A Post-Shankara Advaitin says 'anādi ajnāna, etc. are mithyā'
V Subrahmanian
Nor is the reason (hetu) unestablished (asiddha), because the scriptures declare that ignorance, its connection (with the Self), jīva-hood, and the like are removed by knowledge (vidyā). A more detailed discussion of this is given elsewhere."
Recently we saw another Post Shankara Advaitin also hold that avidya, etc. are mithya.
Swami Vidyaranya, in his Anubhuti Prakasha has said:
अविद्यादिनिवृत्तिश्च चैतन्यव्यतिरेकतः ।
नास्तीत्येवमभिप्राय एवकारेण सूच्यते ॥ १८.२६९॥
The cessation of anādi Avidya, etc. is also not distinct from Brahman.
Here too the appearance/superimposition of Avidya, etc., on Brahman is admitted to be non-different from Brahman. This implies that Avidya, etc. are only appearances in Brahman.
All the above prove unequivocally that proponents of the concept of Mūlāvidyā do not consider it a real entity apart from Brahman. In other words, admitting Mulavidya does not render Brahman un-Advaitic, meaning it doesn't introduce a second entity.
Warm regards
subbu
Jaishankar Narayanan
upAdAna-kArana is defined as follows in different traditional texts
1. कार्याभिन्नकारणं – The cause which is non-different from the effect like even the clay is non-different from clay-pot.
2. कार्यान्वितम् कारणं - The cause which inheres in the effect like even the clay inheres in the clay-pot.
3. कार्याधारत्वे सति कार्यजनिहेतुः – that which becomes the cause for the production / creation of the effect being the support / foundation / basis of the effect.
Now in all these definitions there is no mention of whether upAdAna is a material like solid, liquid, gas, plasma etc. It is the cause which is found wherever the effect is found. In fact, the effect cannot even be cognised without cognising the upAdAna-kAranA. Even modern science says that matter can be both wave and particle (anirvachanIya) and also matter and energy are interchangeable. So, in reality a cause need not be a material in the sense we normally understand at the macro level, which is all only an appearance / Maya.
Generally, upAdAna-kArana is translated as ‘Material Cause’ which can be confusing as people then think it should be a tangible substance. According to our Shastra, Maya is the upAdAna-kAranA for the entire jagat / universe and it is not a tangible substance as it avyakta (unmanifest) and sookshma (subtle). Even Modern Science says that sub atomic particles or quarks are the building blocks of quantum systems and a quantum system itself can spread as a transcendental wave, which is not tangible and needs to be collapsed by an observer. Some translators use ‘Proximate Cause’ for upAdAna-kArana, which is better.
Even if upAdAna is material, it does not matter as all that is drishya are mithyA which is the traditional teaching. If the vyakta mithyA jagat does not affect the advaya status of brahman how can avyakta mithya mAyA or mithyA mulAvidyA can affect advaita? mulAvidya is drishya as it is sAkshi-bhAsya and so it is mithyA.
Further if atasmin tad-buddhih (erroneous cognition which is adhyAsa) alone is avidyA, then it cannot be called naisargika by bhAshyakAra. This erroneous cognition is not there in deep sleep and it is there once you wake up. So it is created every time a samsAri wakes up. So only mulAvidyA is really naisargika and it is there wherever and whenever subject-object duality is perceived which makes it the upAdAna-kAraNa of the entire objective world.
This entire prakriya is against all established means of knowledge. BhAshyakAra says अभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिरिति सर्वप्रमाणव्याकोप इति - abhāvādbhāvotpattiriti sarvapramāṇavyākopa iti in Taittiriya Sambandha Bhashya but SSS and his followers claim that from jnAna-abhAva in sleep a samsAri is born in waking which is completely against Shankara's siddanta. What is the difference between absence of knoweldge and absence any other thing like gagabugan? Absence cannot have any visheshaNa so what is so special about jnAna-abhAva.
Further in the same Taittiriya Sambandha bhashya अभावस्य विशेषाभावाद्विकल्पमात्रमेतत् । भावप्रतियोगी ह्यभावः ... न ह्यभाव उत्पलादिवद्विशेषणसहभावी । विशेषणवत्त्वे भाव एव स्यात् । - abhāvasya viśeṣābhāvādvikalpamātrametat । bhāvapratiyogī hyabhāvaḥ ... na hyabhāva utpalādivadviśeṣaṇasahabhāvī । viśeṣaṇavattve bhāva eva syāt ।
If abhAva has any qualities then it is bhAva only.
Further they also twist the adhyAropa-apavAda and also claim falsely as though it was invented by SSS. In fact they claim that adhyAropa should not be explanatory as though it is a dosha or defect. Actually it is adhyAropa only for the advaitins and not for others. So adhyAropa also should explain the vyavahAra properly and it should be beyond logic and not illogical. SSS followers frequently use adhyAropa itself as an excuse to paper over their illogical arguments.
Finally this prakriya leads to anirmoksha prasanga (moksha is not possible). All the proponents of this prakriya, with whom I have interacted for over 30 years now, are either waiting for dvaita perception to end or to become 'projections' of ignorant masses' - as otherwise they cannot be jnAnis. One senior follower even claimed Shankara himself never claimed himself to be a jnAni. The greatest casualty of this prakriya is that they deny the svAnubhava of a jnAni as a jnAni.
So mumukshus should shun such prakriyas which lead to anirmoksha-prasanga. They should not be mislead by academics who are only motivated by their livelihood and status.
with love and prayers.
Jaishankar
Namaste Subbuji,
The accusation of a second thing in addition to Brahman stems from
mulavidya vada demanding a material cause.
Padmapada:
[" Mithyajnana nimitta iti
" 23—that which is mithya
(erroneous) and at the same time, ajnana (nescience) is mithyajnana.]
The word ' mithya ' means * inexpressible ' (anirvacanlya),
and by the word * ajnana ' is meant the potency of avidya which
is of the nature of insentience and is the negation of jnana. And
' tannimitta ' means * having that (viz., mithyajnana) as the
material cause.'
Siddhantabindu:
*§57* नापि भ्रमसंशयतत्संस्कारपरम्पराऽरूपम्, अपरोक्षत्वात्,
अतीतानागतभ्रमसंशयतत्संस्काराणां चापरोक्षत्वेन ज्ञातुम् अशक्यत्वात्,
आवरणात्मकत्वात्, भ्रमाद्युत्पादनत्वाच् च । आत्मनो निर्विकारत्वात्,
अन्तःकरणादेश् च तज्जन्यत्वात् ।
This nescience cannot be of the nature of delusion, doubt or a succession
of mental impressions caused by delusion or doubt, because it is directly
experienced. Delusions, doubts and their impressions which relate to the
past or to the future cannot be experienced directly at the present time. This
nescience cannot be mere negation because it is something which covers or
hides (the atman) and is the material cause of the delusion in the form ‘I
am a man, etc’. The self cannot be the cause of this delusion because it is
immutable. Nor can the mind, etc., be the cause of the delusion, because
they are themselves products of nescience.
Sudhanshu Shekhar
There is always an implication of ‘something’ that is not Brahman with the notion of mulavidya. Calling it anirvacaniya, maya or ‘not a tangible substance as it avyakta (unmanifest) and sookshma (subtle),’ only disguises by implying there is something which is avyakta, sookshma, or indefinable.
Michael Chandra Cohen
Jaishankar Narayanan
Namaste Jaishankarji,
You are quite right and I easily forget satkaryavada. Your 3 definitions
are helpful.
The issue is how does SSS warrant the accusation of reifying a second
entity onto PSA? It is more subtle than just upAdAnakAraNa. There is always
an implication of ‘something’ that is not Brahman with the notion of
mulavidya. Calling it anirvacaniya, maya or ‘not a tangible substance as it
avyakta (unmanifest) and sookshma (subtle),’ only disguises by implying
there is something which is avyakta, sookshma, or indefinable.
“mulAvidya is drishya as it is sAkshi-bhAsya and so it is mithyA.” –
reifying by way of both standpoint and explanation.
“So it is created every time a samsAri wakes up.” – the mere idea of
creation, of a samsAri ‘waking up’, is the subtle second thing SSS refers
to in all the above.
However, none of this applies to simple error – adhyasa. Why add a cause to
adhyasa and all sorts of weighty explanation to that which is to be
sublated in the end anyway? Instead, simply recognize Sankara’s words that
adhyasa is prasiddha, anadi, naisargika – no cause necessary to prove
Claude responds to the remainder of your attack:
First, the Taittirīya maxim you turn against us — abhāvād bhāvotpattiḥ
sarvapramāṇavyākopaḥ — charging that we breed the waking saṃsārin from the
jñāna-abhāva of suṣupti. But we assert no utpatti. The whole force of
"naisargiko 'yaṃ loka-vyavahāraḥ" is anāditva: the saṃsāra is unoriginated.
Where nothing is produced, a maxim against production-from-absence has no
purchase. It binds precisely whoever needs a positive upādāna for an arisen
effect — i.e., the bhāvarūpa account. The pramāṇa tells against the side
that requires a bhāva, not against ours.
Second, the abhāva/bhāva pincer — "viśeṣaṇavattve bhāva eva syāt." A false
dilemma. Śaṅkara's avidyā is neither a bare abhāva nor a bhāva-padārtha; it
is atasmiṃs tad-buddhiḥ — viparyaya-jñāna, erroneous cognition. A cognition
may be false and still be a cognition, bearing its phenomenal features
without being reified into insentient stuff. The abhāva-horn is not ours to
hold. It is mūlāvidyā that must be at once positive (bhāvarūpa), insentient
(jaḍa), and the negation of knowledge — Padmapāda's own gloss — and it is
that composite which strains the very logic you cite.
On naisargikatva: occurrent superimpositions do recur on each waking;
granted. But beginninglessness belongs to the series (bīja-aṅkura-nyāya),
not to a continuant dozing through suṣupti. To read a persisting positive
substrate out of the recurrence is to assume the reification under dispute
— no differently than inferring a stored homunculus from the daily return
of waking.
@advaita-vedanta.org
Michael Chandra Cohen
Yes, quite interesting and too easily conflates the two understandings. So what is the difference, do you suggest?
// bijAnkura nyAya which is appropriate only if the bIja is moolAvidya. //
You are asserting, not arguing. The analogy simply presents a beginningless causation. To say the analogy requires a positive substance is to smuggle in the conclusion as a premise!!
Accusing SSS of postulating an abhavarupa ontic as seed, is a superficial reading:
"But 'Ignorance' in the form of failure to apprehend the Self is only a precondition
for misconceiving it: it may be referred to metaphorically as a seed, but it is
not a substance (dravya) having a po\ver (saleti) in any concrete sense. As S~kara puts
it, 'The "seed" is only failure to apprehend the real' (tattva-apratibodha-matram eva hi
bijam, G.K.Bh. 1.11). If it \vere anything else it would be real, and then it \vould be
impossible to cancel it through metaphysical knowledge. SSS, Heart of Sri Samkara p212
Jaishankar Narayanan
Namaste Jaishankar,I find it disappointing that you only present scant response to my critical assessments.
I understand, Bhasyakara is difficult to refute when he is understood as SSS sees him. Nevertheless
you say, //Śaṅkara's avidyā is neither a bare abhāva nor a bhāva-padārtha; it is atasmiṃs tad-buddhiḥThat is the definition of bhAvarupa which you have given, which is the same for moolAvidya as for viparyaya jnAna.//
Yes, quite interesting and too easily conflates the two understandings. So what is the difference, do you suggest?
// bijAnkura nyAya which is appropriate only if the bIja is moolAvidya. //
You are asserting, not arguing. The analogy simply presents a beginningless causation. To say the analogy requires a positive substance is to smuggle in the conclusion as a premise!!
... avyaktā hi sā māyā, tattvānyatvanirūpaṇasyāśakyatvāt ।
... avidyā hyavyaktam; । B.S.Bh B.S. 1.4.3
Accusing SSS of postulating an abhavarupa ontic as seed, is a superficial reading:
"But 'Ignorance' in the form of failure to apprehend the Self is only a precondition
for misconceiving it: it may be referred to metaphorically as a seed, but it is
not a substance (dravya) having a po\ver (saleti) in any concrete sense. As S~kara puts
it, 'The "seed" is only failure to apprehend the real' (tattva-apratibodha-matram eva hi
bijam, G.K.Bh. 1.11). If it \vere anything else it would be real, and then it \vould be
impossible to cancel it through metaphysical knowledge. SSS, Heart of Sri Samkara p212
prājñaḥ kāraṇabaddhastu dvau tau turye na sidhyataḥ ॥ 1.11 ॥
Michael Chandra Cohen
My only immediate reply addresses your comment as shown in this exchange:
//you say, //Śaṅkara's avidyā is neither a bare abhāva nor a bhāva-padārtha; it is atasmiṃs tad-buddhiḥ
That is the definition of bhAvarupa which you have given, which is the same for moolAvidya as for viparyaya jnAna.//
Yes, quite interesting and too easily conflates the two understandings. So what is the difference, do you suggest?
Respectfully, Michael Chandra
Jaishankar Narayanan
Here is a breakdown of SSS's specific stance regarding avidyA and deep sleep:
1. Refutation of bhAvarUpa kAraNa avidyAThe post-Shankara commentarial traditions (such as the Vivaraṇa and Bhāmatī schools) developed the theory that avidyA is a positive entity (bhAvarUpa) that serves as a material cause (kAraNa) of the universe, hiding the Self and projecting the world.SSS directly argued against this, asserting that:
Purely Epistemological: According to SSS's reading of Adi Shankara, avidyA is strictly a cognitive error—defined precisely as mutual superimposition (adhyAsa) or a wrong notion (mithyA-jñAna).
Not an Entity: It is not an ontological, cosmic "substance" or a "positive something" (bhAvarUpa) that exists independently of a thinking mind.
2. The Nature of Deep Sleep (Suṣupti)Traditional post-Shankara Advaita holds that in deep sleep, a trace or causal form of individual ignorance (kAraNa-sharIra or mUlAvidyA) persists in a latent, unmanifest state, which is why we wake up again into duality.SSS fundamentally rejects this interpretation:
No Ignorance in Sleep: SSS maintains that in deep sleep, there is absolute absence of avidyA. Because avidyA is synonymous with adhyAsa (wrong perception/misapprehension), and there is no mind or ego actively misapprehending anything in deep sleep, avidyA cannot exist there.
Pure Brahman: In deep sleep, the jIva temporarily merges into its true nature, which is pure Brahman, completely untouched by ignorance.
3. If there is no avidyA in sleep, why do we wake up?The natural question that arises against SSS's view is: If there is no seed of ignorance left in sleep, why doesn't a person wake up enlightened?
SSS resolves this using Shankara's method of AdhyAropa-Apavāda (deliberate superimposition followed by negation):
When we wake up and retrospectively look back at sleep, we say, "I slept soundly and knew nothing."
SSS argues that this "ignorance" (agrahaNa or non-perception) assigned to sleep is actually a retrospective, waking superimposition.From the true, transcendental standpoint (paramArtha), deep sleep is pristine and devoid of any seed or cause.
The manifestation of the waking state is not caused by a latent bhAvarUpa entity waiting in sleep, but is simply the re-emergence of the mind's habitual projections (avidyA/adhyAsa) the moment the waking state begins.
Summary: SSS rejects mUlAvidyA entirely. For him, avidyA is nothing more than subjective adhyAsa (misapprehension). Since there is no misapprehension in deep sleep, there is no kAraNa avidyA—positive or otherwise—present in that state.
Michael Chandra Cohen
your AI depiction of SSS sounds accurate enough to me though I wouldn't say "jiva temporarily merges into its true nature" just as we wouldn't say the snake or the mirage 'merges' into rope or sand. Adhyasa appears upon waking for the ignorant indicating their lack of Self Knowledge