 若少做一事恐難避戰
聯合報／ 本報記者郭崇倫
2025-09-27 00:00
https://udn.com/news/story/10930/9032597
美國國防大學研究員吳志遠日前在「外交事務」刊文，題為「台海最大之危險」，將台海戰爭的原因分三種可能，但僅限兩岸間，現實情況是美國不可能袖手旁觀，加入美國因素後，情況會變更複雜。
型態一／理性決策犯台
可能之一是理性選擇的戰爭，這是經權衡軍力對比與可能的政經制裁後，北京理性決定是否為武力奪台的最佳時機。決定因素在於可用多少最低代價拿下台灣。前美國印太司令戴維森在國會作證時說，共軍後年可能攻台。這是基於兩岸與美中軍力對比的判斷。
後年也是共軍建軍百年。福建艦成軍後，共軍具備三航母能力，加上九三閱兵呈現的實戰裝備，共軍後年的目標是可期的。
然而兩軍對壘，能力都是相對，共軍雖不斷累積渡海、搶灘、推進及占領能力，但台灣防衛的力量經不對稱作戰概念轉化，加上美軍協助而正強化中，共軍想在後年完全壓制國軍，可能並非易事。
台灣想做的就是使共軍奪台代價極大化，使習近平「蔣介石化」，亦即使習近平興起也許今天不是攻台的好日子，就像蔣在一九五○、六○年代時每天喊要反攻大陸，最初真的想明天就反攻，但最後淪為口號，也就偏安台灣。
俄烏戰爭的先例，俄羅斯誇口三天攻下基輔，結果拖了三年多，習近平做出攻台決定時，絕對會擔心共軍是否像俄軍不能打、不經打。
如美智庫史汀生中心九月公布的「重新思考威脅」報告所指，即北京理性思考後，全面侵台可能性相當低，遠低於許多政策圈與媒體想像。主要考慮有三：侵台代價太高昂、中共高層傾向非戰手段與國際反共聯盟的嚇阻作用。
型態二／義無反顧宣戰
可能之二是義無反顧的戰爭，這是基於民族大義的考慮，任何中共領袖在台灣跨越政治紅線之際，例如正式宣布獨立時，無論犧牲代價多大都不可能不宣戰。
台灣各方對宣布台獨這條紅線已耳熟能詳，即使「務實台獨工作者」當總統後，不敢也不會宣布台獨，但在爭取國際空間等其他方面，仍希望爭取相對政治實體的地位，且對北京的打壓，台灣內部不滿的共識愈來愈高。
這種台灣主體性，在美十年前開始抗中後，情況變更複雜。最近ＡＩＴ與美國國務院指出，包括開羅宣言、波茨坦宣言及舊金山和約，均未決定台灣最終政治地位。有人認為，這是美國要開始承認台灣地位未定論。其實美政策未變，是對大陸強調第二七五八號決議及開羅宣言等，美國反駁陸對台灣的主權宣示。
北京向來認為，台灣的實質台獨是受美國暗中支持，所以每每在雙邊會議要求美國不支持台獨甚至反對台獨，且抱怨美國政府言行不符。美國現行政策其實是反對改變現狀，有時說不支持台獨、有時不說，取決於當時美中交涉的情況，至於宣布反對台獨，絕大多數幕僚反對，因為這使美國的選擇受限。
然而在未經挑釁下，若中共武力犯台，美國一直有的選項是台灣宣布獨立，美國表示支持。這不僅是日前李喜明主導兵推的設想狀況，也一直是美國壓箱底的籌碼。
型態三／擦槍走火意外
可能之三則是擦槍走火戰爭。一次意外或誤判恐迅速失控，進而引爆衝突，這比前兩種可能性更高，至今卻罕見討論。例如共軍戰機因機件故障而墜入台灣領海，大陸要搶救人機，台灣則視為偽裝的蓄意攻擊，因而引發戰爭。
要防止因意外產生的衝突，兩岸需維持祕密溝通管道，用於預防危機和降級緊張，而兩岸必須在軍事行動中保持克制，約束兩軍飛行員或艦艇人員的冒險行為。
美國此前因南海撞機事件，對處理意外有經驗教訓，因此會密切注意事態發展，同時保持戰略模糊，為靈活回應留出空間。美國當然也分別與兩岸維持管道，加強軍事對話，以在第一時間就能降溫。但沒有任何一個溝通是只為了溝通，共軍長期視美中海空遭遇機制是美方刺探情資或己方欺敵的一環，兩岸溝通又何嘗不會以如此角度視之？真正要避戰恐難上加難。
david chou
2025 National Defense Strategy將於下月公布, 但有機會參贊機要的軍事家Toshi Yoshihara已透露了兩個很重大的訊息 (IV)我在前幾則Post都告訴鄉親,日裔美國軍事家Toshi Yoshihara幾天前接受Sankei Shimbun的專訪, Sankei就此做了報導. 該項報導借Toshi的金口, 讓我們知道, 即將被美國國防部公布的2025 National Defense Strategy裡頭有對我們台灣人無比重要的一段內容: "中國對台行動除了-------也可能包括-------以及對台灣內部的軍事、政治進行擾亂工作. 因此, 該戰略也將論及如何因應這些威脅."這一段是要告訴日本人與世人, 五角大廈已深切認知與了解支共對台灣政界與軍方的統戰與滲透已造成極大的影響與危害, 因此, 2025 National Defense Strategy會對此加以討論, 同時會討論如何因應這些威脅. 五角大廈要 "因應這些威脅", 台灣與台灣人可能就會因此而得救.台灣的政界與軍方遭到支共極其嚴重的統戰與滲透, 這早已是台灣的有識之士的共識, 外國媒體過去也時有報導, 若干國外智庫也有做過研究與報告, 如今五角大廈願意正視且提出因應對策, 雖嫌有點晚, 但還不算太晚.台派與台派政權必須採取drastic measures, 來處理這個嚴重問題, 若再懦弱與毫無作為下去, 就是爛泥扶不了牆, 就是等著亡國滅種, 沒有人會可憐我們.我今天把倫敦金融時報駐台記者席佳琳的一份報導 [Appendix II] 張貼在此, 讓鄉親們看看我們台灣的有識之士是如何地憂心老共因為在台灣培植了許許多多內應 [我總是說台灣有滿街與滿坑滿谷的共匪與共匪同路人], 準備要不費一兵一卒, 就拿下台灣.我也順便把自由時報對席佳琳的報導的推介也張貼出來 [Appendix I] , 大家可以參考一下.底下是席佳琳的報導其中的片段:"Concerns in the west have centred on the risk of a Chinese invasion, ----------. But many Taiwanese are far more concerned that Beijing could subvert their country from within-----."[本欄今天結束]
David ChouFounderFormosa Statehood Movement
================================
西方擔心中國犯台！金融時報：台灣人更怕「內應」顛覆民主
自由時報編譯陳成良／綜合報導
2025/08/07 14:45
https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/5135642
英國《金融時報》6日刊出深度報導，指出當西方世界將目光聚焦於中國的軍事入侵威脅時，許多台灣人更深層的恐懼，是北京正透過其在台的政治協力者，從內部顛覆台灣的民主，最終達成「不戰而屈人之兵」的目標。
報導以天使投資人陳若芬（Chen Ru-fen）的故事開篇。這位過去穿梭於冷氣會議室的商界人士，如今卻頂著酷暑走上街頭，投身罷免國民黨（KMT）立委的社會運動。她說：「若我們不阻止他們，我們將永遠失去主權與自由。」
西方憂武嚇 台灣怕滲透
美國軍方高層警告，解放軍的圍台軍演已是攻台的「預演」。然而，《金融時報》指出，許多台灣人認為，北京透過長期的文化與經濟連結、培養在地協力者，並將民選政府邊緣化，才是更立即、更陰險的威脅。
報導引述美國智庫蘭德公司（Rand Corporation）專家哈羅德（Scott Harold）的分析，指出「中國有著利用台灣複雜歷史與政治來破壞其內部團結的悠久歷史。」
中共統戰劇本：從「北平模式」到「黎巴嫩化」
報導回顧，中共的「統一戰線」工作，是透過拉攏、利誘與脅迫等手段來擊敗對手。1949年，中共成功勸降國民黨指揮官，兵不血刃拿下北京，近年更有中國學者建議以這種「北平模式」拿下台灣。前《環球時報》總編輯胡錫進更曾揚言，中國應對台灣進行「黎巴嫩化」，即煽動內部衝突以利北京接管。
分化與收買：從村里長到退役將領
在總統蔡英文2016年上任後，北京便切斷與民進黨政府的官方溝通，轉而對國民黨執政的地方縣市招手，選擇性地採購其農產品。此外，中國政府部門定期在台灣選舉前，招待台灣村里長赴中旅遊，並鎖定軍方，邀請國民黨退役將領參加黃埔軍校百年校慶。
報導指出，對許多公民行動者而言，國民黨如今已是「中共的同路人」。前總統馬英九在上次大選期間，曾公開呼籲同胞「相信習近平」。而在去年贏得國會多數席次後，國民黨更與小黨聯手，通過具爭議性的國會擴權法案，並杯葛大法官人事，導致司法院陷入癱瘓。
去年5月，在國民黨強行表決國會擴權法案時，數萬名抗議者包圍立法院。知名政治學者吳叡人在現場稱此舉為「國會政變」，並指控國民黨正「從內部配合中國的併吞企圖」。
Why Taiwanese fear China could take over from within
Kathrin Hille
Published AUG 7 2025
Why Taiwanese fear China could take over from within
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While the west focuses on the military threat, activists in Taiwan accuse its own politicians of facilitating Beijing’s subversion efforts
[Protests against, left, and for the opposition KMT, right, have divided Taiwan and galvanised activists like Chen Ru-fen, centre © FT montage/DaveTacon/Getty Images ]
Chen Ru-fen’s life has changed beyond recognition. The angel investor has moved from air-conditioned meeting rooms to Taiwan’s sweltering streets. Instead of helping start-ups she is now campaigning to rescue her country from what she believes is a surreptitious Chinese annexation push.
She and thousands of other activists suffered a crushing defeat in their first battle. An unprecedented mass recall vote last month failed to unseat a single lawmaker from the Kuomintang (KMT), the largest party in Taiwan’s parliament, whom activists like Chen accuse of undermining democracy so that China can seize the island.
“I thought I’d go back to my usual life after the vote,” says Chen. “But now we have to keep going. If we don’t stop them, we will lose our sovereignty and our freedom forever.”
Her anxiety reflects growing fears that the Chinese Communist party (CCP) could be inching closer to taking the island it has long claimed is part of China. Xi Jinping, China’s president, has repeatedly declared that the Taiwan issue “cannot be passed on from generation to generation.”
Concerns in the west have centred on the risk of a Chinese invasion, with US military commanders warning that the manoeuvres the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is conducting around Taiwan are no longer exercises but “rehearsals” for an attack.
But many Taiwanese are far more concerned that Beijing could subvert their country from within, by tapping into long-standing cultural and economic links, grooming collaborators and sidelining the country’s elected government.
Since the Democratic Progressive party (DPP), which Beijing denounces as “secessionist”, won the presidency in 2016, the CCP has stepped up its efforts to win over political parties, interest groups and segments of society more amenable to closer relations across the Strait.
“China has a long history of playing on Taiwan’s complex history and political scene to undermine its internal unity,” says Scott Harold, a Taiwan expert at the Rand Corporation, a Washington think-tank. “And Taiwan struggles with the political and societal cohesion it needs to become resilient against that.”
The country has a fractured national identity forged by the Chinese Nationalist ideology of the Kuomintang, the island’s historical ties to China and its international diplomatic isolation.
Although the island’s original residents and the descendants of those who fled there following the communist revolution in 1949 all overwhelmingly reject unification with China, disagreements are becoming more public and more acrimonious under the mounting pressure from Beijing.
“China and international observers look at this and say that Taiwan’s voters have got behind the pro-China stance,” says Shelly Hsu, a Taipei headhunter who participated in the recall campaign.
Hsu believes Xi is bent on taking Taiwan so he can hold on to power, and that the cheapest way for him to do so “is to scare the Taiwanese into surrendering”. Like Chen, she sees the recall vote defeat as an existential moment for the country. “We must abandon our illusions and prepare for battle. Those without a second passport should start exercising and stock up on food,” she says.
[KMT supporters at a rally last month to oppose the ruling DPP’s move to recall their legislators. The party fiercely rejects being described as ‘pro-China’ © Dave Tacon/FT ]
For her and others, the KMT, which fought the communists for decades in the first half of the 20th century, is now best described as a party of traitors and a fifth column.
“The KMT are the CCP’s fellow travellers, they are the CCP’s biggest agent in Taiwan,” says Hsu. The KMT fiercely rejects being described as “pro-China” and insists that they are true patriots. But the country’s undercurrent of competing nationalisms has now burst into the open.
“I have never seen Taiwan this divided,” says Lev Nachman, a political scientist at National Taiwan University.
Xi’s approach to Taiwan conforms to an age-old Communist party playbook that involves a mix of enticement, deception and coercion to control or defeat its adversaries.
Through so-called United Front work, the CCP builds relationships with members of ethnic minorities and religious communities in China and politicians, entrepreneurs and opinion leaders abroad to ensure these groups will help further its interests.
Xi’s own father, Xi Zhongxun, deployed similar tactics back in 1941, asking intelligence official Bu Lu to deal with a KMT commander who was causing the communists trouble in the north-western province of Shaanxi. Bu wined and dined the target until his superiors became suspicious and transferred him away. Xi complimented Bu for having “won without firing a shot”.
The approach reached its zenith in the 1949 revolution, when Communist party troops persuaded the KMT commander in Beijing to hand over the Chinese capital without a fight. In recent years, Chinese scholars have advised the Communist party to use this “Beiping model” to conquer Taiwan.
Hu Xijin, a Chinese propagandist and former editor of the CCP-owned tabloid Global Times, has said that China should “Lebanonise” Taiwan — incite internal strife that would plunge society into a state of chaos, ripe for Beijing to take over.
Despite Xi’s refusal to talk to Taiwan’s DPP government, he is pushing for “integrated development” policies that seek to incorporate Taiwan into China’s society and economy bit by bit.
While his government halted the flow of Chinese tourists to Taiwan and blocked Taiwanese agricultural exports to China after the DPP’s victory, it selectively made deals with local KMT politicians to buy their agricultural produce.
The divide-and-rule gambit prompted Taiwanese tourism companies and farmers to urge their own government to adopt a softer stance towards Beijing. “Our family’s income declined because suddenly we could no longer sell to our biggest market, mainland China,” says Weng Chi-hung, a pomelo farmer in southern Tainan. “The DPP is to blame for that.”
Chinese government departments regularly pay for Taiwanese village heads to visit China ahead of elections in Taiwan, invitations many accept in violation of local law, raising concerns about political interference as those officials play a key role in election campaigns at the grassroots.
Beijing offers financial support for young Taiwanese to set up businesses in China and organises pilgrimages to temples in China that have historic links to Taiwanese deities, aiming to strengthen emotional and cultural ties to the “motherland”.
The CCP has also targeted Taiwan’s military, inviting veterans who fought with the KMT against them to celebrations of the 100th anniversary of Whampoa, the military academy that trained early generations of both Nationalist and communist officers.
[Missile systems at a Taipei park last month during annual military exercises. China’s infiltration and disinformation campaign is complicating Taiwan’s efforts to unify its armed forces © I-Hwa Cheng/AFP/Getty Images]
That appropriation of the KMT military’s Chinese roots complicates Taiwan’s efforts to create armed forces wholeheartedly committed to defending against an invading Chinese army.
At the same time, Beijing is recruiting serving officers as spies. “We have a massive problem with the infiltration of our force now,” says a senior official at the justice ministry’s investigation bureau. In 2024, the number of Taiwanese prosecuted on charges of espionage for China jumped to 64, up from just 10 in 2022, while at least two retired officers have been indicted.
This is paired with a disinformation campaign. The National Security Bureau, Taiwan’s version of the CIA, said in January that the amount of disinformation China distributed into the country had risen 60 per cent over the past year.
One area of particular concern is social media apps widely used by teenagers and even primary school pupils. “Although other democracies also observe adverse effects of Chinese apps like TikTok, the impact goes much deeper here because content travels so much easier due to the shared language,” says Eric Hsu, a researcher at Doublethink Lab, a Taiwanese non-profit that researches Chinese disinformation and influence operations.
Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office keeps close tabs on Taiwanese entrepreneurs and executives living and working in China. Almost 20 businesspeople have told the FT over several years that TAO officials approach representatives of their business associations ahead of elections in Taiwan, seeking pledges they will donate to parties other than the DPP and organise trips back to Taiwan to bring out the anti-DPP vote.
The CCP has also been fostering political parties. In January, Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior asked the Constitutional court to rule on dissolving the Chinese Unification Promotion party, set up by organised crime boss Chang An-lo, on the grounds that it illegally received money from China and violated Taiwanese national security laws.
[Opinions on key issues are deeply split along party lines 70% of DPP supporters blame China for rising cross-strait tensions. But 61% of KMT supporters blame the DPP itself, according to Doublethink Lab 88% of DPP supporters are satisfied with the way democracy in Taiwan works. But only 31% of KMT supporters are, says Doublethink 81% of KMT supporters agree with the idea that the US cannot be trusted. Almost exactly the same percentage of DPP backers say they disagree. ]
Overtly pro-unification groups such as the CUP have had no impact on Taiwan’s elections as only a tiny minority of Taiwanese would consider becoming part of China even as a future option.
But the KMT is a different matter. After ruling Taiwan for four decades, it began allowing a gradual transition to democracy in the late 1980s and became one of the country’s two main political forces along with the DPP.
Like the CCP, the KMT holds that Taiwan is part of a greater Chinese nation, although the former enemies disagree on how to define this. Ever since a KMT chair visited China for the first time in 2005, the two parties have engaged in regular dialogue.
For some, that relationship has become too cosy in recent years, with prominent KMT politicians accused of parroting CCP rhetoric on visits to Beijing.
Wang Hung-wei, one of the lawmakers targeted in the recall, badmouthed Taiwan’s government on a Chinese state television talk show in 2021, while former president and KMT chair Ma Ying-jeou claimed during the last presidential election campaign that Taiwan was too small and weak to defend itself — and urged his compatriots to “trust Xi Jinping”.
Such comments could once be dismissed as posturing or awkward or sentimental behaviour. But they took on greater significance in January last year, when the KMT won the largest number of seats in Taiwan’s parliament.
Within weeks of taking office, it allied with a smaller party to push through a series of highly controversial bills, including an expansion of parliamentary powers at the expense of the executive and the judiciary.
After Taiwan’s top court found those amendments unconstitutional, the KMT and its allies raised the quorum the court needs to rule and blocked new judges nominated by the president. That left the court inquorate — and thus paralysed.
Other manoeuvres included unprecedented budget cuts and a redistribution of funds from the central to local governments, of which a majority are run by the KMT.
It has also proposed a controversial bill that would restrain Taiwan’s use of its military to push back against Chinese incursions. It says this reduces the risk of conflict between two parties which, the bill argues, are technically still at war with each other.
The opposition’s moves to paralyse the government of President Lai Ching-te triggered confrontation with the DPP. But they also inflamed the wider public.
[KMT legislator Cheng Cheng-chien is alleged to have illegally received campaign finance from the Chinese government in last January’s election, when he beat DPP incumbent Carol Lin © Dave Tacon/FT]
In May 2024, when the KMT voted on the expansion of parliamentary powers, tens of thousands of protesters gathered outside. Addressing the crowd, Wu Rwei-ren, a prominent political scientist and historian, called the move a “parliamentary coup” and accused the KMT of “coordinating from within in support of a Chinese annexation of Taiwan”.
DPP lawmakers said the opposition was usurping power following a script provided by Xi Jinping. Although the KMT dismissed such accusations, the rhetoric stuck and the campaign to petition for recalling KMT lawmakers quickly gained traction.
Angel investor and activist Chen was on board from the beginning. “They are hollowing out our courts, they are undermining our democracy, they echo the way China talks,” she says.
In Hsinchu, the centre of Taiwan’s vital semiconductor industry, law professor Carol Lin led a campaign against Cheng Cheng-chien, the KMT legislator who defeated her in the January 2024 race for that seat.
Lin filed a criminal complaint against Cheng, alleging that he illegally received campaign finance from the Chinese government. A special prosecutorial group for national security cases has opened an investigation. “Cheng is probably the case with the clearest evidence of KMT lawmakers colluding with China,” Lin says. Cheng denies the accusations.
President Lai went on a tour of the country, giving speeches ostensibly aimed at uniting the nation against the threat from China. But his rhetoric left no room for those with emotional bonds to China. Lai compared the search for national unity to the process of forging iron, during which the nation must “remove impurities”.
[Angel investor-turned-activist Chen Ru-fen says the KMT is hollowing out Taiwan’s courts, undermining its democracy, and echoing the way China talks © Dave Tacon/FT]
The KMT has denounced the DPP as “green communists” in a reference to their party colour, compared the party with the Nazis, and called Lai a dictator.
China was quick to take advantage of the infighting. State media and social media accounts affiliated with the Taiwan Affairs Office have been trumpeting the vote as a rejection of Lai’s “dictatorial” tendencies.
A growing chorus of voices is warning that deepening internal division is just what the CCP needs. Former DPP lawmaker Lin Chuo-shui last week warned members of his own party against being overzealous in identifying alleged Chinese collaborators.
Optimists believe that Taiwan will pull itself together. James Chen, a political scientist at Tamkang University who supports the KMT, sees the recall results as a demonstration of Taiwanese voters’ judgment and maturity. “The DPP and President Lai should develop better approaches to truly unify the country”, he says, but warns that if the opposition fails to meet the public’s demands “they will not be able to return [to the presidency] in 2028.”
But Chen, the activist, is no longer content to simply put her faith in politicians. “What the recall taught us is that there is still a lot to be done to make our citizens more resilient against Chinese interference,” she says.
One next step that she and her fellow activists are considering is running for elected office at the grassroots level. “Our village heads and borough wardens have often become tools of Chinese influence operations,” she warns. “It is time that we, the citizens, take this into our own hands.”