rope has some problem in rope snake analogy :-)

[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms

Hare Krishna

 

As we all know seeing the snake in place of rope is the problem of seer.  But is there any problem in seen rope also to look like a snake ??  Yes, seems to be the answer by some!!

 

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar

[Vikram Jagannathan]

Namaskaram Shri Bhaskar ji,

I am taking 'problem' to mean something different from the as-is true nature of that entity. Could you please clarify what problem is said to exist in the seen rope by others? 

There are definitely characteristics of the rope that bring about the remembrance of an earlier perceived snake. Adhyasa also is mutual, implying some of the characteristics of the rope are superimposed on the imagined snake as well. But none of this should be a 'problem' within the rope itself per-se.

Apart from the sat-khyati-vadins, for all others there is not an iota of the snake in the rope. What actually exists is just the true nature of the rope as-is.

with humble prostrations,

Vikram

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[Ram Chandran]

Namaskar:
The classical example of snake vs rope is to illustrate that "what perceive to be the truth is not the truth?" We need the light (right knowledge) that could be sun light, moon light or street light or just a good torch light.  Lights from each of those sources may not be the same and in subtle terms make us to understand that knowledge can be from many sources and if we find the right knowledge we can recognize the truth!  Adi Sankara wanted to inform us that our level of ignorance force us to perceive incorrectly! The only way to make the perception to become the truth is to destroy ignorance! The light that can burn our ignorance allows us to become "Enlightened!"

With my warm regards,
Ram Chandran

[Ram Chandran]

namaskar:
Another point to remember in this example is to recognize our physical constraint such as how much distance that our eyes can see.  Even with bright light, from a long distance, the rope may look like a snake and as we go nearer, we will be able to recognize that what we saw is not the snake but a rope which looked like a snake!

With my warm regards,
Ram Chandran 

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Vikram Ji,

Reg  //  Adhyasa also is mutual, implying some of the characteristics of the rope are superimposed on the imagined snake as well //,

Why is the snake considered to be ** imagined ** in AdhyAsa??. Snake is ** experienced as existing ** and not as ** imagined **. Even  after knowing it to be a rope,  recollection is one of experiencing the existence of the snake, not of ** imagining ** the snake. And in Advaita SiddhAnta the snake has a certain level of Reality/Existence, namely prAtibhAsika Reality.

Regards

[V Subrahmanian]

Shankara has held the adhyasta entity to be an imagined/concocted one. That the one under delusion does not know that he has concocted and hence he thinks he is experiencing it.  When the truth is known he will also realize that he had only imagined it.  Of course, the entire samsara anubhava, experience, is also a kalpana, as per siddhanta:  

छान्दोग्योपनिषद्भाष्यम्षष्ठोऽध्यायःद्वितीयः खण्डःमन्त्र २ - भाष्यम्

………; निरवयवस्य सतः कथं विकारसंस्थानमुपपद्यते ? नैष दोषः, रज्ज्वाद्यवयवेभ्यः सर्पादिसंस्थानवत् बुद्धिपरिकल्पितेभ्यः सदवयवेभ्यः विकारसंस्थानोपपत्तेः । ‘वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्’ (छा.………

..

छान्दोग्योपनिषद्भाष्यम्षष्ठोऽध्यायःद्वितीयः खण्डःमन्त्र ३ - भाष्यम्

………स्यां भवेयं प्रजायेय प्रकर्षेणोत्पद्येय, यथा मृद्घटाद्याकारेण यथा वा रज्ज्वादि सर्पाद्याकारेण बुद्धिपरिकल्पितेन ।

The Vedanta paribhasha too holds this citing Sureshwara and even the Sutra bhashya (Sundara Pandya):

वेदान्तपरिभाषाप्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्

………न घटादिप्रमायमव्याप्तिः । तदुक्तम् - " देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत् प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः । लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणन्त्वाऽऽत्मनिश्चयात् ॥" इति । 'आ आत्मनिश्चयात्'-………

वेदान्तपरिभाषाअनुपलब्धिप्रमाणम्

………तदाऽसिद्धिः आरोपितप्रतियोगिकध्वंसस्याधिष्ठाने प्रतीयमानस्याधिष्ठानमात्रत्वात् । तदुक्तम् " अधिष्ठानावशेषो हि नाशः कल्पितवस्तुनः" इति । एवं शुक्तिरूप्यविनाशोऽपीदमवच्छिन्नचैतन्यमेव ।………

वेदान्तपरिभाषाअनुपलब्धिप्रमाणम्

………। न च ब्रह्मण्यपि प्रपञ्चभेदाभ्युपगमेऽद्वैतविरोधः, तात्त्विकभेदानभ्युपगमेन वियदादिवदद्वैताव्याघातकत्वात् । प्रपञ्चस्याद्वैते ब्रह्मणि कल्पितत्वाङ्गीकारात् । तदुक्तं सुरेश्वराचार्यैः- " अक्षमा भवतः केयं साधकत्वप्रकल्पने । किं न पश्यसि संसारं तत्रैवाज्ञानकल्पितम् ॥" इति । 

 

Regards

subbu 

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[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste.

परिकल्पित or कल्पित etc also have the meaning *created*. Not necessarily *imagined*. It is in this sense Bhashya needs to be understood in the current context.

Reg Swami Sureswaracharya vArtika cited //  तदुक्तं सुरेश्वराचार्यैः- " अक्षमा भवतः केयं साधकत्वप्रकल्पने । किं न पश्यसि संसारं तत्रैवाज्ञानकल्पितम् ॥ //,

अज्ञानकल्पितम् should be understood as *created with ajnAna as upAdAna kAraNam*. This is clear by the following vArtika verse BUBV 1-4-371

// अस्य द्वैतेन्द्रजालस्य यदुपादानकारणम् ।

अज्ञानं  तदुपाश्रित्य ब्रह्म कारणमुच्यते ॥ //

// asya dvaitendrajAlasya yadupAdAnakAraNam |

aj~nAnaM  tadupAshritya brahma kAraNamuchyate || //

There are any number of verses in the vArtika which reflect the same understanding.

Same with Vedanta Paribhasha.

Regards

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[Vikram Jagannathan]

Namaskaram Shri Chandramouli ji,

I believe your question / comment is one of semantics & standpoint. I do not see a contradiction. Kindly requesting you to please share what you mean by 'imagined' versus 'created' versus 'experienced as existing'. My intent is shared below.

The snake is said to be imagined (as opposed to being pratyaksha or directly perceived) because this adhyasa is of the nature of remembrance (recollection) of an earlier experience in a different locus. In Vedanta Paribhasha, recollection is not accepted as pratyaksha pramana. Of course, it is accepted that the snake is 'experienced as existing'. But this experience (prama) is not arising from a valid pratyaksha pramana. Being 'imagined' and 'experiencing as existing' are not opposites or mutually exclusive. The 'imagination' is vyavaharika reality and, as you said, 'experience as existing' is pratibhasika reality. As the pratibhasika reality is sublated by the vyavaharika knowledge, the recollection of earlier experience of the snake is understood to be an imagination. It is an imagination, again, since the snake does not actually exist in the rope but only appeared to exist as such.

My understanding of 'creation' (manifestation) is that once created (manifested), the object is valid as a pratyaksha object. If the object is not pratyaksha post-creation, then it is a mere imagination in the vyavaharika sense.

Moving on to BUBV-1-4-371, ajnana is the upadana karanam of "dvaitendrajala". Particularly, "indrajala" means illusion / art of magic, sorcery, jugglery, delusion etc. Ignorance is the material cause of illusion. In that way, it can be argued that illusion is 'created' by ignorance. Applying this to our rope-snake example, it can be argued that the snake is 'created' by the ignorance of rope. But this 'creation' does not have the same ontological reality as of the cause because the cause is ignorance and not knowledge. Thus, it is in a way differentiated from the other 'creation' with knowledge as the cause (such as a pot from a lump of clay) and is termed 'imagination', similar to "indrajala".

with humble prostrations,

Vikram

[V Subrahmanian]

In the Vedanta Paribhasha, the adhyasta vastu is stated to be 'produced' at that time of the adhyasa:

ननु विसंवादिप्रवृत्त्या भ्रान्तिज्ञानसिद्धावपि तस्य प्रातिभासिकतत्कालोत्पन्नरजतादिविषयकत्वे

घटवति घटाभावभ्रमो न तत्कालोत्पन्नघटाभावविषयकः

अवगमेऽपरोक्षावभासस्य तत्कालीनविषयसत्तानियतत्वाद् रजते पारमार्थिकत्वमप्यनिर्वचनीयं रजतवदेवोत्पन्नमिति तदवच्छिन्नरजतसत्त्वे

This 'producing' 'at that time of adhyasa/bhrama/ajnana, is not the same of creation by Ishwara in the manner of Atma > Akasha >  Vayu..etc.  Hence, the kalpana/kalpita of sarpa in rajju is not being created in the ontological sense. This sarpa creation is having ajnana as upAdaana and it is anAd and anirvAchya.  Even when Brahman is said to be the kAraNam, the upAdAna stated here is ajnAnam and this ajnAnam is not of Brahman but that of the jiva-s.  That is a shakti of Brahman, also called mAyA, prakriti, etc. 

warm regards

subbu  

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste.

Reg  //  In the Vedanta Paribhasha, the adhyasta vastu is stated to be 'produced' at that time of the adhyasa:

ननु विसंवादिप्रवृत्त्या भ्रान्तिज्ञानसिद्धावपि तस्य प्रातिभासिकतत्कालोत्पन्नरजतादिविषयकत्वे

घटवति घटाभावभ्रमो न तत्कालोत्पन्नघटाभावविषयकः

अवगमेऽपरोक्षावभासस्य तत्कालीनविषयसत्तानियतत्वाद् रजते पारमार्थिकत्वमप्यनिर्वचनीयं रजतवदेवोत्पन्नमिति तदवच्छिन्नरजतसत्त्वे //,

This is just what I have also stated. Rope-snake being **Imagined ** does not involve origination or production of a vastu namely **snake**. Its ontological status is certainly not the same as that of Creation by Iswara. But surely **production ** of a vastu in adhyAsa does involve vesting that vastu with a certain level of ontological status, by definition. Its ontological status is stated to be prAtibhAsika while Creation by Iswara has the ontological status of vyAvahArika.

Regards

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Vikram Ji,

My understanding is as follows.

Reg  // The snake is said to be imagined (as opposed to being pratyaksha or directly perceived) because this adhyasa is of the nature of remembrance (recollection) of an earlier experience in a different locus. In Vedanta Paribhasha, recollection is not accepted as pratyaksha pramana.//,

Not in my understanding of the Bhashya. No doubt recollection is not accepted as pratyaksha pramana. That the snake is of the nature of remembrance (recollection) is akhyAti vAda of Mimamsaka (Prabhakara). This has been refuted in no uncertain terms by Sri Bhagavatpada. In the Advaita Siddhanta as advanced by Sri Bhagavatpada, snake is actually *produced* by avidyA. It gains its status of *pratyaksha* because the experience is **It is a snake**. The *It is* part is *pratyaksha* in the sense it is pramAtru bhAsya while the snake part is *pratyaksha* being sAkshi bhAsya. Vedanta Paribhasha also mentions as follows while admitting this as pratyaksha

// अत एव च प्रातिभासिकरजतस्थले रजताकाराविद्यावृत्तिः साम्प्रदायिकैरङ्गीकृता ।//

// ata eva cha prAtibhAsikarajatasthale rajatAkArAvidyAvRRittiH sAmpradAyikaira~NgIkRRitA | //.

Reg  // But this experience (prama) is not arising from a valid pratyaksha pramana //,

Not exactly. Snake is sAkshi bhAsya. Are not hunger or thirst considered pratyaksha? They are so because they are sAkshi bhAsya.

Reg // Being 'imagined' and 'experiencing as existing' are not opposites or mutually exclusive //,

Not in my understanding. They are certainly mutually exclusive. *Imagined* excludes any corresponding vastu as *existing*.

Reg  // Ignorance is the material cause of illusion //.

Are you considering Ignorance as a vastu (bhAvarUpa) or as absence of knowledge? The doubt arises because of your followup statement  ** because the cause is ignorance and not knowledge **. If vastu, then illusion also is a vastu. If not, then both it and illusion are not  vastu. So the question of one being the material cause of another does not arise.

Regards

[V Subrahmanian]

Shankara accepts the prAtibhAsika object to be 'non-existent but appears to be existing':

श्रीमद्भगवद्गीताभाष्यम्त्रयोदशोऽध्यायःश्लोक २६ - भाष्यम्

………इत्यनेन निरस्तसर्वोपाधिविशेषं ज्ञेयं ब्रह्मस्वरूपेण यः पश्यति, क्षेत्रं च मायानिर्मितहस्तिस्वप्नदृष्टवस्तुगन्धर्वनगरादिवत् ‘असदेव सदिव अवभासते’ इति एवं निश्चितविज्ञानः यः, तस्य यथोक्तसम्यग्दर्शनविरोधात् अपगच्छति मिथ्याज्ञानम्………

Shankara uses the verb 'adhyasyati' / 'अध्यारोपयति' to show that what is not there is superimposed:

अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि ह्याकाशे बालाः तलमलिनतादि अध्यस्यन्ति । 

बाह्यधर्मानात्मन्यध्यस्यति ।

 तथा आत्मनि सर्वो लोकः क्रियाकारकफलात्मकं विज्ञानं सर्पादिस्थानीयं विपरीतमध्यस्य

 तदर्थं सुखादिविक्रियावति सत्त्वे भोक्तृत्वमध्यारोपयति ।

नानात्वमध्यारोपयति अविद्यया ।

What is not there is superimposed. 

regards

[Vikram Jagannathan]

Namaskaram Shri Chandramouli ji,

Reg  // The snake is said to be imagined (as opposed to being pratyaksha or directly perceived) because this adhyasa is of the nature of remembrance (recollection) of an earlier experience in a different locus. In Vedanta Paribhasha, recollection is not accepted as pratyaksha pramana.//,

Not in my understanding of the Bhashya. No doubt recollection is not accepted as pratyaksha pramana.

We can now start off on a common ground that recollection is not accepted as pratyaksha pramana. 

 

That the snake is of the nature of remembrance (recollection) is akhyAti vAda of Mimamsaka (Prabhakara). This has been refuted in no uncertain terms by Sri Bhagavatpada.

Bhagavan Bhashyakara has provided the first definition of Adhyasa in BSB as "smriti-rupa paratra purvadrishtavabhasa" - "(Superimposition) is a cognition, on a different locus, having a nature similar to that of recollection, and cognising what has been experienced earlier". The key is "smriti-rupa", meaning, a nature of remembrance (recollection). Bhamatikara further defines "smriti-rupa" as "smriteh rupamiva rupam yasyeti smriti-rupah. asannihita-vishayatvam smritirupatvam." - "Its nature is like the nature of recollection. The non-presence of the object is of the essence of recollection."

With this, and the above common ground, adhyasa (nature of remembrance) is not accepted as pratyaksha pramana in vyavaharika.

 

In the Advaita Siddhanta as advanced by Sri Bhagavatpada, snake is actually *produced* by avidyA. It gains its status of *pratyaksha* because the experience is **It is a snake**. The *It is* part is *pratyaksha* in the sense it is pramAtru bhAsya while the snake part is *pratyaksha* being sAkshi bhAsya. Vedanta Paribhasha also mentions as follows while admitting this as pratyaksha

// अत एव च प्रातिभासिकरजतस्थले रजताकाराविद्यावृत्तिः साम्प्रदायिकैरङ्गीकृता ।//

// ata eva cha prAtibhAsikarajatasthale rajatAkArAvidyAvRRittiH sAmpradAyikaira~NgIkRRitA | //.

There is no denying that while there is the perception of a snake, and it is not yet sublated by the perception of the rope, it does appear as if it is a valid pramana for the cognizer. But this pramana is subject to sublation, and when sublated becomes apramana. The above reference to Vedanta Paribhasha exactly illustrates this point that even in the case of a "pratibhasika" existence of silver in a shell, the perception of silver is due to the avidya-vritti in the form of silver. This avidya-vritti is vyavaharika kevala-sakshi-vishaya, but there is no object (silver) corresponding to this in vyavaharika. Hence in Vedanta Paribhasha, this silver is qualified as pratibhasika. The existence of a vritti gives the snake / silver a relative reality and the non-existence of the object in its locus at the vyavaharika level downgrades the ontological status to only pratibhasika instead of vyavaharika. This also matches Shri Subbu ji's reference to Bhashyakara accepting the pratibhasika object to be 'non-existent but appears to be existing'. Non-existent in its locus from vyavaharika, and appears to be existing from pratibhasika. This point in Vedanta Paribhasa occurs in the context "na hi vR^itti.n vinA sAkShiviShayatva.n kevalasAkShivedyatvam.h kintvindriyAnumAnAdipramANavyApAramantareNa sAkShiviShayatvam.h" where the standard sensual perception is incapable of operating.

To summarize, we are not denying the actual experience of a snake cognized as existing. We are only saying that a non-existing (in its locus) snake appears to be existing. This 'appearance' is an experience that is witnessed subjectively by the witness alone. This is so because the object of experience is only created in antahkarana by avidya-vritti and not actual vishya. Therefore, though the snake is 'created' by ignorance, it is differentiated from other valid vyavaharika perceptions wherein the antahkarana-vritti matches the vishya. Hence "imagined". This is again, more of semantics and standpoint. 

 

Reg  // But this experience (prama) is not arising from a valid pratyaksha pramana //,

Not exactly. Snake is sAkshi bhAsya. Are not hunger or thirst considered pratyaksha? They are so because they are sAkshi bhAsya.

Yes, experiences of hunger or thirst or happiness or sorrow are all kevala-sakshi-vedya, but in all these cases the object of these experiences (namely hunger, thirst, happiness, sorrow) are all true kevala-sakshi-vishyas alone in the form of antahkarana-vritti identical to the corresponding vrittis (hunger-vritti, thist-vritti, happiness-vritti, sorrow-vritti). But in the case of the perception of a snake, the object in question is technically a rope and thus the kevala-sakshi-vedya of the snake does not match the actual vishaya. Snake too is only a mis-matched kevala-sakshi-vishaya; hence pratibhasika only. That which is pramana in pratibhasika alone, is apramana in vyavaharika. 

 

Reg // Being 'imagined' and 'experiencing as existing' are not opposites or mutually exclusive //,

Not in my understanding. They are certainly mutually exclusive. *Imagined* excludes any corresponding vastu as *existing*.

Do you mean to say that 'imagined' can only be used with respect to non-existing vastu such as hare's horns or sky-flower? If so, this is different from my definition of 'imagined' as I stated earlier. Again, a matter of semantics. 

Moreover, proceeding with your definition of 'imagined', which excludes any corresponding vastu as 'existing', how can there be an experience of imagination of a non-existing vastu? If a non-existing vastu can be experienced as an imagination, then as the object of imagination / experience, the object does exist; and hence self-contradicts its non-existence! 

 

Reg  // Ignorance is the material cause of illusion //.

Are you considering Ignorance as a vastu (bhAvarUpa) or as absence of knowledge? The doubt arises because of your followup statement  ** because the cause is ignorance and not knowledge **. If vastu, then illusion also is a vastu. If not, then both it and illusion are not  vastu. So the question of one being the material cause of another does not arise.

Yes, I am aligned with both Vartikakara (particularly in the scope of BUBV-1-4-371) and Vedanta-Paribhasa-kara (particularly in the context of rajatakara-avidya-vritti) that avidya is bhava-rupa. It is not necessary that the cause and effect should have the same ontological status. Here, in rope-snake & shell-silver examples, the cause is a vastu in vyavakarika standpoint and the effect is a vastu in pratibhasika standpoint.

However, since you asked this question, my personal understanding (looking to check its validity based on our acharyas' teachings) is that avidya is both abhava and bhava-rupa. The avarana aspect is abhava and the vikshepa aspect is bhava-rupa. This is possible, without any self-contradiction, because of the very nature of avidya. This seems to me to explain the so-called contradictions within our system. At the day-to-day / empirical level, avidya seems grosser and subject to modifications. But as we start seeking inwards, the grossness turns subtler and eventually vanishes altogether. This is like a piece of solid metal which appears rigid from a day-to-day perspective, but deep within, at the subatomic / quantum level, it is merely a gaseous cloud of subatomic particles. But I am seeking validity from our sampradhayam and happy to stand corrected.

with humble prostrations,

Vikram

[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms Sri Vikram Jagannathan prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

Kindly pardon me for this belated reply.  December work pressure at office 😊 Here is my short reply :

 

 

I am taking 'problem' to mean something different from the as-is true nature of that entity. Could you please clarify what problem is said to exist in the seen rope by others? 

 

Ø     According to some, rope is the product of mUlAvidyA, after realizing that it is rope not snake, the avidyA with regard to snake will ‘merge’ in ‘rope’ avidyA (mUlAvidyA) and complete annihilation (nishesha nirmUlana) happens ONLY after complete nAmAvashesha of nAma rUpa, hence antaHkaraNa, nAma rUpa etc. are the product of mulAvidyA recognizing the rope as rope is NOT jnana as rope is the product of mUlAvidyA or rOpe (nAma and rUpa) itself mUlAvidyA!! 

 

There are definitely characteristics of the rope that bring about the remembrance of an earlier perceived snake. Adhyasa also is mutual, implying some of the characteristics of the rope are superimposed on the imagined snake as well. But none of this should be a 'problem' within the rope itself per-se.

 

Ø     As per some theory, There are two different types of jnana should occur before realizing that there is rope and not snake i.e. vrutti vyApti jnana (pramANa bhUta jnana) and phala vyApti jnana (phala bhUta jnana)  coz. brahmAshrita avidyA has two special powers (shakti) one is encompasses the brahman (sva-svarUpa) and some part of the same avidyA covers and projects the outer things also like a black solid screen covering the objects behind it.  In this sense rope (an external thing and yathArtha jnana of this rope) too is covered by some part of the avidyA.  Just removal of jnAnAdhyAsa is not enough there should be a removal of arthAdhyAsa as well.

 

Apart from the sat-khyati-vadins, for all others there is not an iota of the snake in the rope. What actually exists is just the true nature of the rope as-is.

 

Ø     Anirvachaneeya khyAti vAdins would argue that there was some anirvachaneeya snake in rope and that is the reason why we trembled, sweated and ran away!!  Hence avidyA is anirvachaneeya!!. 

[Vikram Jagannathan]

Namaskaram Shri Bhaskar ji,

Thanks for sharing more details.

 

I am taking 'problem' to mean something different from the as-is true nature of that entity. Could you please clarify what problem is said to exist in the seen rope by others? 

 

Ø     According to some, rope is the product of mUlAvidyA, after realizing that it is rope not snake, the avidyA with regard to snake will ‘merge’ in ‘rope’ avidyA (mUlAvidyA) and complete annihilation (nishesha nirmUlana) happens ONLY after complete nAmAvashesha of nAma rUpa, hence antaHkaraNa, nAma rUpa etc. are the product of mulAvidyA recognizing the rope as rope is NOT jnana as rope is the product of mUlAvidyA or rOpe (nAma and rUpa) itself mUlAvidyA!! 

I do not wish to go deep into the validity of mula-avidya (or not); however, would like to state a couple of points for more reflection.

1. Within the context of the illustration: jnana of snake = pratibhasika jnana; jnana of rope = vyavaharika jnana; ajnana of rope as snake = earlier pratibhasika jnana with respect to later vyavaharika jnana; purely from vyavaharika perspective, there is no jnana or ajnana of snake; the very conversation of 'snake' is only with respect to the pratibhasika perspective.

Similarly, jnana of rope = vyavaharika jnana; Brahman Jnana = paramarthika jnana; ajnana of rope = earlier vyavaharika jnana with respect to later paramarthika jnana; purely from paramarthika perspective, there is no jnana or ajnana of rope; the very conversation of 'rope' is only with respect to the vyavaharika perspective.

He who remembers the earlier cognition of snake and later cognition of rope alone can talk about the ajnana; There is no ajnana in pure vyavaharika. Similarly, he who remembers the earlier cognition of rope and later realization of Brahman alone can talk about the ajnana; There is no ajnana in pure paramarthika.

2. It is accepted by all Advaitins that the 'phenomenon & perception' of duality is only an 'appearance' in Brahman and that there is no actual duality whatsoever in Brahman (neha nanasti kinchana). Anyone who feels there is actual duality in Brahman breaks the fundamental premise of Advaita to begin with!

This means there is some 'X'-factor that is not actually present in Brahman, but only 'appears' to be in Brahman and results in the 'phenomenon & perception' of duality in an otherwise One & non-dual Brahman. Mula-avidya-vadins call this 'X'-factor as mula-avidya as the cause and the entire 'phenomenon & perception' of duality as its effect. Now, since in our sampradhayam an effect is non-different from the cause, it is said the 'phenomenon & perception' of all plurality, including the rope, is non-different from this mula-avidya. In this sense, the rope is fundamentally non-different from mula-avidya itself.

This 'X'-factor can be substituted with any other term one chooses, but in my understanding the concept - the rope is non-different from this 'X'-factor - remains the same. When this 'X'-factor is sublated (taranti) the ekam-eva-advitiya nitya-suddha-buddha-mukta-svarupa Brahman is directly realized.

 

 

There are definitely characteristics of the rope that bring about the remembrance of an earlier perceived snake. Adhyasa also is mutual, implying some of the characteristics of the rope are superimposed on the imagined snake as well. But none of this should be a 'problem' within the rope itself per-se.

 

Ø     As per some theory, There are two different types of jnana should occur before realizing that there is rope and not snake i.e. vrutti vyApti jnana (pramANa bhUta jnana) and phala vyApti jnana (phala bhUta jnana)  coz. brahmAshrita avidyA has two special powers (shakti) one is encompasses the brahman (sva-svarUpa) and some part of the same avidyA covers and projects the outer things also like a black solid screen covering the objects behind it.  In this sense rope (an external thing and yathArtha jnana of this rope) too is covered by some part of the avidyA.  Just removal of jnAnAdhyAsa is not enough there should be a removal of arthAdhyAsa as well.

 

Agreed that this is one theory. Vritti-vyapti and phala-vyapti refer to inner workings / etymology of perception in general. Jnana-adhyasa and artha-adhyasa refers to the inner workings of adhyasa. Do you have a different theory for deep etymology of perception and how adhyasa works?

 

Apart from the sat-khyati-vadins, for all others there is not an iota of the snake in the rope. What actually exists is just the true nature of the rope as-is.

 

Ø     Anirvachaneeya khyAti vAdins would argue that there was some anirvachaneeya snake in rope and that is the reason why we trembled, sweated and ran away!!  Hence avidyA is anirvachaneeya!!. 

 

Agreed. However, the trembling etc. is applicable to all khyati-vadins; it is not unique to anirvachaniya-khyati-vadins. Everyone also agrees to the 'perception' of an 'existing' snake. The difference is in how, where & why. I am assuming there is no disagreement on this point.

Now, personally deliberately side-stepping the controversy around adhyasa/avidya, let me ask this question: do you agree that mithyatva is anirvachaniya? Meaning, that which is considered as mithya is neither sat nor asat nor both? Also, do you agree that Brahman alone is satya and everything else that is believed to be existing is mithya? If so, do you agree that whatever is called 'avidya', that is distinct from Brahman, is also mithya? If so, the nature of 'avidya' is anirvachaniya? If you disagree on any of these, please kindly explain. I am just trying to see if we are all aligned at this level or not; it sets a common ground. The rest of difference of opinions, IMHO, is down to semantics and understanding, which I do not wish to enter into.

with humble prostrations,

Vikram

[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms Sri Vikram Jagannathan prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

 

I do not wish to go deep into the validity of mula-avidya (or not); however, would like to state a couple of points for more reflection.

 

Ø     But some would definitely have problem with MV and vehemently rejected it as an alien theory in mUla shAnkara bhAshya and latest contribution by later vyAkhyAnakAra-s in the name of shankara siddhAnta!!  And I am one of the followers of those who think so and sitting in the box of asaMpradAyavAdins 😊

1. Within the context of the illustration: jnana of snake = pratibhasika jnana; jnana of rope = vyavaharika jnana; ajnana of rope as snake = earlier pratibhasika jnana with respect to later vyavaharika jnana; purely from vyavaharika perspective, there is no jnana or ajnana of snake; the very conversation of 'snake' is only with respect to the pratibhasika perspective.

Ø    Do you mean to say snake is virtual satya like mrugatrushNa even after realizing that there is no water !!??  But I agree with you that virtual (prAtibhAsika) satya is less satya when compared to transactional (vyavahArika) satya and transactional satya is less satya when compared to transcendental satya.  (pAramArthika satya).  But I am really having the problem in accepting sarpa as prAtibhAsika satya since as per the analogy sarpa is adhyasta due to misconception of rope.  Because like mrugatrushNa you will not continue to see the sarpa in rajju to call it as prAtibhAsika satya. 

Similarly, jnana of rope = vyavaharika jnana; Brahman Jnana = paramarthika jnana;

Ø     And if I may add to this pAramArthika jnana is NOT any vyavahAra abhAva jnana but vyavahAra bAdhita jnana.  Hope you would agree to this. 

ajnana of rope = earlier vyavaharika jnana with respect to later paramarthika jnana; purely from paramarthika perspective, there is no jnana or ajnana of rope; the very conversation of 'rope' is only with respect to the vyavaharika perspective.

• Yes and determining the real nature (doing the jignAsa) of vyAvahArika rope is what constitutes brahma jignAsa. ( enquiring the reality behind nAmarUpAtmaka jagat). 

He who remembers the earlier cognition of snake and later cognition of rope alone can talk about the ajnana;

 

• Yes, his earlier abhAva of rajju jnana and as a result his vipareeta grahaNa of rajju (adhyAsa / anyathAgrahaNa). 

 

There is no ajnana in pure vyavaharika. Similarly, he who remembers the earlier cognition of rope and later realization of Brahman alone can talk about the ajnana; There is no ajnana in pure paramarthika.

 

Ø     All vyavahAra is avidyApurassara only is it not??  And that is what bhAshyakAra explains in adhyAsa lakshaNa bhAshya (sakala laukika and vaidika vyavahAra) and as you rightly observed there is absolutely no existence of ajnAna in (pure) pAramArthika. 

 

2. It is accepted by all Advaitins that the 'phenomenon & perception' of duality is only an 'appearance' in Brahman and that there is no actual duality whatsoever in Brahman (neha nanasti kinchana).

 

• Yes prabhuji. 

 

Anyone who feels there is actual duality in Brahman breaks the fundamental premise of Advaita to begin with!

 

Ø     Yes, agreed

This means there is some 'X'-factor that is not actually present in Brahman, but only 'appears' to be in Brahman and results in the 'phenomenon & perception' of duality in an otherwise One & non-dual Brahman. Mula-avidya-vadins call this 'X'-factor as mula-avidya as the cause and the entire 'phenomenon & perception' of duality as its effect.

 

 

• As per some that X factor need not be brahmAbhinna citing the justification that there is no bedha between shakti and shaktivanta as the sarvajnatvaM is in the svabhAva of brahman (itareya introduction and sUtra 1-1-4).  And according to some this shakti is not avidyA but mAya.  And in their dictionary of Advaita vedAnta mAya is not avidyA.  When it is seen in the form of nAma rUpa it is brahmAnanya and when it is seen separately from adhishtAna it is avidyAkalpita.  Here later mAya is antaHkaraNa dOsha and jeevaashrita and there is no provision to accept that there is brahmAshrita avidyA in shakti rUpa which is neither agrahaNa nor anyathAgrahaNa nor samshaya.  The fourth type mysterious MV. 

 

 

Now, since in our sampradhayam an effect is non-different from the cause, it is said the 'phenomenon & perception' of all plurality, including the rope, is non-different from this mula-avidya. In this sense, the rope is fundamentally non-different from mula-avidya itself.

 

Ø     kArya-kAraNa ananyatvaM is there to drive home the point that brahman is abhinna nimittOpadAna kAraNa and brahmaikatvaM not to establish the brahmAshrita avidyA as mUlakAraNa and resultant vyAkruta nAma rUpa. 

 

This 'X'-factor can be substituted with any other term one chooses, but in my understanding the concept - the rope is non-different from this 'X'-factor - remains the same. When this 'X'-factor is sublated (taranti) the ekam-eva-advitiya nitya-suddha-buddha-mukta-svarupa Brahman is directly realized.

 

Ø     Yes, that X factor as per shruti termed as mAya, prakruti, avyAkruta, shakti etc. with this only parameshwara does the creation and it is the motivational force through which he does the act of creation clarifies bhAshyakAra.  And this mAyA shakti admitted between Chaitanya kAraNa – achetana (jada) kArya prapancha it belongs to brahman only because at the very beginning there was only brahman without a second.  If this shakti is wrongly attributed to avidyA then we will have to conclude even before the creation of jeeva-jagat brahman at the very beginning itself having the avidyA ( an avidyAvanta brahman!!??) no need to say it is apasiddhAnta. 

 

Ø     I am coming to your concluding queries to me : 

do you agree that mithyatva is anirvachaniya? Meaning, that which is considered as mithya is neither sat nor asat nor both?

 

• I reckon this definition bhAshyakAra gives to mAya not to mithyA or avidyA, somewhere else bhAshyakAra gives the example of dviteeya Chandra darshana as mithyA darshana due to karaNa dOsha.  avidyA is nirvachaneeya hence bhAshyakAra without any ambiguity explains it as jnAnAbhAva, vipareeta grahaNa and saMshaya, if I am right at this place he does not say avidyA is also anirvachaneeya. 

 

Also, do you agree that Brahman alone is satya and everything else that is believed to be existing is mithya?

 

• A small correction from my perspective / understanding:   brahman alone is satya and everything else that is believed to be existing aloof(apart) from brahman is mithyA.  kAryAkArOpi kAraNasya AtmabhUta eva, anAtmabhUtasya anArabhyatvAt clarifies bhAshyakAra in sUtra bhAshya. 

 

If so, do you agree that whatever is called 'avidya', that is distinct from Brahman, is also mithya?

 

• See, as you know in the adhyAsa bhAshya itself bhAshyakAra clarifies what is being called as adhyAsa that is avidyA only.  And I don’t think this adhyAsa has the two types to propagate theories like arthAdhyAsa, so when the adhyAsa / misconception gone in the mind the Bhuta vastu vashaya jnana happens on its own without any special effort (vastu taNtra jnana).  So, yes what ever ‘distinct’ from brahman in reality does not exist, satyanchAnrutancha satyamabhavat yadidaM kiMcha shruti says. 

 

If so, the nature of 'avidya' is anirvachaniya?

 

• How avidyA is anirvachaneeya not able to understand especially when avidyA is NOT mAya in our books 😊 as said above, the shakti proposed as an X factor between cause and effect would always be subject to this ambiguity.  Since mAya can be viewed from two different angles i.e. brahman ( as his shakti) and nAma rUpa jagat (its vyAkruta / manifested form) it can be termed as anirvachaneeya and a-vyakta (avyakta hi sA mAyA tattva anyatvA nirUpaNasya ashaktatvAt.  Foam, buble, water example given by bhAshyakAra with regard to this. 
•  

If you disagree on any of these, please kindly explain.

 

• To the best of my ability I have explained prabhuji.  I am aware that these are all not standardly  propagated Advaita module which is there in tradition as shankara vedAnta for ages but some have their own doubts and raised their voices about what is there in vyAkhyAna is not finding its place in mUla PTB.  So it may look odd to traditionals to see these view points in Advaita siddhAnta pratipAdana 😊

 

[Vikram Jagannathan]

Namaskaram Shri Bhaskar ji,

Before we continue on the main thread, I would like to understand the extent we are aligned on the fundamentals of Advaita. Below, I have mentioned my current understanding in a sequential order. Please let me know if you agree with these points or not. If you disagree with any point, please stop there and do not proceed until we discuss that particular point and come to an agreement.

I would like to open this discussion to the entire group and request others to share & contribute their agreements / disagreements. I have deliberately kept the explanations for these statements to a minimum. If we agree to the statement, but have different explanations / reasons for arriving at that, that's fine; we will get an opportunity to clarify as we go deeper.

With the right spirit and intention, we will have subsequent posts where we continue to add more points.

1. The svarupa lakshana of Brahman is: existence (sat), real (satya), consciousness (chit), knowledge (jnana), bliss (ananda), eternal (nitya), infinite (anadi & ananta), full (purna), partless (avyaya), homogeneous (eka rasa), immutable (kutastha), unchanging (avikara), pure (suddha), devoid of any differentiation whatsoever (sajatiya, vijatiya, svagata abheda)
2. Per ekam-eva-advitiyam, there is no sajatiya or vijatiya or svagata bheda, whatsoever, in Brahman
3. Per neha-nanasti-kinchana, there is no plurality or ‘other’ or something ‘else’ whatsoever in Brahman
4. An infinite homogeneous partless immutable entity cannot have any attributes (viseshana), since an attribute is defined as a quality that is inseparable but distinct from the substance, and there cannot be any distinction in a completely abheda homogenous entity
5. This Brahman is designated as nirvisesha Brahman for the sake of convenience
6. Any quality associated with Brahman, that has in context or in relation something ‘else’, is only a tatastha lakshana of Brahman. This includes qualities such as sarvajna, sarvasakthi, sarveshvara, creator-sustainer-destroyer of the universe, antaryami, witness, being the locus for something else, etc.
7. These qualities are the attributes (viseshana) of Brahman and are distinct manifestations
8. Their relationship with Brahman is that of attribute-substance or shakti-shaktivan or possessed-possessor. In all these cases, they are inseparable but distinct from Brahman.
9. Brahman described as possessing these qualities is designated as savisesha Brahman for the sake of convenience
10. Ontologically, sat is that which once ascertained as existing always remains unchanged across all time. Nirvisesha Brahman is sat.
11. Ontologically, asat is that which is never experienced as existing. Hare’s horn is asat.
12. Ontologically, mithya is that which is neither sat nor asat nor both (sadasat-vilakshana) - it appears to exist but later sublated. The universe of plurality, the viseshanas & sakthis of savisesha Brahman, snake on a rope, rope itself, mirage, double-moon are all examples of this mithya category. If you do not agree with this definition, please clarify what is the ontological status of a mithya entity.
13. Anirvachaniya explicitly means the entity cannot be specifically described as sat or as asat or as both simultaneously - the reason why an object may appear to exist but later sublated. There may be other definitions, but if you do not agree with this definition, please clarify what is the right definition of anirvachaniya and if anirvachaniya is sat or asat or both or something else?
14. If the above two points are in agreement, then the ontological status of anirvachaniya is mithya
15. In our current ignorance we believe the entire perceived universe of plurality and change has an independent existence. What is the actual ontological status of the universe and what is the ontological status of the universe as we believe it to be in our ignorance? Both mithya?
16. But let’s say that through shastra and sadhana, we gain the knowledge that this universe is only a nama-rupa change of Brahman and is completely dependent on Brahman. What now becomes the actual ontological status of the universe and the ontological status of our perception of the universe? Still both mithya?
17. Does the nitya-suddha-buddha-mukta-svarupa nirvisesha Brahman perceive or cognize the universe? Answer is no?
18. Is there the perception of this universe for the savisesha Brahman? Answer is yes?
19. Do you believe that, per “brahmavid brahmaiva bhavati”, a knower of Brahman (jnani) verily becomes (is) Brahman? Is this savisesha Brahman or nirvisesha Brahman? Answer is nirvisesha Brahman?
20. Does this knower of Brahman perceive or cognize the universe? Answer is no?
21. In Adhyasa Bhashya, right after stating the first definition of adhyasa as “smriti rupa …”, Bhagavan bhashyakara explains various theories of how adhyasa could occur. After the last theory, bhagavatpada states in the sentence “sarvathapi tu…” that the one common mechanism in adhyasa is “cognition of one thing having the qualities of another”.
22. Various later acharyas have called this particular section of the Bhashya as explanation of “khyati-vada (theory of error)”. Bhagavan bhashyakara calls this error (khyati) itself as adhyasa.
23. “Khyati”, as related to an incorrect cognition, is a term used in pre-Sankara period itself, such as PatajaliYogaSutra-2.5.
24. Various later acharyas, in their sub-commentaries, have explained that the common mechanism (sarvathapi tu ...) stated in the bhashya is the universal concept of “anirvachaniya khyati”.
25. Anirvachaniya, also because the various khyati vada can be broadly categorized as sat-khyati, asat-khyati or sat-asat-khyati. Bhagavatpada’s common explanation is an underlying thread amongst all these khyati vada. Hence it transcends being exclusively described as sat or asat or sat-asat.
26. In answering the question on how there can be a superimposition between light & dark or ‘I’ and ‘thou’, bhashyakara says that nevertheless (tathapi) this is a natural worldly experience of coupling the real & unreal
27. Though of mutually conflicting attributes and a logical impossibility, bhashyakara still says that adhyasa is still a common observation in the world and only explains it as a 'natural' (naisargikah) phenomenon. Implying that this phenomenon cannot be exactly described or is thus anirvachaniya.

28. This natural phenomenon is adhyasa
29. This adhyasa is also later termed as avidya
30. The entire gamut of loka vyavahara (secular and religious) depends on this adhyasa or is the effect of this adhyasa
31. Since adhyasa is also avidya, the entire gamut depends on and is the effect of this avidya
32. Since this natural phenomenon is anirvachaniya, the exact explanation for adhyasa or avidya is anirvachaniya
33. In other words, Adhyasa as a term is described as “atasmin tad buddhi”. But, how or why adhyasa take place in a certain way cannot be exactly described.
34. Examples of this anirvachaniya adhyasa are shell silver, double moon, rope snake, mirage, colored crystal, red hot iron ball, ‘I’-ness and ‘mine’-ness with BMI and objects
35. In all these examples, the resulting entity, the result of adhyasa, is distinct from the true object; and the true object doesn’t actually contain all the perceived qualities of the resulting entity
36. For example, when a rope is perceived as a snake, there is actually no snake whatsoever in the rope. The qualities of the snake are superimposed on the rope and the rope appears as the snake.
37. Prior to the perception of the rope as the snake, while the rope is perceived as the snake, after the true cognition of the rope as a rope, across all these periods, there is never actually a snake in the rope
38. The superimposed qualities, which actually are not present in the actual object, only appears to be present in the object during adhyasa
39. As long as the resulting adhyasa entity is perceived to be so, the entity is considered as real and existing
40. But on the dawn of true discriminative knowledge, the true nature and qualities of the actual object is perceived as-is
41. At this point the earlier cognition of the adhyasa entity is understood to be false and not actually present in the actual object
42. Because the adhyasa entity is actually not present in the actual object, the adhyasa entity cannot be called as sat
43. At the same time, because the adhyasa entity was experienced as existing prior to dawn of true knowledge, the adhyasa entity cannot be called as asat
44. Obviously the adhyasa entity cannot be both sat and asat simultaneously due to mutual contradiction
45. Thus the ontological status of the adhyasa entity is neither sat nor asat nor both (sadasat-vilakshana). The adhyasa entity is mithya
46. Since adhyasa is also called avidya, avidya too is only mithya
47. Since adhyasa or avidya is anirvachaniya, mithya too is anirvachaniya
48. Anirvachaniya is sadasat-vilakshana
49. Nirvisesha Brahman is perceived as savisesha Brahman due to adhyasa. In other words, the viseshanas are superimposed on Brahman
50. When adhyasa is overcome, the nirvisesha Brahman is realized as-is

with humble prostrations,

Vikram

[Kuntimaddi Sadananda]

Vikramji -PraNAms

Enjoyed reading your crisp itemized list. 

It would be complete if you added two aspects of avidya - aavarana and vkshepa aspects, and which one gets eliminated with Vedanta janita vidya. 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

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[H S Chandramouli]

Namaskaram Vikram Ji,

Reg  //  These qualities are the attributes (viseshana) of Brahman and are

distinct manifestations //,

This seems to contradict point 4 unless you distinguish between Brahman and nirvisesha Brahman of point 5. But that does not appear to be the case as the word Brahman appears to be used in other places in the post without clearly mentioning any qualifications. Perhaps it would be better to use the word Chaitanya for nirvisesha Brahman and correct the post accordingly at other places where Chaitanya is intended. 

Just a suggestion. I thought it would make it easier to comprehend your intention unambiguously. All the more so because the word Brahman is used in the Bhashya in three different contexts, namely nirvisesha Brahman, mAyA vishishta nirvisesha Brahman, and mAyA upahita nirvisesha Brahman. Even in respect of mAyA upahita nirvisesha Brahman, in my understanding, only AvaraNa sahita  nirvisesha Brahman is intended and not AvaraNa rahita  nirvisesha Brahman where ever reference is made to mAyA upahita nirvisesha Brahman in the Bhashya. For example in respect of sAkshi, antaryAmi etc.

You may like to consider

Regards

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[H S Chandramouli]

Namaskaram Vikram Ji,

Reg  //  Ontologically, asat is that which is never experienced as existing.

Hare’s horn is asat //,

In my understanding, the words ** in any locus ** needs to be added at the end of ** as existing **. This is to avoid any mixup with all *imagined ** entities being understood as asat. For example, a snake just ** imagined** (not as ** it is a snake**) is also nonexistent. Because just the word ** snake ** being imagined implies absence of any locus. But snake itself cannot be called asat.

Incidentally this was why I had suggested earlier that the word **imagined** with reference to rope-snake as inappropriate, because the experience there is **It is a snake**, implying a locus which is experienced through a pramANa.

You may like to consider

Regards

Regards

[Vikram Jagannathan]

On Sat, Dec 23, 2023 at 9:50 PM Kuntimaddi Sadananda via Advaita-l <adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

Vikramji -PraNAms
Enjoyed reading your crisp itemized list. 
It would be complete if you added two aspects of avidya - aavarana and vkshepa aspects, and which one gets eliminated with Vedanta janita vidya. 
Hari Om!Sadananda

Namaskaram Acharya Shri Sadananda ji,

Definitely! I missed calling out that the earlier set of 50 points was just an initial list for discussion and agreement. Thought that we will go deeper and cover more points of fundamental Advaita as we align on these first. Avarana and vikshepa aspects of avidya will be an important component of the next list. Thanks a lot for your review and words of encouragement.

On Sun, Dec 24, 2023 at 7:08 AM Ramesam Vemuri <vemuri....@gmail.com> wrote:

Shri Vikram Jagannathan JI,
Namaskarams and Kudos to you, Sir, for the excellent and clear pointwise unambiguous listing of the fundamental approach that Advaita takes in its doctrine.

I wish to make two observations, if you do not mind:

i)  A Deletion suggested:

Under the itemized list at # 12 is the sentence: "The universe

of plurality, the viseshanas & sakthis of savisesha Brahman, snake on a rope, rope itself, mirage, double-moon are all examples of this mithya category. 

"
In the well-known 'snake-on-the-rope' analogy,  rope stands for the formless and featureless *brahman* Itself. Therefore, I submit that the words "rope itself" may be deleted.

ii)  Two Additions suggested:

(a)   In the "adhyAsa bhAShya," bhAShyakAra Shankara himself expresses why or when "adhyAsa" does arise. 
"The unattached Self (brahman) cannot become a cognizer with the activity of perception etc., without accepting the senses, mind and body are Its own. 

(b)  "The Self (brahman) is not absolutely beyond apprehension, because It is apprehended as the content of the concept "I"; and is self-revealing entity.

Namaskaram Shri Ramesam ji,

I wholeheartedly welcome your suggestions, words of wisdom & encouragement.

Regarding the 'deletion' suggestion ref. #12, though the title of this email thread focuses on the rope-snake analogy, my intent of reviewing the fundamentals is more holistic. Please permit me to clarify my intention: I agree with you that within the context of the illustration, rope is considered as sat as it illustrates the nirvisesha Brahman. For #12, I wish to call out that the examples of mithya entities are not limited to a specific illustration, but more from a holistic perspective. In that sense, the snake appearing instead of a rope, as well as the very rope itself (actual rope and not the analogy equivalent for nirvisesha Brahman) is mithya too. Rope (as the equivalent of Brahman) is considered as sat only within the context of the illustration, but outside the context even the rope is mithya only. The reason I deliberately included "rope itself" is to avoid a possibility that someone might just be focused on the illustration and fail to look at the bigger more holistic picture wherein even the rope is only mithya. Kindly let me know if we are in alignment here.

Regarding the 'addition' suggestions; we will include both these in a subsequent set when we look at the adhyasa & avidya in more detail.

On Sun, Dec 24, 2023 at 7:33 AM H S Chandramouli <hschand...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaskaram Vikram Ji,

Reg  //  Ontologically, asat is that which is never experienced as existing.

Hare’s horn is asat //,

In my understanding, the words ** in any locus ** needs to be added at the end of ** as existing **. This is to avoid any mixup with all *imagined ** entities being understood as asat. For example, a snake just ** imagined** (not as ** it is a snake**) is also nonexistent. Because just the word ** snake ** being imagined implies absence of any locus. But snake itself cannot be called asat.

Incidentally this was why I had suggested earlier that the word **imagined** with reference to rope-snake as inappropriate, because the experience there is **It is a snake**, implying a locus which is experienced through a pramANa.

You may like to consider

Namaskaram Shri Chandramouli ji,

Thanks a lot for your suggestions. I will definitely take it up for consideration, and would like to discuss these points with you and other members in the group.

I don't see any problem with adding "in any locus" to #11, while at the same time I believe it might just be redundant. To clarify, can I say that even the snake just 'imagined' is not actually absent of any locus, but still has the locus in the antahkarana of the person imagining? This is because an imagination is also an antahkarana vritti, with the locus as the antahkarana. With this, every imagination also becomes mithya alone. What then about the case of a hare's horn? Can someone imagine it; and if so, does it then lose its status as asat and becomes mithya? What then can be an example of asat, since any example can still be confined within the realm of thought or imagination. Of course, we cannot limit mithya to external entities alone, since then kevala-sakshi-vishaya like punya-papa will also become asat. But then, this brings up the next question of what exactly is the definition of asat? I would like to seek out references / definitions from our purvacharyas. Maybe there is never a 'thing' as asat, except from a relative perspective, because there is a direct contraction between a 'thing' and 'asat'.

Nevertheless, I will add "in any locus" to the bullet in my next iteration.

Reg  //  These qualities are the attributes (viseshana) of Brahman and are

distinct manifestations //,

This seems to contradict point 4 unless you distinguish between Brahman and nirvisesha Brahman of point 5. But that does not appear to be the case as the word Brahman appears to be used in other places in the post without clearly mentioning any qualifications.

Yes, Chandramouli ji; you are correct that there is a point of distinction between Brahman in #7 versus Brahman in #4 and #5. Brahman described in #7 is designated as savisesha Brahman as stated in #9; whereas Brahman described in #4 is designated as nirvisesha Brahman as stated in #5. At the same time, there is only one Brahman alone and not two different Brahmans. The difference is only in our understanding of Brahman. This is precisely why we do not have an explicit designation of "nirguna Brahman / nirvisesha Brahman" or "saguna Brahman / savisesha Brahman" anywhere in vedanta. It is just Brahman. The context alone determines whether the said Brahman is considered in the nirvisesha svarupa (as the former) or is superimposed with various viseshanas (as the latter). This point is clarified in #49 and #50. Though Sankaracharya Bhagavatpada has taught us clear guidelines as to how one should understand from the context if Brahman should be considered in the svarupa aspect or be taken to possess the attributes, at times explicit designations are provided for clarity and convenience.

To summarize, the real nature of Brahman is as indicated in #1 - #5. But in our current worldly experience we superimpose attributes on the attributeless entity (#49). Brahman as the result of our ignorant superimposition is considered in #6 - #9. It is one Brahman alone in different perspectives.

 

Perhaps it would be better to use the word Chaitanya for nirvisesha Brahman and correct the post accordingly at other places where Chaitanya is intended. 

Just a suggestion. I thought it would make it easier to comprehend your intention unambiguously. All the more so because the word Brahman is used in the Bhashya in three different contexts, namely nirvisesha Brahman, mAyA vishishta nirvisesha Brahman, and mAyA upahita nirvisesha Brahman. Even in respect of mAyA upahita nirvisesha Brahman, in my understanding, only AvaraNa sahita  nirvisesha Brahman is intended and not AvaraNa rahita  nirvisesha Brahman where ever reference is made to mAyA upahita nirvisesha Brahman in the Bhashya. For example in respect of sAkshi, antaryAmi etc.

You may like to consider

Agreed. In the context of current discussion, clarity is more important for alignment. I will update the points to state "Chaitanya" for nirvisesha Brahman and "Isvara" for savisesha Brahman. A quick note - there are some contradictions and clarifications in "maya visishta nirvisesha Brahman" and "maya upahita nirvisesha Brahman", which can be discussed later.

For easier reference and updates, I have uploaded the updated list to archives -> https://archive.org/details/reflections-on-fundamentals-of-advaita

with humble prostrations,

Vikram

[sreenivasa murthy]

Dear Sri Vikram Jagannathan,

Mother Sruti points out the TRUTH thus:

Quote:

(1) satyam jnanam anantam Brahma || Taittariya 2-1

(2) sarvagaM hi Etad brahma ayamAtmA brahma ||

                                          Mandukya Mantra 2

 (3)ahamEvEdagam   sarvam || Chandogya 7-25-1

(4)AtmaivEdagaM   sarvam  || Chandogya 7-25-2

(5)Atmata EvEdagM  sarvam || Chandogya 7-26-1

(6)brahmaivEdagM  viSvaM  variShTham || muMDaka

(7) yat sAkShAt aparOkShAt brahma yaH ya AtmA sarvAntaraH

(8)prapaMcOpaSamam   Sivam   advaitam  caturtham

     manyantE

         sa  AtmA  sa  VijnEyaH || Mandukya mantra 7 

Unquote.

Conclusions drawn in the light of the above quoted mantras:

Atma is one's true nature, which is actually present here and now

because I am present here and now. 

This fact can never be refuted.

According to the above mantras “I am ananta i.e. infinite.”

These teachings can also be included in your list of your understanding.

With respectful namaskars,

Sreenivasa Murthy

On Monday, 25 December, 2023 at 04:46:34 am IST, Vikram Jagannathan <vikky...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sat, Dec 23, 2023 at 9:50 PM Kuntimaddi Sadananda via Advaita-l <adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

Vikramji -PraNAms
Enjoyed reading your crisp itemized list. 
It would be complete if you added two aspects of avidya - aavarana and vkshepa aspects, and which one gets eliminated with Vedanta janita vidya. 
Hari Om!Sadananda

Namaskaram Acharya Shri Sadananda ji,

Definitely! I missed calling out that the earlier set of 50 points was just an initial list for discussion and agreement. Thought that we will go deeper and cover more points of fundamental Advaita as we align on these first. Avarana and vikshepa aspects of avidya will be an important component of the next list. Thanks a lot for your review and words of encouragement.

e you are subscribed to the Google Groups "advaitin" group.

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.

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaskaram Vikram Ji,

Reg  //  To clarify, can I say that even the snake just 'imagined' is not actually absent of any locus, but still has the locus in the antahkarana of the person imagining? //,

No. Not in my understanding. Snake as ज्ञान (j~nAna) (knowledge) or स्मृति (smRRiti) (recollection) or ‘ imagined ‘ has antahkaraNa as its location. Not as a vastu.

Regards

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[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste,

I haven't followed the discussion in any detail, so apologies if I am misunderstanding the context in which certain things were said, but this sentence jumped at me:

Reg  //  To clarify, can I say that even the snake just 'imagined' is not actually absent of any locus, but still has the locus in the antahkarana of the person imagining? //

The snake in the rope snake adhyAsa is not imagined "in the mind". Rather the adhyAsa takes place in the locus outside, which leads to the experience, "I see a snake there (e.g. in the passageway)". The locus is not the seer's mind, but the location of the rope.

This differentiates it from asat, where no on can legitimately claim to have experienced the hare's horn at a particular place.

That is why in the second definition of mithyAtvam, the words "pratipannopAdhau" (in the locus where it appears) are appended to the "traikAlika niShedha pratiyogitvam" (the absence in all three periods of time). 

The latter, traikAlika niShedha pratiyogitvam, is common to both asat and mithyA, but pratipanna-upAdhitvam is unique to mithyA only.

The rope snake appears where the rope is. The hare's horn does not appear anywhere. Both don't exist.

Kind regards,

Venkatraghavan

[Vikram Jagannathan]

Namaskaram Shri Sreenivasa Murthy ji, Shri Chandramouli ji and Shri Venkataraghavan ji,

Thanks a lot for additional details and clarifications. I will reflect more on the shared points.

with humble prostrations,

Vikram

[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms Sri Vikram prabhuji
Hare Krishna

I reckon first we have to take a deeper look at Sri Venktaraghavan prabhuji's observation i.e. snake is not 'mental imagination' but has a locus outside rope. Because this is what exactly I was having in mind when I was talking about rope is having some problem in -rope-snake' analogy. Would share my thoughts on his observation (specifically below statement) if my time permits today.

//quote //

The snake in the rope snake adhyAsa is not imagined "in the mind". Rather the adhyAsa takes place in the locus outside, which leads to the experience, "I see a snake there (e.g. in the passageway)". The locus is not the seer's mind, but the location of the rope.

//unquote//

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!
Bhaskar

PS : @Venkatraghavan S prabhuji, any elaboration / further notes on the above statement would be highly appreciated

[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms Sri Venkatraghavan prabhuji

Hare Krishna

The snake in the rope snake adhyAsa is not imagined "in the mind". Rather the adhyAsa takes place in the locus outside, which leads to the experience, "I see a snake there (e.g. in the passageway)". The locus is not the seer's mind, but the location of the rope.

 

Ø     I don’t know the context in which you are saying snake is not imagined in the mind.  But bhAshyakAra clearly says the sarpa is ‘buddhi parikalpita’ ( just one example in chAdOgya : rajjvAdi sarpAdyAkAreNa ‘buddhiparikalpitena’)!!  The rajju-sarpa example has been given to drive home the point that there is no sarpa in rajju and sarpaavayava are mere imagination.  OTOH, brahman (rope) is transactionless as someone else is the nimitta to ‘see’ the sarpa in vyavahArarahita rajju.  And as a result, when the rajju is examined properly we conclude that though it appeared like a snake ( at the time of congnition during the abhAva of rajju jnana) it was not a snake it was / is  rajju only.  We never ever think in our sublated (bAdhita) jnana that there was sarpa outside apart from our mental imagination. 

 

• IMO saying locus is outside for the adhyAsa is clear cut definition of arthAdhyAsa which is NOT the result of jnAnAdhyAsa and these two are mutually exclusive.  Anyway, will wait for your further elaboration.

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Raghav Ji,

Reg  // How do we distinguish sAxI pratyaxa entities like "algebra", "democracy"

etc which I understand are sat,  from asat like hare's horns which can also
be conceptualized by the mind? //,

In my understanding, terms like "algebra", "democracy" etc are mental concepts, not "objects". They cannot be classified as "sat" (existent).

Regards

On Tue, Dec 26, 2023 at 2:52 PM Raghav Kumar Dwivedula via Advaita-l <adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

Namaste Chandramouli ji



On Sun, 24 Dec, 2023, 8:55 pm H S Chandramouli via Advaita-l, <

adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

> Namaskaram Vikram Ji,
>

> Reg  //  Ontologically, asat is that which is never experienced as
> existing.
> Hare’s horn is asat //,
>
> In my understanding, the words ** in any locus ** needs to be added at the
> end of ** as existing **. This is to avoid any mixup with all *imagined **
> entities being understood as asat. For example, a snake just ** imagined**
> (not as ** it is a snake**) is also nonexistent. Because just the word **
> snake ** being imagined implies absence of any locus. But snake itself
> cannot be called asat.
>
> Incidentally this was why I had suggested earlier that the word
> **imagined** with reference to rope-snake as inappropriate, because the
> experience there is **It is a snake**, implying a locus which is
> experienced through a pramANa.
>

Thank you for this clarification.
One additional factor to consider -
 Under the assumption that the word 'objects' refers not only to physical
objects but also to existent entities like
"democracy",
"algebra"
"poem"
"Prime numbers" etc., since they exist and are experienced but not as
objects of the five senses, we categorize these as objects cognized
directly by the mind, "sAxI pratyaxa". Yet they are not asat. The locus of
these objects would be the antaH karaNam or in some cases the locus would
possibly be specific class objects like the collection of people who are
citizens.

How do we distinguish sAxI pratyaxa entities like "algebra", "democracy"
etc which I understand are sat,  from asat like hare's horns which can also
be conceptualized by the mind?

Om
Raghav

[V Subrahmanian]

On Tue, Dec 26, 2023 at 4:18 PM H S Chandramouli <hschand...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Raghav Ji,

Reg  // How do we distinguish sAxI pratyaxa entities like "algebra", "democracy"

etc which I understand are sat,  from asat like hare's horns which can also
be conceptualized by the mind? //,

In my understanding, terms like "algebra", "democracy" etc are mental concepts, not "objects". They cannot be classified as "sat" (existent).

These fall in the category of kshetram: icchaa dveshah sukham duhkham...which are all vishaya to the vishayi the sakshi. All ghaTa jnana, specific vishayaka ajnana, samshaya, etc. too are sAkshi pratyaksha and have their locus in the antahkarana/manas. Being part of the concocted world, they too are concoctions.      

 कामः सङ्कल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाश्रद्धा धृतिरधृतिर्ह्रीर्धीर्भीरित्येतत्सर्वं मन एव   ...This list, not exhaustive, is termed mind itself since they occur in the mind.  Brihadaranyaka upanishad. 

Regards

subbu 

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste.

Reg  //  These fall in the category of kshetram: icchaa dveshah sukham duhkham...which are all vishaya to the vishayi the sakshi //

and

// कामः सङ्कल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाश्रद्धा धृतिरधृतिर्ह्रीर्धीर्भीरित्येतत्सर्वं मन एव  //

These are said to be the attributes of the ego and they become vishaya to the vishayi the sAkshi  only when there is their superimposition on the ego. Not otherwise. 

Regards

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[V Subrahmanian]

On Tue, Dec 26, 2023 at 4:27 PM V Subrahmanian <v.subra...@gmail.com> wrote:

In the Brihadaranyaka Bhashya, while expounding on what all go along with the jiva in transmigration, vidya, learning/knowledge, is also stated. Explaining that Anandagiri says:  

 

विहिता विद्या ध्यानात्मिका । प्रतिषिद्धा नग्नस्त्रीदर्शनादिरूपा । अविहिता घटादिविषया । अप्रतिषिद्धा पथि पतिततृणादिविषया । विहितं कर्म यागादि । प्रतिषिद्धं ब्रह्महननादि । अविहितं गमनादि । अप्रतिषिद्धं नेत्रपक्ष्मविक्षेपादि ।

Faculties like Algebra, etc. come under  अविहिता घटादिविषया ..  Any knowledge, scriptural or otherwise, ordained or prohibited, acquired by the jiva, will remain with him and will go with him upon death, and remain in the subsequent births. All this is located in the antahkaranam and hence objectified by the witness consciousness.  

Regards

subbu 

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Bhaskar ji,

I meant the locus of the snake is not the mind, it is the place outside. 

In my opinion, bhAShyakAra's phrase buddhiparikalpitena, should mean buddhyA parikalpitena and not necessarily buddhau parikalpitena, ie, the snake is imagined by the mind, not that that snake is located in the mind.

The context of my comment is, as you rightly point out, the pratikarmavyavasthA that has been elaborately discussed by post Shankara AchArya-s, involving artha and jnAna adhyAsa. I don't think merely that one phrase in the bhAShya rules out the entire support structure, when there are alternative explanations available.

The reason for the adhyasta object to be postulated to be outside is because of the perceptual experience "I saw it there" and the pravRtti towards (shell silver) or away from it (rope snake). Even though after the sublation one knows that there is no object outside in reality, one does not deny the fact that one had perceived it outside. One denies the validity of that perception in the past because there is no corresponding object outside in reality. 

It is not like a memory where even during the recollection one is aware that one is not perceiving a memory and one is merely recollecting what was seen. In the adhyAsa, there are certain perceptual elements - ie there is sensory contact with the locus of the adhyAsa (samprayoga). It is a product of a defect in the mind (doShajanyatva) - which differentiate it from memory, which is purely a mental construct, located in the mind.  

That is why in the adhyAsa bhAShya, the bhAshyakAra uses the phrase smRtirUpah, like a memory, to indicate that the adhyAsa shares with smRti the characteristic of arising due to samskAra, but is not smRti itself, because it is also doShajanya and has  samprayoga. It is also the reason he adds the word paratra in that bhAShya (smRtirUpah paratra pUrvadRShTAvabhAsah), to indicate that the object was seen to be elsewhere, a particular location outside where something else was present.

On that basis I agree that it is the doSha located in the mind which acts as a nimitta for the adhyAsa, but in my view that is not sufficient to make the adhyAsa itself located in the mind.

Kind regards,

Venkatraghavan

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[V Subrahmanian]

On Tue, Dec 26, 2023 at 10:08 PM Venkatraghavan S via Advaita-l <adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

Namaste Bhaskar ji,
I meant the locus of the snake is not the mind, it is the place outside.

In my opinion, bhAShyakAra's phrase buddhiparikalpitena, should mean
buddhyA parikalpitena and not necessarily buddhau parikalpitena, ie, the

snake is imagined *by* the mind, not that that snake is located *in* the
mind.

Yes, even the Vedanta Paribhasha, I have heard, says that the 'illusory snake is 'produced' at that moment in the mind. We can say 'प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ विद्यमानत्वेन बुद्ध्या परिकल्पितः सर्पः' The snake is imagined 'as present in the locus, rope' at that moment.  

warm regards

subbu 

The context of my comment is, as you rightly point out, the
pratikarmavyavasthA that has been elaborately discussed by post Shankara
AchArya-s, involving artha and jnAna adhyAsa. I don't think merely that one
phrase in the bhAShya rules out the entire support structure, when there
are alternative explanations available.

The reason for the adhyasta object to be postulated to be *outside* is
because of the perceptual experience "I saw it *there*" and the pravRtti

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste,

There is a typo in the sentence: "It is not like a memory where even during the recollection one is aware

that one is not perceiving a memory and one is merely recollecting what was

seen. " Please read this to be:

"It is not like a memory where even during the recollection one is aware

that one is not perceiving the object and one is merely recollecting what was

seen."

Regards

Venkatraghavan

On Tue, 26 Dec 2023, 08:38 Venkatraghavan S via Advaita-l, <adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

Namaste Bhaskar ji,
I meant the locus of the snake is not the mind, it is the place outside.

In my opinion, bhAShyakAra's phrase buddhiparikalpitena, should mean
buddhyA parikalpitena and not necessarily buddhau parikalpitena, ie, the

snake is imagined *by* the mind, not that that snake is located *in* the

mind.

The context of my comment is, as you rightly point out, the
pratikarmavyavasthA that has been elaborately discussed by post Shankara
AchArya-s, involving artha and jnAna adhyAsa. I don't think merely that one
phrase in the bhAShya rules out the entire support structure, when there
are alternative explanations available.

The reason for the adhyasta object to be postulated to be *outside* is
because of the perceptual experience "I saw it *there*" and the pravRtti

> experience, "I see a snake *there *(e.g. in the passageway)". The locus

> is not the seer's mind, but the location of the rope.
>
>
>
> Ø     I don’t know the context in which you are saying snake is not
> imagined in the mind.  But bhAshyakAra clearly says the sarpa is ‘buddhi
> parikalpita’ ( just one example in chAdOgya : rajjvAdi sarpAdyAkAreNa
> ‘buddhiparikalpitena’)!!  The rajju-sarpa example has been given to drive
> home the point that there is no sarpa in rajju and sarpaavayava are mere
> imagination.  OTOH, brahman (rope) is transactionless as someone else is
> the nimitta to ‘see’ the sarpa in vyavahArarahita rajju.  And as a result,
> when the rajju is examined properly we conclude that though it appeared
> like a snake ( at the time of congnition during the abhAva of rajju jnana)
> it was not a snake it was / is  rajju only.  We never ever think in our
> sublated (bAdhita) jnana that there was sarpa outside apart from our mental
> imagination.
>
>
>

>    - IMO saying locus is outside for the adhyAsa is clear cut definition

>    of arthAdhyAsa which is NOT the result of jnAnAdhyAsa and these two are
>    mutually exclusive.  Anyway, will wait for your further elaboration.
>
>
>
> Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!
>
> bhaskar
>
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[Kuntimaddi Sadananda]

PraNAms

Here is my understanding. 

Yes. In fact, every perception involves, cognition based on the attributes of the object as perceived by the senses (with all their limitations), and recognition based on the memory which involves comparing the objects perceived in the past with similar attributes. 

Snake is out there, similar to any other objects perceived via the mind and the senses. The seer of the snake (rope) has a firm belief that it is a snake. Hence his body also reacts - fear, increased blood pressure, etc., which are real. When he runs away from it - other physical reactions also follow. He may live with that perception throughout his life if there is no contradictory experience to prove that it was not a snake but a rope.

 If there is another convincing pramaana - such as going back with torch light and checking if it is a snake or rope, and got convinced it is a rope, the snake that he imagined based on the attributes disappears in his mind with the understanding there is no snake there. This is praatibhasika error since he alone saw. This is in contrast to sunrise and sunset or trees running in opposite direction, while watching in as running train or mirage waters, etc. Where knowledge of reality does not eliminate the perceptions.

The same applies to the perceived world which is vyaavahaarika error and will be perceived even after knowing that it is not really real but apparently real. Hence as long as body, mind, and intellect are functioning the Jnaani's body sees the world of plurality. However, his understanding is that it is mithyaa and not absolutely real. He may also understand that BMI is perceiving which is part of the Prakruti and He is akarthaa. That is his understanding. 

Hence the discussion of whether Jnaani perceives the world or not - is yes or no - hence senses do perceive as long as they are functioning, but his understanding can be different - karmani akarmayaH pasyet.- one who sees as non-doer while his body, mind and intellect are doing. 

For information only for those interested. The Indic Academy has published my book on the pratyaksha pramaana based on Vedanta Paribhasha -as 'How Do I Know'- now available online on Amazon. Dr. Aravindarao has written an introduction to the text. 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

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[Bhaskar YR]

Hari OM!

I find it odd that an "unreal" snake can cause a "real"
jump/aggravation/fear/jolt

praNAms
Hare Krishna

Unreal shAstra can give real jnana or helps us to realize our svarUpa, a dream tiger's roaring can cause a 'real' raise in heart beats after waking ...advaita's standard definition with regard to the question how can an unreal can cause real 😊

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Venkat Ji,

Reg  //  In my opinion, bhAShyakAra's phrase buddhiparikalpitena, should mean buddhyA parikalpitena and not necessarily buddhau parikalpitena, ie, the snake is imagined by the mind, not that that snake is located in the mind.

The context of my comment is, as you rightly point out, the pratikarmavyavasthA that has been elaborately discussed by post Shankara AchArya-s, involving artha and jnAna adhyAsa //,

I have a different understanding for the context of the phrase buddhiparikalpitena. Especially since it applies (anvaya) to मृद्घटाद्याकारेण also apart from सर्पाद्याकारेण. Sri SSS in his translation cum commentary in kannada on Ch Up Bhashya specifically mentions so in Footnote 3 (referring to buddhiparikalpitena in the Bhashya) as below (translation mine)

// This visheshaNa applies (anvaya) to previous term also. kArya also is budhikalpita. It is never distinct from kAraNa //. The ** previous term** referred to is मृद्घटाद्याकारेण.

Contextually, in Ch Up, the mantra 6-2-3 // तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति //, सत् (sat) which is One only becomes many while still maintaining its status as One only. Entire Creation is सत् (sat) only (combination of Chaitanya/Brahman and avyAkruta). It is vivarta with reference to Chaitanya/Brahman or pariNAma with reference to avyAkruta. The pariNAma transformation is of the Clay-Pot type, not Milk-Curd type.

In my understanding, the phrase buddhiparikalpitena does not apply to snake per se. It refers to bheda buddhi amongst different forms the appearance could take place instead of the rope (vivarta as in सर्पाद्याकारेण illustration), namely snake, stick, garland, crack on the ground etc. In case of clay (pariNAma as in मृद्घटाद्याकारेण illustration), the forms could be pot, lump of clay etc. While all of them are rope (or clay) only, buddhi distinguishes them as different entities. This bheda buddhi amongst the forms instead of unity is addressed by the phrase buddhiparikalpitena.

I hope I have conveyed my understanding meaningfully.

Regards

On Tue, Dec 26, 2023 at 10:08 PM Venkatraghavan S via Advaita-l <adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

Namaste Bhaskar ji,
I meant the locus of the snake is not the mind, it is the place outside.

In my opinion, bhAShyakAra's phrase buddhiparikalpitena, should mean
buddhyA parikalpitena and not necessarily buddhau parikalpitena, ie, the

snake is imagined *by* the mind, not that that snake is located *in* the

mind.

The context of my comment is, as you rightly point out, the
pratikarmavyavasthA that has been elaborately discussed by post Shankara
AchArya-s, involving artha and jnAna adhyAsa. I don't think merely that one
phrase in the bhAShya rules out the entire support structure, when there
are alternative explanations available.

The reason for the adhyasta object to be postulated to be *outside* is
because of the perceptual experience "I saw it *there*" and the pravRtti

> experience, "I see a snake *there *(e.g. in the passageway)". The locus

> is not the seer's mind, but the location of the rope.
>
>
>
> Ø     I don’t know the context in which you are saying snake is not
> imagined in the mind.  But bhAshyakAra clearly says the sarpa is ‘buddhi
> parikalpita’ ( just one example in chAdOgya : rajjvAdi sarpAdyAkAreNa
> ‘buddhiparikalpitena’)!!  The rajju-sarpa example has been given to drive
> home the point that there is no sarpa in rajju and sarpaavayava are mere
> imagination.  OTOH, brahman (rope) is transactionless as someone else is
> the nimitta to ‘see’ the sarpa in vyavahArarahita rajju.  And as a result,
> when the rajju is examined properly we conclude that though it appeared
> like a snake ( at the time of congnition during the abhAva of rajju jnana)
> it was not a snake it was / is  rajju only.  We never ever think in our
> sublated (bAdhita) jnana that there was sarpa outside apart from our mental
> imagination.
>
>
>

>    - IMO saying locus is outside for the adhyAsa is clear cut definition

>    of arthAdhyAsa which is NOT the result of jnAnAdhyAsa and these two are
>    mutually exclusive.  Anyway, will wait for your further elaboration.
>
>
>
> Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!
>
> bhaskar
>
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[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Chandramouli ji,

On Wed, 27 Dec 2023, 01:46 H S Chandramouli, <hschand...@gmail.com> wrote:

In my understanding, the phrase buddhiparikalpitena does not apply to snake per se. It refers to bheda buddhi amongst different forms the appearance could take place instead of the rope (vivarta as in सर्पाद्याकारेण illustration), namely snake, stick, garland, crack on the ground etc. In case of clay (pariNAma as in मृद्घटाद्याकारेण illustration), the forms could be pot, lump of clay etc. While all of them are rope (or clay) only, buddhi distinguishes them as different entities. This bheda buddhi amongst the forms instead of unity is addressed by the phrase buddhiparikalpitena.

I think the above explanation is also possible. Even so, in the above explanation, the focus of the meaning of the phrase lies in the bheda buddhi being buddhyA parikalpitena rather than buddhau parikalpitena - Shankaracharya wishes to convey that they are viewed as different by the mind - there is no reason to take away from that phrase that these are viewed differently in the mind. 

In my explanation, the meaning of the phrase buddhiparikalpitena, is slightly different when there is anvaya with mRtghaTa than when there is anvaya with rajjusarpa, because they represent two types of bheda buddhi with respect to multiplicity. That is why Shankaracharya mentions the mRtghaTa and the rajjusarpa examples in the same sentence (because there is something additional he wishes to convey with the second example).

To explain, the former represents the bheda buddhi between the kArya and kAraNa and the latter represents the bheda buddhi of the adhyasta with respect to the adhiShThAna. In the former, the anvaya of the mRt happens during the perception of the ghaTa (ie one continues to see the clay when seeing the pot, leading to the buddhi mRt-ghaTa) and in the latter, one only sees the sarpa and not the rajju during the time of the adhyAsa (ie no one sees it as rajju-sarpa, one sees it only as sarpa). In both cases,  the bahutva is buddhyA parikalpitena - the multiplicity is seen by the mind and not a truth in reality.

Regards,

Venkatraghavan

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Venkat Ji,

Reg  // buddhyA parikalpitena rather than buddhau parikalpitena //,

They need not be understood as being mutually exclusive. buddhyA parikalpitena can be understood as the manifestation of deep rooted conviction in the mind, buddhau parikalpitena. In fact, deep rooted conviction in the mind, buddhau parikalpitena,  would be more appropriate in the current context, it being svAbhAvika, naisargika.

Reg  // That is why Shankaracharya mentions the mRtghaTa and the rajjusarpa examples in the same sentence (because there is something additional he wishes to convey with the second example) //,

Notice the use of the word आदि(Adi)(etcetera) in  रज्ज्वादि सर्पाद्याकारेण in respect of vivarta vikAra as against मृद्घटाद्याकारेण in respect of pariNAma vikAra. It is used in respect of both रज्जु (rajju) and सर्प(sarpa) in one while it is used only in respect of घट(ghata) but not in respect of मृत् (mRRit) in the other.  Multiplicity is seen simultaneously in the case of  mRtghaTAdi (such as pot, lump etc), and hence difference between them can be  perceived by the mind. But multiplicity is not seen simulataneously if only the standard rajjusarpa illustration is considered for vivarta vikAra even if आदि(Adi)(etcetera) word is used in respect of sarpa. Rope is perceived either as snake or as garland or as stick or as crack in the wall, only one at a time. Difference cannot be perceived. Hence रज्ज्वादि  in रज्ज्वादि सर्पाद्याकारेण  is intended to be the equivalent for घटादि of मृद्घटाद्याकारेण. रज्ज्वादि represents all objects simultaneously perceived at any given time, all of which are vivarta vikAra. सर्पाद्याकारेण is to convey vivarta vikAra. They are all conceived as different from each other by the mind though in reality they are all सत्(sat) only. That in my understanding is what Sri Bhagavatpada intends to convey by mentioning  the mRtghaTa and the rajjusarpa examples in the same sentence.

Regards

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste.

Just a clarification.

// though in reality they are all सत्(sat) only // in the last sentence to be understood in the vivarta sense.

Regards

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Chandramouli ji,

I agree with statements in general in your email. Some points where I had a slightly different view:

On Thu, 28 Dec 2023, 01:36 H S Chandramouli, <hschand...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Venkat Ji,

Reg  // buddhyA parikalpitena rather than buddhau parikalpitena //,

They need not be understood as being mutually exclusive.

True.

buddhyA parikalpitena can be understood as the manifestation of deep rooted conviction in the mind, buddhau parikalpitena.

I had meant buddhau in the sense of the adhyAsa being exclusively located in the mind, ie jnAna adhyAsa, with no corresponding artha adhyAsa, which I took to be the meaning ascribed to the phrase buddhiparikalpita by Sri Bhaskar ji.

If you recall, I had mentioned that in artha adhyAsa, the superimposition of the snake takes place at the location of the rope, rather than it purely located in the mind. To which, Sri Bhaskar had cited this bhAShya to say that the snake is only located in the mind. He had said and I quote:

"The rajju-sarpa example has been given to drive home the point that there is no sarpa in rajju and sarpaavayava are mere imagination."

I had offered an alternative explanation for the phrase - whether you agree with that explanation or not, the more important question is whether you agree with Bhaskar ji with respect to this bhAshya being evidence of the rope snake being purely located in the mind ie refuting anirvachanIya khyAti or, alternatively, whether you accept that an anirvachanIya snake is created in the location of the snake at the time of adhyAsa.

In fact, deep rooted conviction in the mind, buddhau parikalpitena,  would be more appropriate in the current context, it being svAbhAvika, naisargika.

Maybe, but my point is that this bhAShya is not a proof of the untenability of anirvachanIya khyAti - ie the creation of an anirvachanIya snake at the location of the rope (arthAdhyAsa) and the creation of a corresponding cognition of the snake in the mind (jnAnAdhyAsa). There are several possible interpretations of the phrase buddhiparikalpita that are possible and to reduce it to merely one and use it as evidence against anirvachanIya khyAti is untenable in my opinion. 

Reg  // That is why Shankaracharya mentions the mRtghaTa and the rajjusarpa examples in the same sentence (because there is something additional he wishes to convey with the second example) //,

Notice the use of the word आदि(Adi)(etcetera) in  रज्ज्वादि सर्पाद्याकारेण in respect of vivarta vikAra as against मृद्घटाद्याकारेण in respect of pariNAma vikAra. It is used in respect of both रज्जु (rajju) and सर्प(sarpa) in one while it is used only in respect of घट(ghata) but not in respect of मृत् (mRRit) in the other.  Multiplicity is seen simultaneously in the case of  mRtghaTAdi (such as pot, lump etc), and hence difference between them can be  perceived by the mind. But multiplicity is not seen simulataneously if only the standard rajjusarpa illustration is considered for vivarta vikAra even if आदि(Adi)(etcetera) word is used in respect of sarpa. Rope is perceived either as snake or as garland or as stick or as crack in the wall, only one at a time. Difference cannot be perceived. Hence रज्ज्वादि  in रज्ज्वादि सर्पाद्याकारेण  is intended to be the equivalent for घटादि of मृद्घटाद्याकारेण. रज्ज्वादि represents all objects simultaneously perceived at any given time, all of which are vivarta vikAra. सर्पाद्याकारेण is to convey vivarta vikAra. They are all conceived as different from each other by the mind though in reality they are all सत्(sat) only. That in my understanding is what Sri Bhagavatpada intends to convey by mentioning  the mRtghaTa and the rajjusarpa examples in the same sentence.

I have a different understanding to the above to what you have provided, but that is not relevant to the point under discussion, so will not go into the reasons for that now.

Regards,

Venkatraghavan

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Venkat Ji,

I have absolutely no doubts about the presence, as per the Bhashya,  of a  prAtibhAsika, anirvachanIya  snake existing at the location of the rope. During several discussions earlier with Bhaskar Ji , this has been a point of disagreement with him and we agreed to disagree.

Regards

[Vikram Jagannathan]

Namaskaram Shri Venkataraghavan ji,

In my understanding, there is always artha-dhyasa and jnana-adhyasa in every instance of adhyasa. Adhyasa is not a falsified (badhita) perception, but it is the prior misunderstanding. The misunderstanding implies an object and the corresponding knowledge. In the case of the perception of red-crystal, the red-crystal (as opposed to the transparent crystal) is itself the artha-adhyasa. The knowledge of redness as a standalone property, as superimposed on the crystal, is only the badhita knowledge and hence at this point, the continued perception is no longer an adhyasa.

On a different note, in general to this thread, there have been other discussions questioning how an unreal snake gives rise to real fear and subsequent responses that snake is unreal and fear too is unreal. I would like to call out that 1) the unreality of snake (as pratibhasika) is known only after the dawn of knowledge of the rope. But the real fear (vyavaharika) is produced prior to this knowledge; wherein snake was still considered as a real (vyavaharika) entity. Thus only a real snake (misunderstood as vyavaharika) caused a real fear (vyavaharika) 2) While using the word 'real' & 'unreal', it is important to call out the level of reality / unreality (paramarthika / vyavaharika / pratibhasika) in case of ambiguity. It seems to me the questions and responses are in different standpoints like apples & oranges.

with humble prostrations,

Vikram

On Thu, Dec 28, 2023 at 8:12 AM Venkatraghavan S via Advaita-l <adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

Namaste Raghav ji,

On Thu, 28 Dec 2023, 05:13 Raghav Kumar Dwivedula via Advaita-l, <
adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

> Namaste Venkataraghavan ji
>
> Can there be example of jnAnAdhyAsa without arthAdhyAsa?


Yes, there can in my opinion, like in the case of the redness of a crystal,
where no new redness is created, it is simply the transference of the
perceived redness of the flower onto the crystal. The doctrine of
anirvachanIya khyAti postulates the utpatti of an artha only where such an
artha does not exist there to make perceptual contact with the senses. When
the artha exists there in perceptual contact (like the flower's redness),
there is no need to postulate the creation of a new redness. Please see the
archives, Sri Chandramouli and I discussed this a few months ago.


Can we say a
> visual or auditory hallucination (of the type that's unconstitutional as in
> schizophrenia a la "The Beautiful Mind" for example)?
>
I can't say for sure because I don't know how auditory hallucination or
schizophrenia manifest, but to the extent that there is perception involved
(even illusory) and the object of perception is not present, one can assume
the creation of an illusory object.

Regards,
Venkatraghavan

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Vikram ji

Re "In my understanding, there is always artha-dhyasa and jnana-adhyasa in every instance of adhyasa."

There is a passage in the Vedanta Paribhasha which says that the creation of a prAtibhAsika object is only admitted in certain circumstances.

 

यत्रारोप्यमसन्निकृष्टं तत्रैव प्रातिभासिकवस्तूत्पत्तेरङ्गीकारात् । 

Where the Aropya, the superimposed object is not in contact with senses, only there is it accepted that a prAtibhAsika object is created.

i.e where there is contact with the superimposed, we accept that there is no anirvachanIya object created. Where it is not in contact, we accept there is an anirvachanIya object created.

अत एव इन्द्रियसन्निकृष्टतया जपाकुसुमगतलौहित्यस्य स्फटिके भानसम्भवात्  न स्फटिकेऽनिर्वचनीयलौहित्योत्पत्तिः । 

That is why, as there is contact with the senses in the case of the red crystal, it is possible for the redness present in the hibiscus to appear in the crystal, and the creation of an anirvachanIya redness in the crystal is not accepted. 

This led me to conclude that in the case of the red crystal, ie a samsarga adhyAsa, the adhyAsa is of a real attribute, but in a different locus - there is a jnAna adhyAsa without a corresponding artha adhyAsa. Happy to revisit this conclusion if evidence is presented to the contrary.

Regards,

Venkatraghavan 

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste.

Vedanta paribhasha which is almost exclusively concerned with epistemology of Advaita Siddhanta is currently considered to be the authority as far as advaita epistemology is concerned. It is much later to texts like Advaita Siddhi, Siddhanta Bindu etc wherein also advaitic epistemological issues are addressed in part. The postulates  expressed in VP are considered to supercede views expressed in all earlier advaitic texts as far as advaitic epistemological issues are concerned.

Regards

On Fri, Dec 29, 2023 at 12:06 PM Bhaskar YR via Advaita-l <adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

The upAsya devatA's body is a mAyika sharIra created on the spot so that the upAsaka has the perception of his upAsya. There is a vision and the object of the vision.

praNAms
Hare Krishna

And it will not stop just seeing the mAyika shareera out there!!  The upAsya devata's body would interact with the upAsaka, guide him in dharma mArga / jnana mArga, distribute the karma phala,  clears the doubt if any on his physical presence etc.  Though it is purely individual experience as a result of purusha tAntra sAdhana one should agree that upAsya devata sAkshAtkAra is the result of karma / ananya bhakti / dhyAna sAdhana and it is not as easy as seeing the snake in place of rajju in dim light!! 😊

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!
bhaskar

[Vikram Jagannathan]

Namaskaram Shri Venkatraghavan ji,

First of all, my apologies for having misspelled your name a few times in the past.

I agree with you on the status of origination of the redness that is perceived. When the red-flower is connected with the sense organ, the redness perceived is not anirvachaniya. But when the flower is not connected with the organ, then the redness can be called pratibhasika.

However, my understanding of this passage is that this refers to the superimposed redness itself and not to the resulting superimposed entity. The resulting superimposed entity is the "red-crystal", which is different and actually non-existent in the perceived locus - transparent-crystal. In this example, with a visible red-flower, the flower, the redness and the crystal-object are all relatively real (vyavaharika). Only the "red-crystal" is pratibhasika. Thus, per my understanding, the appearance of the "red-crystal" is artha-adhyasa and the corresponding subjective experience is jnana-adhyasa.

Seeking to stand corrected.

with humble prostrations,

Vikram

[putran M]

Namaskaram Venkataraghavan-ji,

ie, the snake is imagined by the mind, not that that snake is located in the mind.

Both positions can be valid. The snake is located in the mind for it is not at the rope independently of the mind. But the mind is located at the rope during perception, hence the snake that Consciousness imagines is superimposed onto the rope at its location: therefore the snake is located 'outside' (where the mind is) as well.

thollmelukaalkizhu 

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[V Subrahmanian]

On Sat, Dec 30, 2023 at 11:13 AM putran M <putr...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaskaram Venkataraghavan-ji,

ie, the snake is imagined by the mind, not that that snake is located in the mind.

Both positions can be valid. The snake is located in the mind for it is not at the rope independently of the mind. But the mind is located at the rope during perception, hence the snake that Consciousness imagines is superimposed onto the rope at its location: therefore the snake is located 'outside' (where the mind is) as well.

True. The idea that the snake is out there is in the mind alone and more importantly, the correction that - there is no snake but the rope alone is - also has to happen in the mind alone. The locus of the error is the mind and the correction has to happen there alone.

regards

subbu  

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[Vikram Jagannathan]

Namaskaram Shri Bhaskar ji,

While there are ongoing deeper discussions, I would like to get your kind attention to your earlier response.

// I reckon first we have to take a deeper look at Sri Venktaraghavan prabhuji's observation i.e. snake is not 'mental imagination' but has a locus outside rope. Because this is what exactly I was having in mind when I was talking about  rope is having some problem in -rope-snake' analogy. //

If I understand your position correctly, the perceived snake is purely a "mental imagination" and doesn't have any reality whatsoever (paramarthika / vyavaharika / pratibhasika) outside the mind. Thus the locus of the snake, even while being perceived as such, is the mind alone.

If so, I have some detailed follow-up questions for you (and others interested in this exercise), to flush out all ambiguity, and earnestly solicit your response:

Let's consider the following scenario - Part 1:
Ram and Shyam are walking in Ram's house. In a dimly-lit corridor they perceive a long thin curled "object" lying on the floor, which actually is a rope. Ram cognizes it as a rope and is indifferent to it. Shyam cognizes it as a snake, becomes fearful and starts shivering.

From Ram's current perspective:
Q1: What, per his understanding, is the locus of the object of his cognition - rope? Object on the floor / mind?
Q2: What is the relative ontological status of the rope as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?
Q3: What is the relative ontological status of the snake as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?

From Shyam's current perspective:
Q4: What, per his understanding, is the locus of the object of his cognition - snake? Object on the floor / mind?
Q5: What is the relative ontological status of the snake as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?
Q6: What is the level of reality of his experience of his body shivering from the cognition of the snake? Vyavaharika / pratibhasika?

From the rope's current perspective:
Q7: Hypothetically, if the rope has cognitive awareness, does it cognize itself as possessing the nature & attributes of a rope or a snake? Rope / snake?

Next, let's continue with the scenario - Part 2:
Seeing Shyam fearful, Ram clarifies that "it is just a rope". On hearing these words, Shyam recognizes the object as a rope. His fear is gone but his body is still shivering

From Ram's new perspective:
Q8: Has there been any change in his cognition of the object? Yes/ no?

From Shyam's new perspective:
Q9: What now, per his current understanding, is the locus of the object of his current cognition - rope? Object on the floor / mind?
Q10: What now, per his current understanding, is the locus of the object of his earlier cognition - snake? Object on the floor / mind?
Q11: What is the relative ontological status of the rope as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?
Q12: What is the relative ontological status of the snake as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?
Q13: What now is the level of reality of his experience of his body shivering from the cognition of the snake? Vyavaharika / pratibhasika?

From the rope's new perspective:
Q14: Hypothetically, if the rope has cognitive awareness, has there been any change in its cognition of its nature & attributes? Yes / no?

Furthermore,
Q15: When did Shyam realize that his experience was an adhyasa (error / avidya / ignorance) of "rope misunderstood as a snake"? End of part 1 or end of part 2?

As an additional request, as it would help streamline deeper discussion, I would like you to please indulge in reviewing alignment of the 50 points I shared in the link -> https://archive.org/details/reflections-on-fundamentals-of-advaita

with humble prostrations,
Vikram

[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms

Hare Krishna

 

True. The idea that the snake is out there is in the mind alone and more importantly, the correction that - there is no snake but the rope alone is - also has to happen in the mind alone. The locus of the error is the mind and the correction has to happen there alone.

 

• Yes that is as simple as that, even at the bhrAnti time we don’t say snake which we ‘are’ seeing is anirvachaneeya and after realizing the ‘rope’ knowledge also we don’t say we ‘were’ seeing some anirvachaneeya snake but OTOH we conclude that we were seeing snake due to our mistake of rope or absence of rope knowledge.  Atasmin tadbuddhiH lakshaNa vAkya of adhyAsa too saying the same thing i.e. jnAnAdhyAsa but I don’t know how theories like anivachaneeya khyAti vAda, arthAdhyAsa, akhyAti vAdi, khyAti vAda etc. intruded in shankara’s adhyAsa bhAshya.  adhyAsa is not pramANa siddha but anubhava siddha that is the reason why bhAshyakAra has not given any pramANa vAkya to establish adhyAsa if the adhyAsa is pramANeekruta prama only then it is not bhrama it is something really existing and that which really existing cannot be eradicated by amount of jnana. 

[putran M]

Namaskaram Rishi-ji,

You may send to group so others can also read etc.

 every object that we observe in our day to day life,those objects are not located in our in our mind.

Yes, every object of perception has its vyavaharika location in the world. The rope is located outside. But there is no snake there. The snake in this case is imagined in the mind and as being the perceived object. 

The rope though perceived is not known properly due to some type of obstruction to right knowledge. In such a situation, some extra data is getting tagged and an incorrect conclusion based on memory is done in the mind. The end result is the imagination in the mind of a snake at the location of the rope. 

But going with standard perception theory, it is not incorrect to locate the snake on the substratum rope, because during perception, we may regard the mind itself as having enveloped the rope and the notional snake is superimposed onto it at its location. Even still, if we call it 'snake', that error-part is imagination that strictly speaking is in the mind only. That's how I understand.

thollmelukaalkizhu 

Yes,the data is in our mind,but the object is not,the only case where an object is in our mind alongwith the data is when we are trying imagine someone that we are not seeing in front of us,so for example a dream tiger.

Isn't this correct ?

On Sat, 30 Dec 2023, 11:13 putran M, <putr...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaskaram Venkataraghavan-ji,

ie, the snake is imagined by the mind, not that that snake is located in the mind.

Both positions can be valid.  But the mind is located at the rope during perception, hence the snake that Consciousness imagines is superimposed onto the rope at its location: therefore the snake is located 'outside' (where the mind is) as well.

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/advaitin/CAKqm3-pJBwYJbk-m1XUVCO6GR59S9KKwhoxmDzqjHqPrSgBEfw%40mail.gmail.com.

[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms Sri Putran prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

Both positions can be valid. The snake is located in the mind for it is not at the rope independently of the mind. But the mind is located at the rope during perception, hence the snake that Consciousness imagines is superimposed onto the rope at its location: therefore the snake is located 'outside' (where the mind is) as well.

 

Ø     I am afraid while we are in the full zeal of digging deep into these drushtAnta-s forgetting the very aim of these drushtAnta-s (rajju-sarpa, suvarNAbharaNa, colour-crystal etc.) and how these drushtAnta-s can appropriately be understood to understand the  dArshtAntika!!  The very purpose of these drushtaanta-s is to recognize the existence of brahman and subsequently ascertain the inherent nature of this ever existing brahman.  As per shAstra brahman explained as both cause and effect (upAdAna and nimitta) and at some other places categorically declared brahman is nirguNa, nirvishesha, niravayava, nirvikAra etc. To know the crystal clear spatika (crystal) either we need a rUpa, nAma or its upAdhi saMbandha ( flowers or clothes behind it to ‘know’ or realize the existence of transparent crystal).  In simple words to know brahman as prajnAna ghana and nirupAdhika we need the help of upAdhi (nAma rUpa like to know the absolutely crystal clear crystal we are taking the help of red, blue, yellow flower)  bhAshyakAra explains this like yadi hi nAma rUpa na vyAkreeyate tadA asyAtmanO nirupAdhikaM rUpaM prajnAnaghanAkhyaM na pratikhyAyeta.  Coming to the currently discussing example of flower crystal, it is quite obvious that one cannot see a perfectly transparent crystal unless you keep something behind it.  When we keep red flower we see red crystal, if it is blue then blue crystal.  Here the colourful flower keeps its dharma of ‘colour’ in crystal it helps us to realize the ‘existence’ of absolutely transparent crystal.  The purpose of this drushtAnta should be understood upto this extent and beyond it to say through crystal we can see not only colour but some time flower also, only flower’s colour is adhyArOpita not flower itself etc. are mere stretch of this example.  Likewise suvarNAbhAraNa example too AbharaNa ( nAma rUpa) is there to recognize survarNa.  The AbharaNa is mere vAchAraMbhaNa for survarNa and the shape of AbharaNa does not affect the suvarNa at any point of time.  The suvarNa is totally independent of the AbharaNa though we recognize / realize the existence of gold through AbharaNa!!  Here the knowledge of suvarNa ( brahma ekatvaM) is not influenced by AbharaNa (nAma rUpa jagat) the knowledge of suvarNa may come from naanaa vidha AbharaNa.  The vishesha of nAnA vidha AbharaNa does not make any change in sAmAnya suvarNa.  Here it can be said that the AbharaNa is an upAdhi (jagat) to show the suvarNa (brahman) and hence the upAdhi which is a thing which helps us to see an unknowable and unobjectifiable thing. 

 

• And the second example of rajju-sarpa, shukti-rajata etc. further clarifies the previous example of suvarNAbharaNa and explains brahman does not under go any transformation ( like suvarNa becoming AbharaNa) and it will remain ‘as it is’ and it is free from all the upAdhi-s.  Even before seeing the sarpa in the rope, during the cognition of rope as snake, after the realization of rope at any point of time rajju would remain ‘as it is’ and there was no snake at all.  bhAshyakAra clarifies this in chAndOgya : though really look at the rope sometimes one can see the snake instead.  In such a scenario what is seen as sarpa is nothing but ‘imagined’ parts of the rope only and the ‘imagined parts of rope have given rise to the shape of the serpent :  buddhi parikalpitebhyaH sadavayavebhyO vikArasaMsthAnOpapatteH, a claasical and clear cut explanation of ONLY jnAnAdhyAsa by bhAshyakAra.  In the suvarNAbharaNa there is nothing to assert ‘buddhi parikalpita’ but in rajju sarpa there is something that is buddhi parikalpita, hence IMO suvarNAbharaNa and rajju-sarpa serving the different purpose in bhAshyavAkya though appearing in the same sentence. 

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Venkat Ji,

I am not sure if the following has already been pointed out and discussed in the thread. If yes, my apologies for the repetition.

In case of redness in the crystal, what is anirvachanIya, and hence mithyA,  is the सम्बन्ध (sambandha) (relationship)  between the redness and the crystal. AnirvachanIyatva is in respect of the *in*ness  in  **redness in the crystal**. The सम्बन्ध (sambandha) (relationship), redness is **inside** the crystal,  is anirvchanIya. That is the distinction between anyathAkhyAti and the advaitic view in this case. Redness per se is akin to anyathAkhyAthi, but it does not stop with that in the advaitic view. There is an element of anirvachanIyatva also.

Regards

On Fri, Dec 29, 2023 at 11:49 PM Venkatraghavan S via Advaita-l <adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

On Fri, 29 Dec 2023, 09:34 Venkatraghavan S, <agni...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Namaste Sudhanshu ji,
>
> I would differ from your view - as I have said, the force of the
> siddhikAra's rebuttal is in establishing this is not a reflection, but a
> superimposition.
> Therefore, he draws a distinction between the reflection where both the
> substrate and the attribute are reflected as a rule.
>
> Here he says that this is not a reflection because the substrate is not
> reflected in the crystal, only its redness is. It is not a rule that only
> the redness should appear (in the crystal) and not the flower - if one
> observes the Chandramoulishvara pUja at Sringeri, there are many times when
> both the flower and its colour are visible through the crystal Shivalinga.
> Sometimes only the colour appears and not the flower.
>
> From that it follows that the case being discussed is where the substrate,
> the flower is not visible and only the redness that appears. That being the
> case, it is not surprising that a prAtibhAsika redness is created here.
>
> Regards,
> Venkatraghavan
>
>
> On Fri, 29 Dec 2023, 07:53 Sudhanshu Shekhar, <sudhans...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Namaste Venkat ji,
>>
>> (2/2)
>>
>> with respect to your additional point
>>
>> //One further point, in the Siddhi chapter in question (the first siddhi
>> quote in your email), the siddhikAra says "धर्मिभूतमुखादिनैरपेक्ष्येण
>> तद्धर्मभूतरूपादिप्रतिबिम्बादर्शनात्", indicating that the siddhikAra is
>> talking of a situation where the dharmI, the japAkusuma, is not observed
>> (ie there is no sannikarSha with its lauhitya also), whereas the dharma,
>> the sphaTika's lauhitya is observed. In such a situation, the utpatti of a
>> prAtibhAsika lauhitya is admitted by the paribhAShAkAra, as shown in my
>> email below, pasting here for easy reference -
>> यत्र जपाकुसुमं द्रव्यान्तरव्यवधानादसन्निकृष्टं तत्र लौहित्यप्रतीत्या
>> प्रातिभासिकं लौहित्यं स्वीक्रियतामिति चेत्, न,  इष्टत्वात् .//
>>
>> Well, whether or not there is eye-contact with red-flower, it is only the
>> redness that appears within crystal. In case of pratibimba, it is never so.
>> It never happens in pratibimba that only Dharma is reflected but not the
>> dharmI. SiddhikAra is basically refuting that redness-of-flower is
>> reflected in crystal. In that context, the statement
>> dharmI-bhUta-mukha-Adi-... Is made.
>>
>> The statement does not indicate that siddhikAra is talking about
>> situation where there is no eye-contact with red-flower.
>>
>> Whether red-flower is indriya-sannikrishTa or not, it is only redness
>> that appears in crystal. This rules out the pratibimbatva if
>> redness-of-crystal. That is what siddhikAra means.
>>
>> PanchapAdikA makes it quite clear:
>>
>> कथं पुनः स्फटिके लोहितिम्नः मिथ्यात्वं?....Pl check from here on in
>> PanchapAdikA
>>
>> Regards.

[V Subrahmanian]

Dear Bhaskar,

After hearing about the 'arthaadhyasa' not having hinted or stated by Bhagavatpada, I recalled these two passages from the Bhashya which, in my opinion, is about arthAdyAsa.  The idea is: in atasmin tad buddhi definition of adhyasa, we have the jnanadhyasa articulated well. In the following passages, the bhashya says that 'what is  not there really, is appearing to be there'.  This expression, I think, is about 'some thing' (artha = object) that appears real to an uninformed person, but upon exposure to the bhashya, will be realized as not really existing:   

What appears does not exist  - Shankara observes in the Gita Bhashya

In the Bhagavadgita Bhashya, in two places, we come across this pithy observation by Bhagavatpada:  That which appears does not really exist'.  The actual passages are given below.

At the end of the commentary for 2.16, Shankara summarizes the Vedantic teaching of Bhagavan to Arjuna:  You too, just as the Jnanis, look upon the transformations, the dualities such as cold and heat, as mere appearances analogous to the mirage water'.

In the commentary to 13.26, he makes a similar observation: The kshetram, world, like the elephant conjured up by a magician, an object seen in a dream, a phantom city, etc, are actually non-existent but appear as though they exist. The one with such a conviction, owing to his direct vision of the Truth, transcends delusion.    

1.    BGB 2.16    त्वमपि तत्त्वदर्शिनां दृष्टिमाश्रित्य शोकं मोहं च हित्वा शीतोष्णादीनि  नियतानियतरूपाणि द्वन्द्वानि ‘विकारोऽयमसन्नेव मरीचिजलवन्मिथ्यावभासते’    इति मनसि निश्चित्य तितिक्षस्व इत्यभिप्रायः ॥ १६ ॥  

For him to say 'the transformations are mithya', the basis is the Chandogya 6th ch. passage: वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्  the transformations (such as pot, saucer..) are mere names while the substance in them, clay, alone is real. 

2.  BGB 13.26      निरस्तसर्वोपाधिविशेषं ज्ञेयं ब्रह्मस्वरूपेण यः पश्यति, क्षेत्रं च   मायानिर्मितहस्तिस्वप्नदृष्टवस्तुगन्धर्वनगरादिवत् ‘असदेव सदिव अवभासते’ इति एवं निश्चितविज्ञानः यः, तस्य यथोक्तसम्यग्दर्शनविरोधात् अपगच्छति मिथ्याज्ञानम् ।

regards

subbu

 

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar

 

 

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[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms Sri Vikram prabhuji

Hare Krishna

>  Is busy with office work, year end revenue closing, year beginning book closing etc. at office, kindly bear with me for any delays in my replies.

If I understand your position correctly, the perceived snake is purely a "mental imagination" and doesn't have any reality whatsoever (paramarthika / vyavaharika / pratibhasika) outside the mind. Thus the locus of the snake, even while being perceived as such, is the mind alone.

 

• One thing we have to keep in mind that ‘deep’ analysis of all analogies with regard to anyathAgrahaNa can happen only after the posterior knowledge of the object being perceived (yathArtha jnana).  If rajju is perceived as rajju no problem no talks,  likewise, if the snake is really there also no talks and no problem with regard to authenticity of cognition.  Problem and deeper analysis required only when the rajju is perceived as sarpa and later realization of this misconception and correct understanding of actually existing thing.  And it can also be said that if one thinks that there is sarpa (in place of rajju) and run away from that place forever without trying to ascertain what exactly is there then also the deep discussion is not required rather will not take place at all.  So, all these discussions would take place only ‘after’ the dawn of yathArtha jnana of the rajju rather getting rid of ayathArtha jnana of rajju.  Hope you are with me here 😊

If so, I have some detailed follow-up questions for you (and others interested in this exercise), to flush out all ambiguity, and earnestly solicit your response:

 

• Since my school days I am not good at answering questions even if you provide multiple choice questions 😊 So please bear with my ignorance prabhuji even if I contradict myself while answering your question paper 😊

Let's consider the following scenario - Part 1:
Ram and Shyam are walking in Ram's house. In a dimly-lit corridor they perceive a long thin curled "object" lying on the floor, which actually is a rope. Ram cognizes it as a rope and is indifferent to it. Shyam cognizes it as a snake, becomes fearful and starts shivering.

From Ram's current perspective:
Q1: What, per his understanding, is the locus of the object of his cognition - rope? Object on the floor / mind?

 

• From Ram’s perspective it is vyavahAra yOgya rajju only that is what he sees. 

Q2: What is the relative ontological status of the rope as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?

 

• As said above, vyavahAra yOgya rajju which he uses daily to draw the water from the well 😊

Q3: What is the relative ontological status of the snake as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?

 

• This question does not arise at all as you yourself confirmed he looks at it ‘as it is’ and is indifferent. 

From Shyam's current perspective:
Q4: What, per his understanding, is the locus of the object of his cognition - snake? Object on the floor / mind?

 

• In this story of rAma-shyAma, the ‘Aspada’ for the cognition of snake is,  the object on the floor and cognition of sarpa is due to this object on the floor.  ( Please note I am not taking the exceptions of adhyAsa as explained by bhAshyakAra in adhyAsa bhAshya and I am just replying to your questions based on your story at rAma’s house 😊 )

Q5: What is the relative ontological status of the snake as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?

 

• From the shyam’s current perspective ( which is quite evident that there will be a talk about future realization of something else!!) it is ‘snake’ that he is perceiving.  And shyAm’s current perspective he is ‘just’ seeing the snake without thinking about rope nor anything he would entertain anything about his memories of snake.  ( again please note I am not considering smruti rUpa, pUrva drushtAvabhAsa etc. which bhAshyakAra clarifies and am just going with the flow of your story).

Q6: What is the level of reality of his experience of his body shivering from the cognition of the snake? Vyavaharika / pratibhasika?

 

• Shivering of his body ‘as real as’  his seeing the snake on the floor. 

From the rope's current perspective:

Q7: Hypothetically, if the rope has cognitive awareness, does it cognize itself as possessing the nature & attributes of a rope or a snake? Rope / snake?

 

• I am afraid hypothetically also this question is not valid!!  It is just like asking  barren women has two sons rAma and shyAma and who is elder and who is younger?? 😊 the basic premise of this question itself is wrong because of the simple reason it is the problem of shyAm does not have anything to do with rajju.  bhAshyakAra himself says there is no aNumAtramapi change in rajju even when one is seeing it as something else!!

Next, let's continue with the scenario - Part 2:

Seeing Shyam fearful, Ram clarifies that "it is just a rope". On hearing these words, Shyam recognizes the object as a rope. His fear is gone but his body is still shivering

 

• Yes

From Ram's new perspective:
Q8: Has there been any change in his cognition of the object? Yes/ no?

 

• Where is the question of Ram’s new perspective here?? Earlier did he have some other perspective??  He was / is seeing rope as rope only !!  is it not??

From Shyam's new perspective:
Q9: What now, per his current understanding, is the locus of the object of his current cognition - rope? Object on the floor / mind?

 

Ø     His current understanding or locus of his earlier misunderstanding (as sarpa) is rope or object what exactly lies there on the floor. 

Q10: What now, per his current understanding, is the locus of the object of his earlier cognition - snake? Object on the floor / mind?

 

Ø     He understands earlier also there was rope only and by mistake he took it as snake and thanked Ram for helping him to get rid of his misconception.  (anyathAgrahaNa or adhyAsa).

Q11: What is the relative ontological status of the rope as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?

 

• I think you are repeating the questions phrasing it differently !! aren’t you?? 

Q12: What is the relative ontological status of the snake as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?

Ø     His realization fetched him the knowledge that there was / is never snake out there and snake was only in his mind due to his ajnAna about the rajju (jnana abhAva of the actually existing rajju)

Q13: What now is the level of reality of his experience of his body shivering from the cognition of the snake? Vyavaharika / pratibhasika?

Ø     Again his realization is that there was a  mistaken knowledge (mithyAjnAna) about rajju caused him the shivering etc. with regard to non-existing sarpa. 

From the rope's new perspective:
Q14: Hypothetically, if the rope has cognitive awareness, has there been any change in its cognition of its nature & attributes? Yes / no?

 

• Rope and analogy is there for the one who is taking the sarpa for rajju and it is not there to talk anything about inert thing rajju (strictly within this drushtAnta) whether rajju has undergone any change or not during ayatArtha jnana or after yathArtha jnana is the head ache of the cognizer not the cognized rope (aspada or adhishtAna). 

 

Furthermore,
Q15: When did Shyam realize that his experience was an adhyasa (error / avidya / ignorance) of "rope misunderstood as a snake"? End of part 1 or end of part 2?

 

• What is your answer to this question??  When Shyam realized the rope jnana?? End of Part 1 or 2 or in between at some point of time when Rama helped and educated him ?? 

As an additional request, as it would help streamline deeper discussion, I would like you to please indulge in reviewing alignment of the 50 points I shared in the link -> https://archive.org/details/reflections-on-fundamentals-of-advaita

>  Would look into it prabhuji but you have to be mentally prepared to accept the new perspectives on those points ofcourse based on shankara’s PTB.  😊

[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms Sri Vikram prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

• Thanks for sharing such a comprehensive list of Advaita tenets.  It is really huge indeed and I am really happy that  I don’t have to disagree with you at most of your observations ofcourse with different perspective. 

 

1. The svarupa lakshana of Brahman is: existence (sat), real (satya), consciousness (chit), knowledge (jnana), bliss (ananda), eternal (nitya), infinite (anadi & ananta), full (purna), partless (avyaya), homogeneous (eka rasa), immutable (kutastha), unchanging (avikara), pure (suddha), devoid of any differentiation whatsoever (sajatiya, vijatiya, svagata abheda)
   2. Per ekam-eva-advitiyam, there is no sajatiya or vijatiya or svagata bheda, whatsoever, in Brahman
   3. Per neha-nanasti-kinchana, there is no plurality or ‘other’ or something ‘else’ whatsoever in Brahman
   4. An infinite homogeneous partless immutable entity cannot have any attributes (viseshana), since an attribute is defined as a quality that is inseparable but distinct from the substance, and there cannot be any distinction in a completely abheda homogenous entity
   5. This Brahman is designated as nirvisesha Brahman for the sake of convenience

 

• >    I completely agree with you.
• 
  6. Any quality associated with Brahman, that has in context or in relation something ‘else’, is only a tatastha lakshana of Brahman. This includes qualities such as sarvajna, sarvasakthi, sarveshvara, creator-sustainer-destroyer of the universe, antaryami, witness, being the locus for something else, etc.
  7. These qualities are the attributes (viseshana) of Brahman and are distinct manifestations
  8. Their relationship with Brahman is that of attribute-substance or shakti-shaktivan or possessed-possessor. In all these cases, they are inseparable but distinct from Brahman.
  9. Brahman described as possessing these qualities is designated as savisesha Brahman for the sake of convenience
•  
• >  sarvajnatva etc. is not exterior qualities of parabrahman it is inherent in brahman ( see tattu samanvayAt & next sUtra bhAshya and introductory bhAshya to Itareya up.)

 

• 
  10. Ontologically, sat is that which once ascertained as existing always remains unchanged across all time. Nirvisesha Brahman is sat.
  11. Ontologically, asat is that which is never experienced as existing. Hare’s horn is asat.

 

• >  The word asat has some other meaning as well for example in shruti asadvA edam agra aaseet etc. We cannot say everything comes out from atyata abhAva like shashavishANa.   In taittireeya bhAshya shankara gives meaning for both sat and asat.  And as per this asat is not hare’s horn but something existing but changing. 

 

• 
  12. Ontologically, mithya is that which is neither sat nor asat nor both (sadasat-vilakshana) - it appears to exist but later sublated. The universe of plurality, the viseshanas & sakthis of savisesha Brahman, snake on a rope, rope itself, mirage, double-moon are all examples of this mithya category. If you do not agree with this definition, please clarify what is the ontological status of a mithya entity.

 

• 13. Anirvachaniya explicitly means the entity cannot be specifically described as sat or as asat or as both simultaneously - the reason why an object may appear to exist but later sublated. There may be other definitions, but if you do not agree with this definition, please clarify what is the right definition of anirvachaniya and if anirvachaniya is sat or asat or both or something else?
  
  

• anirvachaneeyatvaM attributed to mAyA shakti of Ishwara (nAma rUpa) bhAshyakAra gives examples of water, bubble, foam etc. to explain this.  I don’t think anywhere shanakra gives the example of dviteeya Chandra, sarpa on rajju etc. to explain the anirvachaneeyatvaM of mAya.  For example : avyaktaa hi sA mAya tattva anyatva nirUpaNasya ashakhyatvaat, it is a-vyakta that is defying any unambiguous description whether it belongs to brahman and inherent to it or it is entirely different from it.  (su.bh. 1.4.3)

• 
  14. If the above two points are in agreement, then the ontological status of anirvachaniya is mithya
•  
• >  mithyA is due to karaNa dOsha, for that appropriate examples are dviteeya Chandra, sarpa on rajju, silver in nacre etc. because here rajata, sarpa, second moon etc. are illusory / mithyA.  We have seen here in this list itself jagat is like sarpa on the rope hence it is illurory / mithyA etc.  But it is an other way round :  what an ignorant man sees or thinks as a snake is really an illusion, it was /is / never be there at any point of time hence deserved to be called as mithyA / illusion.  What actually he is seeing is a rope just confusing it for a sarpa.  Similarly what one cognizes as jagat as limited (parichinna) abrahma, asarvaM etc. is mithyA jagat but what actually there is brahmAbhinna jagat which you can call as jagat or brahman what is there is adviteeya brahma tattva.  It is because of this reason we say, that which is mithyA can never be anirvachaneeya.  anirvachaneeyatvaM can be explained only when both the kAraNa and kArya or shakti-shakta are simultaneously cognized either by direct perception ( like gold and ornament) or through the shAstra ( where jagat is pratyaksha but brahman is shAstra pramANita abhinna nimittOpadAna kAraNa for this jagat).  But where as mithyA is strictly related to the wrong (mis) conception of an object due to karaNa dOsha or due to some other reason and once we get rid of this dOsha the mithyA darshana of sarpa, rajata, second moon will not be there.  But whereas even after realizing that AbharaNa is nothing suvarNa, the vyAvahArika validity of suvarNAbharaNa would continue.  This is the difference between mithya and anirvachaneeya.  In the anirvachaneeya kArya kAraNa saMbandha, it has been told that its relation with its cause is one of identity.  And like kAraNa this kArya too trikAla abhAdhita.  It is not some ajnAni saying this it has been confirmed by ‘brahmavAdins’ clarifies bhAshyakAra : kAryakAraNa sambandhaH brahma vAdinaH katha eti chet??  Na, tasya tadAtmalakshaNa sambandOpapatteH.  One who knows the svarUpa of this kArya knows ONLY as the cause.  Sri SSS gives an example of a goldsmith view of his jewelry  in the shop as gold and his complete focus on gold and he is not so particular about its (gold’s) nAma and rUpa. 

 

• 
  15. In our current ignorance we believe the entire perceived universe of plurality and change has an independent existence. What is the actual ontological status of the universe and what is the ontological status of the universe as we believe it to be in our ignorance? Both mithya?

 

• >  Please see above, what is independent of brahman is mithyA there exists nothing apart from brahman.  If you see the jagat aloof from brahman it is mithyA jagat but when you see the svarUpa of jagat it is nothing but brahman and we stop calling it jagat and continue to realize it brahman only. 
• 
  16. But let’s say that through shastra and sadhana, we gain the knowledge that this universe is only a nama-rupa change of Brahman and is completely dependent on Brahman. What now becomes the actual ontological status of the universe and the ontological status of our perception of the universe? Still both mithya?
•  
• >  If you see the definition of Samyak darshana, sarvAtma darshana, Atmaikatva drushti etc. you will come to know what is the status of jagat after Samyak jnana. 

 

• 17. Does the nitya-suddha-buddha-mukta-svarupa nirvisesha Brahman perceive or cognize the universe? Answer is no?

 

• dhAta yathA pUrvamakalpayatu is shruti vAkya and accepting the  Ishwara hetuka srushti is ‘vedAnta maryAda’ clarifies bhAshyakAra. 

• 
  18. Is there the perception of this universe for the savisesha Brahman? Answer is yes?
•  
• >  Yes, hence the jagat what we are seeing is brahma mAnasa pratyaya.

 

• 19. Do you believe that, per “brahmavid brahmaiva bhavati”, a knower of Brahman (jnani) verily becomes (is) Brahman? Is this savisesha Brahman or nirvisesha Brahman? Answer is nirvisesha Brahman?

 

• Yes he realizes that he is nirvishesha parabrahman and that is called svarUpa jnana it does not mean his sarvAtma bhAva should vanish in thin air that can happen only after the physical death of that jnani or mahApraLaya but that is not what propagated in sadyO mukti or jeevanmukti.  The jnana is something neither attained lOkAntara nor janmAntara nor attained in a state like samAdhi.  Please note the Atmaikatva jnana is vyavahAra bAdhita jnana but NOT vyavahAra abhAva jnana. 

• 
  20. Does this knower of Brahman perceive or cognize the universe? Answer is no?

 

• aha Mannam, annaada, shlOkakarta is the shruti vAkya from this you can deduce the siddhAnta whether the brahmavida perceives the universe or not.  And your subsequent questionnaire completely pertains to adhyAsa bhAshya and its explanation etc. We can take it as a separate thread.  How for adhyAsa mulAvidyA is upAdAna, how jnAnAdhyAsa is different from arthAdhyAsa, how anirvachaneeya khyAti vAda is different from shankara’s anubhava siddha adhyAsa vAda etc. etc.

[Vikram Jagannathan]

Namaskaram Shri Bhaskar ji,

Thank you for indulging me by responding to my multiple-choice question paper. I can assure you that the intent is only to seek alignment & common ground. :)

However, observing that your responses were not 'from the choices provided', I have taken the liberty to find the appropriate match based on your responses. If you feel any of these are inappropriate, kindly correct me. There are 4 responses, marked with **, that require your explicit review. The questions are: Q3, Q12, Q13 and Q15.

For alignment, I have also mentioned my responses to all these questions.
Note: Terms 'sat' and 'asat' are only used relatively within the context of the scenario and the object of cognition. I am not using them in their more generic terms to denote Brahman or something like hare's horns respectively.

This also summarizes our discussion as it stands. I have provided detailed explanations below this summary, resulting in a rather long post, but which can be conveniently removed in subsequent threads for brevity. Kindly review & confirm on the below summary, before I can move on to my observations and resume on the original topic.

From Ram's current perspective:
Q1: What, per his understanding, is the locus of the object of his cognition - rope? Object on the floor / mind?

Bhaskar ji: object on the floor
Vikram: object on the floor

Q2: What is the relative ontological status of the rope as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?

Bhaskar ji: sat (vyavaharika)
Vikram: sat (vyavaharika)

Q3: What is the relative ontological status of the snake as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?

Bhaskar ji: asat **
Vikram: asat

From Shyam's current perspective:
Q4: What, per his understanding, is the locus of the object of his cognition - snake? Object on the floor / mind?

Bhaskar ji: object on the floor
Vikram: object on the floor

Q5: What is the relative ontological status of the snake as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?

Bhaskar ji: sat (vyavaharika)
Vikram: sat (vyavaharika)

Q6: What is the level of reality of his experience of his body shivering from the cognition of the snake? Vyavaharika / pratibhasika?

Bhaskar ji: vyavaharika
Vikram: vyavaharika

From the rope's current perspective:
Q7: Hypothetically, if the rope has cognitive awareness, does it cognize itself as possessing the nature & attributes of a rope or a snake? Rope / snake?

Bhaskar ji: rope
Vikram: rope

From Ram's new perspective:
Q8: Has there been any change in his cognition of the object? Yes/ no?

Bhaskar ji: no
Vikram: no

From Shyam's new perspective:
Q9: What now, per his current understanding, is the locus of the object of his current cognition - rope? Object on the floor / mind?

Bhaskar ji: object on the floor
Vikram: object on the floor

Q10: What now, per his current understanding, is the locus of the object of his earlier cognition - snake? Object on the floor / mind?

Bhaskar ji: locus of snake was in the mind but the reason for this cognition is the ajnana about the object on the floor
Vikram: locus of snake was in the mind but the reason for this cognition is the ajnana about the object on the floor

Q11: What is the relative ontological status of the rope as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?

Bhaskar ji: sat (vyavaharika)
Vikram: sat (vyavaharika)

Q12: What is the relative ontological status of the snake as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?

Bhaskar ji: **
Vikram: mithya (pratibhasika)

Q13: What now is the level of reality of his experience of his body shivering from the cognition of the snake? Vyavaharika / pratibhasika?

Bhaskar ji: vyavaharika **
Vikram: vyavaharika

From the rope's new perspective:
Q14: Hypothetically, if the rope has cognitive awareness, has there been any change in its cognition of its nature & attributes? Yes / no?

Bhaskar ji: no
Vikram: no

Furthermore,
Q15: When did Shyam realize that his experience was an adhyasa (error / avidya / ignorance) of "rope misunderstood as a snake"? End of part 1 or end of part 2?

Bhaskar ji: end of part 2 **
Vikram: end of part 2

On Wed, Jan 3, 2024 at 3:46 AM Bhaskar YR <bhask...@hitachienergy.com> wrote:

If I understand your position correctly, the perceived snake is purely a "mental imagination" and doesn't have any reality whatsoever (paramarthika / vyavaharika / pratibhasika) outside the mind. Thus the locus of the snake, even while being perceived as such, is the mind alone.

 

• One thing we have to keep in mind that ‘deep’ analysis of all analogies with regard to anyathAgrahaNa can happen only after the posterior knowledge of the object being perceived (yathArtha jnana).  If rajju is perceived as rajju no problem no talks,  likewise, if the snake is really there also no talks and no problem with regard to authenticity of cognition.  Problem and deeper analysis required only when the rajju is perceived as sarpa and later realization of this misconception and correct understanding of actually existing thing.  And it can also be said that if one thinks that there is sarpa (in place of rajju) and run away from that place forever without trying to ascertain what exactly is there then also the deep discussion is not required rather will not take place at all.  So, all these discussions would take place only ‘after’ the dawn of yathArtha jnana of the rajju rather getting rid of ayathArtha jnana of rajju.  Hope you are with me here 😊

Agreed. 

Let's consider the following scenario - Part 1:
Ram and Shyam are walking in Ram's house. In a dimly-lit corridor they perceive a long thin curled "object" lying on the floor, which actually is a rope. Ram cognizes it as a rope and is indifferent to it. Shyam cognizes it as a snake, becomes fearful and starts shivering.

From Ram's current perspective:
Q1: What, per his understanding, is the locus of the object of his cognition - rope? Object on the floor / mind?

 

• From Ram’s perspective it is vyavahAra yOgya rajju only that is what he sees. 

The object is rajju, yes, but my question is the locus of this cognized rajju. Would you say the locus is the "object on the floor" or the "mind"? Based on your response for Q4, I am noting this down as "Object on the floor".

 

Q2: What is the relative ontological status of the rope as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?

 

• As said above, vyavahAra yOgya rajju which he uses daily to draw the water from the well 😊

Fitting your response to the above choices, I am noting down the answer is "sat (vyavaharika)".

 

Q3: What is the relative ontological status of the snake as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?

 

• This question does not arise at all as you yourself confirmed he looks at it ‘as it is’ and is indifferent. 

True. However if one were to ask Ram this question, is it fair to say the response would be "asat" (please reference 'Note:' above)?

 

From Shyam's current perspective:
Q4: What, per his understanding, is the locus of the object of his cognition - snake? Object on the floor / mind?

 

• In this story of rAma-shyAma, the ‘Aspada’ for the cognition of snake is,  the object on the floor and cognition of sarpa is due to this object on the floor.  ( Please note I am not taking the exceptions of adhyAsa as explained by bhAshyakAra in adhyAsa bhAshya and I am just replying to your questions based on your story at rAma’s house 😊 )

Fair enough. Noting down your response as "object on the floor".

 

Q5: What is the relative ontological status of the snake as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?

 

• From the shyam’s current perspective ( which is quite evident that there will be a talk about future realization of something else!!) it is ‘snake’ that he is perceiving.  And shyAm’s current perspective he is ‘just’ seeing the snake without thinking about rope nor anything he would entertain anything about his memories of snake.  ( again please note I am not considering smruti rUpa, pUrva drushtAvabhAsa etc. which bhAshyakAra clarifies and am just going with the flow of your story).

Going by the word 'just' and the earlier agreed remark, I am noting down your response as "sat (vyavaharika)"

 

Q6: What is the level of reality of his experience of his body shivering from the cognition of the snake? Vyavaharika / pratibhasika?

 

• Shivering of his body ‘as real as’  his seeing the snake on the floor. 

Going by response to Q5, noting down as "vyavaharika"

 

From the rope's current perspective:

Q7: Hypothetically, if the rope has cognitive awareness, does it cognize itself as possessing the nature & attributes of a rope or a snake? Rope / snake?

 

• I am afraid hypothetically also this question is not valid!!  It is just like asking  barren women has two sons rAma and shyAma and who is elder and who is younger?? 😊 the basic premise of this question itself is wrong because of the simple reason it is the problem of shyAm does not have anything to do with rajju.  bhAshyakAra himself says there is no aNumAtramapi change in rajju even when one is seeing it as something else!!

Agreed. Since there is not even an iota of snake in the rope, for explicit response and alignment, I am noting this down as "rope".

 

Next, let's continue with the scenario - Part 2:

Seeing Shyam fearful, Ram clarifies that "it is just a rope". On hearing these words, Shyam recognizes the object as a rope. His fear is gone but his body is still shivering

 

• Yes

From Ram's new perspective:
Q8: Has there been any change in his cognition of the object? Yes/ no?

 

• Where is the question of Ram’s new perspective here?? Earlier did he have some other perspective??  He was / is seeing rope as rope only !!  is it not??

Yes. But being explicit and unambiguous I did not wish to presume there was no new perspective. This also keeps the narrative cleaner in the summary. I will note down your response as "no".

 

From Shyam's new perspective:
Q9: What now, per his current understanding, is the locus of the object of his current cognition - rope? Object on the floor / mind?

 

Ø     His current understanding or locus of his earlier misunderstanding (as sarpa) is rope or object what exactly lies there on the floor. 

Noting down your response as "object on the floor".

 

Q10: What now, per his current understanding, is the locus of the object of his earlier cognition - snake? Object on the floor / mind?

 

Ø     He understands earlier also there was rope only and by mistake he took it as snake and thanked Ram for helping him to get rid of his misconception.  (anyathAgrahaNa or adhyAsa).

Agreed. But my question is - with his current new understanding that the locus of the rope is the "object on the floor", what is now his understanding of the locus of his earlier cognition as the snake? Does he still feel that the earlier cognition of the snake is still the "object on the ground" or does he realize that the locus was his "mind"? Going with your response to Q9 & Q12, is it safe to mark this as "locus of snake was in the mind alone but the reason for this cognition is the ajnana about the object on the floor"?

 

Q11: What is the relative ontological status of the rope as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?

 

• I think you are repeating the questions phrasing it differently !! aren’t you?? 

No, the question is distinct and intentional. With the realization of the object as the rope, and based on your responses to Q2 and Q5, is it fair to note down your response as "sat (vyavaharika)"?

 

Q12: What is the relative ontological status of the snake as the object? Sat (vyavaharika) / mithya (pratibhasika) / asat?

Ø     His realization fetched him the knowledge that there was / is never snake out there and snake was only in his mind due to his ajnAna about the rajju (jnana abhAva of the actually existing rajju)

This is an important question and I would request you to please respond on the current ontological status of the earlier cognized snake. I would like to highlight your response "snake was only in his mind due to his ajnAna about the rajju"; Particularly the word 'due' marking the relationship between the cognition and its cause.

 

Q13: What now is the level of reality of his experience of his body shivering from the cognition of the snake? Vyavaharika / pratibhasika?

Ø     Again his realization is that there was a  mistaken knowledge (mithyAjnAna) about rajju caused him the shivering etc. with regard to non-existing sarpa. 

Yes, but what is the level of reality of the continued shivering? Going by response to Q6, can it be said that this is still "vyavaharika" as the body is still actually shivering?

 

From the rope's new perspective:
Q14: Hypothetically, if the rope has cognitive awareness, has there been any change in its cognition of its nature & attributes? Yes / no?

 

• Rope and analogy is there for the one who is taking the sarpa for rajju and it is not there to talk anything about inert thing rajju (strictly within this drushtAnta) whether rajju has undergone any change or not during ayatArtha jnana or after yathArtha jnana is the head ache of the cognizer not the cognized rope (aspada or adhishtAna). 

 

Agreed. I just want to be explicit that throughout the entire scenario, from the rope's perspective, there has never been an iota of snake on the rope. If it had cognitive self awareness, it would always cognize itself only as the rope. So marking this response as "no".

 

Furthermore,
Q15: When did Shyam realize that his experience was an adhyasa (error / avidya / ignorance) of "rope misunderstood as a snake"? End of part 1 or end of part 2?

 

• What is your answer to this question??  When Shyam realized the rope jnana?? End of Part 1 or 2 or in between at some point of time when Rama helped and educated him ?? 

My response, within the mentioned choices, is "end of part 2", since at the "end of part 1" Shyam had the cognition of a snake as the object on the floor. This includes the time after "end of part 1" when Ram helped and educated him. Going with your response for Q12, marking the same for you.

 

As an additional request, as it would help streamline deeper discussion, I would like you to please indulge in reviewing alignment of the 50 points I shared in the link -> https://archive.org/details/reflections-on-fundamentals-of-advaita

>  Would look into it prabhuji but you have to be mentally prepared to accept the new perspectives on those points ofcourse based on shankara’s PTB.  😊

 

Bhaskar ji, I am a seeker of Truth and not a reviewer or a judge or an upholder of a particular sampradhayam. Thanks for providing your opinion on the other thread.

 

with humble prostrations,

Vikram