A kilogram of darkness please

[dwa...@advaita.org.uk]

Apologies for the sarcastic subject heading but…

 

Also, since when did members hold their conversations in Sanskrit? Thus restricting understanding to those few who actually understand the language to that degree? As (still) a moderator of this forum, I would administer a slapped wrist!

 

Like Sada-ji, despairing of trying to follow all of the discussions on this topic, I thought I would ask a simple question of ChatGPT. If anyone has not yet tried ‘talking to’ AI on intelligent subjects, they should give it a try – they might be pleasantly surprised to find they can actually understand what it is saying and have what passes for an intelligent conversation!  If you read the following, you will see that you cannot totally rely upon everything it says – the answers actually contradict each other at one point – but the conclusion is intelligent and may clarify the issue for some readers. Apologies for the length, but readers should find it very readable, unlike some recent posts…

 

 

Q: Did Shankara believe that 'darkness' was a physical entity and, if so, how did he rationalize this?

 

A: Yes, Adi Shankaracharya did consider 'darkness' (तमस् or tamas) to be a physical entity, but this concept needs to be understood within the broader metaphysical framework of Advaita Vedanta.

 

Shankara's View on 'Darkness'

 

In Advaita Vedanta, as articulated by Shankara, 'darkness' is often associated with avidya (ignorance) or maya (illusion). While 'darkness' in the physical sense refers to the absence of light, in a metaphysical sense, it symbolizes ignorance, which obscures the true nature of the Self (Atman).

 

However, Shankara did sometimes treat darkness as a physical entity that has tangible effects. For instance, in his commentary on the Brahma Sutras (particularly 2.2.28), Shankara addresses the debate about whether darkness is a substance (dravya) or merely the absence of light. He leans toward the view that darkness can be treated as a substance because it appears to have tangible effects: it can be seen (or rather, experienced), it can obscure vision, and it can be perceived as something distinct from light.

 

Rationalization

 

Shankara's rationalization of darkness as a physical entity comes from the idea that it possesses characteristics that make it more than just a mere absence. Here’s how he might have rationalized this:

 

• Perceptibility: Darkness is perceptible to the senses. Even though it is experienced in the absence of light, it is still something that is noticed by an observer. This perceptibility suggests that it has a kind of existence, even if it is not an independent entity like light.

 

• Effect on Objects: Darkness can obscure objects, preventing them from being seen. This obscuring effect is treated as a quality that darkness possesses, much like how a physical object can block light or cast a shadow.

 

• Comparison with Ignorance: Just as darkness covers or conceals objects, ignorance (avidya) covers or conceals the true nature of reality. In this analogy, both darkness and ignorance are considered to have a kind of substance or reality in that they have the power to obscure. However, just as darkness is dispelled by light, ignorance is dispelled by knowledge (jnana).

 

• Vedantic Metaphysics: In the non-dual framework of Advaita Vedanta, everything that appears to exist within the realm of duality, including darkness, is ultimately a manifestation of maya. Maya itself is neither fully real nor fully unreal; it is the power that creates the illusion of duality. Within this framework, darkness can be seen as a real experience within the illusory world, even though it is ultimately part of the same illusion that veils the non-dual reality.

 

Conclusion

 

Shankara's treatment of darkness as a physical entity is rooted in his metaphysical understanding of how the world operates within the illusion of duality. By treating darkness as a substance, Shankara aligns the concept with the broader idea of avidya—something that has real effects in the world of appearances, yet is ultimately unreal when viewed from the perspective of non-dual Brahman.

 

This perspective reflects the intricate way in which Advaita Vedanta navigates the relationship between the phenomenal world (which includes experiences like darkness) and the ultimate, non-dual reality.

 

Q: Is it correct that Shankara comments upon Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 3.7.13: समानमन्यत् । योऽप्सु तिष्ठन् , अग्नौ, अन्तरिक्षे, वायौ, दिवि, आदित्ये, दिक्षु, चन्द्रतारके, आकाशे, यस्तमस्यावरणात्मके बाह्ये तमसि, तेजसि तद्विपरीते प्रकाशसामान्ये — इत्येवमधिदैवतम् अन्तर्यामिविषयं दर्शनं देवतासु । अथ अधिभूतं भूतेषु ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तेषु अन्तर्यामिदर्शनमधिभूतम् ॥.

 

A: Yes, Adi Shankaracharya does comment on Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 3.7.13 in his commentary on the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. The verse you're referring to discusses the concept of the Antaryamin (the inner controller) who dwells within various elements and entities of the universe, including water, fire, air, space, and so on.

Key Points in Shankara's Commentary

 

Shankara’s commentary elaborates on the nature of this inner controller as Brahman, who is present within all aspects of existence. In the passage you provided, Shankara is interpreting the verse as part of his broader discussion on the nature of Brahman as the underlying reality within all things.

 

• Adhidaivata (Cosmic Level): Shankara explains that the inner controller (Antaryamin) resides within all the deities or divine forces (देवतासु). These include water (apsu), fire (agnau), the atmosphere (antarikshe), air (vayau), the heavens (divi), the sun (aditye), the directions (dikshu), the moon and stars (chandratārake), and space (ākāśe).

 

• Tamas (Darkness) as an Avrana (Covering): Interestingly, Shankara also includes tamas (darkness) in his commentary, referring to it as an āvaraṇa-ātmaka (something that has the nature of covering or concealing). This aligns with his broader metaphysical view where darkness is seen as a substance or entity that can obscure, just like ignorance obscures the knowledge of the Self.

 

• Adhibhuta (Physical Level): Shankara also discusses how the same Antaryamin (inner controller) is present within the physical elements and beings (भूतेषु) ranging from the highest, like Brahma, to the lowest, like a blade of grass (stamba). This shows the non-dualistic view where Brahman pervades everything.

 

Conclusion

 

So, to answer your question directly: Yes, Shankara comments upon Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 3.7.13 and elaborates on the idea of Brahman as the inner controller present in all things, including tamas (darkness). This reflects his broader Advaitic philosophy, where Brahman is the immanent and transcendent reality behind all aspects of the universe, including the dualistic phenomena like light and darkness.

 

Q: Does anything said by Shankara mean that he considered 'darkness' as literally a physical entity rather than a metaphorical, metaphysical one?

 

A: No, Shankara did not consider 'darkness' (तमस्, tamas) as a literal physical entity in the sense of a material substance like earth or water. Instead, he treated darkness primarily as a metaphorical or metaphysical concept, particularly in the context of Advaita Vedanta, where it symbolizes ignorance (avidya) or the obscuration of true knowledge.

 

Understanding Darkness in Shankara's Commentaries

 

• Metaphysical Interpretation: In Shankara's philosophy, 'darkness' is closely associated with avidya, the ignorance that conceals the true nature of the Self (Atman) and the ultimate reality (Brahman). This 'darkness' is not a physical entity, but rather a metaphysical condition that causes the perception of duality and the experience of the phenomenal world as separate from Brahman.

 

• Figurative Usage: When Shankara discusses 'darkness' in his commentaries, he typically uses it in a figurative sense to describe the state of ignorance. For example, in his commentary on the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, when he refers to tamas as āvaraṇa-ātmaka (having the nature of covering or concealing), he is describing its function as a veil over true knowledge, not as a physical substance.

 

• Philosophical Context: In Advaita Vedanta, phenomena like darkness and light are often used to explain the relationship between ignorance and knowledge. Light represents knowledge that reveals the true nature of reality, while darkness represents the ignorance that obscures it. This is a metaphorical framework rather than a statement about physical reality.

 

Clarification on Brahma Sutra Commentary

 

In his commentary on the Brahma Sutras (2.2.28), where Shankara engages with the idea of darkness, he entertains the notion of darkness having a sort of existence because it can be perceived and has an effect (e.g., obscuring vision). However, this discussion is more about the epistemological status of darkness—how it can be known and its effects—rather than asserting that darkness is a physical substance.

 

Conclusion

 

Śaṅkara did not treat ‘darkness’ as a literal physical entity. His discussions of darkness were primarily metaphorical and metaphysical, focused on its role as a symbol of ignorance in the non-dualistic framework of Advaita Vedanta. Darkness, in this context, is a useful metaphor for explaining how ignorance obscures the true nature of the Self, but it is not considered a physical substance in the material sense.

 

Q: Your earlier answer was “Yes, Adi Shankaracharya did consider ‘darkness’ (तमस् or tamas) to be a physical entity...” but now you say that “Śaṅkara did not treat ‘darkness’ as a literal physical entity.” Is this confusion inherent in Śaṅkara’s own writing?

 

A: I apologize for the earlier confusion. Let me clarify the issue to address both your question and the apparent contradiction in my previous responses.

 

Śaṅkara’s View on Darkness

 

Śaṅkara’s treatment of darkness (tamas) indeed involves different layers of meaning, which can sometimes seem contradictory but are actually part of a nuanced philosophical framework.

 

    Metaphysical and Metaphorical Use:

 

• Darkness as Avidya (Ignorance): In Advaita Vedanta, darkness is often used metaphorically to represent ignorance (avidya). This ignorance is not a physical substance but a metaphysical condition that veils the true nature of reality. This is the predominant way in which Shankara uses the concept of darkness.
• Darkness in Relation to Knowledge: Shankara also uses the metaphor of light and darkness to illustrate the relationship between knowledge (jnana) and ignorance (avidya). Here, darkness is clearly not a physical entity but a conceptual tool to explain the obscuring power of ignorance.

 

    Epistemological Consideration:

 

Darkness as Perceptible Phenomenon: In his commentary on the Brahma Sutras (2.2.28), Shankara does entertain the idea of darkness as something that can be perceived and has tangible effects (such as obscuring vision). This suggests that darkness has a certain "reality" in the empirical world, though not as a physical substance like earth or water, but rather as a perceptible phenomenon. This discussion is more about how we experience darkness and the status of that experience, not about darkness being a physical material entity.

 

    Apparent Contradiction:

 

        The confusion arises from the fact that Shankara, while mainly treating darkness as a metaphor for ignorance, also acknowledges its perceptibility in the empirical world, which can be interpreted as giving it a kind of existence. However, this does not mean that he considered darkness to be a physical entity in the same way as the elements (earth, water, fire, etc.).

 

Resolution of the Confusion

 

• Darkness in the Empirical World: When Shankara refers to darkness as something perceptible, he is addressing it as an empirical phenomenon within the world of duality, where it can be seen and experienced. This does not make it a physical substance but rather a part of the illusory world (maya), which itself is neither completely real nor completely unreal.

 

• Darkness in the Metaphysical Sense: When Shankara discusses darkness in the context of ignorance, he is clearly using it metaphorically to describe the non-physical aspect of avidya that obscures the truth of non-duality.

 

Conclusion

 

The confusion isn't inherent in Shankara's writings but rather in how his nuanced treatment of darkness is interpreted. He uses darkness both as a metaphor for ignorance and as an empirically perceptible phenomenon in the world of duality, but he does not treat it as a literal physical entity in the way we understand physical substances.

 

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste.

//The confusion isn't inherent in Shankara's writings but rather in how his nuanced treatment of darkness is interpreted. He uses darkness both as a metaphor for ignorance and as an empirically perceptible phenomenon in the world of duality, but he does not treat it as a literal physical entity in the way we understand physical substances.//

There is no confusion. Darkness is clearly stated as bhAva in Shankara's bhAshya.

Without prejudice to the above, whether or not Shankara treated darkness as a literal physical entity has no bearing on the conclusion that darkness is indeed bhAva and not abhAva. This is so because bhAvatva of darkness is proved through pramANa and its abhAvatva is rejected through logic.

Further, even if one holds that Shankara has not stated darkness as bhAva, he should also hold that bhAvatva of darkness is not denied by Him either.

So, when bhAvatva of darkness is proved through anumAna and abhAvatva is negated through yukti - where is the problem in accepting bhAvatva of darkness.

Regarding one kg of darkness -- I would give that certainly, but in lieu of that, please, one kg of space. No? Ok. One kg of electric field please. No? One kg of magnetic field!!!

Being bhAva does not mean measurability in kgs. 

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[dwa...@advaita.org.uk]

Dear Sudhanshu-ji,

 

“Regarding one kg of darkness -- I would give that certainly, but in lieu of that, please, one kg of space. No? Ok. One kg of electric field please. No? One kg of magnetic field!!!”

Not the same, I’m afraid. Space is where you put stuff – if there isn’t any when you need to tidy up, you have a problem. Electric and magnetic fields have measurable effects on other accepted objects.

But, in the case of ‘darkness’, it is the way that we use language that is the problem. ‘Darkness’ is the word that we use for ‘lack of light’. Switching on a torch does not ‘remove’ darkness; it introduces light. If we keep bumping into things and hurting ourselves, what is needed is a torch (to remedy the lack of adequate light) or spectacles (to remedy the lack of good eyesight). Suppose that someone enters the cave, without a torch, and suffers an injury. The reason for this is that he tripped over a rock, which he was unable to see. It is clearly true that he couldn’t see because there was no light in the cave, but darkness was not the ‘cause’ of his injury. The cause was the rock which lay in his path. With a good torch, he would have been able to see and avoid it.

Best wishes,
Dennis

 

 

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Dennis ji. Kalyan ji.

Not the same, I’m afraid. Space is where you put stuff – if there isn’t any when you need to tidy up, you have a problem.

Fine. But how does this militate against the bhAvatva of space? Space is bhAva avidyA-kArya, as it is created (तस्मात् वा एतस्मात् आत्मनः आकाशः सम्भूतः). It is triguNAtmak and yet does not have any measurable unit. Fits perfect as an example for immeasurability of bhAva tamas. 

Electric and magnetic fields have measurable effects on other accepted objects.

Yes. But they are not measurable in kg. You asked for one kg of tamas.

But, in the case of ‘darkness’, it is the way that we use language that is the problem. ‘Darkness’ is the word that we use for ‘lack of light’.

This is your presumption arising on account of non-deliberation. It is proved through anumAna that darkness is not abhAva. I will demonstrate how. You will need to contradict the anumAna and not merely cite presumed linguistic usage as a counter-argument.

Switching on a torch does not ‘remove’ darkness; it introduces light. If we keep bumping into things and hurting ourselves, what is needed is a torch (to remedy the lack of adequate light) or spectacles (to remedy the lack of good eyesight). Suppose that someone enters the cave, without a torch, and suffers an injury. The reason for this is that he tripped over a rock, which he was unable to see. It is clearly true that he couldn’t see because there was no light in the cave, but darkness was not the ‘cause’ of his injury. The cause was the rock which lay in his path. With a good torch, he would have been able to see and 

Again this is just presumption. You are assuming. On what reasoning can you say that it is not created immediately when torch light is put off? There is no reason. If it is proved that tamas is not abhAva, then you will have to accept it's creation.

Why darkness cannot be mere absence of light 

In order to know abhAva, we need to have prior knowledge of pratiyogI. For example, in order to know there is pot-abhAva in the room, we need to know what a pot is. Unless we know a pot, we cannot aver that there is pot-abhAva in the room.

When darkness is posited as prakAsha-abhAva, we need to ask whether it is prakAsha-sAmAnya-abhAva or prakAsha-vishesha-abhAva or sarva-prakAsha-abhAva. 

That is to say, let there be A = {p1, p2, p3..pn}, which is a set of prakAsha in the universe. Then, the darkness which is posited as prakAsha-abhAva can be either 

(i) the abhAva of any of the elements in the set A.

(ii) the abhAva of any specific element in the set A.

(iii) the abhAva of all the elements of the set together.

(iv) the abhAva of each of the elements of the set together.

None of the scenarios are admissible. For example, let us take situation 1 and 2. They are both similar. Let any general or specific element of the set be absent and yet there is sunlight. Can there be darkness? No. Thus, mere absence of a general or specific element of the set does not imply darkness. Hence, it is proved that prakAsha-sAmAnya-abhAva or prakAsha-vishesha-abhAva are not darkness.

Let us take situation 3. This is not tenable either. Because in order to remove darkness, we will need to switch on all p1 to pn. Let us see carefully here: Darkness = abhAva of (p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3… ∧ pn). So to remove darkness, we need to have p1 & p2 & p3… & pn, which is contrary to experience. Further, it also implies that we must know p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3… ∧ pn in order to know darkness, which is impossible. Thus, it is proved that darkness is not sarva-prakAsha-abhAva either.

Now, situation 4 states darkness = (~p1 ∧ ~p2 ∧ ~p3 … ∧ ~pn). This implies that in order to know darkness, we need to know each of the p1 to pn. Because unless we know p1, we cannot know p1-abhAva. Thus, similar to situation 3, this situation 4, which demands prior knowledge of all prakAsha, is an impossibility.

Thus, it is proved that darkness is not prakAsha-abhAva.

Another reason

तमः शब्द वाच्यो नाभावः, स्वमात्रवृत्तिधर्मप्रकारकप्रतियोगिज्ञानाजन्यप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वाद्, घटवत्।  

(i) There are some particular features of abhAva. It resides at more than one place. For e.g. cloth is pot-abhAva. Table is also pot-abhAva. Thus, pot-abhAva-tva resides in cloth as well as table. However, pot-ness exists only in a pot. It does not exist anywhere else. Thus, pot is a padArtha which is swa-mAtra-vritti-dharma-prakArak. Meaning thereby, its qualitative feature inheres only in it. All non-abhAva-padArtha are similarly swa-mAtra-vritti-dharma-prakArak.

Now, whether darkness-ness is seen anywhere other than darkness? Is it seen in a pot? No. Thus, darkness is also swa-mAtra-vritti-dharma-prakArak.

(ii) The knowledge of an abhAva cannot arise without the knowledge of its pratiyogI. Thus, cognition of abhAva is dependent or causally linked with the cognition of prayogI. Thus, abhAva is always pratiyogI-jnAna-janya.

However, darkness is pratiyogI-jnAna-ajanya. We directly perceive darkness.

(iii) Like a pot, darkness is also an object of pratyaksha.

Thus, just as pot, darkness is swa-mAtra-vritti-dharma-prakArak, pratiyogI-jnAna-ajanya and pratyaksha-vishaya. And there is a vyApti, whichever entity is swa-mAtra-vritti-dharma-prakArak-pratiyogI-jnAna-ajanya-pratyaksha-vishaya, that entity is not abhAVa. तमः शब्द वाच्यो नाभावः, स्वमात्रवृत्तिधर्मप्रकारकप्रतियोगिज्ञानाजन्यप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वाद्, घटवत्।  

Thus, we prove through anumAna, which is a valid pramANa, that darkness is not abhAva. Here, darkness is paksha. Hetu is swa-mAtra-vritti-dharma-prakArak-pratiyogI-jnAna-ajanya-pratyaksha-vishaya-tvam. SAdhya is non-abhAva-tva. DrishTAnta is pot.

Another reason

ShankarAchArya says in Brahma Sutra BhAshya 2.2.26 – निर्विशेषस्य त्वभावस्य कारणत्वाभ्युपगमे शशविषाणादिभ्योऽप्यङ्कुरादयो जायेरन् ; न चैवं दृश्यते ; यदि पुनरभावस्यापि विशेषोऽभ्युपगम्येत — उत्पलादीनामिव नीलत्वादिः, ततो विशेषवत्त्वादेवाभावस्य भावत्वमुत्पलादिवत्प्रसज्येत ; नाप्यभावः कस्यचिदुत्पत्तिहेतुः स्यात् , अभावत्वादेव, शशविषाणादिवत्. abhAva does not give rise to anything. On account of being abhAva, like horns of hare. There are no vishesha in abhAva like blue-ness is vishesha in case of lotus. Why? Because on account of this vishesha itself, abhAva will turn to non-abhAva like lotus.

Darkness has a vishesha of black-ness. There is no vishesha in cases of pot-abhAva, cloth-abhAva. Thus, this vishesha itself turns darkness into non-abhAva. 

The fact that darkness is not abhAva implies that it is bhAva.

Further, please note that anything which is seen is created and triguNAtmak. So, even if you hold darkness as prakAsha-abhAva, it still is bhAvarUpa because abhAva is also bhAvarUpa as proved by the following anumAna - अपि च, चतुर्विधानामभावानाम् , घटस्येतरेतराभावो घटादन्यो ष्टः — यथा घटाभावः पटादिरेव, न घटस्वरूपमेव । न च घटाभावः सन्पटः अभावात्मकः ; किं तर्हि ? भावरूप एव । एवं घटस्य प्राक्प्रध्वंसात्यन्ताभावानामपि घटादन्यत्वं स्यात् , घटेन व्यपदिश्यमानत्वात् , घटस्येतरेतराभाववत् ; तथैव भावात्मकताभावानाम् । 

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Ananta Chaitanya [Sarasvati]]

Namaste Sudhanshuji,

On Sat, Aug 31, 2024, 8:29 AM Sudhanshu Shekhar <sudhans...@gmail.com> wrote:

But, in the case of ‘darkness’, it is the way that we use language that is the problem. ‘Darkness’ is the word that we use for ‘lack of light’.

This is your presumption arising on account of non-deliberation. It is proved through anumAna that darkness is not abhAva. I will demonstrate how. You will need to contradict the anumAna and not merely cite presumed linguistic usage as a counter-argument.

Even a simple non-figurative language use known to  everyone will show how darkness is a bhAva padArtha. We say: it is a little dark, too dark, pitch dark, etc. Where is gradation possible in lack of light! If it be said that it is due to gradation of light, then still one has to accept there is some light that cannot counter the darkness present. And then the aprakAshaH tamaH definition not given but used by the opponent will have the virodArthe na~n, not abhavArthe.

gurupAdukAbhyAm,

--Ananta Chaitanya

/* येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति, तं केन विजानीयात्। Through what should one know That, owing to which all this is known! [Br.Up. 4.5.15] */

[dwa...@advaita.org.uk]

Dear Sudhanshu-ji,

 

Apologies, but as soon as I see the word ‘pratiyogi’, I switch off. And there is no way that I can spend hours trying to translate all of your Sanskrit and logic into terms that I can understand. I speak neither Sanskrit nor symbolic logic. To my mind, this is a topic that can be discussed at a level that everyone can follow, because it relates to everyday experience and the language that we all use. (I bet you read and admire writers such as Vimuktātman and Maṇḍana Miśra!) You must concede that, although such an approach often puts a stop to arguments, it does not necessarily win them.

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Ananta Chaitanya ji.

 

Even a simple non-figurative language use known to  everyone will show how darkness is a bhAva padArtha. We say: it is a little dark, too dark, pitch dark, etc. Where is gradation possible in lack of light! If it be said that it is due to gradation of light, then still one has to accept there is some light that cannot counter the darkness present. And then the aprakAshaH tamaH definition not given but used by the opponent will have the virodArthe na~n, not abhavArthe.

Indeed!

Namaste Dennis ji.

//You must concede that, although such an approach often puts a stop to arguments, it does not necessarily win them.//

it is not about winning or losing but about learning what the advaita siddhAnta holds. 

I will try presenting my own understanding as to how I got convinced in the heart of hearts that darkness is triguNatmaka. Let us refer to drishTi-srishTi-vAda which posits absolute identity between waking and dream. Aitareya Upanishads says - trayah swapnAh. I am sure you would be well aware of this.

Now, if we analyse the dream-darkness, is it logical to say that it is dream-prakAsha-abhAva? No. Whatever is seen in a dream, be it light or darkness or pot or pot-abhAva or whatever -- is all avidyA-kArya and hence triguNAtmaka.

Dream-light cannot be placed at a higher pedestal than dream-darkness. No one is contingent on another. Both are seen, hence both are illusory and hence both are at par being triguNAtmaka avidyA-kArya.

Waking being identical to dream imples waking-darkness to be also triguNAtmaka avidyA-kArya.

SrishTi-drishTi-vAda also holds the same but uses complex logic as I presented. I agree that it is difficult to even understand. But we need to put in requisite effort if we need to have clarity.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

 

[Akilesh Ayyar]

Honestly I find this whole discussion utterly irrelevant to seekers. 

But that said, one small point I’ll add. Those who have seen and then later become totally blind say that what remains is not darkness. And yet of course there is in their experience an absence-of-light. So here we have two possibilities for the experience of the absence of light:

-darkness

-the total non-perception of visual information in blindness, which is apparently not the same as darkness

Akilesh Ayyar

[Jaishankar Narayanan]

Namaste,

I think one needs to first have clarity with respect to how we interpret Veda as a means of knowledge. We all know that Shankara has said that even 100 Shruti vakyas cannot contradict pratyaksha anubhava that fire is hot and even if Shruti says 'Fire is cold' it has to reinterpreted in a way that it does not contradict our experience.

Now Shruti clearly says Darkness is an existent entity. Shankara and Sureshvara agree and interpret it as an existent entity. Should we accept this as it is or sugarcoat it as figurative / metaphorical / metaphysical etc.? 

The current scientific consensus is that darkness is the absence of photons (or any radiation). But is it enough to reinterpret the Shruti? Hundred years back if we went by Scientific consensus we would have reinterpreted shrutis revealing that space is created. Shankara in Taittiriya Bhashya also says time also is created along with space. Space-time was considered to be absolute by classical physics . Even our Naiyayikas  consider space, time etc as eternal. Even today I saw an argument by a Vishitadvaiti that atma cannot be both  nitya and sukhasvarupa, as all sukha experienced in the world is anityam and space and time are nityam (according to nyAya) but not sukhasvarupa. Should we override the Shruti based on such logic?

In this case I will still go with the Shruti and our acharyas as I think Science has not yet matured enough to understand darkness and avidya. Even Scientists talk about Dark matter and Dark energy. They say Dark matter is entirely invisible, emitting no light or energy, making it undetectable by conventional sensors and detectors. Its existence is inferred because, without it, the behavior of stars, planets, and galaxies would be inexplicable. Further they say Dark matter constitutes over 80% of all matter in the universe. So darkness may very well be the dark matter which is an existent entity and light may just be something which is opposed to that or which neutralises it temporarily.

So if you accept Veda as a pramana then just accept that darkness is an existent entity.

with love and prayers,

Jaishankar

[Kuntimaddi Sadananda]

Jaishankarji - PraNAms

Just some food for thought. Time is defined as a gap between two sequential observations. It can be modified as a gap between two sequential experiences - For that Mind is required. Hence during the deep sleep state, one does not experience time. 

Similarly, space is defined as a gap between two simultaneous observations - in essence, we need two points. Nature has provided two eyes and two ears and we have stereographic observation via senses. (Now a days one of my ears is not working!)  

During the deep sleep state, we have no experience of space and time - since the mind is inactive. One conclusion is without the mind active one cannot perceive! space or time. 

Also of interest is one cannot see! light also - one can only see or recognize the reflected light from the object. In the night we can see the full moon since sunlight falling on the moon is getting reflected. We cannot see the sunlight that exits between moon and say Mars if there is no object to reflect it. 

Similarly one cannot recognize the light of consciousness that is ever present - only when it gets reflected by the subtle mind it can be recognized - only by the reflection process mind appears as a local conscious entity just like the moon becoming a local luminous entity by reflecting sunlight. 

I agree the Vedic statements to be understood on their right - as it says - aatmanaH aakaashaH sambhuutaH -- etc.

 In the discussion of bhaava-abhaava aspects, the need of the mind for observation is required. 

Anyway, all the discussions are taking at the mental level and most of these are beyond my mind.

My 2C.

Hari Om!

Sada

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[Raghav Kumar]

Namaste Sudhanshu ji

Kindly check the following.

To assert abhAva-pratiyogIjnAna-ajanya-pratyaxa-viShayatvaM for darkness may not seem obvious since we have knowledge of both light and darkness since we can recollect. 

 But there is a clear difference in our experience of any abhAva like pot-abhAva etc. vis-a-vis darkness. For example, when I assert pot-abhAva on the adhikaraNa like the ground, the thought of pot also necessarily comes - but not so in the case of darkness. That is our anubhava of pratyaxa whereby we can assert abhAva-pratiyogIjnAna-ajanya-pratyaxa-viShayatvaM  for darkness because we don't have to think of light when we experience darkness.

Om

Raghav

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Raghav ji.

 

But there is a clear difference in our experience of any abhAva like pot-abhAva etc. vis-a-vis darkness. For example, when I assert pot-abhAva on the adhikaraNa like the ground, the thought of pot also necessarily comes - but not so in the case of darkness. That is our anubhava of pratyaxa whereby we can assert abhAva-pratiyogIjnAna-ajanya-pratyaxa-viShayatvaM  for darkness because we don't have to think of light when we experience darkness.

True. abhAva-jnAna is always pratiyogI-jnAna-janya. Since darkness-jnAna is not pratiyogI-jnAna-janya because we can directly perceive it, it shows darkness is pratiyogI-jnAna-ajanya. Hence, darkness is not abhAva.  

[dwa...@advaita.org.uk]

Dear Sudhanshu-ji and Jaishankar-ji,

 

There is a very real danger in discussions such as these of missing the point of Advaita. It is a teaching method, obviously in vyavahāra, to bring our minds to the realization of the truth of non-duality. In reality, there are no seekers seeking Self-knowledge and no teachers transmitting it; indeed, no creation at all.

 

I believe that the original (scriptural) prakriyā-s and Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya-s use everyday (at the time) understanding of what can be seen and reasoned upon to bring about this realization. They do not require complex logic or modern scientific understanding to cut through the examples that they use. I believe that many post-Śaṅkara writers, and lots of modern-day academics, attempt to do precisely this. To my mind, it only serves to reduce the likelihood of a seeker understanding the message and nothing at all to ‘clarify’ it.

 

I think we can all appreciate that darkness is simply an absence of light. We can bring a torch into a cave but the only way that we can bring darkness into a room is by removing the source of the light. Ancients appreciated this without any special knowledge, even though we now know about photons and electromagnetic radiation.

 

I don’t accept the equivalence of waking and dream states so I do not find that argument helpful. (They are certainly similar – Māṇḍūkya kārikā bhāṣya 2.4 – but also different – Brahmasūtra bhāṣya 2.2.29.) I’m afraid that the theory of eka-jīva-vāda has never done much for me, although vācārambhaṇa śruti has clear teaching value. I talk about EJV in https://www.advaita-vision.org/the-devils-teaching-part-1/ if you are interested in my views.

One thing I would ask: You say that whatever we see in dream is “avidyA-kArya and hence triguNAtmaka”. I understand this to mean that you are saying that dream is the ‘effect of ignorance’ and is therefore a real thing? But doesn’t this pre-suppose that ignorance is a real thing that can be the ‘cause’ of anything? Where do you believe that a scripture or Śaṅkara makes the statement that dreams are ‘caused by’ ignorance?

 

Regarding science and dark matter, it is an interesting idea that darkness might actually be dark matter, but I suspect that an astrophysicist would fall over laughing! ChatGPT’s summary is that: “The idea that darkness "consists of" dark matter misunderstands both concepts. Darkness is about light's presence or absence, while dark matter is about unseen mass that influences gravity. The two are unrelated phenomena in the context of current scientific understanding.”

 

It is true that there is a danger of modern scientific understanding presenting an obstacle to understanding traditional Advaita but one cannot ignore or reject basic knowledge of worldly things. For example, we can no longer accept the literal notion of the mind being ‘contained’ in the heart. Another example is that the scriptures speak of insects being ‘svedaja’, meaning ‘born from sweat or moisture’. Examples such as these were used by the ancients to point the listener towards an understanding of the non-dual truth. They may well have believed them at the time but their relevance was that they functioned well as metaphors. It was never necessary that they were literally true. And now we know that some of them are not.

 

I suggest that darkness and ignorance being existent entities fall into this category. Useful (maybe) as teaching tropes but certainly not literally true.

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

[Akilesh Ayyar]

I believe that the original (scriptural) prakriyā-s and Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya-s use everyday (at the time) understanding of what can be seen and reasoned upon to bring about this realization. They do not require complex logic or modern scientific understanding to cut through the examples that they use. 

This is simply untrue. Anyone reading the bhashya to understand its nuances would require a great deal of logical sophistication — at the time they were composed, and now too. 

This does not mean that all of these complexities are actually necessary for most seekers; they most certainly are not. They may well be obstacles for many. Clearly a lot of it was written for essentially academic and ideological purposes, to provide grounding in a theological war against Advaita’s opponents.

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Dennis ji.

I will retain the focus on bhAvarUpatva of tamas and hence ignore general points made by you.

>  I think we can all appreciate that darkness is simply an absence of light. We can bring a torch into a cave but the only way that we can bring darkness into a room is by removing the source of the light. Ancients appreciated this without any special knowledge, even though we now know about photons and electromagnetic radiation.

Ancients went into great detail about what is "absence", which I see lacking in your presentation. You are using the word "absence" but not defining what it is. Please define what is "absence".

Without prejudice to my claim of bhAvarUpatva of darkness, let me for the time being go along with your claim of tamas being prakAsha-abhAva.

Tell me, how is prakAsha-abhAva not bhAvarUpa! Shankara proves in ghaTa-bhAshya (BrihadAraNyak 1.2.1) that vishesha-abhAva such as pot-abhAva is bhAvarUpa. Here is the logic adduced by him: अपि च, चतुर्विधानामभावानाम् , घटस्येतरेतराभावो घटादन्यो ष्टः — यथा घटाभावः पटादिरेव, न घटस्वरूपमेव । न च घटाभावः सन्पटः अभावात्मकः ; किं तर्हि ? भावरूप एव । एवं घटस्य प्राक्प्रध्वंसात्यन्ताभावानामपि घटादन्यत्वं स्यात् , घटेन व्यपदिश्यमानत्वात् , घटस्येतरेतराभाववत् ; तथैव भावात्मकताभावानाम् ।

So, even if you hold that darkness is prakAsha-abhAva, you will have to accept that darkness is triguNAtmaka bhAvAtmaka avidyA-kArya.

You are mixing nyAya concept of vieshsha-abhAva in VedAnta. Advaita VedAnta does not accept nyAya concept of abhAva as demonstrated by BhAshyakAra above in BrihaDaraNyak 1.2.1.

If you appreciate vedAntic concept of vishesha-abhAva, you will see the fruitlessness of your insistence on darkness being absence-of-light. It still remains triguNAtmaka avidyA-kArya as per ghaTa-bhAshya.

>  I don’t accept the equivalence of waking and dream states so I do not find that argument helpful. (They are certainly similar – Māṇḍūkya kārikā bhāṣya 2.4 – but also different – Brahmasūtra bhāṣya 2.2.29.)

Then you have violated Aitareya Shruti 1.3.12 - trayah swapnAh, and the bhAshya thereupon - त्रयः स्वप्ना जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्याख्याः । ननु जागरितं प्रबोधरूपत्वान्न स्वप्नः । नैवम् ; स्वप्न एव । कथम् ? परमार्थस्वात्मप्रबोधाभावात् स्वप्नवदसद्वस्तुदर्शनाच्च । -  which posits absolute identity of waking and dream. This is also some great common sense and Phi 101 which posits identity of waking and dream on account of your very inability to distinguish a dream and waking. You cannot prove that you are not dreaming right now. So, your insistence on waking being different from dream is born out of untenable assumptions which have been contradicted by bhAshya.

The postulation of difference of waking and dream elsewhere in BSB is for manda-adhikArI, for whom creation is mentioned, as is explained by bhAshyakAra elsewhere. You are mistaking the postulation-for-manda-adhikArI as the advaita-siddhAnta.

> One thing I would ask: You say that whatever we see in dream is “avidyA-kArya and hence triguNAtmaka”. I understand this to mean that you are saying that dream is the ‘effect of ignorance’ and is therefore a real thing?

On the contrary, being avidyA-kArya, both dream and waking are illusory and hence not real.

> But doesn’t this pre-suppose that ignorance is a real thing that can be the ‘cause’ of anything? Where do you believe that a scripture or Śaṅkara makes the statement that dreams are ‘caused by’ ignorance?

Unreal ignorance is the cause of unreal avidyA-kArya. "Both waking and dream are avidyA-kArya" is repeatedly spoken in bhAshya at every step.

Reality of ignorance is not needed for it being a cause. It is bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNa, and due to sAjAtya with avidyA-kArya i.e. sat-vilakshaNatA, it is logical to postulate it being the cause of avidyA-kArya.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Jaishankar Narayanan]

Namaste Dennis ji,

I don't have any disagreement with most of what you say, but I think you missed the point of Advaita if you think Advaita accepts any absence other than unholy compounds like vandhyAputra. All specific absence points to only the presence of something, leading finally to the sad-AtmA.

What we say is that darkness is not merely the absence of light (that too visible light if you go by human vision) but always a presence.  I only talked about dark matter because even if you remove all the detectable matter including light, there can be the presence of dark matter. So when shruti talks about tamas it is talking about the presence of a covering ( as opposed to empty space, which is what you are implying).  I don't think science has had the last word on darkness and you seem to somehow be very certain about your ideas of darkness which also explains your use of sarcasm here. I don't think there is anything  called empty space if we go by the definition of  bhashyakAra in taittiriya Upanishad Bhashya that akAsha is  अवकाशप्रदात्राकाशम्  avakAsha-pradAtr-AkAsham (that which accommodates). So all space should have something which it accommodates, whether you are able to detect it or not.

with love and prayers,

Jaishankar

[Kalyan]

Namaste Sri Sudhanshu-ji

Thank you for addressing your post to me also.

I appreciate the efforts you have put to discuss this topic. 

Please allow me sometime to understand and ponder over what you wrote.

Thank you

Best Regards

Kalyan

[Raghav Kumar]

Namaste

Pujya Swami Dayananda Saraswati ji used to say that vedAnta particularly shankara bhAShya cannot be understood without slow and careful unfoldment from a traditional teacher in contrast to the modern trends of what Swamiji would dub "Paperback vedAnta" or modern Vedanta- a sort of dumbed down version without nuance and clarity. 

Many people innocently ask - "I want to start studying shankara bhAShya. Can you recommend a good book ?"!

Om

On Sun, 1 Sept 2024 at 1:53 am, Akilesh Ayyar

<aki...@siftingtothetruth.com> wrote:

[Jaishankar Narayanan]

Namaste Raghav ji,

In future some one may ask you which AI should I use to get answers for my Vedanta Questions. We can call it post modern Vedanta :-)

With love and prayers,

Jaishankar

[dwa...@advaita.org.uk]

Dear Sudhanshu-ji, Jaishankar-ji, Raghav-ji and Akilesh-ji,

 

You have made some fair points but not altered my position. I maintain that those aspects of Advaita that are likely to persuade a seeker to Self-realization can be explained to any (sādhana catuṣṭaya sampatti qualified) intelligent seeker. I believe it is really only the post-Śaṅkara authors who started logic-nitpicking over everything that was said and complicated the issues. (I.e. I agree with SSS here, although not necessarily with all of his other beliefs.)

 

I am not prepared to embark upon any discussions of the sort that occupied post-Shankarans but, as regards Sudhanshu-ji’s point I would have thought that all Śaṅkara is saying in Br.U.B. 1.2.1 is that darkness is the word we use to refer to an absence of light. Since we all know what we mean when we speak of ‘darkness’, in that sense it can be considered to ‘exist’. This way of looking at it also answers Jaishankar-ji’s point about ‘presence’ and ‘absence’ – one certainly speaks of the ‘presence of darkness’ and no one is any doubt as to what is meant. One might even say that there is darkness in the cave and others would know what was meant, even if they did think it was a strange way of putting it! But I suggest that everyone would understand it to mean that there was an absence of light (excepting a few Nyāya-influenced Advaitins of course).

 

I’ve been trying to think of another example. One that occurs to me is the use of the word ‘famine’ in a country where there is no food. Food is obviously something we can hold, and even eat. Famine is a state whose consequences are evident, but it is not something that we can pick up and hold. But I agree that we would have to say that famine ‘exists’ in that country. Nevertheless, it exists because there is an absence of food! It is the way that we use language. Similarly, darkness exists because there is an absence of light. Just as it is food that it the actual ‘thing’ that we want in a state of famine, so it is with light and darkness.

 

Of course, waking and dream worlds are ultimately equivalent in being mithyā. But no one (including you!) would deny that they are practically different in our experience. This is incontrovertible and presumably why Śaṅkara differentiated them as vyavahāra and pratibhāsa and, as an interim explanation, stated that Īśvara was the ‘creator’ of the former. As I emphasized in my first post (?), Advaita is intended to take us from our initial belief in a dualistic universe to an intellectual realization of non-duality. There is no fruitful purpose in going down academic blind alleys.

 

I’m afraid you lose me, Sudhanshu-ji, in your last few paras, talking of unreal things being the cause of other unreal things. Apologies for my initial confusion over the word ‘triguṇātmaka’. I have not encountered this word before and was ‘brought up’ in a school that conflated Sāṅkhya and Advaita and used the  Sāṅkhyan (real) version of the guṇa-s! I very rarely refer to them at all.

 

I didn’t think I was being sarcastic on the topic of darkness and dark matter. I certainly do not claim to be certain on any such topic. Who knows what the scientists are going to come up with next? (There are even one or two who seem to have the strange idea that consciousness is fundamental to the universe.) But, as regards space being ‘accommodating’, doesn’t this mean that space is that which CAN accommodate, rather than being that which must already be accommodating something?

 

I certainly do not deny that advaita requires “slow and careful unfoldment from a traditional teacher” – I have said this many times. What I am saying is that this does not mean it is necessary to invoke obscure Nyāya syllogisms in order to make sense of it or to reinterpret everything that Śaṅkara said in order to make it ‘clearer’ what he ‘actually meant’. And I certainly hope that no one is referring to my ‘Confusions in Advaita Vedanta’ as “paperback Vedānta”! (A third of the publishing run was in hardback.)

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Dennis ji.

You have not replied to the central point. I will try again.

Let us concentrate. Even if darkness, as you say, is absence-of-light, how is it not bhAvarUpa? BhAshyakAra proves in Br.U.B. 1.2.1 that abhAva are bhAvarUpa (this is not common sense. this is advaita-siddhAnta-rahasya). He makes a clear statement -- तथैव भावात्मकताभावानाम्. And He did not make a statement just like that -- he gave solid anumAna for that.

So, either you refute His statement by counter logic, or accept that prakAsha-abhAva, which you hold as darkness, is bhAvarUpa.
Be specific to the topic please.

//I would have thought that all Śaṅkara is saying in Br.U.B. 1.2.1 is that darkness is the word we use to refer to an absence of light. Since we all know what we mean when we speak of ‘darkness’, in that sense it can be considered to ‘exist’.//

BhAshya is clear. Pot-abhAva, whether it is prAk, pradhvamsa, anyonya or atyanta -- is bhAvarUpa. Further, all such vishesha-abhAva, be it pot-abhAva, cloth-abhAva, chair-abhAva, food-abhAva, are bhAvarUpa. The word bhAvarUpa here is not "in the sense of being considered to exist". It has been demonstrated by BhAshyakAra to be like cloth, in the pot-abhAva example. He has taken cloth as an example of bhAvarUpa.

So, please ponder over this and respond as to how even your acceptance of darkness being prakAsha-abhAva militates against its bhAvarUpatva.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste  Sudhanshuji, 

--तथैव भावात्मकताभावानाम्. meaning please

--//The word bhAvarUpa here is not "in the sense of being considered to exist". It has been demonstrated by BhAshyakAra to be like cloth, in the pot-abhAva example. He has taken cloth as an example of bhAvarUpa.// 

from fn1 below referring cloth as example of pot-abhava: 

"The mīmamsaka-s say, every entity is bhāva (positive) from its own svarūpa, and it’s in abhāva

when viewed from another object. Following this school, the vyavahāra bheda of jars and clothes,
of bhāva and abhāva is expounded here. Imagining bheda in abhāva is wrong, say Tai.U.Bh (9,
introduction), BSBh 2.1.18 (449), BGBh 18.48 (546) - all these from pāramartha drsti. So, no
contradiction here."

Sri Kumarji translated and posted in SAV group though you, Sudhanshuji, did not substantively respond although you did offer some nice peripheral observations (not included here).  Sri Kumarji's pedagogy in presentation.

 

*** All Abhāva-s (absence, negations) are bhāva rūpa (positive entity) ***

POST #8 (previous posts in the first comment below; full bhāsya in uploaded file):

Now:. Some schools (naiyāyikā, mimāmsaka) talk of 4 kinds of abhāva-s (before creation of jar, after destruction of jar, complete absence of jar, and mutual exclusion such as jar not-existing in cloth). Each of these four abhāva-s of the jar point to a positive entity, and the jar as effect exists before its creation.

So far: Upaniṣad (Br.U. 1.2.1) started with “There was nothing whatsoever here in the beginning.”

The nihilist: Yes! There was neither effect nor cause.

Vedantin: No, both were there (existent). An effect, a jar for example, is possible only when there is a cause such as lump-of-clay. In the beginning, the cause covered the effect (the world).

Opponent: Cause was not there because to create jar (world) the lump-of-clay (cause) must have been there, but śruti says there was nothing.

Vedantin: Cause persists (anuvṛtti) in all products.

Opponent: No need for a cause. World is a series of products coming and going. Persistence is due to “similarity” and not due to cause. Vedantin: Similarity is a type of inference which is subordinate to direct observation (pratyakṣa). Don’t you directly see clay particles persisting from lump to jar? Also, manifestation itself is an indicator of the cause. So also existence in time through notions of past and future jars such as jar-to-be, jar-that-was.

Questions for POST #8:

1. Is the notion of abhāva applicable from a pāramārtha dristi? (Hint: See SSS fn #1 and references there.)
2. If Mūlāvidya is the covering identified as mṛtyu or death in the upanishad verse of ghaṭa bhāṣya, would that Mūlāvidya be bhāvarūpa? If yes, is there support for the answer in bhāṣya? If not, is that identified prior to mṛtyu as bhaāvarūpa, and with support from bhāṣya?

Read on —

BHĀṢYA - Moreover, among the four kinds of abhāva-s (absence, Sw.M translated as negations), the jar’s itaretara-abhāva (mutual exclusion, or anyōnyabhāva) is seen to be other-than-the-jar. For example, a jar’s abhāva is a cloth (or another thing), but not the jar itself (svarūpa).

So, the cloth, an abhāva of the jar in this context, is not abhāva-rūpa (nonentity) but a positive entity (bhāva-rūpa [1]). Similarly, the (other abhāva-s) prāg, pradhvaṃsa, and atyanta abhāva-s (respectively, abhāva-s before birth/creation, after death/destruction, and complete like hare’s horn) must also be other than the jar. Because (these three abhāva-s) we say are jar’s abhāva-s, using the same term (śabda) jar as we do when we say ‘jar’s itaretara-abhāva’. These abhāva-s are also positive entities (bhāva rūpa) just like itaretara-abhāva. This being so, prāg abhāva does not mean that the jar’s svarūpa is not there before its birth [2]. Moreover, if by saying prāg abhāva you are pointing jar’s svarūpa, then to say ‘there is (abhāva) of jar’ is incongruous.

If you use it merely as a fancy, as in the expression, "the body of the stone sculpture," then the phrase 'the prāg abhāva of a jar' would only mean that it is the imaginary abhāva that is mentioned in terms of the jar [3], and not the jar itself. If, on the other hand, you say that the abhāva of a jar is something other than it, we have already answered the point [4].

———-

SSSS Footnotes:

1. The mīmamsaka-s say, every entity is bhāva (positive) from its own svarūpa, and it is in abhāva when viewed from another object. Following this school, the vyavahāra bheda of jars and clothes, of bhāva and abhāva is expounded here. Imagining bheda in abhāva is wrong, say Tai.U.Bh (9, introduction), BSBh 2.1.18 (449), BGBh 18.48 (546) - all these from pāramartha drsti. So, no contradiction here.
2. If abhāva is bhāva padārtha different from pratiyogi, then it means a positive entity different from the jar. Just as the positive cloth has anyōnya abhāva with respect to the jar, why not the prāg abhāva be positive with respect to the jar? This is the sense here. Here Tīka (Ānandagiri) says- ghata is anādi, ananta, advaya, and sarvātma. But this is not seen in the bhāsya.
3. In ‘abhāva of jar,’ if bheda is imagined, then abhāva will be imagined; then to say, jar is non-existent would be incongruous.
4. Because abhāva is bhāvātmaka, one cannot say svarūpa is non-existent. If it is said that the svarūpa of a jar is non-existent before birth, then it is said so to (set up) the defect discussed next.

Continuing…

BHĀṢYA - Moreover, if the jar before its manifestation be an complete abhāva (nonentity) like the proverbial horns of a hare (śaśaviṣāṇavat), it cannot be connected either with its cause or with existence (sat), for connection requires two positive entitles. If it is said to be connected with things that are inseparable, it would be incorrect. For, we cannot conceive of an inseparable connection between an existent and a non-existent thing. Separable or inseparable connection is possible between two positive entities only, not between an entity and a nonentity, nor between two nonentities. Therefore, we conclude that the effect does exist before it is manifested.

Here is Sri Kumarji''s full translation of SSSSji's notes on Ghata Bhasya -- Hope it is informative

https://drive.google.com/file/d/10Do3FlNxgKLVGu_xDB2wSwFe7wXjt9wx/view?usp=drive_link

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.

--तथैव भावात्मकताभावानाम्. meaning please

the abhAva-s have bhAvAtmakatA. [I am not translating as these words are not casual words which can be easily translated in English. Let us retain their sanskrit origin]

I request the replies to be precise and to the point. Question is precise. Answers should be precise. 

Question is simple - even if darkness is accepted as prakAsha-abhAva, as per the anumAna adduced by BhAshyakAra in BUB 1.2.1, it is still bhAvarUpa. So, darkness, even if accepted as prakAsha-abhAva, is triguNAtmaka.

In fact the bhAshyakAra's anumAna can be easily remodelled as under: -

घटान्योन्याभावः सन्पटः त्रिगुणात्मकः। (pot-anyonya-abhAva is triguNAtmaka, being cloth)

घटस्य प्राक्प्रध्वंसात्यन्ताभावानामपि त्रिगुणात्मकत्वम् , घटेन व्यपदिश्यमानत्वात् , घटस्येतरेतराभाववत् ; (pot-atyanta-abhAva, pot-prAk-abhAva, pot-pradhvamsa-abhAva are triguNAtmaka, on account of having transactability through pot, like pot-anyonya-abhAva)

तथैव त्रिगुणात्मकताभावानाम् । (Therefore abhAvAs have triguNAtmakatA.)

Please answer in a precise manner. I cannot find the answer in what Sri Kumar ji has written.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[dwa...@advaita.org.uk]

Dear Sudhanshu-ji,

 

If we are going ‘back to basics’ and “concentrating”, can we establish what we are talking about first, please.

 

What do you mean by saying that X is ‘bhAvarUpa’ (in English)? Monier-Williams gives: “really existing, real, actual”. Since we are talking in Advaitin language, that ought to mean that it exists ‘in all three periods of time’. I would have said that, by that definition, like every other worldly perception or conception, darkness is not real. You cannot mean that it is ‘sat’ since, like every other perception or conception, it is mithyā. This is why I complain when people use Sanskrit in their discussions. It is certainly true that some Sanskrit terms have no simple English equivalent but it is also true that not all seekers have a comprehensive and identical understanding of such terms. We should really only use a Sanskrit term when there is no commonly understood English equivalent.

 

My naïve understanding is that, if Śaṅkara had meant that ‘pot-absence’ is a really existing thing, he would have used unambiguous language to state this. But he doesn’t. Any discussion about this seems to me highly contrived and of little value in the teaching of Advaita but, since Śaṅkara obviously did this, let us proceed. I understand that he meant that, in a discussion in a particular context, we can treat something as actually existing because we both know what we are talking about and there is no confusion.

 

Suppose that you and I are having an argument about the pot that we believe to be on the table in room X of the museum. Suppose a third person comes in and tells us he has seen this pot on the table in room Y. This being the case, if I go into room X, I could say that I become aware of the absence of the pot. In that sense, it has a sort of meaning to say that the pot-absence exists in room X. But why anyone would want to talk in this way eludes me. Perhaps you could explain? Or perhaps I am simply misunderstanding what is being said here? I would just say that the pot isn’t in room X so I am prepared to accept the third person’s claim that it is in room Y.

 

So I can agree to your statement that “prakAsha-abhAva, which you hold as darkness, is bhAvarUpa” (if by that you mean that the ‘absence of light’ ‘exists’) but only if you accept that this is meaningful only in the context of a discussion such as the example I give here. It is only the thing that we are actually talking about (i.e. pot or light) that has real (mithyā) existence. The ‘pot-absence’ or ‘darkness’ are just convenient (?) words to help our discussion. Of course, a word such as ‘darkness’ has come to have such common usage that it is easy for people to think that it actually refers to something in its own right – which is why we have a problem.

 

Darkness has mithyā existence as a concept, but not as a percept. We don’t ‘see’ darkness; when it is dark, we fail to see anything and give this ‘absence of light’ the name ‘darkness’ for convenience.

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

From: adva...@googlegroups.com <adva...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Sudhanshu Shekhar
Sent: Sunday, September 1, 2024 1:32 PM
To: adva...@googlegroups.com; A discussion group for Advaita Vedanta <adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org>
Subject: Re: [advaitin] A kilogram of darkness please

 

Namaste Dennis ji.

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Dennis ji.

//What do you mean by saying that X is ‘bhAvarUpa’ (in English)? Monier-Williams gives: “really existing, real, actual”. Since we are talking in Advaitin language, that ought to mean that it exists ‘in all three periods of time’.//

You should see how AchArya used the term. He said --  न च घटाभावः सन्पटः अभावात्मकः ; किं तर्हि ? भावरूप एव । He gives cloth as an example of bhAvarUpa. That very same connotation is to be used when something is said to be bhAvarUpa. It is neither Brahman nor horns of hare. For example, a cloth. BhAshyakAra says that pot-abhAva, being cloth, is bhAvarUpa. So, there is no need to refer to Monier Williams. Also, in advaita siddhAnta, bhAvarUpa has been discussed in great detail.

//I would have said that, by that definition, like every other worldly perception or conception, darkness is not real. You cannot mean that it is ‘sat’ since, like every other perception or conception, it is mithyā.//

Why are you taking this meaning of bhAvarUpa (as sat) when bhAshyakAra is using the term to denote objects such as cloth.

//This is why I complain when people use Sanskrit in their discussions. It is certainly true that some Sanskrit terms have no simple English equivalent but it is also true that not all seekers have a comprehensive and identical understanding of such terms.//

Seekers should put in effort to understand what is the intended meaning of Sanskrit terms used. Non-comprehension by seekers is not a valid reason to stop using original terms which have a definition and instead opt for vague English words.

// We should really only use a Sanskrit term when there is no commonly understood English equivalent.//

You are entitled to your opinion.

//My naïve understanding is that, if Śaṅkara had meant that ‘pot-absence’ is a really existing thing, he would have used unambiguous language to state this. But he doesn’t. //

There is nothing unambiguous in the language used by AchArya. BhAvarUpa is used for mithyA objects which is different from Brahman as well as nirvishesha-abhAva like horns of hare.

//Any discussion about this seems to me highly contrived and of little value in the teaching of Advaita but, since Śaṅkara obviously did this, let us proceed.//

The fact that AchArya regarded this discussion important shows that it is not contrived. Please remember - he has used anumAna pramANa to disregard a common misunderstanding prevalent that pot-abhAva is mere abhAva like nothingness/horns of hare. No. It is bhAvarUpa and hence triguNAtmaka.

//I understand that he meant that, in a discussion in a particular context, we can treat something as actually existing because we both know what we are talking about and there is no confusion.//

No. If both parties were believing same thing, there was no need of anumAna pramANa used by AchArya in the first place. He is rejecting the naiyAyikAs contention that pot-abhAva is some abhAva like horns of hare. Instead it is a bhAvarUpa vastu like cloth. You should consider going through the topic in more detail.

 //Suppose that you and I are having an argument about the pot that we believe to be on the table in room X of the museum. Suppose a third person comes in and tells us he has seen this pot on the table in room Y. This being the case, if I go into room X, I could say that I become aware of the absence of the pot. In that sense, it has a sort of meaning to say that the pot-absence exists in room X. But why anyone would want to talk in this way eludes me. Perhaps you could explain? Or perhaps I am simply misunderstanding what is being said here? I would just say that the pot isn’t in room X so I am prepared to accept the third person’s claim that it is in room Y.//

If you can know about pot-abhAva in room x, you have no option but to admit a bhAvarUpa pot-abhAva in room x. If other person cannot know that, that is not a reason enough to postulate the non-existence thereof.

//So I can agree to your statement that “prakAsha-abhAva, which you hold as darkness, is bhAvarUpa” (if by that you mean that the ‘absence of light’ ‘exists’) but only if you accept that this is meaningful only in the context of a discussion such as the example I give here.//

Just as AchArya meant cloth as an example of bhAvarUpa and not mere absence, similarly prakAsha-abhAva. I fail to understand your insistence despite the fact that AchArya is proving exactly the opposite. He is disproving the claim that pot-abhAva is mere abhAva like horns of hare.

//It is only the thing that we are actually talking about (i.e. pot or light) that has real (mithyā) existence. The ‘pot-absence’ or ‘darkness’ are just convenient (?) words to help our discussion. Of course, a word such as ‘darkness’ has come to have such common usage that it is easy for people to think that it actually refers to something in its own right – which is why we have a problem.//

Then what is AchArya proving? Is he explaining linguistic usage through anumAna pramANa? 😀

//Darkness has mithyā existence as a concept, but not as a percept. We don’t ‘see’ darkness; when it is dark, we fail to see anything and give this ‘absence of light’ the name ‘darkness’ for convenience.//

This is against common experience of pratyaksha. Also, it is against the anumAna I have already presented. तमः शब्द वाच्यो नाभावः,स्वमात्रवृत्तिधर्मप्रकारकप्रतियोगिज्ञानाजन्यप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वाद्, घटवत्।  

It is against the BhAshya portions already provided.

It stands proved as per pratyaksha, anumAna, BhAshya and Shruti that darkness is a pramAtri-gamya mithyA-bhAvarUpa-neela-rUpa-vat-dravya. 

Further, please consider the following anumAna, which I remodeled based on BhAshyakAra's anumAna:

घटान्योन्याभावः सन्पटः त्रिगुणात्मकः। (pot-anyonya-abhAva is triguNAtmaka, being cloth)

घटस्य प्राक्प्रध्वंसात्यन्ताभावानामपि त्रिगुणात्मकत्वम् , घटेन व्यपदिश्यमानत्वात् , घटस्येतरेतराभाववत् ; (pot-atyanta-abhAva, pot-prAk-abhAva, pot-pradhvamsa-abhAva are triguNAtmaka, on account of having transactability through pot, like pot-anyonya-abhAva)

तथैव त्रिगुणात्मकताभावानाम् । (Therefore abhAvAs have triguNAtmakatA.)

If you cannot refute this argument, then you must accept that vishesha-abhAva are triguNAtmaka. Hence, your claim that darkness is prakAsha-abhAva, even though wrong, still does not militate against its triguNAtmakatA. Darkness remains a triguNAtmaka mithyA vastu.

Regards,

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

 

[dwa...@advaita.org.uk]

Dear Sudhanshu-ji,

 

It is not that I cannot refute your arguments but that I cannot follow them. I have already stated that I believe it essential to use SOME Sanskrit words, when there is no English equivalent. MithyA is the obvious example. I have not registered that there is anything in these discussions that cannot be expressed in English. I have never felt it necessary to use the word bhAvarUpa, even, or abhAva. Every time I encounter such words, my attempt to understand what you are saying falters and, when I see Devanagari, I just give up trying. Obviously I can work out what they are saying with effort, maybe resorting to translators and/or dictionaries to speed things up, but why should I have to do this? And, before you say that I should make the effort since it is so intrinsic to Advaita, it is far too late in life to attempt this! And I have managed to write some 10 – 12 books on Advaita without this expertise.

 

If you want to proceed with this discussion (I would honestly like to understand your reasoning), you will have to rewrite the post below in simple English. Meanwhile, maybe other readers (and even yourself?) might enjoy the following attempt to summarize the situation in a light-hearted way:

 

****

 

What is ‘absence’ anyway? It is simply a word we use to refer to the fact that something is not here. Suppose that the teacher realizes that little Johnny is not in the class again. He reports this to the head who says: “His absence has been noted”. What does this mean exactly?

 

Does it simply refer to whatever the headmaster has written in his little black book? Is it something belonging to Johnny that he ought to get rid of or leave at home when he comes into school? Presumably he cannot bring it with him to school because then he would no longer have it!

 

Obviously ‘absence’ in this context refers to Johnny himself. If Johnny’s absence is noted at the school, then clearly Johnny himself is not there. The two are mutually exclusive.

 

But all of this simply relates to the often baffling way in which language develops. All that we are talking about is whether or not Johnny is present at the school. When he isn’t there, we use this catch-all word to refer to the situation. The way in which we use it is as an adjective describing Johnny – ‘absent Johnny’ (again). We cannot use it as a non-qualified noun and say ‘there is absence’, because no one would know what we were talking about. It has to be connected to a noun and simply refers to the ‘non-presence’ of that noun.

 

We might conceivably invent another noun here. If Johnny is absent most days and we get tired of telling the head, we could agree that ‘J Lo’ means that he is absent (his second name is Lowry). Then, when the teacher passes the head in the corridor, he could just say “J Lo” and the head would note it with resignation.

 

And this, I suggest, provides an explanation for the role of the words ‘darkness’ and ‘ignorance’. Light and knowledge are so important in our lives that their absence merited specific words of their own. “J Lo”, on the other hand, doesn’t (or maybe it is already used elsewhere).

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

 

 

From: adva...@googlegroups.com <adva...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Sudhanshu Shekhar
Sent: Monday, September 2, 2024 5:24 AM
To: adva...@googlegroups.com; A discussion group for Advaita Vedanta <adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org>
Subject: Re: [advaitin] A kilogram of darkness please

 

Namaste Dennis ji.

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Respected Dennis ji.

You have presented a common sense understanding of absence. That is refuted in advaita. That is precisely what BhAshyakAra did. His anumAna is actually very simply worded. 

Let me modify BhAshyakAra's anumAna a little bit and word it in English.

1. "mutual non-existence of pot" is composed of three guNAs, being cloth.

2.  "absolute-non-existence-of-pot, prior-non-existence-of-pot and non-existence-due-to-destruction-of-pot" , are composed of three guNAs . On account of having transactability through pot. Like mutual-non-existence-of-pot.

3. Similarly, "all non-existences with a counter-positive" are composed of three guNAs.

This is as simple as it can be worded. If you can refute it, please go ahead. If you still cannot, I give up as I cannot simplify it further.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[dwa...@advaita.org.uk]

Dear Sudhanshu-ji,

 

Thank you for your persistence but I regret to say that your ‘simplification’ is as ‘clear as mud’ as they say in the North of England. I find it difficult to believe that it cannot be further simplified for idiots such as myself. How, for example, does ‘mutual non-existence’ differ from ‘absolute non-existence? And where does cloth come into it? Why the reference to the three guNa-s or complication of ‘counter-positives’?

 

Rather than simply give up, I have been discussing this with ChatGPT and the latest elicited response is very clear and simple. Does the following correspond with your understanding?

 

 

A: The distinction between Prāgabhāva, Anyonyābhāva, and Ghaṭābhāva is also a subtle and important aspect of Advaita Vedanta and serves a specific purpose in teaching about the nature of reality. Let’s explore the purpose of these distinctions:

Definitions:

 

    Prāgabhāva (प्रागभाव):

        Meaning: This refers to the non-existence of an object before it is created or comes into being. For example, the absence of a pot before the potter makes it.

        Purpose in Teaching: Prāgabhāva is used to explain that before something comes into existence in the empirical world, it does not have any independent reality. This helps in understanding that all created objects have a beginning and are therefore not eternal or ultimately real.

 

    Anyonyābhāva (अन्‍योन्‍याभाव):

        Meaning: This refers to mutual non-existence, where two objects are understood to be distinct from each other. For example, the non-existence of pot-ness in a cloth and cloth-ness in a pot.

        Purpose in Teaching: Anyonyābhāva is used to clarify the distinct identities of objects in the empirical world. This distinction is crucial for functioning in the world of duality but also points out that such distinctions are based on name and form, not on ultimate reality.

 

    Ghaṭābhāva (घटाभाव):

        Meaning: This refers to the specific absence of an object in a certain place, such as the absence of a pot on a table.

        Purpose in Teaching: Ghaṭābhāva helps in understanding the relative, context-dependent nature of existence. It shows that the presence or absence of objects is perceptible and meaningful only within the empirical world (vyavahāra), reinforcing the idea that such realities are not absolute.

 

The Purpose of These Distinctions in Advaita Vedanta:

 

    Clarifying Different Types of Non-Existence:

        These distinctions help students understand that not all non-existence is the same. By distinguishing between Prāgabhāva (prior non-existence), Anyonyābhāva (mutual non-existence), and Ghaṭābhāva (specific absence), Advaita Vedanta clarifies that the concept of non-existence is multifaceted and context-dependent.

 

    Demonstrating the Relativity of Empirical Reality:

        By exploring how objects and their absences are understood differently depending on context (e.g., before creation, relative to other objects, or in a specific place), Advaita shows that empirical reality (mithyā) is not the absolute truth. It is dependent on time, place, and circumstance, and therefore cannot be the ultimate reality.

 

    Teaching About the Non-Absoluteness of the World:

        These distinctions emphasize that the world of duality, where things come into existence, have specific identities, and can be absent in specific contexts, is not ultimately real (sat). This prepares the student to understand that all empirical distinctions dissolve in the realization of Brahman, where such distinctions do not apply.

 

    Highlighting the Dependence of Empirical Reality on Consciousness:

        The distinctions help to demonstrate that what we consider to be existence or non-existence in the world is perceived through consciousness. The understanding of Prāgabhāva, Anyonyābhāva, and Ghaṭābhāva ultimately leads to the realization that these distinctions arise within consciousness and have no independent existence apart from it. This aligns with the Advaita teaching that Brahman (pure consciousness) is the only reality, and everything else is a manifestation within it.

 

    Aiding in the Process of Discrimination (Viveka):

        For the spiritual seeker, understanding these nuances aids in the practice of viveka, the discrimination between the real (Brahman) and the unreal (the world). By analyzing how existence and non-existence operate in the empirical world, the seeker is better equipped to recognize that these are all ultimately aspects of the illusory world of māyā.

 

Summary:

 

The distinctions between Prāgabhāva, Anyonyābhāva, and Ghaṭābhāva serve as important tools in Advaita Vedanta for analyzing the nature of empirical reality. They help clarify that non-existence, like existence, is context-dependent and relative. This understanding deepens the seeker’s insight into the non-absoluteness of the empirical world and aids in the realization of Brahman as the only true reality, where such distinctions do not ultimately hold.

 

 

I will now see if I can extend this understanding to a consideration of darkness, and thence to ignorance.

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

From: adva...@googlegroups.com <adva...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Sudhanshu Shekhar
Sent: Monday, September 2, 2024 9:28 AM
To: adva...@googlegroups.com; A discussion group for Advaita Vedanta <adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org>
Subject: Re: [advaitin] A kilogram of darkness please

 

Respected Dennis ji.

 

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Siudhanshuji,

You said: 

//In fact the bhAshyakAra's anumAna can be easily remodelled as under: -

घटान्योन्याभावः सन्पटः त्रिगुणात्मकः। (pot-anyonya-abhAva is triguNAtmaka, being cloth)

घटस्य प्राक्प्रध्वंसात्यन्ताभावानामपि त्रिगुणात्मकत्वम् , घटेन व्यपदिश्यमानत्वात् , घटस्येतरेतराभाववत् ; (pot-atyanta-abhAva, pot-prAk-abhAva, pot-pradhvamsa-abhAva are triguNAtmaka, on account of having transactability through pot, like pot-anyonya-abhAva)

तथैव त्रिगुणात्मकताभावानाम् । (Therefore abhAvAs have triguNAtmakatA.)//

How is reason to accept pot's absence by virtue of cloth as a positive entity? It is absurd on the face of it. That needs to be the starting point. If so, the burden of proof is on Mulavidyavada, it seems to me and SSSS's understanding seems quite plausible

What is this "transactional through pot"? Are you saying absence is transactional," like darkness covers light?  Sankara discusses "shade" and Rahu as abhavarupa despite having affections like coolness (US 18.40). 

My earlier response citing SSSS in footnotes you found imprecise. SSSS said, "Following this school, the vyavahāra bheda of jars and clothes, of bhāva and abhāva is expounded here. Imagining bheda in abhāva is wrong" and he cited Tait Up Intro bhasya, BGBh 18.48. BSBh 2.2.26 as reference. 

What is imprecise, precisely? jar abhava due to anyonya abhava is only imagined, a quibble/vikalpa, as bhavarupa of clothes, Tait Intro below. I  

Tai.U.Bh (intro) 

मोक्षस्य भावरूपत्वात् । प्रध्वंसाभावोऽप्यारभ्यत इति न सम्भवति अभावस्य विशेषाभावाद्विकल्पमात्रमेतत् । भावप्रतियोगी ह्यभावः । यथा ह्यभिन्नोऽपि भावो घटपटादिभिर्विशेष्यते भिन्न इव घटभावः पटभाव इति, एवं निर्विशेषोऽप्यभावः क्रियागुणयोगाद्द्रव्यादिवद्विकल्प्यते । न ह्यभाव उत्पलादिवद्विशेषणसहभावी । विशेषणवत्त्वे भाव एव स्यात्

IAST

**mokṣasya bhāvarūpatvāt. pradhvaṁsābhāvo'pyārabhyata iti na sambhavati abhāvasya viśeṣābhāvādvikalpamātrametat. bhāvapratiyogī hyabhāvaḥ. Yathā hyabhinnopi bhāvo ghaṭapaṭādibhirviśeṣyate bhinna iva ghaṭabhāvaḥ paṭabhāva iti, evaṁ nirviśeṣopyabhāvaḥ kriyāguṇayogāddravyādivadvikalpyate. Na hyabhāva utpalādivadviśeṣaṇasahabhāvī. Viśeṣaṇavattve bhāva eva syāt.**

Preceding the para cited below:

(Objection:)-What has been destroyed is not itself again born. Thus, like the pradhvamsabhava, non- existence of a thing, known as destruction, moksha is eternal and is yet produced.

(Answer:) No.

Cite - Para translated with SSSS ji notes.

Because moksha is positive (bhāvarūpa) [1].

To say that pradhvamsābhāva, non-existence (abhāva) of a thing known as destruction, is produced is only a verbal quibble (vikalpa [2]), inasmuch as nothing specific can be predicated (viśeșa) of abhāva. Abhāva (non-existence) is indeed only the pratiyogi of bhāva. How so? Just as bhāva, though one and the same throughout, is distinguished by cloth, pot, and so on, -e.g., we speak of the existence of a cloth, the existence of a pot (ghaṭabhāvaḥ paṭabhāva), and so on,-so also, though abhava or non-existence is in itself devoid of all distinctions, yet it is spoken of as different and in association with different acts or qualities (kriyā guṇa) as though it were a substance etc. [3] Abhāva (non-existence) cannot, indeed, co-exist with attributes as the blue lotus co-exists with its attributes. If it were possessed of attributes, then it would come under the category of bhava or being [4].

———

SSSS notes:

[1] The mokșa that is abiding in Self is not an abhāva like pradhvamsābhāva.

[2] Only a verbal quibble, not an entity.

[3] See BGBh 18.45. BSBh 2.2.26

[4] The sense is the attributes are fit only for bhāva.

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.

How is reason to accept pot's absence by virtue of cloth as a positive entity? It is absurd on the face of it. That needs to be the starting point. If so, the burden of proof is on Mulavidyavada.

Sir. I have merely reproduced what BhAshyakAra said. He said that - "pot-anyonya-abhAva, being cloth, is not abhAva. It is bhAvarUpa. न च घटाभावः सन्पटः अभावात्मकः ; किं तर्हि ? भावरूप एव ।" These are the words of AchArya. Where is the question of burden of proof and where is absurdity!!

What is this "transactional through pot"? Are you saying absence is transactional," like darkness covers light?  Sankara discusses "shade" and Rahu as abhavarupa despite having affections like coolness (US 18.40). 

Again these are words of BhAshyakAra - घटेन व्यपदिश्यमानात्वात्. One uses pot-prAk-abhAva, pot-atyanya-abhAva, pot-dhvansa-abhAva in terms of pot. I am very very literal to what AchArya said. Nothing like Rahu/darkness etc.

What is imprecise, precisely? jar abhava due to anyonya abhava is only imagined, a quibble/vikalpa, as bhavarupa of clothes, Tait Intro below. I  

Let us focus on anumAna presented by AchArya in ghaTa-bhAshya. TaittirIya is talking about nirvishesha-abhAva such as horns of hare. 

In fact Michael ji, I have stated whatever I had to say in simplest possible manner. I cannot simplify it any further. If someone can refute it logically, I am all ears. But it is difficult for me to simplify any further. Whatever you quoted of SSS ji does not address the issue at hand.

The anumAna I presented based on remodelling of BhAshyakAra's anumAna proves that vishesha-abhAva such as pot-abhava is triguNAtmaka, and this is central siddhAnta of advaita. I reproduce the anumAna for the sake of completion - 

• घटान्योन्याभावः सन्पटः त्रिगुणात्मकः। (pot-anyonya-abhAva is triguNAtmaka, being cloth)
• घटस्य प्राक्प्रध्वंसात्यन्ताभावानामपि त्रिगुणात्मकत्वम् , घटेन व्यपदिश्यमानत्वात् , घटस्येतरेतराभाववत् ; (pot-atyanta-abhAva, pot-prAk-abhAva, pot-pradhvamsa-abhAva are triguNAtmaka, on account of having transactability through pot, like pot-anyonya-abhAva)
• तथैव त्रिगुणात्मकताभावानाम् । (Therefore abhAvAs have triguNAtmakatA.)

You should take clear position. Is pot-abhava triguNAtmaka? If not, then how your position is not contradicted by ghaTa-bhAshya-anumAna?

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Raghav Kumar]

Namaste Sudhanshu ji

One passage is the key 

"Again these are words of BhAshyakAra - घटेन व्यपदिश्यमानात्वात्. One uses pot-prAk-abhAva, pot-atyanya-abhAva, pot-dhvansa-abhAva in terms of pot."

This key word (vyapadishyamAnatvAt) implies,  even "horns of a hare" (atyantAbhAva) implies a notion, no doubt, but uses the terms of 'horns' and a 'hare' and so is bhAvAtmaka - this is what bhAShya is saying. We are not saying bhAva but bhAvarUpa or bhAvAtmaka.

Kindly check.

Om

Raghav 

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On Tue, 3 Sept 2024 at 8:51 pm, Sudhanshu Shekhar

<sudhans...@gmail.com> wrote:

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Raghav ji.

BhAshya is silent about nirvishesha-abhAva, which are without pratiyogI, like horns of hare, which are nihswarUpa and vastu-shUnya.

BhAshya is talking about vishesha-abhAva, which has a pratiyogI, like pot-abhAva. BhAshya proves their bhAvAtmakatA, like cloth.

So, nirvishesha-abhAva is beyond the purview of ghaTa-bhAshya.

Regards. 

[Raghav Kumar]

Thank you for pointing it out ji.

I should have written, even snake seen in a rope (atyantAbhAva) is regarded as bhAvAtmaka and people run away from it. Transactability - vyavahAra-yogyatA- is there. 

(horns of hare is nirvisheShAbhAva and is not being asserted as bhAvAtmaka, as you pointed out)

I would translate the key word ghaTena-vyapadishyamAnatvAt - the reason preferred by bhAShya - as "designated by the 'pot' "

Om

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On Tue, 3 Sept 2024 at 9:21 pm, Sudhanshu Shekhar

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Sudhanshuji, 

Please be patient I am struggling to make sense of Bhasya, of what you are saying and what SSSS intends here as well. Special thanks to Sri Kumarji for his translations and helpful comments on FB. 

I read in Bhasya (SSSS Kannada translation) something different from what you seem to be saying. My comments in <> ---  

BU 2,1,1 Bhasya: "For example, a jar’s abhāva is a cloth (or another thing), but not the jar itself (svarūpa). 

So, the cloth, an abhāva of the jar in this context, is not abhāva-rūpa (nonentity) but a positive entity (bhāva-rūpa [1]). "

SSSS Footnotes:

1. The mīmamsaka-s <why bring them into the conversation? > say, every entity is bhāva (positive) from its own svarūpa, and it is in abhāva when viewed from another object <clothes to jar are bhavarupa but not that abhavarupa-jar is bhavarupa. Clothes are bhava from its own svarupa but abhava when viewed from jar's svabhava. >. Following this school, the vyavahāra bheda of jars and clothes, of bhāva and abhāva is expounded here. Imagining bheda in abhāva is wrong, say Tai.U.Bh (9, introduction), BSBh 2.1.18 (449), BGBh 18.48 (546) - all these from pāramartha drsti. So, no contradiction here. <Bhasya's purpose here is to validate satkarya vada and how svarupa of the cause can remain intact despite apparent effects. The point is thaat the only bhava here is Brahman, all else are illusory including the vyavahara bheda 4 kinds of abhava and their relationship with bhavarupa svarupa jar - the only svarupa of jar is formless bhava clay.  I think that is what SSSS is saying.
   
   How might abhava qualify as a paramarthika bheda bhava? Is that what you are claiming? That avidya points to a bhavarupa distinction in Brahman? Please be patient, I am struggling to grasp exactly what is said here.   

You said, "BhAshyakAra - घटेन व्यपदिश्यमानात्वात्. One uses pot-prAk-abhAva, pot-atyanya-abhAva, pot-dhvansa-abhAva in terms of pot."  I don't actually follow. Are you saying prak-abhava etc are bhavas different from pot bhava?

I will share and consider on trigunatmika though it doesn't seem to be mentioned in these passages. 

Regards, mcc

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[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Raghav Ji,

Copying below from Tai Up Bh Vartika of Swami Sureswaracharya with the tIka of Sri Anandagiri Acharya. Self explanatory.

//   // कार्यप्रध्वंसतोऽन्यद्यत्तदनित्यं क्रियोत्थितेः ।

घटादिवत्प्रतिज्ञायां विशिष्टत्वाददोषता ॥ २८ ॥ //

Translation (Balasubrahmanian)  // Any effect, other than posterior non-existence, which is produced by action, like pot, etc., is impermanent; since (the effect whose impermanence is sought to be established) is qualified (as being positive), there is no defect //.

AG tIka  // यभ्दावत्वे सति कृतकं तदनित्यमित्येतदेव साधयति कार्य अनित्यमिति प्रतिज्ञायां कार्यत्वहेतोर्भावत्वेन विशिष्टत्वात्पातज्ञाहेत्वोर्व्याप्तिभङ्गदोषर्वत्ता नास्तीति फलितमाह -- प्रतिज्ञायामिति ॥ २८ ॥//.

Translation (Balasubrahmanian)  // The Advaitin argues that, if a positive something is produced, then it is impermanent. The effect whose impermanence is sought to be established by inference is thus qualified as positive. The case of pradhvamsābhāva cannot be cited as an exception to the principle, for it is abhāva and not bhāva. The inference may be stated as follows: Heaven which is said to be release is impermanent; because it is an effect which is positive; all effects which are positive are impermanent like a pot //.

// प्रध्वंसाच्छकलादि स्यात्तच्चानित्यं घटादिवत् ।

कल्पनामात्रतोऽभावो नैवाऽऽरभ्यः स कर्मभिः ॥ २९ ॥ //

Translation (Balasubrahmaanian) // By the act of destruction, the effect in the form of potsherds is produced. Like pot, etc., it is also impermanent. Abhāva which is only in imagination is not produced by action //.

AG tIka  // प्रध्वंसस्य कार्यत्वेऽपि नित्यत्वमभ्युपगम्योकं तदेवासिद्धुमित्याह—प्रध्वंसादिति । नाशक्रियातः शकलादिकार्यं जायते तच्च घटादिवदनित्यतो न ध्वंसस्तत्कार्यत्वं वाऽस्तीत्यर्थः । कस्ता भवन्मते प्रध्वंसाभावस्तत्राऽऽह---कल्पनेति । प्रध्वंसस्यास्मन्मते शशविषाणवद्विकल्पमात्रत्वानित्यत्वानित्यत्वयोरभावान्नासौ प्यभिचारभूरित्यर्थः ॥ २९ ॥//.

Translation (Balasubrahmanian)  // The Advaitin does not accept negative entities like pradhvaṁsābhāva. When a pot is destroyed, what originates is potsherds. Strictly speaking, there is no destruction or non-existence of pot. if pot does not exist in the form of pot, it exists in some other form, say, potsherds. So the Advaitin accepts neither pradhvaṁsābhāva nor its being an effect of an act. According to Advaita, what is called pradhvaṁsābhāva is, like a hare's horn, a figment of imagination, and the question of its being permanent or otherwise does not arise //.

Regards

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[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Raghav Ji,

The TUBV quote in my earlier post corresponds to the TUB portion which I had cited in another concurrent thread, copied below for ready reference.

// As per Advaita SiddhAnta, abhAva is vikalpa only. A few citations below.

TUB , Sambandha Bhashya // प्रध्वंसाभावोऽप्यारभ्यत इति न सम्भवति अभावस्य विशेषाभावाद्विकल्पमात्रमेतत् । भावप्रतियोगी ह्यभावः ।//.

Regards

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Raghav Ji,

Reg  // Can we say atyantAbhAva is the only idea accepted in Advaita? //,

Both anyOnyAbhAva as well as atyantAbhAva are accepted, but not in the same sense as in the nyAya School. In their usage in Advaita SiddhAnta, different levels of Reality are recognized. Otherwise, different terms like bheda are generally used, for example, in differentiating pot and cloth, instead of anyOnyAbhAva.

Reg  // And hence the "traikAlika-niShedha-atyantAbhAva-pratiyogitvaM" still remains a valid definition of mithyAtvaM although it employs navya nyAya //,

It may not be appropriate to say that it employs navya nyAya. Because different levels of Reality like prAtibhAsika and vyAvahArika are not admitted in navya nyAya. Whereas the explanation for the second  definition of mithyAtvaM admits of both levels of Reality. Interestingly, illustrations like shell-silver are also sought to be explained in terms of anyOnyAbhAva as well.

Regards

On Wed, Sep 4, 2024 at 5:06 PM Raghav Kumar Dwivedula <raghav...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Chandramouli ji

Thank you for the TUBV and Ananda Giri gloss references on the mere vikalpa nature of pradhavmsha and prAgabhAva as just the bhAvarUpatvaM of lump and shards of clay.

Can we say atyantAbhAva is the only idea accepted in Advaita? (This of course renders the adjective atyanta superfluous)

And hence the "traikAlika-niShedha-atyantAbhAva-pratiyogitvaM" still remains a valid definition of mithyAtvaM although it employs navya nyAya.

Om

Raghav

[Raghav Kumar]

Thank you for the response ji

Namaste

Om

Raghav

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On Thu, 5 Sept 2024 at 3:36 pm, H S Chandramouli

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