some keen insights from ABD Smt Manjushree Hegde, Sankara's Two Truths as Pedagogy, 11 May 2026 in J. of Hindu Studies, OUP
This assertion, articulated from the stance of the sākṣin, is categorically different from the same assertion if/when articulated from the stance of an individual, embodied and embedded in the vyāvahārika-world. Comans claims that SSS (absurdly) asserts that the vyāvahārika-world—a shared, public domain—is intrinsically linked to myy [an individual’s] waking state. Such an assertion leads to the (undesirable) conclusion that the external world, like the world of dreams, is private, subjective and idiosyncratic to each individual. This is the doctrine of dṛṣtisṛṣti—the creation of the world is concomitant with its perception—which Śaṅkara (certainly) does not subscribe to (Comans 2000, p. 262). Doherty makes the same accusation: ‘[dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭivāda] is, however, consistent with the rest of Satchidānandendra’s thought. Even if he had not named it, dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda is the inevitable consequence of several of his views…’ (Doherty 1999, p. 123). SSS does not, in fact, assert that the ‘common world of experience’ ‘vanishes when a person is in dream or sleep’. To say that a person is awake/dreams/sleeps within a common world of experience is the lokadṛṣṭi. From this stance, SSS asserts the reality of the dualistic world, its continuance through the three states, etc; uncompromisingly, he upholds the logic of the vyāvahārika. It is from the śāstradṛṣṭi—as awareness only—that SSS discusses the sublation of the waking state—and with it, the waking world—in dream/deep sleep. From the stance of the sākṣin/awareness, the “shared” world of experience is, in its entirety, simply contents/objects presented to awareness; its consistency/intersubjectivity—features that appear intrinsic to it—are no evidence of its independence/autonomy. SSS’ argument is echoed in Dalal’s observation: ‘The world is independent of mind, but dependent on the witnessing observer. Thus, he [Śaṅkara] is able to collapse the contents of experience into witnessing consciousness without necessarily reducing the external object to mere cognition and as being wholly created by cognition’ (Dalal 2022, p. 411).
Doherty observes, ‘[SSS’ argument] is all true, of course, from the absolute standpoint (pāramārthika-dṛṣṭyā) and Satchidanandendra’s opponents would not contest this’ (Doherty 2005, p. 227). The key point is that SSS’ sākṣin-stance is different from the PSA’s pāramārthikadṛṣṭi; the latter is achieved post-gnosis, and is not immediately accessible. The PSA posit the sublation of the phenomenal world as a future “event” of “awakening” to the ultimate reality (Hirst 2005, p. 92). In contrast, to take the sākṣinstance is to notice what is available in direct experience—the irrefutable absence of the waking world in the dream (svapne vipratipadyate) and deep sleep states—to understand its ultimate reality (tasmādādyantavatvena mithyaiva khalu te smṛtāḥ) (GKB 2.7). It is therefore that SSS argues—that Śaṅkarācārya argues—that the world is incontestably real from the vyāvahārika perspective; from the sākṣin standpoint, on the other hand, the vyāvahārika-world is illusory for its sublation (in dream/deep sleep) is directly cognised (Saraswati 2009b, p. 90). From the perspective of absolute non-dual reality, there is nothing to be said at all. SSS is clear that the śāstradṛṣṭi does not undermine the lokadṛṣṭi: it is an epistemic standpoint to understand the ultimate reality. Comans’ (and Doherty’s) criticism conflates the two.This conflation/confusion stems from a very valid concern: how is the examination of the contents of awareness of the waking state—as experienced by the (contemplating) individual—not constrained by their subjectivity; how, in other words, a clearly subjective starting point of inquiry can be called as a universal, trans-personal perspective; for indisputably, it is an individual who must undertake the inquiry— the epistemic shift from lokadṛṣṭi to śāstradṛṣṭi—to examine the contents of awareness—of ‘their’ waking/dream/deep-sleep states—as the disinterested Witness. SSS argues that the stance of the Witness is a heuristic tool of inquiry that allows us to see that despite the appearance of the immediate point-of-access to awareness as subjective, awareness itself is prior to the I-notion, and also ‘subjectivity’, and is therefore, trans-subjective.41 The critical move from lokadṛṣṭi to śāstradṛṣṭi allows the critical insight that the very notion of individuality, the sense of ‘my’ experience, is itself a content of awareness. By rigorously analysing our ‘subjective’ experience from the standpoint of awareness, we are forced to re-evaluate ‘subjectivity’ itself; the inquiry progressively unravels the limitations of our habitual, individualised perspective and points towards a more fundamental reality; it employs our ‘subjective experiences’ to show their limitations.
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Namaste, sir,
Thank you for your very kind words. My thanks also to V. Subramanian ji for his comments.
Um, maybe you could share the complete paper with him? The arguments are designed to be understood holistically. The paper carefully examines how the terms vyāvahārika and pāramārthika dṛṣṭi carry different meanings when used by SSS verses the PSA. The challenge lies in that while these terms are identical, they are interpreted differently by both. This has led to arguments where both sides miss each other's intended meanings. Understanding what each tradition means by these same terms is crucial for productive discourse.
I would like to clarify that adhyāropa-apavāda is an approach to reading texts. When Śaṅkarācār̥ya makes a claim in one place, he always—without exception—contradicts it elsewhere. If he says "the world depends on the mind" somewhere, he will definitely deny this same point in another passage. The second statement (apavāda) is meant to correct or qualify the first one (adhyāropa). My main argument is that we must read these statements together as pairs, not cherry-pick one statement and present it as Śaṅkarācārya's final position. This dialectical approach is how the texts are designed to be understood. The critical error in contemporary scholarship lies in isolating individual statements, interpreting them independently, and then reifying these partial readings as Śaṅkarācārya's definitive position.
We misunderstand Śaṅkarācārya when we isolate just one of these statements. The true teaching emerges from reading both the provisional statement and its later qualification together, as a deliberate pedagogical pair. This is why I respectfully suggest that citing isolated passages doesn't fully capture his teaching—I'm fairly certain that given time, one could locate the corresponding contradictory statement for any single quote presented.
If you ask, what is the purpose of making a statement only to contradict it later? Each statement serves a specific function in its momentary existence before being negated - it is designed to refute some particular misconception that a seeker holds. So, rather than focusing solely on what Śaṅkarācārya positively affirms, we should examine what erroneous notion each positive (but provisional) statement is meant to refute. The teaching moves in stages, systematically clearing away layers of misunderstanding.
I'd like to add another important point: The PSA are certainly aware that Śaṅkarācārya systematically contradicts his own statements—they also recognize this as the adhyāropa-apavāda method. However, where I believe they've taken a problematic turn is in how they categorize these statements. They've essentially mapped these contradictory pairs onto separate ontological realms: they treat the initial statements (adhyāropa) as "vyāvahārika" definitions that represent relative truth before mokṣa, while considering the contradicting statements (apavāda) as "pāramārthika" definitions that only become relevant after mokṣa. This interpretation creates an artificial division where the apavāda statements are relegated to some future state of realization—as though they're not immediately relevant to the seeker's current understanding. The practical consequence is that they primarily work with the adhyāropa statements to construct their philosophical system, effectively sidelining half of Śaṅkara's dialectical method. This approach fundamentally misunderstands the pedagogical immediacy of the dialectic. Both parts of the contradiction are meant to work together in the present moment of understanding, not be assigned to different reality levels. This is precisely why a thorough clarification of the terms "vyāvahārika" and "pāramārthika" is absolutely essential—which is exactly what my paper undertakes. These terms serve as the conceptual hinges upon which the entire interpretative framework turns. Until there's engagement with these terms, a meaningful dialogue on these interpretative differences is quite impossible.
Regarding dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi - the book I've attached nicely demonstrates how this is a PSA development.
Thank you,
Manjushree.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/179YcpOFTuMImrG0JTNuuTmsVU1EqWFlK/view?usp=sharing
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Namaste Subbuji, Smt. Hedgeji reply and link to her recent paper:
Namaste, sir,
Thank you for your very kind words. My thanks also to V. Subramanian ji for his comments.
We misunderstand Śaṅkarācārya when we isolate just one of these statements. The true teaching emerges from reading both the provisional statement and its later qualification together, as a deliberate pedagogical pair. This is why I respectfully suggest that citing isolated passages doesn't fully capture his teaching—I'm fairly certain that given time, one could locate the corresponding contradictory statement for any single quote presented.
praNAms
Hare Krishna
The above highlighted observation is contradicted by Shankara and Gaudapada:
https://adbhutam.wordpress.com/2017/07/29/the-world-is-mind-alone-shankaracharya/ (the details of the bhashya are there in this post)
In both the Mundaka Upanishad bhashya and the Mandukya Karika bhashya, Shankara asserts that the world is dependent on the mind by default and even reasons: when the mind is active, the world is cognized and when the mind is not active, in deep sleep and samadhi, the world is not cognized.
Hence, cognition is creation - dristi sristi vāda - is explicitly accepted as the śāstra dristi by Shankara and Gaudapada. The loka drishti is denied by them as avidya kalpita and the shastra drsti is accepted as the one contradicting the loka dristi. In fact in the Bh.Gita verse 2.69 bhashya says it all: the distinction between the loka drsti and sastra dristi, that is, the sastra dristi contradicting/negating the loka dristi. There are many more instances of such a view of Shankara.
Ø There is nothing to prove in 2.69 geeta verse that world is mere construction, OTOH, how pramAtru, prameya and pramANa distinctions are avidyA Kalpita, how shAstra being the untya pramANa removes the very knowership etc. there is absolutely nothing to prove Ishwara srushti is mental construction of tiny jeeva’s mind. I am really surprised to see this totally irrelevant reference from geeta bhAshya!!. It deals mainly about ajnAni-s rAga dvesha and jnAni-s dvandvaateeta stable mind.
Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!
bhaskar
praNAms
Hare Krishna
The above highlighted observation is contradicted by Shankara and Gaudapada:
- No not at all really!! Both shankara and gaudapAda clearly says jagat is NOT just jeeva mAnasa pratyaya…OTOH Ishwara hetuka srushti is vedAnta maryAda insists bhAshyakAra. Seeing IT in ‘in’ and ‘out’ is what gaudapAda too emphasizes.
https://adbhutam.wordpress.com/2017/07/29/the-world-is-mind-alone-shankaracharya/ (the details of the bhashya are there in this post)
In both the Mundaka Upanishad bhashya and the Mandukya Karika bhashya, Shankara asserts that the world is dependent on the mind by default and even reasons: when the mind is active, the world is cognized and when the mind is not active, in deep sleep and samadhi, the world is not cognized.
- But don’t you prabhuji-s are the vociferous advocators of mithyA vastu darshana in sushupti also?? And unconditionally accepting the existence of bhAva rUpa / kAraNAvidyA in sushupti?? You have place for avidyA but you don’t have the place for Ishwara srushti!!?? Quite strange indeed!! Please note shankara refuted the buddhist’s vijnAnavAda (the school which says ‘mind all” and nothing outside). In one of his works Sri SSS clearly says : the universe is NOT an illusion according to bAdarAyana as explained by shankara. vyavahAra (human procedure in common life) has its own criterion for testing the reality and unreality. It is the Buddhists who deny reality to external objects. The vijnAnavAdin says that the object is identical with the idea, since both of them are experienced to gether. But shankara draws our attention to the principle : it is on the evidence or want of evidence of some valid means of knowledge that we have to determine the conceivability or the inconceivability of the existence of a thing and NOT vice versa. (sUtra bhAshya 2-2-28). It is no doubt bhAshyakAra every now and them insisted to realize the essential identity of the jagat with brahman.
Hence, cognition is creation - dristi sristi vāda - is explicitly accepted as the śāstra dristi by Shankara and Gaudapada. The loka drishti is denied by them as avidya kalpita and the shastra drsti is accepted as the one contradicting the loka dristi. In fact in the Bh.Gita verse 2.69 bhashya says it all: the distinction between the loka drsti and sastra dristi, that is, the sastra dristi contradicting/negating the loka dristi. There are many more instances of such a view of Shankara.
Ø There is nothing to prove in 2.69 geeta verse that world is mere construction, OTOH, how pramAtru, prameya and pramANa distinctions are avidyA Kalpita, how shAstra being the untya pramANa removes the very knowership etc. there is absolutely nothing to prove Ishwara srushti is mental construction of tiny jeeva’s mind. I am really surprised to see this totally irrelevant reference from geeta bhAshya!!. It deals mainly about ajnAni-s rAga dvesha and jnAni-s dvandvaateeta stable mind.
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namaste Sudhanshuji, THe book you've attached??From the Sri Swami Paramarthanandaji Bot containing 15000 pages of transcribed talks of the venerable swamiji, DSV is rejected for the reasons below. Additionally, how will DSV account for sAkshi and Eshwara?Swami Paramarthananda rejects *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi vāda* (the theory that the world is created by individual perception) as the *final teaching* of Advaita Vedanta for **philosophical, pedagogical, and practical reasons**, rooted in Śaṅkara's works and the *Brahma Sūtras*. Here’s a detailed breakdown of his critique:
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namaste Sudhanshuji, THe book you've attached??
From the Sri Swami Paramarthanandaji Bot containing 15000 pages of transcribed talks of the venerable swamiji, DSV is rejected for the reasons below.
Additionally, how will DSV account for sAkshi and Eshwara?
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Would you or even Swami P's disciples have known to reference Vichara Saagar, page 1445 without the Bot?
Just to be sure, these terms are defined as, " pure consciousness (Brahman) conditioned by māyā" and pure consciousness (Brahman) reflected in avidyā (ignorance), respectively, by the Bot.
The idea of asanga chaitanya with an upadhi and actual ignorance that can be a reflecting medium doesn't make much sense to me.
Are they elaborations upon the notions of mula and tula avidya? Instead both terms are sastrika superimpositions intended to dissuade notions of individuality and objective realism intended to be ultimately withdrawn. Otherwise, what is the benefit of creating multiple avidyas? Do we find that in PTB or is it just another new theoretical elaboration?
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praNAms
Hare Krishna
Malavidya is central to Advaita. Whenever Advaita says avidyA, it is mUlAvidyA.
The sum and substance is this -- whatever is seen, is illusory.
The seer is non-illusory. Even I is illusory. The entity intended by the word I is non-illusory.
what is the benefit of creating multiple avidyas? Do we find that in PTB or is it just another new theoretical elaboration?
praNAms Sri MCC prabhuji
Hare Krishna
The benefit of introducing multiple avidyA-s is quite simple that it would help the promotion of anirvachaneeya bhAva rUpa, brahmAshrita avidyA. But I don’t think vivaraNa would endorse the theory of multiple avidyA-s to multiple jeeva-s and I think it is bhAmati who says this. As per vivaraNa mUlAvidyA is anAdi, have the Ashraya in brahman, it is sadasad vilakshaNa, anAdi coz. it has the ashraya of Shuddha Chaitanya. Will be there in sushupti also with vikshepa saMskAra, and in waking and dreaming projected in the form of ahamkara, and it is the material cause for the adhyAsa etc. etc. Whereas bhAshyakAra very clearly says avidyA which is jnAnAbhAva is eka rUpa.
praNAms
Hare Krishna
Commenting on this Shankara says: It means that those who are given to enquire into the ultimate reality, do not hold creation to be of any purport. ...A section of those stated above hold that creation is akin to......
according to jeevas’ own Karma.
Shankara can be seen here to hold the latter group also as those who are not really after the ultimate upanishadic Truth. Shankaracharya concludes by saying: Therefore aspirants after liberation are concerned with the Turiya alone and not with the creation that is of no use, consequence. See the last part of the commentary.
This is not to deny the invaluable benefit of imbibing aasthikya, bhakti, etc. that can be had from looking upon Brahman as the creator.
praNAms
Hare Krishna
Note that the requirement of a purified mind to appreciate vivarta and by extension DSV. So the Acharyas have taken enough care to avoid pitfalls in Vedanta sadhana.
praNAms
Hare Krishna
The very first Brahma Sutra enjoins the prepared mind to embark upon the Vedanta enquiry. All bhakti sadhana is included in the chitta shuddhi required.
Ø Yes and karma, karma yOga, nishkAma karma too advised for the chitta Shuddhi.
The path is: Karma > Bhakti / Upasana > Jnana. All Upanishads, Gaudapada and Shankara have this in built carefully crafted path.
- The sum and substance of whatever is seen is brahman not illusory…
praNAms
Hare Krishna
You have not appreciated bAdha-sAmAmAdhikaraNya. The ghost is post, the snake is rope ---- these statements mean that snake/ghost is illusory and rope/post is real.
"Seen is Brahman" means seen is illusory and Brahman is real.
Ø The seen, seer the act of seeing etc. are all brahman only and there exists nothing but brahman is what is called sarvAtmabhAva. Na cha bhOktru bhOgyayOritaretarabhAvApattirnacha parasmAd ‘brahmaNOnyatvaM bhavishyati clarifies bhAshyakAra in sUtra, the shewaashwatara too clarifies in one its mantra-s. ahamannaM ahamannAdaH ahaM shlOkakarta is the clarion call of the brahma jnAni. It is because of the simple reason for the seen (nAma rUpa/the effect) brahman is the abhinna nimittOpadAna kAraNaM.
You cannot say that "seen is Brahman" does not mean "seen is illusory".
Ø Seeing the snake in place of rope is illusory (avidyA bhrAnti drushti / ayatArtha jnAna/jeeva mAnasa pratyaya / adhyAsa drushti / atasmin tadbuddhiH) seeing the rope in rope is yathArtha jnAna. Seeing the jagat independently from brahman is avidyA drushti seeing the jagat non different from brahman is realizing the svarUpa of jagat i.e. brahman.
Do you deny bAdha-sAmAmAdhikaraNya or do you not understand it? Or do you advocate pariNAma-vAda?
Ø Whether it is brahma pariNAma vAda or vivarta vAda or bAdha sAmAnAdhikAraNya, the bottom line or ultimate siddhAnta is brahman is nirvikAri, nirvishesha, niravayava but the jnAni who realizes that this brahman is nirvishesha gets that knowledge through sama darshana….sarveshu brahAdisthAvarAnteshu vishameshu sarvabhUteshu samaM nirvisheshaM brahmAtmaikatvavishayaM darshanaM jnAnaM yasya saH sarvatra samadarshanaH. If one arrives / realized this knowledge the means of this realization is hardly a matter of concern to him.
Swami Paramarthananda rejects *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi vāda* (the theory that the world is created by individual perception) as the *final teaching* of Advaita Vedanta for **philosophical, pedagogical, and practical reasons**, rooted in Śaṅkara's works and the *Brahma Sūtras*.
praNAms Sri MCC prabhuji
Hare Krishna
I am not familiar with this Swamiji’s work. But DSV is plainly goes against shAstra / yukti / anubhava. Dream srushti by individual can not be the justification to reject the Ishwara srushti especially bhAshyakAra saying that the creation never ever possible by jeeva, the finite and limited individual being / tiny soul with qualified / conditioned mind. In sUtra bhAshya he clarifies the jeeva who is not Ishwara (the sarva shakta) is not at all capable of making manifest the many and varied names and forms of mountains, rivers, oceans and the like. For that matter he further clarifies even the siddha purusha, yOgi-s, pavAda purusha-s who have acquired the siddhis (occult powers) of aNimAdi ashta siddhi-s. cannot effect the manifestation of the creation and manage its affairs. It is possible ONLY by sarvajna, sarvashakta, nitya, Shuddha, buddha, mukta, avidyA vinirmukta Ishwara. Again whenever there is any meaningful talk on jagat srushti we have to have Ishwara not the jeeva.