In the Gita bhashya 13 chapter Shankaracharya through a short dialogue demonstrates that avidya is objectified and not the property of the observer consciousness. This is what clinches the case in favour of Avidya being Bhava rupa according to Shankaracharya as he includes Avidya along with the experiences of misery etc. This very chapter has categorised Kshetra as consisting of of the five elements and the elemental world outside, the organs through which we experience the outside world and, most importantly, the emotions such as desire, anger, misery which are included in Kshetram that is distinct from the observer Chaitanya consciousness, the Kshetrajna.
Surely for those who hold that Avidya is jnanabhava and not any bhaava rupa category, there is the responsibility of proving that desire, hatred, etc. that are experienced by all are also some 'abhava' and not bhava.
The following is the translation the whole dialogue by Swami Gambhirananda.
The terms in the Bhashya that clinch the issue are:
यदा च एवम् ,
अविद्यादुःखित्वाद्यैः न ज्ञातुः क्षेत्रज्ञस्य किञ्चित् दुष्यति ॥
(Therefore Avidya, misery, etc. do not taint the observer Consciousness (that is, they are not the property of Atman but the dharma of the anatman, manas)
यदि पुनः अविद्या ज्ञेया, अन्यद्वा ज्ञेयं ज्ञेयमेव ।
If avidya is observed, jneya, just like any other jneya, Avidya is jneya for sure (and not the Knower, jnaata, consciousness)
There is no doubt that iccha, dvesha, etc. are jneya.
One cannot club abhava with bhava. Since Shankara clubs avidya with iccha,dvesha, etc. which are all indisputably bhaava, it goes without saying that for Shankara avidya too is bhava. If that were not so, he should not have clubbed avidya with iccha etc. that are clearly antahkarana dharmas. This also answers the objection that the talk of 'locus' for avidya is a post-Shankara concept. Shankara clearly localizes avidya to antahkarana along with iccha, devesha, etc. Also, here Shankara holds avidya to be located in the jiva: jivaashrita avidya. In the Brihadaranyaka 1.4.10 'aham brahma asmi' bhashya, Shankara accepts avidya to Brahman. Thus Brahmaashritaa avidya is also accepted by Shankara. All these concepts are not post-Shankara products.
So, Shankara holds avidya to be an observed, just like misery, desire, etc. are saakshi vedya. So, by no means can avidya, like iccha, dvesha, be an abhava rupa. By including Avidya in the same category of iccha, etc. Shankara has held Avidya to be bhava rupa.
Gambhirananda:
Oh! Sir, if being ignorant, sorrowful, etc. are qualities of the Self, how is it that they are directly perceived? Or how can they be alities of the Knower of the field? If the conclusion be that all that is known constitutes the field, and that the one who knows is verily the knower of the field, then, to say that being ignorant, sorrowful, etc.are the qualities of the knower of the field and that they are directly perceived is a contradictory statement having only ignorance as its basis. Here, (the opponent) asks: To whom does ignorance belong? (The answer is that) it belongs verily to him by whom it is experienced! Objection: In whom is it perceived? Reply: Here the answer is: It is pointless to ask, 'In whom is ignorance experienced?' Objection: How? Reply: If ignorance be perceived (by you), then you perceive its possessor as well. Moreover, when that possessor of ignorance is perceived it is not reasonable to ask, 'In whom is it perceived?' For, when an owner of cattle is seen, the estion, 'To whom do the cattle belong', does not become meaningful. Objection: Well, is not the illustration dissimilar? Since, the cattle and their owner are directly perceived, their relation also is directly perceived. Hence the estion is meaningless. Ignorance and its possessor are not directly perceived in that manner, in which case the estion would have been meaningless. Reply: What will it matter to you if you know the relation of ignorance with a person who is not directly perceived as possessed of ignorance? Opponent: Since ignorance is a source of evil, therefore it should be got rid of. Reply: He to whom ignorance belongs will get rid of it! Opponent: Indeed, ignorance belongs to myself. Reply: In that case, you know ignorance as also yourself who possess it? Opponent: I know, but not through direct perception. Reply: If you know through inference, then how is the connection (between yourself and ignorance) known? Surely it is not possible for you the knower to have at that time ['When you are knowing your own ignorance.'] the knowledge of the relation (of the Self) with ignorance which is an object of knowledge; ['After having perceived ignorance as an object of your knowledge, how can you who continue to be the knower cognize yourself as the knower of that ignorance? For this would lead to the contradiction of the same person becoming the subject and the object of cognition.'] because the cognizer is then engaged in cognizing ignorance as an object. Besides, there cannot be someone who is a (separate) cognizer of the relation between the knower and ignorance, and a separate cognition of that (relation), for this would lead to infinite regress. If the knower and the relation between the knower and the thing known be cognizable, then a separate cognizer has to be imagined. Of him, again, another knower has to be imagined; of him again a separate cognizer would have to be imagined! Thus, an infinite regress becomes unavoidable. Again, whether the knowable be ignorance or anything else, a knowable is verily a knowable; similarly, even a knower is surely a knower; he does not become a knowable. And when this is so, [Since the knower cannot be known, therefore his relation with ignorance also cannot be known by himself or by anybody else] nothing of the cognizer-the knower of the field-is tainted by such defects as ignorance, sorrowfulness, etc.
End quote.
regards
subbu