'BhAva' cannot be a product of 'abhAva' - Shankara

[V Subrahmanian]

Shankara has, in a few places across the Bhashyas, has reiterated that abhAva cannot give rise to an effect that is bhAva,  In other words, non-existence cannot give rise to an existent.

BSB 2.2.26:

नाप्यभावः कस्यचिदुत्पत्तिहेतुः स्यात् , अभावत्वादेव, शशविषाणादिवत् । अभावाच्च भावोत्पत्तावभावान्वितमेव सर्वं कार्यं स्यात्; न चैवं दृश्यते, सर्वस्य च वस्तुनः स्वेन स्वेन रूपेण भावात्मनैवोपलभ्यमानत्वात् ।

In the context of the cause of the world being abhAva, non-existence, proposed by the Buddhist :

[Non-existence, abhAva, can't be the cause of anything, like the hare's horn, etc.  (Hare's horn, etc. can't give rise to any effect.)  If one were to admit an effect arising from abhAva, non-existence, then such an effect has to be endowed with abhAva, non-existence.  But such a situation is mot noticed./experienced.]

The same idea is reiterated in the next sutra bhashya too.

In BGB 4.18, in the context of 'non-performance of ordained action cannot result in any pratyavaaya, sin:  

नापि नित्यानाम् अकरणात् अभावात् प्रत्यवायभावोत्पत्तिः, ‘नासतो विद्यते भावः’ (भ. गी. २ । १६) इति वचनात् ‘कथं असतः सज्जायेत’ (छा. उ. ६ । २ । २) इति च दर्शितम् असतः सज्जन्मप्रतिषेधात् । असतः सदुत्पत्तिं ब्रुवता असदेव सद्भवेत् , सच्चापि असत् भवेत् इत्युक्तं स्यात् । तच्च अयुक्तम् , सर्वप्रमाणविरोधात् । 

Shankara cites the Bh.Gita verse: 2.16 which says, in this context, 'from non-existence, asat, there can't be an existent, sat, originating. Also the Chandogya Upanishad says: How indeed can sat, existent, arise from asat, non-existence? A consequence would be: asat alone is sat and sat is asat. This is illogical and not supported by any pramana.

In the Taittiriyopanishat bhashyam:  In the same context as the above, Shankara reiterates: from non-performance, which is abhAva, there can't arise an effect called pratyavaaya, a positive effect:.

अन्यथा हि अभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिरिति सर्वप्रमाणव्याकोप इति । 

Thus, as per Shankara, abhAva, whether it is jnAnAbhAva or anything, there can be no effect that is cognizable.  If Avidya/Ajnanam is held to be an abhAva (jnAnAbhAva), the effect of adhyAsa and anartha samsara, can't be admissible. However, the entire shAstra, as declared by Shankara at the end of the AdhyAsa bhAshya: 

अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते । 

The Vedantas (Upanishads) have for their purpose the eradication/dispelling of the cause of anartha, misery. 

Shankara accepts the misery experienced by all to be a bhAva and not some abhAva.  Thus, for Shankara, the cause of this bhAva misery, cannot be an abhAva.  It has to be necessarily a bhAvarUpa avidya/ajnAnam.  

From the shruti and smriti cited by Shankara and what he himself has said it is clear that the world, experience of samsAra, etc. are all bhAvarUpa and not abhAvarUpa.  It is another context altogether that the GaudapAda KarikA teaches ajAtivAda, na nirodho na chotpattih...na mumukshuh na vai muktah as the ParamArthatA.  Even there, that ParamArtha is not an abhAva. 

Om Tat Sat 

 

 

  

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Subbhu, SSSSji does not wish to consider abhava some kind of ontic something that opposes bhavarupa avidya. Rather, it is taken as agrahana - an epistemic 'not knowing' the cause, as it were, of viparita jnana or adhyasa. 'As it were' because all causation is recognized as a product of adhyasa therefore anadi. Cause, as it were, is simply a way of speaking, pratipatti krama, or the idea of adhyasa itself presupposes not knowing the Truth. Sankara, on the other hand, following your citations, is referring to abhava considered as an ontic cause that cannot produce an effect. 

Pranam, mcc

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[V Subrahmanian]

On Wed, Aug 28, 2024 at 4:28 PM Michael Chandra Cohen <michaelc...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Subbhu, SSSSji does not wish to consider abhava some kind of ontic something that opposes bhavarupa avidya. Rather, it is taken as agrahana - an epistemic 'not knowing' the cause, as it were, of viparita jnana or adhyasa. 'As it were' because all causation is recognized as a product of adhyasa therefore anadi. Cause, as it were, is simply a way of speaking, pratipatti krama, or the idea of adhyasa itself presupposes not knowing the Truth. Sankara, on the other hand, following your citations, is referring to abhava considered as an ontic cause that cannot produce an effect. 

Namaste Michael ji,

Your response is well received.  As is being made clear in the ongoing discussions, it is becoming clear that Sri SSS ji has unwittingly accepted, though in a different nomenclature, that very thing he has vehemently opposed. The avidya that the 'other' party is terming as mUlAvidya, is also admitted by them to be anAdi adhyasta. So, it is not at all a real ontic like the Brahman of the Vedanta. It is admitted to be not of the abhAva type like the hare's horn because it cannot then produce any effect.  Since it is seen to produce the effect called samsara, it is admitted to be distinct from the absolute abhAva.  It is termed anirvachaniya.  Swamiji too, as you say, accepts a cause that precedes adhyAsa and such a cause is not as real as Brahman. 

warm regards

subbu    

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[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Michael ji,

The implication of Sri SSS' position - that avidyA is jnAna abhAva - the absence of knowledge, is not merely epistemic, it also is ontic. The absence of knowledge cannot be an existent entity in his conception. To deny existence, to say something is absent, is entering the realm of ontology, even if in this case, it is to deny the presence of knowledge. 

If it were otherwise, i.e. the absence of knowledge, was some "existent" entity, all the concerns that Sri SSS has with an bhAvarUpa avidyA, would apply equally to his stance too.

That being the case, such a non-existent entity cannot give rise to an "existent" effect, such as adhyAsa. If Sri SSS alleges otherwise, he would contradict experience and the explicit words of the bhAShya that Sri Subbu and others have pointed out.

So we are left with the only alternative remaining to justify his position, the one that you pointed out - that adhyAsa logically presupposes jnAna abhAva. That is, jnAna must be absent for adhyAsa to occur. If this was the nature of "causation" that was meant, this logical postulate would be worded thus:

1) If jnAna was present, adhyAsa wouldn't occur. It is observed that adhyAsa occurs, jnAna must be absent. 

2) However, there is an equally valid alternative logical postulate. The shruti says that Brahman is svaprakAsha, self evident. However, common experience is that it is not evident to most. Therefore, it follows that there must be some "thing" that obstructs that otherwise natural knowledge of the self.

Based on this logical postulate, it is postulated that the "thing" which obscures the otherwise natural cognition of the self is ignorance. The absence of knowledge cannot be the thing, because by virtue of it being absent, is not a thing. Further, being absent, it cannot obscure.

Now the postulation of this thing called ignorance does not invalidate postulate 1. Because when jnAna is absent, ignorance continues to exist. However, when it is present, ajnAna cannot exist, and nor can its product, adhyAsa.

However, if ignorance were jnAna abhAva, postulate 2 is invalidated. There is no way to explain why the svaprakAsha Brahman isn not immediately and directly known by all.

Kind regards,

Venkatraghavan 

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Hari Om,

BhAshyakAra has made following statements:

1. #अविद्याध्यस्तो ब्रह्मण्येकस्मिन् अयं प्रपञ्चो विद्यया प्रविलाप्यत इति ब्रूयात् , ततो ब्रह्मैव #अविद्याध्यस्तप्रपञ्चप्रत्याख्यानेन आवेदयितव्यम् — ‘एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म’ ‘तत्सत्यꣳ स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि’ (छा. उ. ६ । ८ । ७) इति — तस्मिन्नावेदिते, विद्या स्वयमेवोत्पद्यते, तया च अविद्या बाध्यते, ततश्च #अविद्याध्यस्तः सकलोऽयं नामरूपप्रपञ्चः स्वप्नप्रपञ्चवत् प्रविलीयते (BSB 3.2.21)
2. रज्जुस्वरूपप्रकाशनेनैव हि तत्स्वरूपविज्ञानम् #अविद्याध्यस्तसर्पादिप्रपञ्चप्रविलयश्च भवति । (BSB 3.2.21)
   
3. एवं च सति, सर्वक्षेत्रेष्वपि सतः भगवतः क्षेत्रज्ञस्य ईश्वरस्य संसारित्वगन्धमात्रमपि नाशङ्क्यम् । न हि क्वचिदपि लोके #अविद्याध्यस्तेन धर्मेण कस्यचित् उपकारः अपकारो वा दृष्टः ॥ यत्तु उक्तम् — न समः दृष्टान्तः इति, तत् असत् । कथम् ? #अविद्याध्यासमात्रं हि दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोः साधर्म्यं विवक्षितम् । (GItA 13.2)
   
4. न च आत्मनः संसारित्वम् , #अविद्याध्यस्तत्वादात्मनि संसारस्य । न हि रज्जुशुक्तिकागगनादिषु सर्परजतमलादीनि मिथ्याज्ञानाध्यस्तानि तेषां भवन्तीति । (ChhAndogya 8.12.1)
   
5. कथं पुनः स्वरूपे व्यापाराभावे शास्त्रस्य द्वैतविज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वम् ? नैष दोषः, रज्ज्वां सर्पादिवदात्मनि #द्वैतस्याविद्याध्यस्तत्वात् कथं सुख्यहं दुःखी मूढो जातो मृतो जीर्णो देहवान् पश्यामि व्यक्ताव्यक्तः कर्ता फली संयुक्तो वियुक्तः क्षीणो वृद्धोऽहं ममैते इत्येवमादयः सर्वे आत्मन्यध्यारोप्यन्ते । (MANDUkya 2.32)
   

In all these places, BhAshyakAra has made the usage of term "avidyA-adhyAsa". Had avidyA and adhyAsa been identical, this usage of avidyA-adhyAsa would not only have been superfluous but also having the defect of punarukti. It would mean avidyA-avidyA or adhyAsa-adhyAsa, which is meaningless.

The only logical conclusion which can, hence, be derived is as follows - avidyA and adhyAsa have different connotations. The adhyAsa is caused by avidyA. The word avidyA-adhyAsa is accordingly explained as avidyayA adhyAsah (अविद्यया अध्यासः). This is supported by BBV 1.4.414: #यस्मिंश्चाविद्ययाध्यासः संसारानर्थलक्षणः ।। स्वाभाविक्या कृतो मिथ्या शुक्त्यादौ रजतादिवत् ।। ४१४ ।। Also in GItA 13.2 स्थाणुपुरुषौ ज्ञेयावेव सन्तौ ज्ञात्रा अन्योन्यस्मिन् #अध्यस्तौ #अविद्यया.

This implies that avidyA is the cause whereas adhyAsa is the effect due to the use of karaNa-kAraka in avidyA.

Therefore, to aver that avidyA and adhyAsa are defined to be identical is contradicted by the usage of BhAshyakAra in the above mentioned places. 

Now, BhAshyakAra has also made the statement - तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते । This means that the learned ones regard adhyAsa as avidyA.

Thus, despite different literal connotation of avidyA and adhyAsa, the learned ones regard adhyAsa as avidyA.

Now, a cause can be either upAdAna or nimitta. While none regards the effect pot as potter/wheel/stick which are all nimitta for pot, everyone is unanimous in accepting that pot is nothing but clay, its upAdAna.

A jeweller would very easily accept that despite gold and necklace having different literal connotation -- necklace is nothing but gold. While an ordinary purchaser may put in great value in ornament, the tattva-darshI jeweller knows that necklace is nothing but gold. In his stock register, he would not mention the number of necklaces - but the weight of gold.

Similarly, the very fact that BhAshyakAra (a) uses avidyA as the cause of adhyAsa and (b) regards adhyAsa to be nothing but avidyA --- clearly implies that avidyA is the upAdAna-kAraNa of adhyAsa.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Sudhanshuji et. al.,  Please see the response below of Prof. Keralapuraji and a new thread from Prasanth Neti rebutting Venkata Radhavaji's earlier reply to my original post on Paul Hacker

Namaste Subbhuji and Venkara Raghavanji,,  Both of  you are concerned that nothing comes from nothing and thus abhavarupa avidya is invalid, Such that VRji said, //That being the case, such a non-existent entity cannot give rise to an "existent" effect, such as adhyAsa. If Sri SSS alleges otherwise, he would contradict experience and the explicit words of the bhAShya that Sri Subbu and others have pointed out//

However the only ontic reality is Brahman. Lack of knowledge is not a thing. Darkness is not a thing, it is just absence of light. Yet, co-terminus with that epistemological absence is this appearance of adhyasa. You must find a different line of argument than bhavarupa absence to refute SSSS and Bhasya. 

Though I vowed no proxy argument, there appeared yesterday two astute responses to my earlier post in the SAV FB group that I believe are worth sharing.

Sri Kumar

Admin

Top contributor

I will repost Prof. Ramanatha Keralapura ji’s earlier comments/posts here that have direct bearing on the discussions in that forum Michael Chandra Cohen ji Ramesam Vemuri ji Bhaskar Yr ji

(BTW - it is the same FINITE number of points that keep going around. Maybe, we should compile these and reuse.)

Here is Feb 8, 2022:

Sudhanshu Shekhar ji,

Part 1/2

Once it is decided in the mind that adhyasa has to have a cause and that cause is the bhavarupa-avidya (Mulaavidya), then every occcurence of the words avidya or ajnana in the Bhashyas or Vartika will imply to you that meaning only. Just as a plant whose root has been distanced from mother earth will no longer grow any more, so also, the Bhashyartha will not be sustained, once the basis for the understanding of the Bhashyas has been manipulated. This is what has been done by the vyakhyanakara in the adhyasa Bhashya by splitting the compound mithyajnana as "mithya ajnana" and forcing its meaning to be anirvacaniya avidya shakti as the material cause of the world as well as for adhyasa. This is what has been done by the Pancapadikakara, who has been wrongly given the descipleship of the Acarya, but, who, instead, is most likely a follower of the pre-Shankara proponents of bhedopadana-avidya-vadins.

Acarya says in a straight-forward manner that avidya is adhyasa, mithyajnana-nimitta, a mental superimposition. It is because of non-discrimination of Atma and anAtma. It is naisargika, avicArita-siddha. It is anAdi and hence no cause for it can be postulated. All pramana-prameya vyavahara, laukika and vaidika, presuppose the existense of this adhyasa. (adhyasa bhashya).

In the Bhagavadgita Bhashya also it is said "...iteretara-taddharmaadhyasa-lakshanah samyogah kshetra-kshetrajna-swarupa-viveka-abhava-nibandhanah". Examples of rope-snake and shell-silver are given- due to lack of knowledge of discriminating them as rope or silver, how snake or silver is superimposed.

Where does Shankara talk about a cause for adhyasa? Where does he imply arthadhyasa, which, again, is a misinterpretation of the adhyasa Bhashya vakya- "smriti-rupah paratra purvadrishtavabhasah"?

Acarya has said यदि ज्ञानाभावः यदि संशयज्ञानं यदि विपरीतज्ञानं वा अज्ञानमित्युच्यते, सर्वं तत् ज्ञानेनैव निवर्त्यते। ajnana, whether called as absence of knowledge, doubt or wrong knowledge, all that is removed by jnana only. Avidya-adhyasa is jnana-badhya, sublatable by jnana.

On the basis of the above and arguments aligned with it, the entirety of Bhashya can be understood without a contradiction.

Now, the Vartikakara walks in the footsteps of the acarya. You also agree with this.

In the Brihadvartika, the following shlokas are written:

आत्मात्मवत्वसंबंध आत्मात्माज्ञानयोर्मता। परो’विवेको भूतानामात्माविद्येति कथ्यते॥ 1.4.381

अज्ञानं संशयत्वान्नो मिथ्याज्ञानात्तथैव च। तयोस्त्तत्वविवक्षायामज्ञानं तत्वमुच्यते॥ 1.4.440

मिथ्याज्ञानं कथं वस्तु न हि मिथ्येति वस्तु सत्। मिथ्या तद् वस्तु चेत्युक्तिर्महतामेव शोभते॥ 1.4.425

These shlokas make it clear that aviveka (non-discrimination, not knowing), jnAnAbhAva, is called avidya. Also, the essence of wrong knowledge and doubt is ajnAna/jnAnAbhAva. This does not mean that ajnAna is the cause of the other two in the usual sense. It is said to be the cause in the sequence of understanding, pratipatti-krama- wrong knowledge and doubt presuppose JnAnAbhAva. Further, mithyAjnana is 'not a thing', 'not an object' (avastu) just as jnAnAbhAva, and, therefore, sublatable by jnana.

In the Taittiriya Bhashya Vartika, the following shlokas are written:

न जानामीत्यविद्यैका’नित्या तत्कारणं मता। स्वप्रसिद्ध्यैव सा सिद्ध्येत् निशौलूकीव वासरे॥ 2.176

avidya of the form "I do not know" is the reason for it (kshetra-kshetrajna-vibhaga). It is self-established like the night (darkness) of the owl during a day. (The pramANa for the owl's night is its own experience).

प्रमाणोत्पन्नया दृष्ट्या यो’विद्यां द्रष्टुमिच्चति। दीपॆनासौ ध्रुवं पश्येत् गुहाकुक्षिगतं तमः॥ 2.177

One who desires to see (establish) avidya by a pramANa will certainly be like one who finds the darkness in the cave by means of a lamp. (it may be remembered that the Pancapadikakara uses arthApatti pramana)

अनात्मेति यद्भाति तदविद्याविजृंभितं। तस्मादविद्या साप्युक्ता विद्यात्मैकरूपिणी॥ 2.178

Whatever is appearing to be anAtma, that is the 'expansion' of avidya alone. Therefore anAtma also is said to be avidya. Vidya is of the form "Atman alone wothout a second".

आत्माग्रहातिरेकेण तस्या रूपं न विद्यते। अमित्रवदविद्येति सत्येवं घटते सदा॥ 2.179

Other than non-apprehension of Atma, there is no other svarUpa for it (avidya). The letter "a" in the word avidya is to be understood in the sense that avidya is opposite to vidya.

AjnAna is not triguNAtmika. The Vartika says- Atma who is not known, is the cause of jagat, not the three guNas!

प्रधानवादमाशंक्य यस्मात् भूयो’पि भण्यते। अज्ञात आत्मा जगतः कारणं न गुणत्रयम्॥ 1.4.480

But here you are-

The material cause of this magical duality is ajnAna. Brahman is said to be cause on account of the superimposition of that ajnAna (in Brahman), and you quote BrihadAraNyak BhAshya Vartika:-

अस्य द्वैतेन्द्रजालस्य यदुपादानकारणम्। अज्ञानं तदुपाश्रित्य ब्रह्म कारणमुच्यते।।

You have presumed that the word ajnAnam in the Vartika is bhAvarUpa-avidya (MUlAvidya). But it is not so. Neither the Bhashyakara nor the Vartikakara uses the term bhAvarUpa avidya. By the Vartikas I have cited, ajnAnam is only jnAnAbhAva, absence of knowledge.

Now the question arises as to how absence of jnana can bring about the duality, कथमसतः सज्जायेत? But this question can come from only those who do not understand the "heart" of Shankara or Suresvara. It is never told that abhAva is the cause of bhAva. नासतो विद्यते भावो ना’भावो विद्यते सतः| (Gita 2.16).

In the Naishkarmyasiddhi 3.7, Suresvara has written a sambandha grantha:

The siddhAnti has told in the previous shlokas that by the knowledge obtained by the Vedanta vakya, ajnAna which is the cause of samsAra is removed. But the opponent assumes that it is only mithyAjnAna that is the cause of samsAra, and by assuming that ajnAna is the cause, there remains nothing for the Vedanta vakya to remove. Since ajnAna is avastu, it cannot cause samsAra. Asat cannot cause sat as per Chandogya Shruti 6.2.2.

अज्ञानं हि नाम ज्ञानाभावः। तस्य च अवस्तु स्वाभाव्यात् कुतः संसारकारणत्वम्। न हि असतः सज्जन्म इष्यते। "कुतस्तु खलु सोम्येवं स्यादिति।... कथमसतः सज्जायेत? (छा.उ.6.2.2) इति श्रुतेरिति।

The siddhanti gives the parihara: अत्र उच्यते। It will be said in this respect-

अज्ञात एव सर्वोर्थः प्राग्यतो बुद्धिजन्मनः। एकेनैव सता सन्श्च सन्नज्ञातो भवेत्ततः॥ Nai.si.3.7

Every object is unknown only, until its right knowledge is got. Its existence, as when we say a pot exists, is the existence of the real (sat) only, that is one without a second. Therefore, it must be that 'sat' itself is the unknown, ajnAta.

If we start exploring the real nature, vastu-satatva, of an object, say a pot, then it will be decided that it is clay only, which is the cause of pot. However, although the knowledge that it is clay only, has arisen, the 'sadbuddhi', that its existence is the existence of sat only, continues. We now say 'clay exists' instead of 'pot exists', where existence is that of sat alone.

This is how it can be decided that existence of all objects is existence of sat only, and therefore, the nature that "the object is not known" corresponds to that of sat, and not to objects like a pot, which are known to be as such by a wrong knowledge (mithyAjnana).

( It is not out of place here to point out that in the Bhasya for Chandogya 6.2.2, Acarya rejects the asadvAda position of the opponent, who is shunyavAdI bauddha, and establishes the SatkAryavAda of the Vedanta. Similar to the arguments there, can be found in the above also).

What has been demonstrated above is that Suresvara and Acarya have ekavAkyatA on most matters, except for minor differences in some places. One of them is that Acarya considers adhyasa or mithyAjnana as avidya, since that is which the one causes all the sorrow in human life. Suresvara considers jnAnAbhAva or ajnAna as avidya since, without jnAnAbhAva one cannot think of mithyAjnana. However both Acaryas have said that avidya is anAdi and there is no avidya other than jnAnAbhAva, mithyAjnAna and samshaya. Therefore there is no support from either Acarya for bhAvarUpa avidya.

In the Vartika 1.4.371 quoted in OP, therefore, the upAdAna-kAraNa for the appearance of the world of duality is actually Brahman, with the support (upAshritya) of ajnAna or jnAnAbhAva, and not some bhAvarUpa avidya.

However, it need not be construed from the Vartika that actually a material cause is required, since the world of duality has been suggested to be magical in nature. The cause of a magical show is its "base of its support" (adhiSThAna), namely the magician. The cause of rope-snake is the base of its support, rope alone. It is in this sense only that Brahman is called nimitta as well as upAdAna kAraNa for the world- Brahman alone is there before 'creation', and there is no other material. (Su.Bha.1.4.23)

There are two other aspects in the OP that need comments. It is said there that "Accordingly, the material cause of this magical duality is triguNAtmaka ajnAna which is neither sat nor asat. Brahman is said to be cause on account of the superimposition of that ajnAna (in Brahman),

Acarya has said in Sutra Bhashya 2.1.14 (सर्वज्ञ्यस्य ईश्वरस्य आत्मभूते इवाविद्याकल्पिते....), that Name and form which are anirvacanIya in their appearance and which are the seed form of the world, are called by names maya, shakti, and prakriti. It is well known that Vedanta uses some samkhya prakriya and accordingly prakriti or maya are triguNAtmika. But maya is avidyA-kalpita says Acarya. Therefore maya and avidya are not the same. Avidya is the occasion for the appearance of namarUpatmaka world, not-self, and the ruinous identification of the Self with it.

The second point in the OP is "Brahman is said to be cause on account of the superimposition of that ajnAna (in Brahman)". Now, where from this superimposition on Brahman happens? It must be from the avidyAbhUmi. In otherwords, avidya/adhyasa is presupposed to exist for doing this superimposition. Thus avidya is prior, pUrvasiddha, to this superimposition. Is it logical to say that the purvasiddha adhyasa has its cause as bhAvAvidya, which is avidyakalpita?

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste all, Here is another response citing Sureswara on creation of adhyasa

Some more relevant points. This comment and the next are courtesy: André Marques ji who has led the draft translation of “Critique of Mūlāvidyā Vimarśe” by Sw. Jñānanandendra Saraswati (disciple of SSSS ji; name pūrvāśrama Vițțhal Śāstry). Question is posed by Pūrvapakși identified as Reviewer. Answer by Vițțhal Śāstry.

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[Reviewer]- Aren't the words "nimitta" (instrumental or efficient cause) and "kāraṇa" (cause in general) synonymous? If so, it is contradictory to say that the instrumental cause is not the cause. Both instrumental causality (nimitta-kāraṇatva) and material causality (upādāna-kāraṇatva) are being intended here. In the superimposition that is of the form of effect, false knowledge (mithyā-jñāna), in the form of a defect, acts as the instrumental cause. Since the effect inherits its nature from the cause, false knowledge also acts as the material cause. The trace (inert) characteristics (jāḍya-dharma) present in the cause are seen manifested in the effect.

[Viṭṭhalaśāstrī] - It has already (earlier in article) been shown that false knowledge in the form of the mutual superimposition of Ātmā and anātmā is not an effect. Are not superimposition (adhyāsa) and false knowledge (mithyā-jñāna) one and the same? That being the case, what is the meaning of saying false knowledge is the cause — in the form of a defect — of an effect-superimposition?

Since mūlāvidyā itself is untenable, what is the meaning of saying it is inert (jaḍa)? As it has been established that the inert substance (jaḍa-dravya) is merely a name and not a real entity (vastu), in what can mūlāvidyā be reflected? These are mere assumptions (kalpanā) and not factual. By saying "mithyā-jñāna-nimitta," I have accepted that the instrumental cause (nimitta) is the cause, implying that transactions arise from the superimposition called false knowledge. The word "nimitta" does not signify material causality.

• 1h

  about an hour ago

Sri Kumar

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Continued from previous comment:

[Reviewer] - In Śrī Sureśvara's Vārttika, it is stated, "adhyāsaś ca vinā hētuṁ na loka upapadyatē," meaning that superimposition requires a cause. Additionally, the Vārttika explicitly states that ignorance is the material cause for the illusion of duality: “asya dvaitēndra jālasya yad upādāna kāraṇam | ajñānaṁ tad upāśritya brahma kāraṇam ucyatē” (Ignorance is the material cause of this magical illusion of duality; from the perspective of ignorance, Brahman is said to be the cause). If we interpret ignorance here as absence of knowledge (jñānābhāva) or non-apprehension (agrahaṇa), both being forms of absence (abhāva), how can it be justified as the material cause? Is not the material cause that which is intimately connected with the effect (anvaya-kāraṇa)? Is absence (abhāva) some kind of thing that can be pervasively present in the dualistic world? Moreover, the commentary itself states, "abhāvād vā utpattir iti sarvapramāṇa vyākōpaḥ," meaning that creation from absence would contradict all proof, does it not?

[Viṭṭhalaśāstrī] - The author of the Vārttika, having stated that superimposition requires a cause ("adhyāsaś ca vinā hētuṁ na loka upapadyatē"), proclaims, "ajñāta ātmā jagataḥ kāraṇam" (the unknown Self is the cause of the world). He also uses the term "upādāna-kāraṇa" (material cause), stating, “asya dvaitēndra jālasya yad upādāna kāraṇam | ajñānaṁ tad upāśritya brahma kāraṇam ucyatē." Since the duality that is the effect is described as an illusion (indra-jāla), the world which is an effect (kārya), must be imagined (kalpita) in Brahman through superimposition (adhyāsa), making Brahman both the material and instrumental cause. That is why the author of the Vārttika says the unknown Self (ajñāta-ātmā) is the cause. He uses the terms "ajñāta ātmā," "ātmāvidyā," and "ātma-agrahaṇa" interchangeably.

Therefore, superimposition is illusory knowledge (bhranti-jñāna), and its cause is the lack of knowledge of Truth (tattva-jñāna). The lack of knowledge of Truth does not mean absence (abhāva) [of something] but rather forms of the unknown Self (ajñāta-ātmā rūpa), as stated by the author of the Vārttika himself. This eliminates the objection of how creation can arise from absence. The reviewer, in the sixth question, has stated that the absence of knowledge of Truth is a positive entity (bhāvarūpa-vṛtti). Remember, here we are discussing mistaken understanding, not the creation of an object. It is a universally experienced fact that the cause for mistaken understanding is the absence of correct understanding. Therefore, the cause for superimposition is the lack of knowledge of Truth, not mūlāvidyā.

The Commentator (Śaṅkara) states, "itare'tarāvivekēna adhyasya," meaning that mistaken understanding arises from the lack of discrimination between the Self and non-Self. In Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, Vaitathya Prakaraṇa (2.13): "aniścitā yathā rajjuḥ andhakāre vikalpitā | sarpa dhārādibhir bhēdais tadvad ātmā vikalpitaḥ" (Just as a rope is mistaken for a snake in the darkness, similarly the Self is imagined in various ways due to lack of certainty).

The commentary explains that since the true nature of the Self, which is pure consciousness and non-dual, is not ascertained, the Self is imagined with distinctions like the individual-self (jīva), vital breath (prāṇa), etc. This is the essence of all the Upaniṣads. Mistaken understanding arises only in the absence of correct knowledge. This is a universally experienced truth. The world is a projection (kalpita) of this mistaken understanding and not a real entity. That is why it is said to be dispelled by knowledge. The inert (jaḍa) [mūlāvidyā-bīja] cannot be the material cause for this. The unknown Self (ajñāta-ātmā) is the cause in every sense [instrumental and material]. The author of the Vārttika himself states that the absence of knowledge of Truth (tattva-jñāna-abhāva) and the unknown Self (ajñāta-ātmā) are one and the same.

The unknown Self pervades the entire world, whereas mūlāvidyā does not. It has already been established that the world is not a materially inert entity (jada vastu) but a projection (kalpita) of superimposition. If we say that mūlāvidyā is the root cause from which superimposition and the world arise then it implies the ultimate reality of cause and effect, resulting in dualism. This cannot be refuted by knowledge. Such a concept of Advaita Vedānta would be a mere fantasy. If we consider the author of the Vārttika’s own words that duality is an illusion (indra-jāla), it becomes clear that an illusion cannot have a material cause.

[Ananta Chaitanya [Sarasvati]]

Namaste Sudhanshuji,

On Thu, Aug 29, 2024, 12:11 PM Sudhanshu Shekhar <sudhans...@gmail.com> wrote:

In all these places, BhAshyakAra has made the usage of term "avidyA-adhyAsa". Had avidyA and adhyAsa been identical, this usage of avidyA-adhyAsa would not only have been superfluous but also having the defect of punarukti. It would mean avidyA-avidyA or adhyAsa-adhyAsa, which is meaningless.

There is another issue here. If avidyA is abhAvarUpa, then adhyAsa being avidyA, it is also abhAvarUpa. Then what seems to be the issue with non existing adhyasta saMsAra?! Oh, wait, but it appears, it binds, etc. Is that called abhAvarUpa? Its really laughable as to they can't see the meaning of anirvachanIya mithyA. And they have the audacity to point fingers at the vyAkhyAnakAras.

It reminds me of Pujya Swamiji (PS) Dayananda Sarasvatiji's joke that some Western professor of "Vedanta" in an university abroad told him that he had been teaching for multiple decades and understands everything, except for "2 small things": mithyA and sat!! PS was speechless. 😀

gurupAdukAbhyAm,

--Ananta Chaitanya
/* येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति, तं केन विजानीयात्। Through what should one know That, owing to which all this is known! [Br.Up. 4.5.15] */

[Jaishankar Narayanan]

Namaste Ananta Chaitanya ji,

I remember Pujya Swami ji mentioning this in our classes. 

Further Sureshvaracharya is very clear in the Introduction to the third chapter first verse where he  establishes that ajnAna  / mulAvidyA has AtmA as vishaya and AshrayA. 

अनात्मनश्च  अज्ञानप्रसूतत्वात् । न हि पूर्वसिद्दं सत् तत: लब्ध आत्मलाभस्य  सेत्स्यत  आश्रयस्य आश्रयी संभवति । 

Further the non-Self is itself a product of ignorance / mulAvidyA. What exists already cannot be dependent on what is brought into being by itself (by mulAvidyA) .   

Also they talk about epistemology but without the mind there is no epistemology and mind itself is a product of mulAvidyA

with love and prayers,

Jaishankar

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Michael Ji,

Venkat Ji observed

//  However, if ignorance were jnAna abhAva, postulate 2 is invalidated. There is no way to explain why the svaprakAsha Brahman is not immediately and directly known by all //,

This is another very important difference between the two schools. So far mainly the vikshepa aspect has been discussed repeatedly. However this AvaraNa aspect has somehow not been addressed in its important implication. It would be in order if this aspect is covered in some detail in your responses from the scholars of Sri SSS school.

Regards

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Michael Ji,

This has a bearing on the treatment of Sushupti in the two schools of thought.

Regards

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji. [And to respected Prof. Keralpura ji, if he is reading the post]

Please find below the response to Prof. Keralpura ji's comment:

//Once it is decided in the mind that adhyasa has to have a cause and that cause is the bhavarupa-avidya (Mulaavidya), then every occcurence of the words avidya or ajnana in the Bhashyas or Vartika will imply to you that meaning only. Just as a plant whose root has been distanced from mother earth will no longer grow any more, so also, the Bhashyartha will not be sustained, once the basis for the understanding of the Bhashyas has been manipulated.//

Does not deserve any comment.

//This is what has been done by the vyakhyanakara in the adhyasa Bhashya by splitting the compound mithyajnana as "mithya ajnana" and forcing its meaning to be anirvacaniya avidya shakti as the material cause of the world as well as for adhyasa.//

VArtikakAra also holds ajnAna as material cause in the following places:

BBV 1.4.371

अस्य द्वैतेन्द्रजालस्य यदुपादानकारणम्। अज्ञानं तदुपाश्रित्य ब्रह्मकारणमुच्यते।।

BBV 4.3.338

उपादानं हि बुद्ध्यादेरात्माविद्येति भण्यते। सकृद्विभातं चिन्मात्रं ज्योतिरित्युपदिश्यते।।  

//This is what has been done by the Pancapadikakara, who has been wrongly given the descipleship of the Acarya, but, who, instead, is most likely a follower of the pre-Shankara proponents of bhedopadana-avidya-vadins.//

Both VArtikakAra and PanchapAdikAra have held ajnAna to be material cause. What else, all AchAryAs of advaita paramparA have done it, excluding SSSS ji. Not even a single AchArya is there who has said that ajnAna is not the material cause. BhAshyakAra also uses words such as अज्ञान-ज i.e. born from ajnAna, which is meaningful in the sense of material cause. 

//Acarya says in a straight-forward manner that avidya is adhyasa, mithyajnana-nimitta, a mental superimposition. It is because of non-discrimination of Atma and anAtma. It is naisargika, avicArita-siddha. It is anAdi and hence no cause for it can be postulated.//

Same BhAshyakAra has made the following usage clearly demonstrating avidyA as cause of adhyAsa:

1. #अविद्याध्यस्तो ब्रह्मण्येकस्मिन् अयं प्रपञ्चो विद्यया प्रविलाप्यत इति ब्रूयात् , ततो ब्रह्मैव #अविद्याध्यस्तप्रपञ्चप्रत्याख्यानेन आवेदयितव्यम् — ‘एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म’ ‘तत्सत्यꣳ स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि’ (छा. उ. ६ । ८ । ७) इति — तस्मिन्नावेदिते, विद्या स्वयमेवोत्पद्यते, तया च अविद्या बाध्यते, ततश्च #अविद्याध्यस्तः सकलोऽयं नामरूपप्रपञ्चः स्वप्नप्रपञ्चवत् प्रविलीयते (BSB 3.2.21)

2. रज्जुस्वरूपप्रकाशनेनैव हि तत्स्वरूपविज्ञानम् #अविद्याध्यस्तसर्पादिप्रपञ्चप्रविलयश्च भवति । (BSB 3.2.21)

3. एवं च सति, सर्वक्षेत्रेष्वपि सतः भगवतः क्षेत्रज्ञस्य ईश्वरस्य संसारित्वगन्धमात्रमपि नाशङ्क्यम् । न हि क्वचिदपि लोके #अविद्याध्यस्तेन धर्मेण कस्यचित् उपकारः अपकारो वा दृष्टः ॥ यत्तु उक्तम् — न समः दृष्टान्तः इति, तत् असत् । कथम् ? #अविद्याध्यासमात्रं हि दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोः साधर्म्यं विवक्षितम् । (GItA 13.2)

4. न च आत्मनः संसारित्वम् , #अविद्याध्यस्तत्वादात्मनि संसारस्य । न हि रज्जुशुक्तिकागगनादिषु सर्परजतमलादीनि मिथ्याज्ञानाध्यस्तानि तेषां भवन्तीति । (ChhAndogya 8.12.1)

5. कथं पुनः स्वरूपे व्यापाराभावे शास्त्रस्य द्वैतविज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वम् ? नैष दोषः, रज्ज्वां सर्पादिवदात्मनि #द्वैतस्याविद्याध्यस्तत्वात् कथं सुख्यहं दुःखी मूढो जातो मृतो जीर्णो देहवान् पश्यामि व्यक्ताव्यक्तः कर्ता फली संयुक्तो वियुक्तः क्षीणो वृद्धोऽहं ममैते इत्येवमादयः सर्वे आत्मन्यध्यारोप्यन्ते । (MANDUkya 2.32)

In all these places, BhAshyakAra has made the usage of the term "avidyA-adhyAsa". Had avidyA and adhyAsa been identical, this usage of avidyA-adhyAsa would not only have been superfluous but also having the defect of punarukti. It would mean avidyA-avidyA or adhyAsa-adhyAsa, which is meaningless.

The only logical conclusion which can, hence, be derived is as follows - avidyA and adhyAsa have different connotations. The adhyAsa is caused by avidyA. The word avidyA-adhyAsa is accordingly explained as avidyayA adhyAsah (अविद्यया अध्यासः). This is supported by BBV 1.4.414: #यस्मिंश्चाविद्ययाध्यासः संसारानर्थलक्षणः ।। स्वाभाविक्या कृतो मिथ्या शुक्त्यादौ रजतादिवत् ।। ४१४ ।। Also in GItA 13.2 स्थाणुपुरुषौ ज्ञेयावेव सन्तौ ज्ञात्रा अन्योन्यस्मिन् #अध्यस्तौ #अविद्यया.

This implies that avidyA is the cause whereas adhyAsa is the effect due to the use of karaNa-kAraka in avidyA.

Therefore, to aver that avidyA and adhyAsa are defined to be identical is contradicted by the usage of BhAshyakAra in the above mentioned places. 

Now, BhAshyakAra has also made the statement - तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते । This means that the learned ones regard adhyAsa as avidyA.

Thus, despite different literal connotations of avidyA and adhyAsa, the learned ones regard adhyAsa as avidyA.

Now, a cause can be either upAdAna or nimitta. While none regards the effect pot as potter/wheel/stick which are all nimitta for pot, everyone is unanimous in accepting that pot is nothing but clay, its upAdAna.

A jeweller would very easily accept that despite gold and necklace having different literal connotation -- necklace is nothing but gold. While an ordinary purchaser may put in great value in ornament, the tattva-darshI jeweller knows that necklace is nothing but gold. In his stock register, he would not mention the number of necklaces - but the weight of gold.

Similarly, the very fact that BhAshyakAra (a) uses avidyA as the cause of adhyAsa and (b) regards adhyAsa to be nothing but avidyA --- clearly implies that avidyA is the upAdAna-kAraNa of adhyAsa.

//All pramana-prameya vyavahara, laukika and vaidika, presuppose the existense of this adhyasa. (adhyasa bhashya).//

True.

//In the Bhagavadgita Bhashya also it is said "...iteretara-taddharmaadhyasa-lakshanah samyogah kshetra-kshetrajna-swarupa-viveka-abhava-nibandhanah". Examples of rope-snake and shell-silver are given- due to lack of knowledge of discriminating them as rope or silver, how snake or silver is superimposed.//

swarUpa-viveka-abhAva is a result of AvaraNa. When you are blindfolded, you cannot see and consequently, if you walk, you will fall in a ditch or you will collide with someone. So, swarUpa-viveka-abhAva does not imply absence of AvaraNa. BhAshyakAra clarifies this:

तामसे च आवरणात्मके तिमिरादिदोषे सति अग्रहणादेः अविद्यात्रयस्य उपलब्धेः ॥ 

Only when there is AvaraNa such as timira-Adi-dosha, there is upalabdhi of avidyA-traya. So, AvaraNa is distinguished from avidyA-traya. Like, blindfold cloth is different from not-seeing and falling-in-the-ditch.

Similarly, AchArya says:

सर्वत्रैव अग्रहणविपरीतसंशयप्रत्ययास्तन्निमित्ताः करणस्यैव कस्यचित् भवितुमर्हन्ति, न ज्ञातुः क्षेत्रज्ञस्य 

Here also, a distinction is made of agrahNa-viparIta-samshaya AND their nimitta (AvaraNa).

So, BhAshyakAra clearly holds avidyA as AvaraNAtmaka and non-abhAva.

//Where does Shankara talk about a cause for adhyasa? Where does he imply arthadhyasa, which, again, is a misinterpretation of the adhyasa Bhashya vakya- "smriti-rupah paratra purvadrishtavabhasah"?//

As discussed above.

//Acarya has said यदि ज्ञानाभावः यदि संशयज्ञानं यदि विपरीतज्ञानं वा अज्ञानमित्युच्यते, सर्वं तत् ज्ञानेनैव निवर्त्यते। ajnana, whether called as absence of knowledge, doubt or wrong knowledge, all that is removed by jnana only. Avidya-adhyasa is jnana-badhya, sublatable by jnana.//

Yes. All three are jnAna-nivartya because they have ajnAna as the upAdAna. An upAdeya can be sublated only when upAdAna is sublated. jnAna can remove only ajnAna. Unless ajnAna is the upAdAna of jnAna-abhAva, samshaya-jnAna and viparIta-jnAna, jnAna could not have sublated these. This statement also proves that ajnAna is the upAdAna. On account of arthapatti.

//On the basis of the above and arguments aligned with it, the entirety of Bhashya can be understood without a contradiction.//

Not only not even a word of bhAshya can be understood by the faulty prakriyA adduced by SSSS ji, it is self-contradictory. The most basic point is this. ajnAna is known by sAkshI. It is sAkshi-vedya. How can it be abhAva. By definition, abhAva is paroksha-vishaya whereas sAkshi-vedya vastu is aparoksha-vishaya. There are hundreds of contradictions in SSSS ji. To demonstrate them, I ask the following questions:

1. Is avidyA triguNAtmikA i.e. composed of three guNAs namely sattva, rajas and tamas? [yes/no]

2. Is adhyAsa triguNAtmaka?  [yes/no]

3. Is the thought "I am body" triguNAtmaka?  [yes/no]

4. Is pot-abhAva triguNAtmaka?  [yes/no]

5. Is the remover of avidyA, Brahma-vidyA, triguNAtmikA?  [yes/no]

6. Is mAyA triguNAtmikA?  [yes/no]

7. Is avidyA adhyasta?  [yes/no]

8. Is mAyA adhyasta?  [yes/no]

9. Is avidyA nirvishesha-abhAva like horns of hare OR is avidyA savishesha-abhAva like pot-abhAva?  [nirvishesha-abhAva/savishesha-abhAva]

10. Are avidyA and ajnAna identical?  [yes/no]

11. Is shuddha Brahman the locus (Ashraya) of avidyA?  [yes/no]

12. Is shuddha Brahman the vishaya of avidyA?  [yes/no]

13. As per SSS ji's understanding of mUlAvidyA, whether mUlAvidyA is adhyasta?  [yes/no]

//Now, the Vartikakara walks in the footsteps of the acarya. You also agree with this.//

I agree. Not only vArtikakAra but all AchAryAs in sampradAya hold avidyA to be abhAva-vilakshaNa on account of its material causality. But not in your sense.

//In the Brihadvartika, the following shlokas are written:

आत्मात्मवत्वसंबंध आत्मात्माज्ञानयोर्मता। परो’विवेको भूतानामात्माविद्येति कथ्यते॥ 1.4.381

अज्ञानं संशयत्वान्नो मिथ्याज्ञानात्तथैव च। तयोस्त्तत्वविवक्षायामज्ञानं तत्वमुच्यते॥ 1.4.440

मिथ्याज्ञानं कथं वस्तु न हि मिथ्येति वस्तु सत्। मिथ्या तद् वस्तु चेत्युक्तिर्महतामेव शोभते॥ 1.4.425

These shlokas make it clear that aviveka (non-discrimination, not knowing), jnAnAbhAva, is called avidya.//

This conclusion of yours is wrong. 

BhAshyakAra says in GItA - तमः तृतीयः गुणः अज्ञानजम् अज्ञानात् जातम् अज्ञानजं विद्धि मोहनं मोहकरम् अविवेककरं सर्वदेहिनां सर्वेषां देहवताम् ।

Please see the sequence: ajnAna → tamo-guNa → aviveka.

This makes it clear that ajnAna and aviveka are not synonyms. As demonstrated above, jnAna-abhAva is not ajnAna either.

//Also, the essence of wrong knowledge and doubt is ajnAna/jnAnAbhAva. This does not mean that ajnAna is the cause of the other two in the usual sense. It is said to be the cause in the sequence of understanding, pratipatti-krama- wrong knowledge and doubt presuppose JnAnAbhAva. Further, mithyAjnana is 'not a thing', 'not an object' (avastu) just as jnAnAbhAva, and, therefore, sublatable by jnana.//

What do you mean by “essence”. Please don’t use vague ambiguous words. What is “sequence of understanding”? Please define cause. Is cause the essence of effect? Does cause come prior in the sequence-of-understanding? If yes, then you are just shying away from using the word “cause” and instead using other words which mean the same as cause.

//In the Taittiriya Bhashya Vartika, the following shlokas are written:

न जानामीत्यविद्यैका’नित्या तत्कारणं मता। स्वप्रसिद्ध्यैव सा सिद्ध्येत् निशौलूकीव वासरे॥ 2.176

avidya of the form "I do not know" is the reason for it (kshetra-kshetrajna-vibhaga). It is self-established like the night (darkness) of the owl during a day. (The pramANa for the owl's night is its own experience).//

Sir, “न जानामि” does not have jnAna-abhAva as its vishaya. Tell me, what kind of jnAna-abhAva it is? prAk, pradhvamsa, anyonya, atyanta? What is it? You have not understood VArtika which promulgates avidyA as upAdAna-kAraNa. No upAdAna-kAraNa is abhAva.

//प्रमाणोत्पन्नया दृष्ट्या यो’विद्यां द्रष्टुमिच्चति। दीपॆनासौ ध्रुवं पश्येत् गुहाकुक्षिगतं तमः॥ 2.177

One who desires to see (establish) avidya by a pramANa will certainly be like one who finds the darkness in the cave by means of a lamp. (it may be remembered that the Pancapadikakara uses arthApatti pramana)//

So? We also hold avidyA to be sAkshi-bhAsya and not pramANa-gamya.

//अनात्मेति यद्भाति तदविद्याविजृंभितं। तस्मादविद्या साप्युक्ता विद्यात्मैकरूपिणी॥ 2.178

Whatever is appearing to be anAtma, that is the 'expansion' of avidya alone. Therefore anAtma also is said to be avidya. Vidya is of the form "Atman alone wothout a second".//

Yes.

//आत्माग्रहातिरेकेण तस्या रूपं न विद्यते। अमित्रवदविद्येति सत्येवं घटते सदा॥ 2.179

Other than non-apprehension of Atma, there is no other svarUpa for it (avidya). The letter "a" in the word avidya is to be understood in the sense that avidya is opposite to vidya.//

Sir, Rahul is your amitra. Does it mean that Rahul is abhAva. Similarly, avidyA. agrahNa is being explained as amitra. This reference is against you.

//AjnAna is not triguNAtmika. The Vartika says- Atma who is not known, is the cause of jagat, not the three guNas!

प्रधानवादमाशंक्य यस्मात् भूयो’पि भण्यते। अज्ञात आत्मा जगतः कारणं न गुणत्रयम्॥ 1.4.480//

The verse shows that triguNAtmaka-ajnAna is not an independent cause. Rather ajnAna-adhyAsa-vishishTa-AtmA is cause of jagat. VArtikakAra uses the term ajnAta-AtmA. This means ajnAna-adhyAsa-vishishTa-AtmA.

//But here you are-

The material cause of this magical duality is ajnAna. Brahman is said to be cause on account of the superimposition of that ajnAna (in Brahman), and you quote BrihadAraNyak BhAshya Vartika:-

अस्य द्वैतेन्द्रजालस्य यदुपादानकारणम्। अज्ञानं तदुपाश्रित्य ब्रह्म कारणमुच्यते।।

You have presumed that the word ajnAnam in the Vartika is bhAvarUpa-avidya (MUlAvidya). But it is not so. Neither the Bhashyakara nor the Vartikakara uses the term bhAvarUpa avidya. By the Vartikas I have cited, ajnAnam is only jnAnAbhAva, absence of knowledge.//

As explained above.

//Now the question arises as to how absence of jnana can bring about the duality, कथमसतः सज्जायेत? But this question can come from only those who do not understand the "heart" of Shankara or Suresvara. It is never told that abhAva is the cause of bhAva. नासतो विद्यते भावो ना’भावो विद्यते सतः| (Gita 2.16).//

Ok. Let us see how without a sAmpradAyika-teaching, you could get access to the heart of Shankara. 

//In the Naishkarmyasiddhi 3.7, Suresvara has written a sambandha grantha:

The siddhAnti has told in the previous shlokas that by the knowledge obtained by the Vedanta vakya, ajnAna which is the cause of samsAra is removed. But the opponent assumes that it is only mithyAjnAna that is the cause of samsAra, and by assuming that ajnAna is the cause, there remains nothing for the Vedanta vakya to remove. Since ajnAna is avastu, it cannot cause samsAra. Asat cannot cause sat as per Chandogya Shruti 6.2.2.

अज्ञानं हि नाम ज्ञानाभावः। तस्य च अवस्तु स्वाभाव्यात् कुतः संसारकारणत्वम्। न हि असतः सज्जन्म इष्यते। "कुतस्तु खलु सोम्येवं स्यादिति।... कथमसतः सज्जायेत? (छा.उ.6.2.2) इति श्रुतेरिति।

The siddhanti gives the parihara: अत्र उच्यते। It will be said in this respect-

अज्ञात एव सर्वोर्थः प्राग्यतो बुद्धिजन्मनः। एकेनैव सता सन्श्च सन्नज्ञातो भवेत्ततः॥ Nai.si.3.7

Every object is unknown only, until its right knowledge is got. Its existence, as when we say a pot exists, is the existence of the real (sat) only, that is one without a second. Therefore, it must be that 'sat' itself is the unknown, ajnAta.//

First you must understand that you are the pUrvapakshI here and not the siddhAntI because you hold mithyAjnAna is the cause of samsAra. 

SiddhAntI is not a sAmkhya but is a VedAnti. He explains that the material cause of the world is ajnAta-AtmA i.e. ajnAna-adhyAsa-vishishTa-AtmA. As explained earlier in BBV 1.4.371, the kAraNatva belongs to ajnAna which is superimposed in AtmA, which is the Ashraya of ajnAna. That is how VArtikakAra is explaining here.

//If we start exploring the real nature, vastu-satatva, of an object, say a pot, then it will be decided that it is clay only, which is the cause of pot. However, although the knowledge that it is clay only, has arisen, the 'sadbuddhi', that its existence is the existence of sat only, continues. We now say 'clay exists' instead of 'pot exists', where existence is that of sat alone.//

Yes. So?

//This is how it can be decided that existence of all objects is existence of sat only, and therefore, the nature that "the object is not known" corresponds to that of sat, and not to objects like a pot, which are known to be as such by a wrong knowledge (mithyAjnana).//

Sir, the vishaya of ignorance is not pot but shuddha chaitanya which is delimited by pot. This is well accepted in siddhAnta and also in Naishkarmya Siddhi. The existence-seen-in-pot is not of pot but of आरोप्य-तादात्म्य-आपन्न-सद्रूप-अधिष्ठान. So, you are not saying something which we contradict. 

//( It is not out of place here to point out that in the Bhasya for Chandogya 6.2.2, Acarya rejects the asadvAda position of the opponent, who is shunyavAdI bauddha, and establishes the SatkAryavAda of the Vedanta. Similar to the arguments there, can be found in the above also).//

Yes. But please note that Brahman per se cannot be the material cause of the world in satkAryavAda. It has to be avidyA-vishishTa-Brahman. BhAshyakAra says in unambiguous manner in MANDUkya - तस्मात्सबीजत्वाभ्युपगमेनैव सतः प्राणत्वव्यपदेशः, सर्वश्रुतिषु च कारणत्वव्यपदेशः । Wherever Brahman is said to be kAraNa, please understand, as explained by BhAshyakAra, it is not shuddha Brahman, but sabIja-Brahman.

//What has been demonstrated above is that Suresvara and Acarya have ekavAkyatA on most matters, except for minor differences in some places. One of them is that Acarya considers adhyasa or mithyAjnana as avidya, since that is which the one causes all the sorrow in human life. Suresvara considers jnAnAbhAva or ajnAna as avidya since, without jnAnAbhAva one cannot think of mithyAjnana. However both Acaryas have said that avidya is anAdi and there is no avidya other than jnAnAbhAva, mithyAjnAna and samshaya. Therefore there is no support from either Acarya for bhAvarUpa avidya.//

As demonstrated above, there is no diversion between BhAshya and VArtika.

//In the Vartika 1.4.371 quoted in OP, therefore, the upAdAna-kAraNa for the appearance of the world of duality is actually Brahman, with the support (upAshritya) of ajnAna or jnAnAbhAva, and not some bhAvarUpa avidya.//

Sir ji. Shloka says unambiguously that ajnAna is material cause. No abhAva can be material cause. Period.

//However, it need not be construed from the Vartika that actually a material cause is required, since the world of duality has been suggested to be magical in nature. The cause of a magical show is its "base of its support" (adhiSThAna), namely the magician. The cause of rope-snake is the base of its support, rope alone. It is in this sense only that Brahman is called nimitta as well as upAdAna kAraNa for the world- Brahman alone is there before 'creation', and there is no other material. (Su.Bha.1.4.23)//

Sir, this is called jabardasti. VArtika is saying “ajnAna is material cause” and you, on account of your incorrect basics, are effectively saying - there is no need of material cause - for reason a, b, c. I leave it to yourself to decide the tenability or the lack thereof of such view. 

Whether it is magic or rope-snake or world, upAdAna-kAraNa is needed and is proved logically as well. 

//There are two other aspects in the OP that need comments. It is said there that "Accordingly, the material cause of this magical duality is triguNAtmaka ajnAna which is neither sat nor asat. Brahman is said to be cause on account of the superimposition of that ajnAna (in Brahman)//

Really well said.

//Acarya has said in Sutra Bhashya 2.1.14 (सर्वज्ञ्यस्य ईश्वरस्य आत्मभूते इवाविद्याकल्पिते....), that Name and form which are anirvacanIya in their appearance and which are the seed form of the world, are called by names maya, shakti, and prakriti. It is well known that Vedanta uses some samkhya prakriya and accordingly prakriti or maya are triguNAtmika. But maya is avidyA-kalpita says Acarya. Therefore maya and avidya are not the same. Avidya is the occasion for the appearance of namarUpatmaka world, not-self, and the ruinous identification of the Self with it.//

Sir, bhAshya makes a conspicuous distinction between nAma-rUpa and nAma-rUpa-bIja. While nAma-rUpa-bIja is stated as the cause, nAma-rUpa is stated as kArya. This distinction is displayed in bhAshya by usage of the word “avidyA-Atmaka” for nAma-rUpa-bIja, whereas for nAma-rUpa, the usage is “avidyA-krita/kalpita/pratyupasthApita/adhyAropita”.

As we know, bhAshya uses the word “Atmaka” in the sense of “mAtra”, which is evident from the following usage:  “ब्रह्मणः सदात्मकस्य” and “सन्मात्रं हि ब्रह्म”. Therefore, it is clear that avidyAtmaka means avidyA-mAtra.

The words krita/kalpita/pratyupasthApita/adhyAropita refer to the kArya. 

Thus, it is concluded from the study of bhAshya that:

avidyA = avyAkrita = avyakta = MAyA = nAma-rUpa-bIja = avyAkrita-nAma-rUpa

avidyA-kArya = nAma-rUpa = vyAkrita-nAma-rUpa

It follows that MAyA is not kalpita/krita/pratyupasthApita/adhyAropita by avidyA. Instead, MAyA and avidyA are identical. The effect of avidyA/MAyA, which is nAma-rUpa, is krita/kalpita/pratyupasthApita by avidyA/MAyA.

//The second point in the OP is "Brahman is said to be cause on account of the superimposition of that ajnAna (in Brahman)". Now, where from this superimposition on Brahman happens? It must be from the avidyAbhUmi. In otherwords, avidya/adhyasa is presupposed to exist for doing this superimposition. Thus avidya is prior, pUrvasiddha, to this superimposition. Is it logical to say that the purvasiddha adhyasa has its cause as bhAvAvidya, which is avidyakalpita?//

Sir, adhyAsa is two-fold, kAraNa-adhyAsa which is anAdi avidyA-adhyAsa and kArya-adhyAsa which is sAdi-adhyAsa. The anAdi-avidyA-adhyAsa has no concept of prior, on account of it being anAdi. Further, avidyA being swa-para-nirvAhikA like bheda, there is no AtmAshraya-dosha. So, bhAvarUpA-avidyA, which is the cause of kArya-adhyAsa, is enabler of its own adhyAsa with respect to Brahman as well, just as bheda, while differentiating pot and cloth, also differentiates itself from pot and cloth. As SarvajnAtma-muni puts it up:

भेदं च भेद्यं च भिनत्ति भेदो यथैव भेदान्तरमन्तरेण ।

मोहं च कार्यं च भिनत्ति मोहस्तथैव मोहान्तरमन्तरेण ॥

Similarly, avidyA is swa-para-nirvAhikA. There is no issue.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Ananta Chaitanya [Sarasvati]]

Namaste.

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 5:00 PM Sudhanshu Shekhar <sudhans...@gmail.com> wrote:

//This is what has been done by the Pancapadikakara, who has been wrongly given the descipleship of the Acarya, but, who, instead, is most likely a follower of the pre-Shankara proponents of bhedopadana-avidya-vadins.//

Whoever said the above needs to tone down on personal opinions on juggernauts in the sampradAya. If there is proof to establish it, let him offer the same. I don't think this person knows an iota of what Bhagavan Panchapadikakara says in his works, other than the earlier Sanskrit 101 sandhi mithyA+ajnAna.

Kind rgds,
--Ananta Chaitanya

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Sudhanshuji, 

I've posted on FB and hope to get to it myself. 

kind regards, michael

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[Jaishankar Narayanan]

Namaste Ananta ji,

I agree with you here. It is ridiculous that such comments are being made without any understanding of the sampradaaya. These people are on a high that everyone else is 'wrong' for more than 1000 years and they have found the mistakes and are alone 'correct'. Sad to see such brainwashing :-)

with love and prayers,

Jaishankar

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